s390/qeth: reject oversized SNMP requests
Commitd4c08afafa
("s390/qeth: streamline SNMP cmd code") removed the bounds checking for req_len, under the assumption that the check in qeth_alloc_cmd() would suffice. But that code path isn't sufficiently robust to handle a user-provided data_length, which could overflow (when adding the cmd header overhead) before being checked against QETH_BUFSIZE. We end up allocating just a tiny iob, and the subsequent copy_from_user() writes past the end of that iob. Special-case this path and add a coarse bounds check, to protect against maliciuous requests. This let's the subsequent code flow do its normal job and precise checking, without risk of overflow. Fixes:d4c08afafa
("s390/qeth: streamline SNMP cmd code") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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@ -4374,6 +4374,10 @@ static int qeth_snmp_command(struct qeth_card *card, char __user *udata)
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get_user(req_len, &ureq->hdr.req_len))
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get_user(req_len, &ureq->hdr.req_len))
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return -EFAULT;
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return -EFAULT;
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/* Sanitize user input, to avoid overflows in iob size calculation: */
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if (req_len > QETH_BUFSIZE)
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return -EINVAL;
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iob = qeth_get_adapter_cmd(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL, req_len);
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iob = qeth_get_adapter_cmd(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL, req_len);
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if (!iob)
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if (!iob)
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return -ENOMEM;
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return -ENOMEM;
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