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linux-sg2042
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Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 

Pull key subsystem fixes from James Morris:
 "Here are a bunch of fixes for Linux keyrings, including:

   - Fix up the refcount handling now that key structs use the
     refcount_t type and the refcount_t ops don't allow a 0->1
     transition.

   - Fix a potential NULL deref after error in x509_cert_parse().

   - Don't put data for the crypto algorithms to use on the stack.

   - Fix the handling of a null payload being passed to add_key().

   - Fix incorrect cleanup an uninitialised key_preparsed_payload in
     key_update().

   - Explicit sanitisation of potentially secure data before freeing.

   - Fixes for the Diffie-Helman code"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
  KEYS: fix refcount_inc() on zero
  KEYS: Convert KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE to use the crypto KPP API
  crypto : asymmetric_keys : verify_pefile:zero memory content before freeing
  KEYS: DH: add __user annotations to keyctl_kdf_params
  KEYS: DH: ensure the KDF counter is properly aligned
  KEYS: DH: don't feed uninitialized "otherinfo" into KDF
  KEYS: DH: forbid using digest_null as the KDF hash
  KEYS: sanitize key structs before freeing
  KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material
  KEYS: encrypted: sanitize all key material
  KEYS: user_defined: sanitize key payloads
  KEYS: sanitize add_key() and keyctl() key payloads
  KEYS: fix freeing uninitialized memory in key_update()
  KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length
  KEYS: encrypted: use constant-time HMAC comparison
  KEYS: encrypted: fix race causing incorrect HMAC calculations
  KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()
  KEYS: encrypted: avoid encrypting/decrypting stack buffers
  KEYS: put keyring if install_session_keyring_to_cred() fails
  KEYS: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in get_derived_key()
  ...
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2017-06-11 16:17:29 -07:00
parent 6d53cefb18 92347cfd62
commit 32627645e9
19 changed files with 337 additions and 337 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
arch/arm64/Kconfig
View File

@ -1084,10 +1084,6 @@ config SYSVIPC_COMPAT
def_bool y
depends on COMPAT && SYSVIPC
config KEYS_COMPAT
def_bool y
depends on COMPAT && KEYS
endmenu
menu "Power management options"

5
arch/powerpc/Kconfig
View File

@ -1199,11 +1199,6 @@ source "arch/powerpc/Kconfig.debug"
source "security/Kconfig"
config KEYS_COMPAT
bool
depends on COMPAT && KEYS
default y
source "crypto/Kconfig"
config PPC_LIB_RHEAP

3
arch/s390/Kconfig
View File

@ -363,9 +363,6 @@ config COMPAT
config SYSVIPC_COMPAT
def_bool y if COMPAT && SYSVIPC
config KEYS_COMPAT
def_bool y if COMPAT && KEYS
config SMP
def_bool y
prompt "Symmetric multi-processing support"

3
arch/sparc/Kconfig
View File

@ -577,9 +577,6 @@ config SYSVIPC_COMPAT
depends on COMPAT && SYSVIPC
default y
config KEYS_COMPAT
def_bool y if COMPAT && KEYS
endmenu
source "net/Kconfig"

4
arch/x86/Kconfig
View File

@ -2776,10 +2776,6 @@ config COMPAT_FOR_U64_ALIGNMENT
config SYSVIPC_COMPAT
def_bool y
depends on SYSVIPC
config KEYS_COMPAT
def_bool y
depends on KEYS
endif
endmenu

4
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
View File

@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
}
error:
kfree(desc);
kzfree(desc);
error_no_desc:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
@ -450,6 +450,6 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
error:
kfree(ctx.digest);
kzfree(ctx.digest);
return ret;
}

1
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
View File

@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
}
}
ret = -ENOMEM;
cert->pub->key = kmemdup(ctx->key, ctx->key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert->pub->key)
goto error_decode;

1
include/linux/key.h
View File

@ -173,7 +173,6 @@ struct key {
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
unsigned magic;
#define KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC 0x18273645u
#define KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X 0xf8e9dacbu
#endif
unsigned long flags; /* status flags (change with bitops) */

4
include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
View File

@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ struct keyctl_dh_params {
};
struct keyctl_kdf_params {
char *hashname;
char *otherinfo;
char __user *hashname;
char __user *otherinfo;
__u32 otherinfolen;
__u32 __spare[8];
};

6
security/keys/Kconfig
View File

@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ config KEYS
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
config KEYS_COMPAT
def_bool y
depends on COMPAT && KEYS
config PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
bool "Enable register of persistent per-UID keyrings"
depends on KEYS
@ -89,9 +93,9 @@ config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
depends on KEYS
select MPILIB
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRYPTO_DH
help
This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman
public keys and shared secrets using values stored as keys

312
security/keys/dh.c
View File

@ -8,34 +8,17 @@
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
#include <linux/mpi.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/kpp.h>
#include <crypto/dh.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include "internal.h"
/*
* Public key or shared secret generation function [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
*
* ya = g^xa mod p;
* or
* ZZ = yb^xa mod p;
*
* where xa is the local private key, ya is the local public key, g is
* the generator, p is the prime, yb is the remote public key, and ZZ
* is the shared secret.
*
* Both are the same calculation, so g or yb are the "base" and ya or
* ZZ are the "result".
*/
static int do_dh(MPI result, MPI base, MPI xa, MPI p)
{
return mpi_powm(result, base, xa, p);
}
static ssize_t mpi_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, size_t maxlen, MPI *mpi)
static ssize_t dh_data_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, void **data)
{
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
@ -56,19 +39,17 @@ static ssize_t mpi_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, size_t maxlen, MPI *mpi)
status = key_validate(key);
if (status == 0) {
const struct user_key_payload *payload;
uint8_t *duplicate;
payload = user_key_payload_locked(key);
if (maxlen == 0) {
*mpi = NULL;
duplicate = kmemdup(payload->data, payload->datalen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (duplicate) {
*data = duplicate;
ret = payload->datalen;
} else if (payload->datalen <= maxlen) {
*mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(payload->data,
payload->datalen);
if (*mpi)
ret = payload->datalen;
} else {
ret = -EINVAL;
ret = -ENOMEM;
}
}
up_read(&key->sem);
@ -79,6 +60,29 @@ error:
return ret;
}
static void dh_free_data(struct dh *dh)
{
kzfree(dh->key);
kzfree(dh->p);
kzfree(dh->g);
}
struct dh_completion {
struct completion completion;
int err;
};
static void dh_crypto_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
{
struct dh_completion *compl = req->data;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
return;
compl->err = err;
complete(&compl->completion);
}
struct kdf_sdesc {
struct shash_desc shash;
char ctx[];
@ -89,6 +93,7 @@ static int kdf_alloc(struct kdf_sdesc **sdesc_ret, char *hashname)
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc;
int size;
int err;
/* allocate synchronous hash */
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hashname, 0, 0);
@ -97,16 +102,25 @@ static int kdf_alloc(struct kdf_sdesc **sdesc_ret, char *hashname)
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm) == 0)
goto out_free_tfm;
err = -ENOMEM;
size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm);
sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sdesc)
return -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_tfm;
sdesc->shash.tfm = tfm;
sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0;
*sdesc_ret = sdesc;
return 0;
out_free_tfm:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
return err;
}
static void kdf_dealloc(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc)
@ -120,14 +134,6 @@ static void kdf_dealloc(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc)
kzfree(sdesc);
}
/* convert 32 bit integer into its string representation */
static inline void crypto_kw_cpu_to_be32(u32 val, u8 *buf)
{
__be32 *a = (__be32 *)buf;
*a = cpu_to_be32(val);
}
/*
* Implementation of the KDF in counter mode according to SP800-108 section 5.1
* as well as SP800-56A section 5.8.1 (Single-step KDF).
@ -138,25 +144,39 @@ static inline void crypto_kw_cpu_to_be32(u32 val, u8 *buf)
* 5.8.1.2).
*/
static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen)
u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen, unsigned int zlen)
{
struct shash_desc *desc = &sdesc->shash;
unsigned int h = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
int err = 0;
u8 *dst_orig = dst;
u32 i = 1;
u8 iteration[sizeof(u32)];
__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
while (dlen) {
err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (err)
goto err;
crypto_kw_cpu_to_be32(i, iteration);
err = crypto_shash_update(desc, iteration, sizeof(u32));
err = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&counter, sizeof(__be32));
if (err)
goto err;
if (zlen && h) {
u8 tmpbuffer[h];
size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, h);
memset(tmpbuffer, 0, chunk);
do {
err = crypto_shash_update(desc, tmpbuffer,
chunk);
if (err)
goto err;
zlen -= chunk;
chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, h);
} while (zlen);
}
if (src && slen) {
err = crypto_shash_update(desc, src, slen);
if (err)
@ -179,7 +199,7 @@ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
dlen -= h;
dst += h;
i++;
counter = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(counter) + 1);
}
}
@ -192,7 +212,7 @@ err:
static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen)
uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen, size_t lzero)
{
uint8_t *outbuf = NULL;
int ret;
@ -203,7 +223,7 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc,
goto err;
}
ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, buflen);
ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, buflen, lzero);
if (ret)
goto err;
@ -221,21 +241,26 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
struct keyctl_kdf_params *kdfcopy)
{
long ret;
MPI base, private, prime, result;
unsigned nbytes;
ssize_t dlen;
int secretlen;
int outlen;
struct keyctl_dh_params pcopy;
uint8_t *kbuf;
ssize_t keylen;
size_t resultlen;
struct dh dh_inputs;
struct scatterlist outsg;
struct dh_completion compl;
struct crypto_kpp *tfm;
struct kpp_request *req;
uint8_t *secret;
uint8_t *outbuf;
struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc = NULL;
if (!params || (!buffer && buflen)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
goto out1;
}
if (copy_from_user(&pcopy, params, sizeof(pcopy)) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
goto out1;
}
if (kdfcopy) {
@ -244,104 +269,147 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
if (buflen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN ||
kdfcopy->otherinfolen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OI_LEN) {
ret = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
goto out1;
}
/* get KDF name string */
hashname = strndup_user(kdfcopy->hashname, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
if (IS_ERR(hashname)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(hashname);
goto out;
goto out1;
}
/* allocate KDF from the kernel crypto API */
ret = kdf_alloc(&sdesc, hashname);
kfree(hashname);
if (ret)
goto out;
goto out1;
}
/*
* If the caller requests postprocessing with a KDF, allow an
* arbitrary output buffer size since the KDF ensures proper truncation.
*/
keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, kdfcopy ? SIZE_MAX : buflen, &prime);
if (keylen < 0 || !prime) {
/* buflen == 0 may be used to query the required buffer size,
* which is the prime key length.
*/
ret = keylen;
goto out;
memset(&dh_inputs, 0, sizeof(dh_inputs));
dlen = dh_data_from_key(pcopy.prime, &dh_inputs.p);
if (dlen < 0) {
ret = dlen;
goto out1;
}
dh_inputs.p_size = dlen;
/* The result is never longer than the prime */
resultlen = keylen;
keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.base, SIZE_MAX, &base);
if (keylen < 0 || !base) {
ret = keylen;
goto error1;
dlen = dh_data_from_key(pcopy.base, &dh_inputs.g);
if (dlen < 0) {
ret = dlen;
goto out2;
}
dh_inputs.g_size = dlen;
keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.private, SIZE_MAX, &private);
if (keylen < 0 || !private) {
ret = keylen;
goto error2;
dlen = dh_data_from_key(pcopy.private, &dh_inputs.key);
if (dlen < 0) {
ret = dlen;
goto out2;
}
dh_inputs.key_size = dlen;
result = mpi_alloc(0);
if (!result) {
secretlen = crypto_dh_key_len(&dh_inputs);
secret = kmalloc(secretlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!secret) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error3;
goto out2;
}
/* allocate space for DH shared secret and SP800-56A otherinfo */
kbuf = kmalloc(kdfcopy ? (resultlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen) : resultlen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kbuf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error4;
}
/*
* Concatenate SP800-56A otherinfo past DH shared secret -- the
* input to the KDF is (DH shared secret || otherinfo)
*/
if (kdfcopy && kdfcopy->otherinfo &&
copy_from_user(kbuf + resultlen, kdfcopy->otherinfo,
kdfcopy->otherinfolen) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto error5;
}
ret = do_dh(result, base, private, prime);
ret = crypto_dh_encode_key(secret, secretlen, &dh_inputs);
if (ret)
goto error5;
goto out3;
ret = mpi_read_buffer(result, kbuf, resultlen, &nbytes, NULL);
if (ret != 0)
goto error5;
tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp("dh", CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
goto out3;
}
ret = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, secret, secretlen);
if (ret)
goto out4;
outlen = crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm);
if (!kdfcopy) {
/*
* When not using a KDF, buflen 0 is used to read the
* required buffer length
*/
if (buflen == 0) {
ret = outlen;
goto out4;
} else if (outlen > buflen) {
ret = -EOVERFLOW;
goto out4;
}
}
outbuf = kzalloc(kdfcopy ? (outlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen) : outlen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!outbuf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out4;
}
sg_init_one(&outsg, outbuf, outlen);
req = kpp_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out5;
}
kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
kpp_request_set_output(req, &outsg, outlen);
init_completion(&compl.completion);
kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
dh_crypto_done, &compl);
/*
* For DH, generate_public_key and generate_shared_secret are
* the same calculation
*/
ret = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
wait_for_completion(&compl.completion);
ret = compl.err;
if (ret)
goto out6;
}
if (kdfcopy) {
ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(sdesc, buffer, buflen, kbuf,
resultlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen);
} else {
ret = nbytes;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
/*
* Concatenate SP800-56A otherinfo past DH shared secret -- the
* input to the KDF is (DH shared secret || otherinfo)
*/
if (copy_from_user(outbuf + req->dst_len, kdfcopy->otherinfo,
kdfcopy->otherinfolen) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out6;
}
ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(sdesc, buffer, buflen, outbuf,
req->dst_len + kdfcopy->otherinfolen,
outlen - req->dst_len);
} else if (copy_to_user(buffer, outbuf, req->dst_len) == 0) {
ret = req->dst_len;
} else {
ret = -EFAULT;
}
error5:
kzfree(kbuf);
error4:
mpi_free(result);
error3:
mpi_free(private);
error2:
mpi_free(base);
error1:
mpi_free(prime);
out:
out6:
kpp_request_free(req);
out5:
kzfree(outbuf);
out4:
crypto_free_kpp(tfm);
out3:
kzfree(secret);
out2:
dh_free_data(&dh_inputs);
out1:
kdf_dealloc(sdesc);
return ret;
}

206
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
View File

@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
@ -54,13 +55,7 @@ static int blksize;
#define MAX_DATA_SIZE 4096
#define MIN_DATA_SIZE 20
struct sdesc {
struct shash_desc shash;
char ctx[];
};
static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
static struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
enum {
Opt_err = -1, Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update
@ -141,23 +136,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc)
*/
static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
{
if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)
goto out;
if (orig_desc)
if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
goto out;
} else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)
goto out;
if (orig_desc)
if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
goto out;
} else
goto out;
int prefix_len;
if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
else
return -EINVAL;
if (!new_desc[prefix_len])
return -EINVAL;
if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
out:
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
@ -321,53 +315,38 @@ error:
return ukey;
}
static struct sdesc *alloc_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg)
static int calc_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, u8 *digest,
const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
{
struct sdesc *sdesc;
int size;
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
int err;
size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg);
sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sdesc)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
sdesc->shash.tfm = alg;
sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0;
return sdesc;
desc->tfm = tfm;
desc->flags = 0;
err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, buf, buflen, digest);
shash_desc_zero(desc);
return err;
}
static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
{
struct sdesc *sdesc;
int ret;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
int err;
sdesc = alloc_sdesc(hmacalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s transform: %ld\n",
hmac_alg, PTR_ERR(tfm));
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen);
if (!ret)
ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, buf, buflen, digest);
kfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
static int calc_hash(u8 *digest, const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
{
struct sdesc *sdesc;
int ret;
sdesc = alloc_sdesc(hashalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
}
ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, buf, buflen, digest);
kfree(sdesc);
return ret;
err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
if (!err)
err = calc_hash(tfm, digest, buf, buflen);
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
return err;
}
enum derived_key_type { ENC_KEY, AUTH_KEY };
@ -385,10 +364,9 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
derived_buf_len = HASH_SIZE;
derived_buf = kzalloc(derived_buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!derived_buf) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: out of memory\n");
if (!derived_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (key_type)
strcpy(derived_buf, "AUTH_KEY");
else
@ -396,8 +374,8 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key,
master_keylen);
ret = calc_hash(derived_key, derived_buf, derived_buf_len);
kfree(derived_buf);
ret = calc_hash(hash_tfm, derived_key, derived_buf, derived_buf_len);
kzfree(derived_buf);
return ret;
}
@ -480,12 +458,9 @@ static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
struct skcipher_request *req;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned int padlen;
char pad[16];
int ret;
encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
padlen = encrypted_datalen - epayload->decrypted_datalen;
req = init_skcipher_req(derived_key, derived_keylen);
ret = PTR_ERR(req);
@ -493,11 +468,10 @@ static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
goto out;
dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad);
sg_init_table(sg_in, 2);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
epayload->decrypted_datalen);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[1], pad, padlen);
sg_set_page(&sg_in[1], ZERO_PAGE(0), AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
sg_set_buf(sg_out, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
@ -533,6 +507,7 @@ static int datablob_hmac_append(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
if (!ret)
dump_hmac(NULL, digest, HASH_SIZE);
out:
memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
return ret;
}
@ -561,8 +536,8 @@ static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key, p, len);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = memcmp(digest, epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len,
sizeof digest);
ret = crypto_memneq(digest, epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len,
sizeof(digest));
if (ret) {
ret = -EINVAL;
dump_hmac("datablob",
@ -571,6 +546,7 @@ static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
dump_hmac("calc", digest, HASH_SIZE);
}
out:
memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
return ret;
}
@ -584,9 +560,14 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
struct skcipher_request *req;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
char pad[16];
u8 *pad;
int ret;
/* Throwaway buffer to hold the unused zero padding at the end */
pad = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pad)
return -ENOMEM;
encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
req = init_skcipher_req(derived_key, derived_keylen);
ret = PTR_ERR(req);
@ -594,13 +575,12 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
goto out;
dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen);
memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad);
sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
sg_init_table(sg_out, 2);
sg_set_buf(sg_in, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
epayload->decrypted_datalen);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, sizeof pad);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
memcpy(iv, epayload->iv, sizeof(iv));
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, encrypted_datalen, iv);
@ -612,6 +592,7 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
goto out;
dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
out:
kfree(pad);
return ret;
}
@ -722,6 +703,7 @@ static int encrypted_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
out:
up_read(&mkey->sem);
key_put(mkey);
memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
return ret;
}
@ -828,13 +810,13 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
ret = encrypted_init(epayload, key->description, format, master_desc,
decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv);
if (ret < 0) {
kfree(epayload);
kzfree(epayload);
goto out;
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, epayload);
out:
kfree(datablob);
kzfree(datablob);
return ret;
}
@ -843,8 +825,7 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
epayload = container_of(rcu, struct encrypted_key_payload, rcu);
memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
kfree(epayload);
kzfree(epayload);
}
/*
@ -902,7 +883,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_epayload);
call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free);
out:
kfree(buf);
kzfree(buf);
return ret;
}
@ -960,33 +941,26 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
up_read(&mkey->sem);
key_put(mkey);
memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
kfree(ascii_buf);
kzfree(ascii_buf);
return asciiblob_len;
out:
up_read(&mkey->sem);
key_put(mkey);
memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
return ret;
}
/*
* encrypted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
*
* Before freeing the key, clear the memory containing the decrypted
* key data.
* encrypted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
*/
static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data[0];
if (!epayload)
return;
memzero_explicit(epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
kfree(key->payload.data[0]);
kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
}
struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
@ -999,47 +973,17 @@ struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_encrypted);
static void encrypted_shash_release(void)
{
if (hashalg)
crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
if (hmacalg)
crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
}
static int __init encrypted_shash_alloc(void)
{
int ret;
hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
hmac_alg);
return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
}
hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
hash_alg);
ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
goto hashalg_fail;
}
return 0;
hashalg_fail:
crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
return ret;
}
static int __init init_encrypted(void)
{
int ret;
ret = encrypted_shash_alloc();
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: can't allocate %s transform: %ld\n",
hash_alg, PTR_ERR(hash_tfm));
return PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
}
ret = aes_get_sizes();
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
@ -1048,14 +992,14 @@ static int __init init_encrypted(void)
goto out;
return 0;
out:
encrypted_shash_release();
crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
return ret;
}
static void __exit cleanup_encrypted(void)
{
encrypted_shash_release();
crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
unregister_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
}

4
security/keys/gc.c
View File

@ -158,9 +158,7 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
kfree(key->description);
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X;
#endif
memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(*key));
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
}
}

16
security/keys/key.c
View File

@ -660,14 +660,11 @@ not_found:
goto error;
found:
/* pretend it doesn't exist if it is awaiting deletion */
if (refcount_read(&key->usage) == 0)
goto not_found;
/* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
* doesn't actually change the key
/* A key is allowed to be looked up only if someone still owns a
* reference to it - otherwise it's awaiting the gc.
*/
__key_get(key);
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&key->usage))
goto not_found;
error:
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
@ -966,12 +963,11 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
/* the key must be writable */
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
/* attempt to update it if supported */
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!key->type->update)
goto error;
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
prep.data = payload;

16
security/keys/keyctl.c
View File

@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
if (_payload) {
if (plen) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)
@ -132,7 +132,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
error3:
kvfree(payload);
if (payload) {
memzero_explicit(payload, plen);
kvfree(payload);
}
error2:
kfree(description);
error:
@ -324,7 +327,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
if (_payload) {
if (plen) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)
@ -347,7 +350,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
key_ref_put(key_ref);
error2:
kfree(payload);
kzfree(payload);
error:
return ret;
}
@ -1093,7 +1096,10 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
error2:
kvfree(payload);
if (payload) {
memzero_explicit(payload, plen);
kvfree(payload);
}
error:
return ret;
}

12
security/keys/keyring.c
View File

@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ descend_to_keyring:
* Non-keyrings avoid the leftmost branch of the root entirely (root
* slots 1-15).
*/
ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(keyring->keys.root);
ptr = READ_ONCE(keyring->keys.root);
if (!ptr)
goto not_this_keyring;
@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ descend_to_keyring:
if ((shortcut->index_key[0] & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) != 0)
goto not_this_keyring;
ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
goto begin_node;
}
@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ descend_to_node:
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
smp_read_barrier_depends();
ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr));
}
node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ begin_node:
ascend_to_node:
/* Go through the slots in a node */
for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
ptr = READ_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr) && node->back_pointer)
goto descend_to_node;
@ -790,13 +790,13 @@ ascend_to_node:
/* We've dealt with all the slots in the current node, so now we need
* to ascend to the parent and continue processing there.
*/
ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->back_pointer);
ptr = READ_ONCE(node->back_pointer);
slot = node->parent_slot;
if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
smp_read_barrier_depends();
ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer);
ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer);
slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
}
if (!ptr)

7
security/keys/process_keys.c
View File

@ -809,15 +809,14 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
key_put(keyring);
ret = 0;
goto error2;
goto error3;
}
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error2;
goto error3;
commit_creds(new);
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
@ -827,6 +826,8 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
okay:
return ret;
error3:
key_put(keyring);
error2:
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
error:

50
security/keys/trusted.c
View File

@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen,
}
ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
kfree(sdesc);
kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
if (!ret)
ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
out:
kfree(sdesc);
kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
out:
kfree(sdesc);
kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
kfree(sdesc);
kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
kfree(sdesc);
kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
*bloblen = storedsize;
}
out:
kfree(td);
kzfree(td);
return ret;
}
@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
kfree(tb);
kzfree(tb);
return ret;
}
@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
/* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
kfree(tb);
kzfree(tb);
return ret;
}
@ -1037,12 +1037,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
out:
kfree(datablob);
kfree(options);
kzfree(datablob);
kzfree(options);
if (!ret)
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
else
kfree(payload);
kzfree(payload);
return ret;
}
@ -1051,8 +1051,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
struct trusted_key_payload *p;
p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
kfree(p);
kzfree(p);
}
/*
@ -1094,13 +1093,13 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
if (ret != Opt_update) {
ret = -EINVAL;
kfree(new_p);
kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (!new_o->keyhandle) {
ret = -EINVAL;
kfree(new_p);
kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
@ -1114,22 +1113,22 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
kfree(new_p);
kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (new_o->pcrlock) {
ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
kfree(new_p);
kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
out:
kfree(datablob);
kfree(new_o);
kzfree(datablob);
kzfree(new_o);
return ret;
}
@ -1158,24 +1157,19 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
kfree(ascii_buf);
kzfree(ascii_buf);
return -EFAULT;
}
kfree(ascii_buf);
kzfree(ascii_buf);
return 2 * p->blob_len;
}
/*
* trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
* trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
*/
static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data[0];
if (!p)
return;
memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
kfree(key->payload.data[0]);
kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
}
struct key_type key_type_trusted = {

16
security/keys/user_defined.c
View File

@ -86,10 +86,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse);
*/
void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
kfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
kzfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
static void user_free_payload_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct user_key_payload *payload;
payload = container_of(head, struct user_key_payload, rcu);
kzfree(payload);
}
/*
* update a user defined key
* - the key's semaphore is write-locked
@ -112,7 +120,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
if (zap)
kfree_rcu(zap, rcu);
call_rcu(&zap->rcu, user_free_payload_rcu);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_update);
@ -130,7 +138,7 @@ void user_revoke(struct key *key)
if (upayload) {
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
kfree_rcu(upayload, rcu);
call_rcu(&upayload->rcu, user_free_payload_rcu);
}
}
@ -143,7 +151,7 @@ void user_destroy(struct key *key)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0];
kfree(upayload);
kzfree(upayload);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy);