KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()
With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.] Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc)
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*/
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static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
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{
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if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
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if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)
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goto out;
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if (orig_desc)
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if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
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goto out;
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} else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
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if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)
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goto out;
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if (orig_desc)
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if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
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goto out;
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} else
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goto out;
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int prefix_len;
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if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
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prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
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else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
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prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
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else
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!new_desc[prefix_len])
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return -EINVAL;
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if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len))
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return -EINVAL;
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return 0;
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out:
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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