hollalinux
/
linux-sg2042
mirror of https://github.com/sophgo/linux-riscv.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge branch 'perf/urgent' into perf/core, to resolve conflict 

Conflicts:
	arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Ingo Molnar 2016-04-28 10:35:17 +02:00
parent a8944c5bf8 cf3beb7c90
commit 0b20e59cef
7 changed files with 116 additions and 30 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
arch/x86/events/amd/core.c
View File

@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static __initconst const u64 amd_hw_cache_event_ids
/*
* AMD Performance Monitor K7 and later.
*/
static const u64 amd_perfmon_event_map[] =
static const u64 amd_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX] =
{
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES] = 0x0076,
[PERF_COUNT_HW_INSTRUCTIONS] = 0x00c0,

6
arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c
View File

@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static enum {
#define LBR_PLM (LBR_KERNEL | LBR_USER)
#define LBR_SEL_MASK 0x1ff /* valid bits in LBR_SELECT */
#define LBR_SEL_MASK 0x3ff /* valid bits in LBR_SELECT */
#define LBR_NOT_SUPP -1 /* LBR filter not supported */
#define LBR_IGN 0 /* ignored */
@ -621,8 +621,10 @@ static int intel_pmu_setup_hw_lbr_filter(struct perf_event *event)
* The first 9 bits (LBR_SEL_MASK) in LBR_SELECT operate
* in suppress mode. So LBR_SELECT should be set to
* (~mask & LBR_SEL_MASK) | (mask & ~LBR_SEL_MASK)
* But the 10th bit LBR_CALL_STACK does not operate
* in suppress mode.
*/
reg->config = mask ^ x86_pmu.lbr_sel_mask;
reg->config = mask ^ (x86_pmu.lbr_sel_mask & ~LBR_CALL_STACK);
if ((br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_NO_CYCLES) &&
(br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_NO_FLAGS) &&

71
arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
View File

@ -136,9 +136,21 @@ static int __init pt_pmu_hw_init(void)
struct dev_ext_attribute *de_attrs;
struct attribute **attrs;
size_t size;
u64 reg;
int ret;
long i;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX)) {
/*
* Intel SDM, 36.5 "Tracing post-VMXON" says that
* "IA32_VMX_MISC[bit 14]" being 1 means PT can trace
* post-VMXON.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC, reg);
if (reg & BIT(14))
pt_pmu.vmx = true;
}
attrs = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < PT_CPUID_LEAVES; i++) {
@ -269,20 +281,23 @@ static void pt_config(struct perf_event *event)
reg |= (event->attr.config & PT_CONFIG_MASK);
event->hw.config = reg;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, reg);
}
static void pt_config_start(bool start)
static void pt_config_stop(struct perf_event *event)
{
u64 ctl;
u64 ctl = READ_ONCE(event->hw.config);
/* may be already stopped by a PMI */
if (!(ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN))
return;
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, ctl);
if (start)
ctl |= RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN;
else
ctl &= ~RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, ctl);
WRITE_ONCE(event->hw.config, ctl);
/*
* A wrmsr that disables trace generation serializes other PT
* registers and causes all data packets to be written to memory,
@ -291,7 +306,6 @@ static void pt_config_start(bool start)
* The below WMB, separating data store and aux_head store matches
* the consumer's RMB that separates aux_head load and data load.
*/
if (!start)
wmb();
}
@ -922,11 +936,17 @@ void intel_pt_interrupt(void)
if (!ACCESS_ONCE(pt->handle_nmi))
return;
pt_config_start(false);
/*
* If VMX is on and PT does not support it, don't touch anything.
*/
if (READ_ONCE(pt->vmx_on))
return;
if (!event)
return;
pt_config_stop(event);
buf = perf_get_aux(&pt->handle);
if (!buf)
return;
@ -963,6 +983,35 @@ void intel_pt_interrupt(void)
}
}
void intel_pt_handle_vmx(int on)
{
struct pt *pt = this_cpu_ptr(&pt_ctx);
struct perf_event *event;
unsigned long flags;
/* PT plays nice with VMX, do nothing */
if (pt_pmu.vmx)
return;
/*
* VMXON will clear RTIT_CTL.TraceEn; we need to make
* sure to not try to set it while VMX is on. Disable
* interrupts to avoid racing with pmu callbacks;
* concurrent PMI should be handled fine.
*/
local_irq_save(flags);
WRITE_ONCE(pt->vmx_on, on);
if (on) {
/* prevent pt_config_stop() from writing RTIT_CTL */
event = pt->handle.event;
if (event)
event->hw.config = 0;
}
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(intel_pt_handle_vmx);
/*
* PMU callbacks
*/
@ -973,6 +1022,9 @@ static void pt_event_start(struct perf_event *event, int mode)
struct pt *pt = this_cpu_ptr(&pt_ctx);
struct pt_buffer *buf;
if (READ_ONCE(pt->vmx_on))
return;
buf = perf_aux_output_begin(&pt->handle, event);
if (!buf)
goto fail_stop;
@ -1007,7 +1059,8 @@ static void pt_event_stop(struct perf_event *event, int mode)
* see comment in intel_pt_interrupt().
*/
ACCESS_ONCE(pt->handle_nmi) = 0;
pt_config_start(false);
pt_config_stop(event);
if (event->hw.state == PERF_HES_STOPPED)
return;

3
arch/x86/events/intel/pt.h
View File

@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ enum pt_capabilities {
struct pt_pmu {
struct pmu pmu;
u32 caps[PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM * PT_CPUID_LEAVES];
bool vmx;
};
/**
@ -107,10 +108,12 @@ struct pt_buffer {
* struct pt - per-cpu pt context
* @handle: perf output handle
* @handle_nmi: do handle PT PMI on this cpu, there's an active event
* @vmx_on: 1 if VMX is ON on this cpu
*/
struct pt {
struct perf_output_handle handle;
int handle_nmi;
int vmx_on;
};
#endif /* __INTEL_PT_H__ */

4
arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h
View File

@ -285,6 +285,10 @@ static inline void perf_events_lapic_init(void) { }
static inline void perf_check_microcode(void) { }
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
extern void intel_pt_handle_vmx(int on);
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) && defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD)
extern void amd_pmu_enable_virt(void);
extern void amd_pmu_disable_virt(void);

4
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
View File

@ -3103,6 +3103,8 @@ static __init int vmx_disabled_by_bios(void)
static void kvm_cpu_vmxon(u64 addr)
{
intel_pt_handle_vmx(1);
asm volatile (ASM_VMX_VMXON_RAX
: : "a"(&addr), "m"(addr)
: "memory", "cc");
@ -3172,6 +3174,8 @@ static void vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
static void kvm_cpu_vmxoff(void)
{
asm volatile (__ex(ASM_VMX_VMXOFF) : : : "cc");
intel_pt_handle_vmx(0);
}
static void hardware_disable(void)

52
kernel/events/core.c
View File

@ -1106,6 +1106,7 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
* function.
*
* Lock order:
* cred_guard_mutex
* task_struct::perf_event_mutex
* perf_event_context::mutex
* perf_event::child_mutex;
@ -3449,7 +3450,6 @@ static struct task_struct *
find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
{
struct task_struct *task;
int err;
rcu_read_lock();
if (!vpid)
@ -3463,16 +3463,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
if (!task)
return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
/* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */
err = -EACCES;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto errout;
return task;
errout:
put_task_struct(task);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
/*
@ -8592,6 +8583,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
get_online_cpus();
if (task) {
err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
if (err)
goto err_cpus;
/*
* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
*
* We must hold cred_guard_mutex across this and any potential
* perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
* serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
*/
err = -EACCES;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_cred;
}
if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP)
cgroup_fd = pid;
@ -8599,7 +8608,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
NULL, NULL, cgroup_fd);
if (IS_ERR(event)) {
err = PTR_ERR(event);
goto err_cpus;
goto err_cred;
}
if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
@ -8658,11 +8667,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
goto err_context;
}
if (task) {
put_task_struct(task);
task = NULL;
}
/*
* Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it):
*/
@ -8760,6 +8764,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
/*
* This is the point on no return; we cannot fail hereafter. This is
* where we start modifying current state.
*/
if (move_group) {
/*
* See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
@ -8831,6 +8840,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
if (task) {
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
put_task_struct(task);
}
put_online_cpus();
mutex_lock(&current->perf_event_mutex);
@ -8863,6 +8877,9 @@ err_alloc:
*/
if (!event_file)
free_event(event);
err_cred:
if (task)
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
err_cpus:
put_online_cpus();
err_task:
@ -9147,6 +9164,9 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
/*
* When a child task exits, feed back event values to parent events.
*
* Can be called with cred_guard_mutex held when called from
* install_exec_creds().
*/
void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child)
{