linux-sg2042/arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2012 - Virtual Open Systems and Columbia University
* Author: Christoffer Dall <c.dall@virtualopensystems.com>
*/
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
#include <trace/events/kvm.h>
#include "trace.h"
void kvm_mmio_write_buf(void *buf, unsigned int len, unsigned long data)
{
void *datap = NULL;
union {
u8 byte;
u16 hword;
u32 word;
u64 dword;
} tmp;
switch (len) {
case 1:
tmp.byte = data;
datap = &tmp.byte;
break;
case 2:
tmp.hword = data;
datap = &tmp.hword;
break;
case 4:
tmp.word = data;
datap = &tmp.word;
break;
case 8:
tmp.dword = data;
datap = &tmp.dword;
break;
}
memcpy(buf, datap, len);
}
unsigned long kvm_mmio_read_buf(const void *buf, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned long data = 0;
union {
u16 hword;
u32 word;
u64 dword;
} tmp;
switch (len) {
case 1:
data = *(u8 *)buf;
break;
case 2:
memcpy(&tmp.hword, buf, len);
data = tmp.hword;
break;
case 4:
memcpy(&tmp.word, buf, len);
data = tmp.word;
break;
case 8:
memcpy(&tmp.dword, buf, len);
data = tmp.dword;
break;
}
return data;
}
/**
* kvm_handle_mmio_return -- Handle MMIO loads after user space emulation
* or in-kernel IO emulation
*
* @vcpu: The VCPU pointer
* @run: The VCPU run struct containing the mmio data
*/
int kvm_handle_mmio_return(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
{
unsigned long data;
unsigned int len;
int mask;
/* Detect an already handled MMIO return */
if (unlikely(!vcpu->mmio_needed))
return 0;
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
if (!kvm_vcpu_dabt_iswrite(vcpu)) {
len = kvm_vcpu_dabt_get_as(vcpu);
data = kvm_mmio_read_buf(run->mmio.data, len);
if (kvm_vcpu_dabt_issext(vcpu) &&
len < sizeof(unsigned long)) {
mask = 1U << ((len * 8) - 1);
data = (data ^ mask) - mask;
}
if (!kvm_vcpu_dabt_issf(vcpu))
data = data & 0xffffffff;
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, len, run->mmio.phys_addr,
KVM: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in write_mmio Reported by syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in write_mmio+0x11e/0x270 [kvm] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8803259df7f8 by task syz-executor/32298 CPU: 6 PID: 32298 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G OE 4.15.0-rc2+ #18 Hardware name: LENOVO ThinkCentre M8500t-N000/SHARKBAY, BIOS FBKTC1AUS 02/16/2016 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xab/0xe1 print_address_description+0x6b/0x290 kasan_report+0x28a/0x370 write_mmio+0x11e/0x270 [kvm] emulator_read_write_onepage+0x311/0x600 [kvm] emulator_read_write+0xef/0x240 [kvm] emulator_fix_hypercall+0x105/0x150 [kvm] em_hypercall+0x2b/0x80 [kvm] x86_emulate_insn+0x2b1/0x1640 [kvm] x86_emulate_instruction+0x39a/0xb90 [kvm] handle_exception+0x1b4/0x4d0 [kvm_intel] vcpu_enter_guest+0x15a0/0x2640 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x549/0x7d0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x479/0x880 [kvm] do_vfs_ioctl+0x142/0x9a0 SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0x9a The path of patched vmmcall will patch 3 bytes opcode 0F 01 C1(vmcall) to the guest memory, however, write_mmio tracepoint always prints 8 bytes through *(u64 *)val since kvm splits the mmio access into 8 bytes. This leaks 5 bytes from the kernel stack (CVE-2017-17741). This patch fixes it by just accessing the bytes which we operate on. Before patch: syz-executor-5567 [007] .... 51370.561696: kvm_mmio: mmio write len 3 gpa 0x10 val 0x1ffff10077c1010f After patch: syz-executor-13416 [002] .... 51302.299573: kvm_mmio: mmio write len 3 gpa 0x10 val 0xc1010f Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-12-15 09:40:50 +08:00
&data);
data = vcpu_data_host_to_guest(vcpu, data, len);
vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_dabt_get_rd(vcpu), data);
}
/*
* The MMIO instruction is emulated and should not be re-executed
* in the guest.
*/
kvm_skip_instr(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_trap_il_is32bit(vcpu));
return 0;
}
int io_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run,
phys_addr_t fault_ipa)
{
unsigned long data;
unsigned long rt;
int ret;
bool is_write;
int len;
u8 data_buf[8];
/*
* No valid syndrome? Ask userspace for help if it has
* volunteered to do so, and bail out otherwise.
*/
if (!kvm_vcpu_dabt_isvalid(vcpu)) {
KVM: arm/arm64: Allow reporting non-ISV data aborts to userspace For a long time, if a guest accessed memory outside of a memslot using any of the load/store instructions in the architecture which doesn't supply decoding information in the ESR_EL2 (the ISV bit is not set), the kernel would print the following message and terminate the VM as a result of returning -ENOSYS to userspace: load/store instruction decoding not implemented The reason behind this message is that KVM assumes that all accesses outside a memslot is an MMIO access which should be handled by userspace, and we originally expected to eventually implement some sort of decoding of load/store instructions where the ISV bit was not set. However, it turns out that many of the instructions which don't provide decoding information on abort are not safe to use for MMIO accesses, and the remaining few that would potentially make sense to use on MMIO accesses, such as those with register writeback, are not used in practice. It also turns out that fetching an instruction from guest memory can be a pretty horrible affair, involving stopping all CPUs on SMP systems, handling multiple corner cases of address translation in software, and more. It doesn't appear likely that we'll ever implement this in the kernel. What is much more common is that a user has misconfigured his/her guest and is actually not accessing an MMIO region, but just hitting some random hole in the IPA space. In this scenario, the error message above is almost misleading and has led to a great deal of confusion over the years. It is, nevertheless, ABI to userspace, and we therefore need to introduce a new capability that userspace explicitly enables to change behavior. This patch introduces KVM_CAP_ARM_NISV_TO_USER (NISV meaning Non-ISV) which does exactly that, and introduces a new exit reason to report the event to userspace. User space can then emulate an exception to the guest, restart the guest, suspend the guest, or take any other appropriate action as per the policy of the running system. Reported-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2019-10-11 19:07:05 +08:00
if (vcpu->kvm->arch.return_nisv_io_abort_to_user) {
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_ARM_NISV;
run->arm_nisv.esr_iss = kvm_vcpu_dabt_iss_nisv_sanitized(vcpu);
run->arm_nisv.fault_ipa = fault_ipa;
return 0;
}
kvm_pr_unimpl("Data abort outside memslots with no valid syndrome info\n");
return -ENOSYS;
}
/* Page table accesses IO mem: tell guest to fix its TTBR */
if (kvm_vcpu_dabt_iss1tw(vcpu)) {
kvm_inject_dabt(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(vcpu));
return 1;
}
/*
* Prepare MMIO operation. First decode the syndrome data we get
* from the CPU. Then try if some in-kernel emulation feels
* responsible, otherwise let user space do its magic.
*/
is_write = kvm_vcpu_dabt_iswrite(vcpu);
len = kvm_vcpu_dabt_get_as(vcpu);
rt = kvm_vcpu_dabt_get_rd(vcpu);
if (is_write) {
data = vcpu_data_guest_to_host(vcpu, vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, rt),
len);
KVM: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in write_mmio Reported by syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in write_mmio+0x11e/0x270 [kvm] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8803259df7f8 by task syz-executor/32298 CPU: 6 PID: 32298 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G OE 4.15.0-rc2+ #18 Hardware name: LENOVO ThinkCentre M8500t-N000/SHARKBAY, BIOS FBKTC1AUS 02/16/2016 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xab/0xe1 print_address_description+0x6b/0x290 kasan_report+0x28a/0x370 write_mmio+0x11e/0x270 [kvm] emulator_read_write_onepage+0x311/0x600 [kvm] emulator_read_write+0xef/0x240 [kvm] emulator_fix_hypercall+0x105/0x150 [kvm] em_hypercall+0x2b/0x80 [kvm] x86_emulate_insn+0x2b1/0x1640 [kvm] x86_emulate_instruction+0x39a/0xb90 [kvm] handle_exception+0x1b4/0x4d0 [kvm_intel] vcpu_enter_guest+0x15a0/0x2640 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x549/0x7d0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x479/0x880 [kvm] do_vfs_ioctl+0x142/0x9a0 SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0x9a The path of patched vmmcall will patch 3 bytes opcode 0F 01 C1(vmcall) to the guest memory, however, write_mmio tracepoint always prints 8 bytes through *(u64 *)val since kvm splits the mmio access into 8 bytes. This leaks 5 bytes from the kernel stack (CVE-2017-17741). This patch fixes it by just accessing the bytes which we operate on. Before patch: syz-executor-5567 [007] .... 51370.561696: kvm_mmio: mmio write len 3 gpa 0x10 val 0x1ffff10077c1010f After patch: syz-executor-13416 [002] .... 51302.299573: kvm_mmio: mmio write len 3 gpa 0x10 val 0xc1010f Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-12-15 09:40:50 +08:00
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, len, fault_ipa, &data);
kvm_mmio_write_buf(data_buf, len, data);
ret = kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, fault_ipa, len,
data_buf);
} else {
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, len,
KVM: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in write_mmio Reported by syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in write_mmio+0x11e/0x270 [kvm] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8803259df7f8 by task syz-executor/32298 CPU: 6 PID: 32298 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G OE 4.15.0-rc2+ #18 Hardware name: LENOVO ThinkCentre M8500t-N000/SHARKBAY, BIOS FBKTC1AUS 02/16/2016 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xab/0xe1 print_address_description+0x6b/0x290 kasan_report+0x28a/0x370 write_mmio+0x11e/0x270 [kvm] emulator_read_write_onepage+0x311/0x600 [kvm] emulator_read_write+0xef/0x240 [kvm] emulator_fix_hypercall+0x105/0x150 [kvm] em_hypercall+0x2b/0x80 [kvm] x86_emulate_insn+0x2b1/0x1640 [kvm] x86_emulate_instruction+0x39a/0xb90 [kvm] handle_exception+0x1b4/0x4d0 [kvm_intel] vcpu_enter_guest+0x15a0/0x2640 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x549/0x7d0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x479/0x880 [kvm] do_vfs_ioctl+0x142/0x9a0 SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0x9a The path of patched vmmcall will patch 3 bytes opcode 0F 01 C1(vmcall) to the guest memory, however, write_mmio tracepoint always prints 8 bytes through *(u64 *)val since kvm splits the mmio access into 8 bytes. This leaks 5 bytes from the kernel stack (CVE-2017-17741). This patch fixes it by just accessing the bytes which we operate on. Before patch: syz-executor-5567 [007] .... 51370.561696: kvm_mmio: mmio write len 3 gpa 0x10 val 0x1ffff10077c1010f After patch: syz-executor-13416 [002] .... 51302.299573: kvm_mmio: mmio write len 3 gpa 0x10 val 0xc1010f Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-12-15 09:40:50 +08:00
fault_ipa, NULL);
ret = kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, fault_ipa, len,
data_buf);
}
/* Now prepare kvm_run for the potential return to userland. */
run->mmio.is_write = is_write;
run->mmio.phys_addr = fault_ipa;
run->mmio.len = len;
vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
if (!ret) {
/* We handled the access successfully in the kernel. */
if (!is_write)
memcpy(run->mmio.data, data_buf, len);
vcpu->stat.mmio_exit_kernel++;
kvm_handle_mmio_return(vcpu, run);
return 1;
}
if (is_write)
memcpy(run->mmio.data, data_buf, len);
vcpu->stat.mmio_exit_user++;
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
return 0;
}