gen_init_cpio: avoid stack overflow when expanding
Fix possible overflow of the buffer used for expanding environment variables when building file list. In the extremely unlikely case of an attacker having control over the environment variables visible to gen_init_cpio, control over the contents of the file gen_init_cpio parses, and gen_init_cpio was built without compiler hardening, the attacker can gain arbitrary execution control via a stack buffer overflow. $ cat usr/crash.list file foo ${BIG}${BIG}${BIG}${BIG}${BIG}${BIG} 0755 0 0 $ BIG=$(perl -e 'print "A" x 4096;') ./usr/gen_init_cpio usr/crash.list *** buffer overflow detected ***: ./usr/gen_init_cpio terminated This also replaces the space-indenting with tabs. Patch based on existing fix extracted from grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static int cpio_mkfile(const char *name, const char *location,
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int retval;
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int rc = -1;
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int namesize;
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int i;
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unsigned int i;
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mode |= S_IFREG;
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@ -392,9 +392,12 @@ static char *cpio_replace_env(char *new_location)
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*env_var = *expanded = '\0';
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strncat(env_var, start + 2, end - start - 2);
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strncat(expanded, new_location, start - new_location);
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strncat(expanded, getenv(env_var), PATH_MAX);
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strncat(expanded, end + 1, PATH_MAX);
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strncat(expanded, getenv(env_var),
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PATH_MAX - strlen(expanded));
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strncat(expanded, end + 1,
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PATH_MAX - strlen(expanded));
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strncpy(new_location, expanded, PATH_MAX);
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new_location[PATH_MAX] = 0;
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} else
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break;
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}
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