ima: remove enforce checking duplication
Based on the IMA appraisal policy, files are appraised. For those files appraised, the IMA hooks return the integrity appraisal result, assuming IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode. This patch combines both of these criteria (in policy and enforcing file integrity), removing the checking duplication. Changelog v1: - Update hook comments Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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@ -208,7 +208,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
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kfree(pathbuf);
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out:
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mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
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return (rc && must_appraise) ? -EACCES : 0;
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if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
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return -EACCES;
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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@ -219,19 +221,15 @@ out:
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* Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
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* policy decision.
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*
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* Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
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* (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
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* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
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* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
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*/
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int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
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{
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int rc = 0;
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if (!file)
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return 0;
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if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
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rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
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MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
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return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
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if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
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return process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
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MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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@ -244,18 +242,15 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
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* So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
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* what is being executed.
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*
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* Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
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* (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
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* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
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* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
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*/
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int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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{
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int rc;
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rc = process_measurement(bprm->file,
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return process_measurement(bprm->file,
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(strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
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bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
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MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
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return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
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}
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/**
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@ -265,18 +260,15 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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*
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* Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
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*
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* Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
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* (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
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* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
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* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
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*/
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int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
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{
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int rc;
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ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
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rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
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return process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
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mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
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FILE_CHECK);
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return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
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@ -286,19 +278,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
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*
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* Measure/appraise kernel modules based on policy.
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*
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* Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
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* Return code is based upon measurement appraisal.
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* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
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* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
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*/
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int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
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{
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int rc;
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if (!file)
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rc = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
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else
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rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
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MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK);
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return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
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return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
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return process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
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MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK);
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}
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static int __init init_ima(void)
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