perf: Break deadlock involving exec_update_mutex
Syzbot reported a lock inversion involving perf. The sore point being perf holding exec_update_mutex() for a very long time, specifically across a whole bunch of filesystem ops in pmu::event_init() (uprobes) and anon_inode_getfile(). This then inverts against procfs code trying to take exec_update_mutex. Move the permission checks later, such that we need to hold the mutex over less code. Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
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@ -11832,24 +11832,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
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goto err_task;
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}
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if (task) {
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err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
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if (err)
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goto err_task;
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/*
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* Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
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*
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* We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
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* perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
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* serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
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* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
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*/
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err = -EACCES;
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if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
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goto err_cred;
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}
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if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP)
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cgroup_fd = pid;
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@ -11857,7 +11839,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
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NULL, NULL, cgroup_fd);
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if (IS_ERR(event)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(event);
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goto err_cred;
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goto err_task;
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}
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if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
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@ -11976,6 +11958,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
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goto err_context;
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}
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if (task) {
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err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
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if (err)
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goto err_file;
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/*
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* Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
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*
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* We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
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* perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
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* serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
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* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
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*/
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err = -EACCES;
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if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
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goto err_cred;
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}
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if (move_group) {
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gctx = __perf_event_ctx_lock_double(group_leader, ctx);
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@ -12151,7 +12151,10 @@ err_locked:
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if (move_group)
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perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
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mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
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/* err_file: */
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err_cred:
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if (task)
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mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
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err_file:
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fput(event_file);
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err_context:
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perf_unpin_context(ctx);
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@ -12163,9 +12166,6 @@ err_alloc:
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*/
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if (!event_file)
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free_event(event);
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err_cred:
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if (task)
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mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
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err_task:
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if (task)
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put_task_struct(task);
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