Bluetooth: Introduce trusted flag for management control sockets

Providing a global trusted flag for management control sockets provides
an easy way for identifying sockets and imposing restriction on it. For
now all management sockets are trusted since they require CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
This commit is contained in:
Marcel Holtmann 2015-03-14 19:27:58 -07:00 committed by Johan Hedberg
parent 96f1474af0
commit 50ebc055fa
2 changed files with 12 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ enum {
/* HCI socket flags */
enum {
HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED,
HCI_MGMT_INDEX_EVENTS,
HCI_MGMT_UNCONF_INDEX_EVENTS,
HCI_MGMT_EXT_INDEX_EVENTS,

View File

@ -796,6 +796,11 @@ static int hci_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
goto done;
}
/* The monitor interface is restricted to CAP_NET_RAW
* capabilities and with that implicitly trusted.
*/
hci_sock_set_flag(sk, HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED);
send_monitor_replay(sk);
atomic_inc(&monitor_promisc);
@ -817,6 +822,12 @@ static int hci_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
goto done;
}
/* Since the access to control channels is currently
* restricted to CAP_NET_ADMIN capabilities, every
* socket is implicitly trusted.
*/
hci_sock_set_flag(sk, HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED);
/* At the moment the index and unconfigured index events
* are enabled unconditionally. Setting them on each
* socket when binding keeps this functionality. They