libceph: zero out session key and connection secret
Try and avoid leaving bits and pieces of session key and connection secret (gets split into GCM key and a pair of GCM IVs) around. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
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e71ba9452f
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10f42b3e64
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@ -569,6 +569,34 @@ e_range:
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return -ERANGE;
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}
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static int decode_con_secret(void **p, void *end, u8 *con_secret,
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int *con_secret_len)
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{
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int len;
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ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, bad);
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ceph_decode_need(p, end, len, bad);
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dout("%s len %d\n", __func__, len);
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if (con_secret) {
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if (len > CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN) {
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pr_err("connection secret too big %d\n", len);
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goto bad_memzero;
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}
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memcpy(con_secret, *p, len);
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*con_secret_len = len;
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}
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memzero_explicit(*p, len);
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*p += len;
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return 0;
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bad_memzero:
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memzero_explicit(*p, len);
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bad:
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pr_err("failed to decode connection secret\n");
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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static int handle_auth_session_key(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
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void **p, void *end,
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u8 *session_key, int *session_key_len,
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@ -612,17 +640,9 @@ static int handle_auth_session_key(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
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dout("%s decrypted %d bytes\n", __func__, ret);
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dend = dp + ret;
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ceph_decode_32_safe(&dp, dend, len, e_inval);
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if (len > CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN) {
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pr_err("connection secret too big %d\n", len);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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dout("%s connection secret len %d\n", __func__, len);
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if (con_secret) {
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memcpy(con_secret, dp, len);
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*con_secret_len = len;
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}
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ret = decode_con_secret(&dp, dend, con_secret, con_secret_len);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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}
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/* service tickets */
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@ -828,7 +848,6 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
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{
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void *dp, *dend;
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u8 struct_v;
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int len;
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int ret;
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dp = *p + ceph_x_encrypt_offset();
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@ -843,17 +862,9 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
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ceph_decode_64_safe(&dp, dend, *nonce_plus_one, e_inval);
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dout("%s nonce_plus_one %llu\n", __func__, *nonce_plus_one);
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if (struct_v >= 2) {
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ceph_decode_32_safe(&dp, dend, len, e_inval);
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if (len > CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN) {
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pr_err("connection secret too big %d\n", len);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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dout("%s connection secret len %d\n", __func__, len);
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if (con_secret) {
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memcpy(con_secret, dp, len);
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*con_secret_len = len;
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}
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ret = decode_con_secret(&dp, dend, con_secret, con_secret_len);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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}
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return 0;
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@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_decode(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void **p, void *end)
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key->len = ceph_decode_16(p);
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ceph_decode_need(p, end, key->len, bad);
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ret = set_secret(key, *p);
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memzero_explicit(*p, key->len);
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*p += key->len;
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return ret;
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@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_unarmor(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const char *inkey)
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void ceph_crypto_key_destroy(struct ceph_crypto_key *key)
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{
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if (key) {
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kfree(key->key);
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kfree_sensitive(key->key);
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key->key = NULL;
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if (key->tfm) {
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crypto_free_sync_skcipher(key->tfm);
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@ -689,11 +689,10 @@ static int verify_epilogue_crcs(struct ceph_connection *con, u32 front_crc,
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}
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static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con,
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u8 *session_key, int session_key_len,
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u8 *con_secret, int con_secret_len)
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const u8 *session_key, int session_key_len,
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const u8 *con_secret, int con_secret_len)
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{
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unsigned int noio_flag;
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void *p;
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int ret;
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dout("%s con %p con_mode %d session_key_len %d con_secret_len %d\n",
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@ -751,15 +750,14 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con,
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return ret;
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}
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p = con_secret;
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WARN_ON((unsigned long)p & crypto_aead_alignmask(con->v2.gcm_tfm));
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ret = crypto_aead_setkey(con->v2.gcm_tfm, p, CEPH_GCM_KEY_LEN);
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WARN_ON((unsigned long)con_secret &
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crypto_aead_alignmask(con->v2.gcm_tfm));
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ret = crypto_aead_setkey(con->v2.gcm_tfm, con_secret, CEPH_GCM_KEY_LEN);
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if (ret) {
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pr_err("failed to set gcm key: %d\n", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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p += CEPH_GCM_KEY_LEN;
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WARN_ON(crypto_aead_ivsize(con->v2.gcm_tfm) != CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
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ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(con->v2.gcm_tfm, CEPH_GCM_TAG_LEN);
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if (ret) {
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@ -777,8 +775,11 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con,
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aead_request_set_callback(con->v2.gcm_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
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crypto_req_done, &con->v2.gcm_wait);
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memcpy(&con->v2.in_gcm_nonce, p, CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
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memcpy(&con->v2.out_gcm_nonce, p + CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN, CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
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memcpy(&con->v2.in_gcm_nonce, con_secret + CEPH_GCM_KEY_LEN,
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CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
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memcpy(&con->v2.out_gcm_nonce,
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con_secret + CEPH_GCM_KEY_LEN + CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN,
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CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
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return 0; /* auth_x, secure mode */
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}
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@ -800,7 +801,7 @@ static int hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con, const struct kvec *kvecs,
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desc->tfm = con->v2.hmac_tfm;
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ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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goto out;
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for (i = 0; i < kvec_cnt; i++) {
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WARN_ON((unsigned long)kvecs[i].iov_base &
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@ -808,15 +809,14 @@ static int hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con, const struct kvec *kvecs,
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ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, kvecs[i].iov_base,
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kvecs[i].iov_len);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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goto out;
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}
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ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, hmac);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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out:
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shash_desc_zero(desc);
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return 0; /* auth_x, both plain and secure modes */
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return ret; /* auth_x, both plain and secure modes */
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}
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static void gcm_inc_nonce(struct ceph_gcm_nonce *nonce)
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@ -2072,27 +2072,32 @@ static int process_auth_done(struct ceph_connection *con, void *p, void *end)
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if (con->state != CEPH_CON_S_V2_AUTH) {
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dout("%s con %p state changed to %d\n", __func__, con,
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con->state);
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return -EAGAIN;
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ret = -EAGAIN;
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goto out;
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}
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dout("%s con %p handle_auth_done ret %d\n", __func__, con, ret);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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goto out;
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ret = setup_crypto(con, session_key, session_key_len, con_secret,
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con_secret_len);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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goto out;
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reset_out_kvecs(con);
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ret = prepare_auth_signature(con);
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if (ret) {
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pr_err("prepare_auth_signature failed: %d\n", ret);
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return ret;
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goto out;
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}
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con->state = CEPH_CON_S_V2_AUTH_SIGNATURE;
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return 0;
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out:
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memzero_explicit(session_key_buf, sizeof(session_key_buf));
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memzero_explicit(con_secret_buf, sizeof(con_secret_buf));
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return ret;
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bad:
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pr_err("failed to decode auth_done\n");
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@ -3436,6 +3441,8 @@ void ceph_con_v2_reset_protocol(struct ceph_connection *con)
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}
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con->v2.con_mode = CEPH_CON_MODE_UNKNOWN;
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memzero_explicit(&con->v2.in_gcm_nonce, CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
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memzero_explicit(&con->v2.out_gcm_nonce, CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
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if (con->v2.hmac_tfm) {
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crypto_free_shash(con->v2.hmac_tfm);
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