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linux-sg2042/security/integrity/Kconfig

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integrity: move ima inode integrity data management Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
2011-03-10 03:13:22 +08:00
#
config INTEGRITY
def_bool y
evm: re-release EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures). While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately (eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper: http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf. EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM. Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks: evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(). Changelog v7: - Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review) - fix URL in patch description - remove evm_hmac_size definition - use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size) - moved linux include before other includes - test for crypto_hash_setkey failure - fail earlier for invalid key - clear entire encrypted key, even on failure - check xattr name length before comparing xattr names Changelog: - locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex - using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1 operation. - replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin) - support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs (Dmitry Kasatkin) - iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised - Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin - Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
2011-03-16 04:12:09 +08:00
depends on IMA || EVM
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
2011-03-10 03:13:22 +08:00
integrity: digital signature config option name change Similar to SIGNATURE, rename INTEGRITY_DIGSIG to INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-01-17 23:12:07 +08:00
config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
integrity: digital signature verification using multiple keyrings Define separate keyrings for each of the different use cases - evm, ima, and modules. Using different keyrings improves search performance, and also allows "locking" specific keyring to prevent adding new keys. This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are usually only added from initramfs. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2011-10-05 16:54:46 +08:00
boolean "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings"
digsig: build dependency fix Fix build errors by adding Kconfig dependency on KEYS. CRYPTO dependency removed. CC security/integrity/digsig.o security/integrity/digsig.c: In function ?integrity_digsig_verify?: security/integrity/digsig.c:38:4: error: implicit declaration of function ?request_key? security/integrity/digsig.c:38:17: error: ?key_type_keyring? undeclared (first use in this function) security/integrity/digsig.c:38:17: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in make[2]: *** [security/integrity/digsig.o] Error 1 Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-11-21 23:31:15 +08:00
depends on INTEGRITY && KEYS
integrity: digital signature verification using multiple keyrings Define separate keyrings for each of the different use cases - evm, ima, and modules. Using different keyrings improves search performance, and also allows "locking" specific keyring to prevent adding new keys. This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are usually only added from initramfs. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2011-10-05 16:54:46 +08:00
default n
lib: digital signature config option name change It was reported that DIGSIG is confusing name for digital signature module. It was suggested to rename DIGSIG to SIGNATURE. Requested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-01-17 23:12:03 +08:00
select SIGNATURE
integrity: digital signature verification using multiple keyrings Define separate keyrings for each of the different use cases - evm, ima, and modules. Using different keyrings improves search performance, and also allows "locking" specific keyring to prevent adding new keys. This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are usually only added from initramfs. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2011-10-05 16:54:46 +08:00
help
This option enables digital signature verification support
using multiple keyrings. It defines separate keyrings for each
of the different use cases - evm, ima, and modules.
Different keyrings improves search performance, but also allow
to "lock" certain keyring to prevent adding new keys.
This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
usually only added from initramfs.
integrity: move integrity_audit_msg() This patch moves the integrity_audit_msg() function and defintion to security/integrity/, the parent directory, renames the 'ima_audit' boot command line option to 'integrity_audit', and fixes the Kconfig help text to reflect the actual code. Changelog: - Fixed ifdef inclusion of integrity_audit_msg() (Fengguang Wu) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2013-03-19 02:48:02 +08:00
config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
depends on INTEGRITY && AUDIT
default y
help
In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this
option adds a kernel parameter 'integrity_audit', which
controls the level of integrity auditing messages.
0 - basic integrity auditing messages (default)
1 - additional integrity auditing messages
Additional informational integrity auditing messages would
be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel
command line.
ima: digital signature verification using asymmetric keys Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric key infrastructure. Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM header format. The main difference is that the key identifier is a sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the current implementation. The only purpose of the key identifier is to identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring. ima-evm-utils was updated to support the new signature format. While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm. The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5 is supported. Due to this current limitation, signatures should be generated using a sha1 hash algorithm. Changes in this patch: - Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of in source #ifdefs. - keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be done using keyctl only. - keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space. Key search is done using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match(). - Kconfig option title was changed Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2013-02-07 06:12:08 +08:00
config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support"
depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
default n
select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
help
This option enables digital signature verification using
asymmetric keys.
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
2011-03-10 03:13:22 +08:00
source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
evm: re-release EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures). While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately (eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper: http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf. EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM. Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks: evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(). Changelog v7: - Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review) - fix URL in patch description - remove evm_hmac_size definition - use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size) - moved linux include before other includes - test for crypto_hash_setkey failure - fail earlier for invalid key - clear entire encrypted key, even on failure - check xattr name length before comparing xattr names Changelog: - locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex - using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1 operation. - replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin) - support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs (Dmitry Kasatkin) - iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised - Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin - Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
2011-03-16 04:12:09 +08:00
source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig