linux-sg2042/arch/sh/include/asm/hw_breakpoint.h

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#ifndef __ASM_SH_HW_BREAKPOINT_H
#define __ASM_SH_HW_BREAKPOINT_H
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#define __ARCH_HW_BREAKPOINT_H
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
struct arch_hw_breakpoint {
char *name; /* Contains name of the symbol to set bkpt */
unsigned long address;
u16 len;
u16 type;
};
enum {
SH_BREAKPOINT_READ = (1 << 1),
SH_BREAKPOINT_WRITE = (1 << 2),
SH_BREAKPOINT_RW = SH_BREAKPOINT_READ | SH_BREAKPOINT_WRITE,
SH_BREAKPOINT_LEN_1 = (1 << 12),
SH_BREAKPOINT_LEN_2 = (1 << 13),
SH_BREAKPOINT_LEN_4 = SH_BREAKPOINT_LEN_1 | SH_BREAKPOINT_LEN_2,
SH_BREAKPOINT_LEN_8 = (1 << 14),
};
struct sh_ubc {
const char *name;
unsigned int num_events;
unsigned int trap_nr;
void (*enable)(struct arch_hw_breakpoint *, int);
void (*disable)(struct arch_hw_breakpoint *, int);
void (*enable_all)(unsigned long);
void (*disable_all)(void);
unsigned long (*active_mask)(void);
unsigned long (*triggered_mask)(void);
void (*clear_triggered_mask)(unsigned long);
struct clk *clk; /* optional interface clock / MSTP bit */
};
struct perf_event;
struct task_struct;
struct pmu;
/* Maximum number of UBC channels */
#define HBP_NUM 2
static inline int hw_breakpoint_slots(int type)
{
return HBP_NUM;
}
/* arch/sh/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c */
hw-breakpoints: Change/Enforce some breakpoints policies The current policies of breakpoints in x86 and SH are the following: - task bound breakpoints can only break on userspace addresses - cpu wide breakpoints can only break on kernel addresses The former rule prevents ptrace breakpoints to be set to trigger on kernel addresses, which is good. But as a side effect, we can't breakpoint on kernel addresses for task bound breakpoints. The latter rule simply makes no sense, there is no reason why we can't set breakpoints on userspace while performing cpu bound profiles. We want the following new policies: - task bound breakpoint can set userspace address breakpoints, with no particular privilege required. - task bound breakpoints can set kernelspace address breakpoints but must be privileged to do that. - cpu bound breakpoints can do what they want as they are privileged already. To implement these new policies, this patch checks if we are dealing with a kernel address breakpoint, if so and if the exclude_kernel parameter is set, we tell the user that the breakpoint is invalid, which makes a good generic ptrace protection. If we don't have exclude_kernel, ensure the user has the right privileges as kernel breakpoints are quite sensitive (risk of trap recursion attacks and global performance impacts). [ Paul Mundt: keep addr space check for sh signal delivery and fix double function declaration] Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: K. Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
2010-04-19 00:11:53 +08:00
extern int arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace(struct perf_event *bp);
extern int arch_validate_hwbkpt_settings(struct perf_event *bp);
extern int hw_breakpoint_exceptions_notify(struct notifier_block *unused,
unsigned long val, void *data);
int arch_install_hw_breakpoint(struct perf_event *bp);
void arch_uninstall_hw_breakpoint(struct perf_event *bp);
void hw_breakpoint_pmu_read(struct perf_event *bp);
extern void arch_fill_perf_breakpoint(struct perf_event *bp);
extern int register_sh_ubc(struct sh_ubc *);
extern struct pmu perf_ops_bp;
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* __ASM_SH_HW_BREAKPOINT_H */