userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns.

Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> found a nasty little bug in
the permissions of setns.  With unprivileged user namespaces it
became possible to create new namespaces without privilege.

However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
the user nameapce of the targed namespace.

Which made the following nasty sequence possible.

pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS);
if (pid == 0) { /* child */
	system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd");
}
else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */
	char path[PATH_MAX];
	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt");
	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
	setns(fd, 0);
	system("su -");
}

Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This commit is contained in:
Eric W. Biederman 2012-12-14 07:55:36 -08:00
parent 520d9eabce
commit 5e4a08476b
5 changed files with 10 additions and 5 deletions

View File

@ -2781,7 +2781,8 @@ static int mntns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
struct path root; struct path root;
if (!ns_capable(mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || if (!ns_capable(mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT)) !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT) ||
!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM; return -EPERM;
if (fs->users != 1) if (fs->users != 1)

View File

@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ static void ipcns_put(void *ns)
static int ipcns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *new) static int ipcns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *new)
{ {
struct ipc_namespace *ns = new; struct ipc_namespace *ns = new;
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM; return -EPERM;
/* Ditch state from the old ipc namespace */ /* Ditch state from the old ipc namespace */

View File

@ -325,7 +325,8 @@ static int pidns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
struct pid_namespace *active = task_active_pid_ns(current); struct pid_namespace *active = task_active_pid_ns(current);
struct pid_namespace *ancestor, *new = ns; struct pid_namespace *ancestor, *new = ns;
if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM; return -EPERM;
/* /*

View File

@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ static int utsns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *new)
{ {
struct uts_namespace *ns = new; struct uts_namespace *ns = new;
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM; return -EPERM;
get_uts_ns(ns); get_uts_ns(ns);

View File

@ -649,7 +649,8 @@ static int netns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
{ {
struct net *net = ns; struct net *net = ns;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM; return -EPERM;
put_net(nsproxy->net_ns); put_net(nsproxy->net_ns);