xen/privcmd: Relax access control in privcmd_ioctl_mmap
In the privcmd Linux driver two checks in the functions privcmd_ioctl_mmap and privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch are not needed as they are trying to enforce hypervisor-level access control. They should be removed as they break secondary control domains when performing dom0 disaggregation. Xen itself provides adequate security controls around these hypercalls and these checks prevent those controls from functioning as intended. Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com> Cc: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> [v1: Fixed up the patch and commit description] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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@ -199,9 +199,6 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap(void __user *udata)
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LIST_HEAD(pagelist);
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struct mmap_mfn_state state;
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if (!xen_initial_domain())
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return -EPERM;
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/* We only support privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch for auto translated. */
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if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap))
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return -ENOSYS;
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@ -360,9 +357,6 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(void __user *udata, int version)
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int *err_array = NULL;
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struct mmap_batch_state state;
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if (!xen_initial_domain())
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return -EPERM;
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switch (version) {
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case 1:
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if (copy_from_user(&m, udata, sizeof(struct privcmd_mmapbatch)))
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