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vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash 

Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be
available.  Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case
resulting in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being printed.  This
makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult.  We can relax the
requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging.
This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel
behaviour the same.

If new command line option debug_boot_weak_hash is enabled use
cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.

Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
This commit is contained in:
Tobin C. Harding 2018-06-22 09:15:34 +10:00 committed by Theodore Ts'o
parent 1c4facb846
commit 3672476eda
2 changed files with 25 additions and 0 deletions
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8
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
View File

@ -748,6 +748,14 @@
debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level). debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).
debug_boot_weak_hash
[KNL] Enable printing [hashed] pointers early in the
boot sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead
of siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you are
seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)') and need to see a
value (hashed pointer) instead. Cryptographically
insecure, please do not use on production kernels.
debug_locks_verbose= debug_locks_verbose=
[KNL] verbose self-tests [KNL] verbose self-tests
Format=<0|1> Format=<0|1>

17
lib/vsprintf.c
View File

@ -1651,6 +1651,17 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec); return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
} }
/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */
static int debug_boot_weak_hash __ro_after_init;
static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable(char *str)
{
debug_boot_weak_hash = 1;
pr_info("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n");
return 0;
}
early_param("debug_boot_weak_hash", debug_boot_weak_hash_enable);
static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(not_filled_random_ptr_key); static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(not_filled_random_ptr_key);
static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly; static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
@ -1703,6 +1714,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)
const char *str = sizeof(ptr) == 8 ? "(____ptrval____)" : "(ptrval)"; const char *str = sizeof(ptr) == 8 ? "(____ptrval____)" : "(ptrval)";
unsigned long hashval; unsigned long hashval;
/* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash. */
if (unlikely(debug_boot_weak_hash)) {
hashval = hash_long((unsigned long)ptr, 32);
return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
}
if (static_branch_unlikely(&not_filled_random_ptr_key)) { if (static_branch_unlikely(&not_filled_random_ptr_key)) {
spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr); spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
/* string length must be less than default_width */ /* string length must be less than default_width */