[CRYPTO] aes-i586: Remove setkey
The setkey() function can be shared with the generic algorithm. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This commit is contained in:
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@ -46,9 +46,9 @@
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#define in_blk 16
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/* offsets in crypto_tfm structure */
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#define ekey (crypto_tfm_ctx_offset + 0)
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#define nrnd (crypto_tfm_ctx_offset + 256)
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#define dkey (crypto_tfm_ctx_offset + 260)
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#define klen (crypto_tfm_ctx_offset + 0)
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#define ekey (crypto_tfm_ctx_offset + 4)
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#define dkey (crypto_tfm_ctx_offset + 244)
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// register mapping for encrypt and decrypt subroutines
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@ -221,8 +221,8 @@
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.global aes_enc_blk
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.extern ft_tab
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.extern fl_tab
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.extern crypto_ft_tab
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.extern crypto_fl_tab
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.align 4
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@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ aes_enc_blk:
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1: push %ebx
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mov in_blk+4(%esp),%r2
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push %esi
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mov nrnd(%ebp),%r3 // number of rounds
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mov klen(%ebp),%r3 // key size
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push %edi
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#if ekey != 0
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lea ekey(%ebp),%ebp // key pointer
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@ -255,26 +255,26 @@ aes_enc_blk:
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sub $8,%esp // space for register saves on stack
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add $16,%ebp // increment to next round key
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cmp $12,%r3
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cmp $24,%r3
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jb 4f // 10 rounds for 128-bit key
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lea 32(%ebp),%ebp
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je 3f // 12 rounds for 192-bit key
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lea 32(%ebp),%ebp
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2: fwd_rnd1( -64(%ebp) ,ft_tab) // 14 rounds for 256-bit key
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fwd_rnd2( -48(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
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3: fwd_rnd1( -32(%ebp) ,ft_tab) // 12 rounds for 192-bit key
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fwd_rnd2( -16(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
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4: fwd_rnd1( (%ebp) ,ft_tab) // 10 rounds for 128-bit key
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fwd_rnd2( +16(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd1( +32(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd2( +48(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd1( +64(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd2( +80(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd1( +96(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd2(+112(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd1(+128(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd2(+144(%ebp) ,fl_tab) // last round uses a different table
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2: fwd_rnd1( -64(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab) // 14 rounds for 256-bit key
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fwd_rnd2( -48(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
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3: fwd_rnd1( -32(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab) // 12 rounds for 192-bit key
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fwd_rnd2( -16(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
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4: fwd_rnd1( (%ebp), crypto_ft_tab) // 10 rounds for 128-bit key
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fwd_rnd2( +16(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd1( +32(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd2( +48(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd1( +64(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd2( +80(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd1( +96(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd2(+112(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd1(+128(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
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fwd_rnd2(+144(%ebp), crypto_fl_tab) // last round uses a different table
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// move final values to the output array. CAUTION: the
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// order of these assigns rely on the register mappings
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@ -297,8 +297,8 @@ aes_enc_blk:
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.global aes_dec_blk
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.extern it_tab
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.extern il_tab
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.extern crypto_it_tab
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.extern crypto_il_tab
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.align 4
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@ -312,14 +312,11 @@ aes_dec_blk:
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1: push %ebx
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mov in_blk+4(%esp),%r2
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push %esi
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mov nrnd(%ebp),%r3 // number of rounds
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mov klen(%ebp),%r3 // key size
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push %edi
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#if dkey != 0
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lea dkey(%ebp),%ebp // key pointer
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#endif
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mov %r3,%r0
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shl $4,%r0
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add %r0,%ebp
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// input four columns and xor in first round key
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@ -333,27 +330,27 @@ aes_dec_blk:
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xor 12(%ebp),%r5
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sub $8,%esp // space for register saves on stack
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sub $16,%ebp // increment to next round key
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cmp $12,%r3
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add $16,%ebp // increment to next round key
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cmp $24,%r3
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jb 4f // 10 rounds for 128-bit key
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lea -32(%ebp),%ebp
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lea 32(%ebp),%ebp
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je 3f // 12 rounds for 192-bit key
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lea -32(%ebp),%ebp
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lea 32(%ebp),%ebp
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2: inv_rnd1( +64(%ebp), it_tab) // 14 rounds for 256-bit key
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inv_rnd2( +48(%ebp), it_tab)
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3: inv_rnd1( +32(%ebp), it_tab) // 12 rounds for 192-bit key
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inv_rnd2( +16(%ebp), it_tab)
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4: inv_rnd1( (%ebp), it_tab) // 10 rounds for 128-bit key
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inv_rnd2( -16(%ebp), it_tab)
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inv_rnd1( -32(%ebp), it_tab)
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inv_rnd2( -48(%ebp), it_tab)
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inv_rnd1( -64(%ebp), it_tab)
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inv_rnd2( -80(%ebp), it_tab)
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inv_rnd1( -96(%ebp), it_tab)
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inv_rnd2(-112(%ebp), it_tab)
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inv_rnd1(-128(%ebp), it_tab)
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inv_rnd2(-144(%ebp), il_tab) // last round uses a different table
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2: inv_rnd1( -64(%ebp), crypto_it_tab) // 14 rounds for 256-bit key
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inv_rnd2( -48(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
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3: inv_rnd1( -32(%ebp), crypto_it_tab) // 12 rounds for 192-bit key
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inv_rnd2( -16(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
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4: inv_rnd1( (%ebp), crypto_it_tab) // 10 rounds for 128-bit key
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inv_rnd2( +16(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
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inv_rnd1( +32(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
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inv_rnd2( +48(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
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inv_rnd1( +64(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
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inv_rnd2( +80(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
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inv_rnd1( +96(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
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inv_rnd2(+112(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
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inv_rnd1(+128(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
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inv_rnd2(+144(%ebp), crypto_il_tab) // last round uses a different table
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// move final values to the output array. CAUTION: the
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// order of these assigns rely on the register mappings
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@ -1,468 +1,14 @@
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/*
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*
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/*
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* Glue Code for optimized 586 assembler version of AES
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2002, Dr Brian Gladman <>, Worcester, UK.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* LICENSE TERMS
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*
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* The free distribution and use of this software in both source and binary
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* form is allowed (with or without changes) provided that:
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*
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* 1. distributions of this source code include the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer;
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*
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* 2. distributions in binary form include the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
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* in the documentation and/or other associated materials;
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*
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* 3. the copyright holder's name is not used to endorse products
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* built using this software without specific written permission.
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*
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* ALTERNATIVELY, provided that this notice is retained in full, this product
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* may be distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPL),
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* in which case the provisions of the GPL apply INSTEAD OF those given above.
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*
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* DISCLAIMER
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*
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* This software is provided 'as is' with no explicit or implied warranties
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* in respect of its properties, including, but not limited to, correctness
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* and/or fitness for purpose.
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2003, Adam J. Richter <adam@yggdrasil.com> (conversion to
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* 2.5 API).
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* Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Fruhwirth Clemens <clemens@endorphin.org>
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* Copyright (c) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
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*
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*/
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#include <asm/byteorder.h>
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#include <crypto/aes.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <linux/linkage.h>
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asmlinkage void aes_enc_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
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asmlinkage void aes_dec_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
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#define AES_KS_LENGTH 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE
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#define RC_LENGTH 29
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struct aes_ctx {
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u32 ekey[AES_KS_LENGTH];
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u32 rounds;
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u32 dkey[AES_KS_LENGTH];
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};
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#define WPOLY 0x011b
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#define bytes2word(b0, b1, b2, b3) \
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(((u32)(b3) << 24) | ((u32)(b2) << 16) | ((u32)(b1) << 8) | (b0))
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/* define the finite field multiplies required for Rijndael */
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#define f2(x) ((x) ? pow[log[x] + 0x19] : 0)
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#define f3(x) ((x) ? pow[log[x] + 0x01] : 0)
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#define f9(x) ((x) ? pow[log[x] + 0xc7] : 0)
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#define fb(x) ((x) ? pow[log[x] + 0x68] : 0)
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#define fd(x) ((x) ? pow[log[x] + 0xee] : 0)
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#define fe(x) ((x) ? pow[log[x] + 0xdf] : 0)
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#define fi(x) ((x) ? pow[255 - log[x]]: 0)
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static inline u32 upr(u32 x, int n)
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{
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return (x << 8 * n) | (x >> (32 - 8 * n));
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}
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static inline u8 bval(u32 x, int n)
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{
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return x >> 8 * n;
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}
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/* The forward and inverse affine transformations used in the S-box */
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#define fwd_affine(x) \
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(w = (u32)x, w ^= (w<<1)^(w<<2)^(w<<3)^(w<<4), 0x63^(u8)(w^(w>>8)))
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#define inv_affine(x) \
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(w = (u32)x, w = (w<<1)^(w<<3)^(w<<6), 0x05^(u8)(w^(w>>8)))
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static u32 rcon_tab[RC_LENGTH];
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u32 ft_tab[4][256];
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u32 fl_tab[4][256];
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static u32 im_tab[4][256];
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u32 il_tab[4][256];
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u32 it_tab[4][256];
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static void gen_tabs(void)
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{
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u32 i, w;
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u8 pow[512], log[256];
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/*
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* log and power tables for GF(2^8) finite field with
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* WPOLY as modular polynomial - the simplest primitive
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* root is 0x03, used here to generate the tables.
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*/
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i = 0; w = 1;
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do {
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pow[i] = (u8)w;
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pow[i + 255] = (u8)w;
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log[w] = (u8)i++;
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w ^= (w << 1) ^ (w & 0x80 ? WPOLY : 0);
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} while (w != 1);
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for(i = 0, w = 1; i < RC_LENGTH; ++i) {
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rcon_tab[i] = bytes2word(w, 0, 0, 0);
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w = f2(w);
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}
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for(i = 0; i < 256; ++i) {
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u8 b;
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b = fwd_affine(fi((u8)i));
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w = bytes2word(f2(b), b, b, f3(b));
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/* tables for a normal encryption round */
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ft_tab[0][i] = w;
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ft_tab[1][i] = upr(w, 1);
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ft_tab[2][i] = upr(w, 2);
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ft_tab[3][i] = upr(w, 3);
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w = bytes2word(b, 0, 0, 0);
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/*
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* tables for last encryption round
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* (may also be used in the key schedule)
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*/
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fl_tab[0][i] = w;
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fl_tab[1][i] = upr(w, 1);
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fl_tab[2][i] = upr(w, 2);
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fl_tab[3][i] = upr(w, 3);
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b = fi(inv_affine((u8)i));
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w = bytes2word(fe(b), f9(b), fd(b), fb(b));
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/* tables for the inverse mix column operation */
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im_tab[0][b] = w;
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im_tab[1][b] = upr(w, 1);
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im_tab[2][b] = upr(w, 2);
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im_tab[3][b] = upr(w, 3);
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/* tables for a normal decryption round */
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it_tab[0][i] = w;
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it_tab[1][i] = upr(w,1);
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it_tab[2][i] = upr(w,2);
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it_tab[3][i] = upr(w,3);
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w = bytes2word(b, 0, 0, 0);
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/* tables for last decryption round */
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il_tab[0][i] = w;
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il_tab[1][i] = upr(w,1);
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il_tab[2][i] = upr(w,2);
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il_tab[3][i] = upr(w,3);
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}
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}
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#define four_tables(x,tab,vf,rf,c) \
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( tab[0][bval(vf(x,0,c),rf(0,c))] ^ \
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tab[1][bval(vf(x,1,c),rf(1,c))] ^ \
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tab[2][bval(vf(x,2,c),rf(2,c))] ^ \
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tab[3][bval(vf(x,3,c),rf(3,c))] \
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)
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#define vf1(x,r,c) (x)
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#define rf1(r,c) (r)
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#define rf2(r,c) ((r-c)&3)
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#define inv_mcol(x) four_tables(x,im_tab,vf1,rf1,0)
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#define ls_box(x,c) four_tables(x,fl_tab,vf1,rf2,c)
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#define ff(x) inv_mcol(x)
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#define ke4(k,i) \
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{ \
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k[4*(i)+4] = ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[3],3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
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k[4*(i)+5] = ss[1] ^= ss[0]; \
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k[4*(i)+6] = ss[2] ^= ss[1]; \
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k[4*(i)+7] = ss[3] ^= ss[2]; \
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}
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#define kel4(k,i) \
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{ \
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k[4*(i)+4] = ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[3],3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
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k[4*(i)+5] = ss[1] ^= ss[0]; \
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k[4*(i)+6] = ss[2] ^= ss[1]; k[4*(i)+7] = ss[3] ^= ss[2]; \
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}
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#define ke6(k,i) \
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{ \
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k[6*(i)+ 6] = ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[5],3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
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k[6*(i)+ 7] = ss[1] ^= ss[0]; \
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k[6*(i)+ 8] = ss[2] ^= ss[1]; \
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k[6*(i)+ 9] = ss[3] ^= ss[2]; \
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k[6*(i)+10] = ss[4] ^= ss[3]; \
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k[6*(i)+11] = ss[5] ^= ss[4]; \
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}
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#define kel6(k,i) \
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{ \
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k[6*(i)+ 6] = ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[5],3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
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k[6*(i)+ 7] = ss[1] ^= ss[0]; \
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k[6*(i)+ 8] = ss[2] ^= ss[1]; \
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k[6*(i)+ 9] = ss[3] ^= ss[2]; \
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}
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#define ke8(k,i) \
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{ \
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k[8*(i)+ 8] = ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[7],3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
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k[8*(i)+ 9] = ss[1] ^= ss[0]; \
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k[8*(i)+10] = ss[2] ^= ss[1]; \
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k[8*(i)+11] = ss[3] ^= ss[2]; \
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k[8*(i)+12] = ss[4] ^= ls_box(ss[3],0); \
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k[8*(i)+13] = ss[5] ^= ss[4]; \
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k[8*(i)+14] = ss[6] ^= ss[5]; \
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k[8*(i)+15] = ss[7] ^= ss[6]; \
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}
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#define kel8(k,i) \
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{ \
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k[8*(i)+ 8] = ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[7],3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
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k[8*(i)+ 9] = ss[1] ^= ss[0]; \
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k[8*(i)+10] = ss[2] ^= ss[1]; \
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k[8*(i)+11] = ss[3] ^= ss[2]; \
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}
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#define kdf4(k,i) \
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{ \
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ss[0] = ss[0] ^ ss[2] ^ ss[1] ^ ss[3]; \
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ss[1] = ss[1] ^ ss[3]; \
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ss[2] = ss[2] ^ ss[3]; \
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ss[3] = ss[3]; \
|
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ss[4] = ls_box(ss[(i+3) % 4], 3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
|
||||
ss[i % 4] ^= ss[4]; \
|
||||
ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)]; \
|
||||
k[4*(i)+4] = ff(ss[4]); \
|
||||
ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)+1]; \
|
||||
k[4*(i)+5] = ff(ss[4]); \
|
||||
ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)+2]; \
|
||||
k[4*(i)+6] = ff(ss[4]); \
|
||||
ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)+3]; \
|
||||
k[4*(i)+7] = ff(ss[4]); \
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define kd4(k,i) \
|
||||
{ \
|
||||
ss[4] = ls_box(ss[(i+3) % 4], 3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
|
||||
ss[i % 4] ^= ss[4]; \
|
||||
ss[4] = ff(ss[4]); \
|
||||
k[4*(i)+4] = ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)]; \
|
||||
k[4*(i)+5] = ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)+1]; \
|
||||
k[4*(i)+6] = ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)+2]; \
|
||||
k[4*(i)+7] = ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)+3]; \
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define kdl4(k,i) \
|
||||
{ \
|
||||
ss[4] = ls_box(ss[(i+3) % 4], 3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
|
||||
ss[i % 4] ^= ss[4]; \
|
||||
k[4*(i)+4] = (ss[0] ^= ss[1]) ^ ss[2] ^ ss[3]; \
|
||||
k[4*(i)+5] = ss[1] ^ ss[3]; \
|
||||
k[4*(i)+6] = ss[0]; \
|
||||
k[4*(i)+7] = ss[1]; \
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define kdf6(k,i) \
|
||||
{ \
|
||||
ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[5],3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+ 6] = ff(ss[0]); \
|
||||
ss[1] ^= ss[0]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+ 7] = ff(ss[1]); \
|
||||
ss[2] ^= ss[1]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+ 8] = ff(ss[2]); \
|
||||
ss[3] ^= ss[2]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+ 9] = ff(ss[3]); \
|
||||
ss[4] ^= ss[3]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+10] = ff(ss[4]); \
|
||||
ss[5] ^= ss[4]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+11] = ff(ss[5]); \
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define kd6(k,i) \
|
||||
{ \
|
||||
ss[6] = ls_box(ss[5],3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
|
||||
ss[0] ^= ss[6]; ss[6] = ff(ss[6]); \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+ 6] = ss[6] ^= k[6*(i)]; \
|
||||
ss[1] ^= ss[0]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+ 7] = ss[6] ^= k[6*(i)+ 1]; \
|
||||
ss[2] ^= ss[1]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+ 8] = ss[6] ^= k[6*(i)+ 2]; \
|
||||
ss[3] ^= ss[2]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+ 9] = ss[6] ^= k[6*(i)+ 3]; \
|
||||
ss[4] ^= ss[3]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+10] = ss[6] ^= k[6*(i)+ 4]; \
|
||||
ss[5] ^= ss[4]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+11] = ss[6] ^= k[6*(i)+ 5]; \
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define kdl6(k,i) \
|
||||
{ \
|
||||
ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[5],3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+ 6] = ss[0]; \
|
||||
ss[1] ^= ss[0]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+ 7] = ss[1]; \
|
||||
ss[2] ^= ss[1]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+ 8] = ss[2]; \
|
||||
ss[3] ^= ss[2]; \
|
||||
k[6*(i)+ 9] = ss[3]; \
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define kdf8(k,i) \
|
||||
{ \
|
||||
ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[7],3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+ 8] = ff(ss[0]); \
|
||||
ss[1] ^= ss[0]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+ 9] = ff(ss[1]); \
|
||||
ss[2] ^= ss[1]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+10] = ff(ss[2]); \
|
||||
ss[3] ^= ss[2]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+11] = ff(ss[3]); \
|
||||
ss[4] ^= ls_box(ss[3],0); \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+12] = ff(ss[4]); \
|
||||
ss[5] ^= ss[4]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+13] = ff(ss[5]); \
|
||||
ss[6] ^= ss[5]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+14] = ff(ss[6]); \
|
||||
ss[7] ^= ss[6]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+15] = ff(ss[7]); \
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define kd8(k,i) \
|
||||
{ \
|
||||
u32 __g = ls_box(ss[7],3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
|
||||
ss[0] ^= __g; \
|
||||
__g = ff(__g); \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+ 8] = __g ^= k[8*(i)]; \
|
||||
ss[1] ^= ss[0]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+ 9] = __g ^= k[8*(i)+ 1]; \
|
||||
ss[2] ^= ss[1]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+10] = __g ^= k[8*(i)+ 2]; \
|
||||
ss[3] ^= ss[2]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+11] = __g ^= k[8*(i)+ 3]; \
|
||||
__g = ls_box(ss[3],0); \
|
||||
ss[4] ^= __g; \
|
||||
__g = ff(__g); \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+12] = __g ^= k[8*(i)+ 4]; \
|
||||
ss[5] ^= ss[4]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+13] = __g ^= k[8*(i)+ 5]; \
|
||||
ss[6] ^= ss[5]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+14] = __g ^= k[8*(i)+ 6]; \
|
||||
ss[7] ^= ss[6]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+15] = __g ^= k[8*(i)+ 7]; \
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define kdl8(k,i) \
|
||||
{ \
|
||||
ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[7],3) ^ rcon_tab[i]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+ 8] = ss[0]; \
|
||||
ss[1] ^= ss[0]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+ 9] = ss[1]; \
|
||||
ss[2] ^= ss[1]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+10] = ss[2]; \
|
||||
ss[3] ^= ss[2]; \
|
||||
k[8*(i)+11] = ss[3]; \
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
|
||||
unsigned int key_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
u32 ss[8];
|
||||
struct aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
||||
const __le32 *key = (const __le32 *)in_key;
|
||||
u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
|
||||
|
||||
/* encryption schedule */
|
||||
|
||||
ctx->ekey[0] = ss[0] = le32_to_cpu(key[0]);
|
||||
ctx->ekey[1] = ss[1] = le32_to_cpu(key[1]);
|
||||
ctx->ekey[2] = ss[2] = le32_to_cpu(key[2]);
|
||||
ctx->ekey[3] = ss[3] = le32_to_cpu(key[3]);
|
||||
|
||||
switch(key_len) {
|
||||
case 16:
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 9; i++)
|
||||
ke4(ctx->ekey, i);
|
||||
kel4(ctx->ekey, 9);
|
||||
ctx->rounds = 10;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case 24:
|
||||
ctx->ekey[4] = ss[4] = le32_to_cpu(key[4]);
|
||||
ctx->ekey[5] = ss[5] = le32_to_cpu(key[5]);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
|
||||
ke6(ctx->ekey, i);
|
||||
kel6(ctx->ekey, 7);
|
||||
ctx->rounds = 12;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case 32:
|
||||
ctx->ekey[4] = ss[4] = le32_to_cpu(key[4]);
|
||||
ctx->ekey[5] = ss[5] = le32_to_cpu(key[5]);
|
||||
ctx->ekey[6] = ss[6] = le32_to_cpu(key[6]);
|
||||
ctx->ekey[7] = ss[7] = le32_to_cpu(key[7]);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
|
||||
ke8(ctx->ekey, i);
|
||||
kel8(ctx->ekey, 6);
|
||||
ctx->rounds = 14;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* decryption schedule */
|
||||
|
||||
ctx->dkey[0] = ss[0] = le32_to_cpu(key[0]);
|
||||
ctx->dkey[1] = ss[1] = le32_to_cpu(key[1]);
|
||||
ctx->dkey[2] = ss[2] = le32_to_cpu(key[2]);
|
||||
ctx->dkey[3] = ss[3] = le32_to_cpu(key[3]);
|
||||
|
||||
switch (key_len) {
|
||||
case 16:
|
||||
kdf4(ctx->dkey, 0);
|
||||
for (i = 1; i < 9; i++)
|
||||
kd4(ctx->dkey, i);
|
||||
kdl4(ctx->dkey, 9);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case 24:
|
||||
ctx->dkey[4] = ff(ss[4] = le32_to_cpu(key[4]));
|
||||
ctx->dkey[5] = ff(ss[5] = le32_to_cpu(key[5]));
|
||||
kdf6(ctx->dkey, 0);
|
||||
for (i = 1; i < 7; i++)
|
||||
kd6(ctx->dkey, i);
|
||||
kdl6(ctx->dkey, 7);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case 32:
|
||||
ctx->dkey[4] = ff(ss[4] = le32_to_cpu(key[4]));
|
||||
ctx->dkey[5] = ff(ss[5] = le32_to_cpu(key[5]));
|
||||
ctx->dkey[6] = ff(ss[6] = le32_to_cpu(key[6]));
|
||||
ctx->dkey[7] = ff(ss[7] = le32_to_cpu(key[7]));
|
||||
kdf8(ctx->dkey, 0);
|
||||
for (i = 1; i < 6; i++)
|
||||
kd8(ctx->dkey, i);
|
||||
kdl8(ctx->dkey, 6);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
|
||||
{
|
||||
aes_enc_blk(tfm, dst, src);
|
||||
|
@ -479,14 +25,14 @@ static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = {
|
|||
.cra_priority = 200,
|
||||
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
|
||||
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
||||
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_ctx),
|
||||
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx),
|
||||
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
||||
.cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(aes_alg.cra_list),
|
||||
.cra_u = {
|
||||
.cipher = {
|
||||
.cia_min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
|
||||
.cia_max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
|
||||
.cia_setkey = aes_set_key,
|
||||
.cia_setkey = crypto_aes_set_key,
|
||||
.cia_encrypt = aes_encrypt,
|
||||
.cia_decrypt = aes_decrypt
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -495,7 +41,6 @@ static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = {
|
|||
|
||||
static int __init aes_init(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
gen_tabs();
|
||||
return crypto_register_alg(&aes_alg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ config CRYPTO_AES_586
|
|||
tristate "AES cipher algorithms (i586)"
|
||||
depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && !64BIT
|
||||
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
||||
select CRYPTO_AES
|
||||
help
|
||||
AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). AES uses the Rijndael
|
||||
algorithm.
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue