mac80211: Remove obsolete TKIP flexibility
The TKIP implementation was originally prepared to be a bit more flexible in the way Michael MIC TX/RX keys are configured. However, we are now taking care of the TX/RX MIC key swapping in user space, so this code will not be needed. Similarly, there were some remaining WPA testing code that won't be used in their current form. Remove the unneeded extra complexity. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni.malinen@atheros.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
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@ -26,13 +26,12 @@
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ieee80211_tx_result
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ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
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{
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u8 *data, *key, *mic, key_offset;
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u8 *data, *key, *mic;
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size_t data_len;
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unsigned int hdrlen;
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struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
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struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
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struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
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int authenticator;
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int tail;
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hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
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@ -62,15 +61,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
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skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
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return TX_DROP;
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#if 0
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authenticator = fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FROMDS; /* FIX */
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#else
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authenticator = 1;
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#endif
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key_offset = authenticator ?
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NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY :
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NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY;
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key = &tx->key->conf.key[key_offset];
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key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
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mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
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michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
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@ -81,14 +72,13 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
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ieee80211_rx_result
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ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
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{
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u8 *data, *key = NULL, key_offset;
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u8 *data, *key = NULL;
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size_t data_len;
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unsigned int hdrlen;
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u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
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struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
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struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
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struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
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int authenticator = 1, wpa_test = 0;
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/* No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it */
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if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED)
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@ -106,17 +96,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
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data = skb->data + hdrlen;
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data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
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#if 0
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authenticator = fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_TODS; /* FIX */
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#else
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authenticator = 1;
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#endif
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key_offset = authenticator ?
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NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY :
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NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY;
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key = &rx->key->conf.key[key_offset];
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key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
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michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
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if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0 || wpa_test) {
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if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0) {
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if (!(status->rx_flags & IEEE80211_RX_RA_MATCH))
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return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
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@ -208,7 +190,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_result
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ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
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{
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struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
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int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0, wpa_test = 0;
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int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
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struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
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struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
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struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
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@ -235,7 +217,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
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hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->queue,
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&rx->tkip_iv32,
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&rx->tkip_iv16);
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if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK || wpa_test)
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if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
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return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
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/* Trim ICV */
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