tracing: New flag to allow non privileged users to use a trace event
This adds a new trace event internal flag that allows them to be used in perf by non privileged users in case of task bound tracing. This is desired for syscalls tracepoint because they don't leak global system informations, like some other tracepoints. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
9c0729dc80
commit
61c32659b1
|
@ -154,12 +154,14 @@ enum {
|
|||
TRACE_EVENT_FL_ENABLED_BIT,
|
||||
TRACE_EVENT_FL_FILTERED_BIT,
|
||||
TRACE_EVENT_FL_RECORDED_CMD_BIT,
|
||||
TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY_BIT,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
enum {
|
||||
TRACE_EVENT_FL_ENABLED = (1 << TRACE_EVENT_FL_ENABLED_BIT),
|
||||
TRACE_EVENT_FL_FILTERED = (1 << TRACE_EVENT_FL_FILTERED_BIT),
|
||||
TRACE_EVENT_FL_RECORDED_CMD = (1 << TRACE_EVENT_FL_RECORDED_CMD_BIT),
|
||||
TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY = (1 << TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY_BIT),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct ftrace_event_call {
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -4747,15 +4747,6 @@ static int perf_tp_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
|
|||
if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT)
|
||||
return -ENOENT;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Raw tracepoint data is a severe data leak, only allow root to
|
||||
* have these.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) &&
|
||||
perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() &&
|
||||
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
|
||||
err = perf_trace_init(event);
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -21,17 +21,46 @@ typedef typeof(unsigned long [PERF_MAX_TRACE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)])
|
|||
/* Count the events in use (per event id, not per instance) */
|
||||
static int total_ref_count;
|
||||
|
||||
static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event,
|
||||
struct perf_event *p_event)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* No tracing, just counting, so no obvious leak */
|
||||
if (!(p_event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Some events are ok to be traced by non-root users... */
|
||||
if (p_event->attach_state == PERF_ATTACH_TASK) {
|
||||
if (tp_event->flags & TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak,
|
||||
* only allow root to have these.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int perf_trace_event_init(struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event,
|
||||
struct perf_event *p_event)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct hlist_head __percpu *list;
|
||||
int ret = -ENOMEM;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
int cpu;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = perf_trace_event_perm(tp_event, p_event);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
|
||||
p_event->tp_event = tp_event;
|
||||
if (tp_event->perf_refcount++ > 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
||||
|
||||
list = alloc_percpu(struct hlist_head);
|
||||
if (!list)
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue