linux-sg2042/mm/page_poison.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
mm: page_poison: print page info when corruption is caught When page_poison detects page corruption it's useful to see who freed a page recently to have a guess where write-after-free corruption happens. After this change corruption report has extra page data. Example report from real corruption (includes only page_pwner part): pagealloc: memory corruption e00000014cd61d10: 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 1d d2 ff ff 0f 00 60 ........0......` e00000014cd61d20: b0 1d d2 ff ff 0f 00 60 90 fe 1c 00 08 00 00 20 .......`....... ... CPU: 1 PID: 220402 Comm: cc1plus Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5-00107-g9720c6f59ecf #245 Hardware name: hp server rx3600, BIOS 04.03 04/08/2008 ... Call Trace: [<a000000100015210>] show_stack+0x90/0xc0 [<a000000101163390>] dump_stack+0x150/0x1c0 [<a0000001003f1e90>] __kernel_unpoison_pages+0x410/0x440 [<a0000001003c2460>] get_page_from_freelist+0x1460/0x2ca0 [<a0000001003c6be0>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3c0/0x660 [<a0000001003ed690>] alloc_pages_vma+0xb0/0x500 [<a00000010037deb0>] __handle_mm_fault+0x1230/0x1fe0 [<a00000010037ef70>] handle_mm_fault+0x310/0x4e0 [<a00000010005dc70>] ia64_do_page_fault+0x1f0/0xb80 [<a00000010000ca00>] ia64_leave_kernel+0x0/0x270 page_owner tracks the page as freed page allocated via order 0, migratetype Movable, gfp_mask 0x100dca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE|__GFP_ZERO), pid 37, ts 8173444098740 __reset_page_owner+0x40/0x200 free_pcp_prepare+0x4d0/0x600 free_unref_page+0x20/0x1c0 __put_page+0x110/0x1a0 migrate_pages+0x16d0/0x1dc0 compact_zone+0xfc0/0x1aa0 proactive_compact_node+0xd0/0x1e0 kcompactd+0x550/0x600 kthread+0x2c0/0x2e0 call_payload+0x50/0x80 Here we can see that page was freed by page migration but something managed to write to it afterwards. [slyfox@gentoo.org: s/dump_page_owner/dump_page/, per Vlastimil] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210407230800.1086854-1-slyfox@gentoo.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210404141735.2152984-1-slyfox@gentoo.org Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-30 13:55:12 +08:00
#include <linux/mmdebug.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
mm/debug-pagealloc: prepare boottime configurable on/off Until now, debug-pagealloc needs extra flags in struct page, so we need to recompile whole source code when we decide to use it. This is really painful, because it takes some time to recompile and sometimes rebuild is not possible due to third party module depending on struct page. So, we can't use this good feature in many cases. Now, we have the page extension feature that allows us to insert extra flags to outside of struct page. This gets rid of third party module issue mentioned above. And, this allows us to determine if we need extra memory for this page extension in boottime. With these property, we can avoid using debug-pagealloc in boottime with low computational overhead in the kernel built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC. This will help our development process greatly. This patch is the preparation step to achive above goal. debug-pagealloc originally uses extra field of struct page, but, after this patch, it will use field of struct page_ext. Because memory for page_ext is allocated later than initialization of page allocator in CONFIG_SPARSEMEM, we should disable debug-pagealloc feature temporarily until initialization of page_ext. This patch implements this. Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Jungsoo Son <jungsoo.son@lge.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-13 08:55:49 +08:00
#include <linux/page_ext.h>
#include <linux/poison.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
page_poison: play nicely with KASAN KASAN does not play well with the page poisoning (CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING). It triggers false positives in the allocation path: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memchr_inv+0x2ea/0x330 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88881f800000 by task swapper/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #54 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe0/0x19a print_address_description.cold.2+0x9/0x28b kasan_report.cold.3+0x7a/0xb5 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 memchr_inv+0x2ea/0x330 kernel_poison_pages+0x103/0x3d5 get_page_from_freelist+0x15e7/0x4d90 because KASAN has not yet unpoisoned the shadow page for allocation before it checks memchr_inv() but only found a stale poison pattern. Also, false positives in free path, BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kernel_poison_pages+0x29e/0x3d5 Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8888112cc000 by task swapper/0/1 CPU: 5 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #55 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe0/0x19a print_address_description.cold.2+0x9/0x28b kasan_report.cold.3+0x7a/0xb5 check_memory_region+0x22d/0x250 memset+0x28/0x40 kernel_poison_pages+0x29e/0x3d5 __free_pages_ok+0x75f/0x13e0 due to KASAN adds poisoned redzones around slab objects, but the page poisoning needs to poison the whole page. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190114233405.67843-1-cai@lca.pw Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-06 07:41:24 +08:00
#include <linux/kasan.h>
mm, page_poison: use static key more efficiently Commit 11c9c7edae06 ("mm/page_poison.c: replace bool variable with static key") changed page_poisoning_enabled() to a static key check. However, the function is not inlined, so each check still involves a function call with overhead not eliminated when page poisoning is disabled. Analogically to how debug_pagealloc is handled, this patch converts page_poisoning_enabled() back to boolean check, and introduces page_poisoning_enabled_static() for fast paths. Both functions are inlined. The function kernel_poison_pages() is also called unconditionally and does the static key check inside. Remove it from there and put it to callers. Also split it to two functions kernel_poison_pages() and kernel_unpoison_pages() instead of the confusing bool parameter. Also optimize the check that enables page poisoning instead of debug_pagealloc for architectures without proper debug_pagealloc support. Move the check to init_mem_debugging_and_hardening() to enable a single static key instead of having two static branches in page_poisoning_enabled_static(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113104033.22907-3-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@kernel.org> Cc: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 11:13:34 +08:00
bool _page_poisoning_enabled_early;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(_page_poisoning_enabled_early);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(_page_poisoning_enabled);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(_page_poisoning_enabled);
mm/debug-pagealloc: prepare boottime configurable on/off Until now, debug-pagealloc needs extra flags in struct page, so we need to recompile whole source code when we decide to use it. This is really painful, because it takes some time to recompile and sometimes rebuild is not possible due to third party module depending on struct page. So, we can't use this good feature in many cases. Now, we have the page extension feature that allows us to insert extra flags to outside of struct page. This gets rid of third party module issue mentioned above. And, this allows us to determine if we need extra memory for this page extension in boottime. With these property, we can avoid using debug-pagealloc in boottime with low computational overhead in the kernel built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC. This will help our development process greatly. This patch is the preparation step to achive above goal. debug-pagealloc originally uses extra field of struct page, but, after this patch, it will use field of struct page_ext. Because memory for page_ext is allocated later than initialization of page allocator in CONFIG_SPARSEMEM, we should disable debug-pagealloc feature temporarily until initialization of page_ext. This patch implements this. Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Jungsoo Son <jungsoo.son@lge.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-13 08:55:49 +08:00
static int __init early_page_poison_param(char *buf)
mm/debug-pagealloc: prepare boottime configurable on/off Until now, debug-pagealloc needs extra flags in struct page, so we need to recompile whole source code when we decide to use it. This is really painful, because it takes some time to recompile and sometimes rebuild is not possible due to third party module depending on struct page. So, we can't use this good feature in many cases. Now, we have the page extension feature that allows us to insert extra flags to outside of struct page. This gets rid of third party module issue mentioned above. And, this allows us to determine if we need extra memory for this page extension in boottime. With these property, we can avoid using debug-pagealloc in boottime with low computational overhead in the kernel built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC. This will help our development process greatly. This patch is the preparation step to achive above goal. debug-pagealloc originally uses extra field of struct page, but, after this patch, it will use field of struct page_ext. Because memory for page_ext is allocated later than initialization of page allocator in CONFIG_SPARSEMEM, we should disable debug-pagealloc feature temporarily until initialization of page_ext. This patch implements this. Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Jungsoo Son <jungsoo.son@lge.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-13 08:55:49 +08:00
{
mm, page_poison: use static key more efficiently Commit 11c9c7edae06 ("mm/page_poison.c: replace bool variable with static key") changed page_poisoning_enabled() to a static key check. However, the function is not inlined, so each check still involves a function call with overhead not eliminated when page poisoning is disabled. Analogically to how debug_pagealloc is handled, this patch converts page_poisoning_enabled() back to boolean check, and introduces page_poisoning_enabled_static() for fast paths. Both functions are inlined. The function kernel_poison_pages() is also called unconditionally and does the static key check inside. Remove it from there and put it to callers. Also split it to two functions kernel_poison_pages() and kernel_unpoison_pages() instead of the confusing bool parameter. Also optimize the check that enables page poisoning instead of debug_pagealloc for architectures without proper debug_pagealloc support. Move the check to init_mem_debugging_and_hardening() to enable a single static key instead of having two static branches in page_poisoning_enabled_static(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113104033.22907-3-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@kernel.org> Cc: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 11:13:34 +08:00
return kstrtobool(buf, &_page_poisoning_enabled_early);
}
early_param("page_poison", early_page_poison_param);
static void poison_page(struct page *page)
{
void *addr = kmap_atomic(page);
page_poison: play nicely with KASAN KASAN does not play well with the page poisoning (CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING). It triggers false positives in the allocation path: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memchr_inv+0x2ea/0x330 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88881f800000 by task swapper/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #54 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe0/0x19a print_address_description.cold.2+0x9/0x28b kasan_report.cold.3+0x7a/0xb5 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 memchr_inv+0x2ea/0x330 kernel_poison_pages+0x103/0x3d5 get_page_from_freelist+0x15e7/0x4d90 because KASAN has not yet unpoisoned the shadow page for allocation before it checks memchr_inv() but only found a stale poison pattern. Also, false positives in free path, BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kernel_poison_pages+0x29e/0x3d5 Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8888112cc000 by task swapper/0/1 CPU: 5 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #55 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe0/0x19a print_address_description.cold.2+0x9/0x28b kasan_report.cold.3+0x7a/0xb5 check_memory_region+0x22d/0x250 memset+0x28/0x40 kernel_poison_pages+0x29e/0x3d5 __free_pages_ok+0x75f/0x13e0 due to KASAN adds poisoned redzones around slab objects, but the page poisoning needs to poison the whole page. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190114233405.67843-1-cai@lca.pw Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-06 07:41:24 +08:00
/* KASAN still think the page is in-use, so skip it. */
kasan_disable_current();
kasan, mm: reset tags when accessing metadata Kernel allocator code accesses metadata for slab objects, that may lie out-of-bounds of the object itself, or be accessed when an object is freed. Such accesses trigger tag faults and lead to false-positive reports with hardware tag-based KASAN. Software KASAN modes disable instrumentation for allocator code via KASAN_SANITIZE Makefile macro, and rely on kasan_enable/disable_current() annotations which are used to ignore KASAN reports. With hardware tag-based KASAN neither of those options are available, as it doesn't use compiler instrumetation, no tag faults are ignored, and MTE is disabled after the first one. Instead, reset tags when accessing metadata (currently only for SLUB). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a0f3cefbc49f34c843b664110842de4db28179d0.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-23 04:02:17 +08:00
memset(kasan_reset_tag(addr), PAGE_POISON, PAGE_SIZE);
page_poison: play nicely with KASAN KASAN does not play well with the page poisoning (CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING). It triggers false positives in the allocation path: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memchr_inv+0x2ea/0x330 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88881f800000 by task swapper/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #54 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe0/0x19a print_address_description.cold.2+0x9/0x28b kasan_report.cold.3+0x7a/0xb5 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 memchr_inv+0x2ea/0x330 kernel_poison_pages+0x103/0x3d5 get_page_from_freelist+0x15e7/0x4d90 because KASAN has not yet unpoisoned the shadow page for allocation before it checks memchr_inv() but only found a stale poison pattern. Also, false positives in free path, BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kernel_poison_pages+0x29e/0x3d5 Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8888112cc000 by task swapper/0/1 CPU: 5 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #55 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe0/0x19a print_address_description.cold.2+0x9/0x28b kasan_report.cold.3+0x7a/0xb5 check_memory_region+0x22d/0x250 memset+0x28/0x40 kernel_poison_pages+0x29e/0x3d5 __free_pages_ok+0x75f/0x13e0 due to KASAN adds poisoned redzones around slab objects, but the page poisoning needs to poison the whole page. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190114233405.67843-1-cai@lca.pw Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-06 07:41:24 +08:00
kasan_enable_current();
kunmap_atomic(addr);
}
mm, page_poison: use static key more efficiently Commit 11c9c7edae06 ("mm/page_poison.c: replace bool variable with static key") changed page_poisoning_enabled() to a static key check. However, the function is not inlined, so each check still involves a function call with overhead not eliminated when page poisoning is disabled. Analogically to how debug_pagealloc is handled, this patch converts page_poisoning_enabled() back to boolean check, and introduces page_poisoning_enabled_static() for fast paths. Both functions are inlined. The function kernel_poison_pages() is also called unconditionally and does the static key check inside. Remove it from there and put it to callers. Also split it to two functions kernel_poison_pages() and kernel_unpoison_pages() instead of the confusing bool parameter. Also optimize the check that enables page poisoning instead of debug_pagealloc for architectures without proper debug_pagealloc support. Move the check to init_mem_debugging_and_hardening() to enable a single static key instead of having two static branches in page_poisoning_enabled_static(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113104033.22907-3-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@kernel.org> Cc: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 11:13:34 +08:00
void __kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int n)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
poison_page(page + i);
}
static bool single_bit_flip(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
{
unsigned char error = a ^ b;
return error && !(error & (error - 1));
}
mm: page_poison: print page info when corruption is caught When page_poison detects page corruption it's useful to see who freed a page recently to have a guess where write-after-free corruption happens. After this change corruption report has extra page data. Example report from real corruption (includes only page_pwner part): pagealloc: memory corruption e00000014cd61d10: 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 1d d2 ff ff 0f 00 60 ........0......` e00000014cd61d20: b0 1d d2 ff ff 0f 00 60 90 fe 1c 00 08 00 00 20 .......`....... ... CPU: 1 PID: 220402 Comm: cc1plus Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5-00107-g9720c6f59ecf #245 Hardware name: hp server rx3600, BIOS 04.03 04/08/2008 ... Call Trace: [<a000000100015210>] show_stack+0x90/0xc0 [<a000000101163390>] dump_stack+0x150/0x1c0 [<a0000001003f1e90>] __kernel_unpoison_pages+0x410/0x440 [<a0000001003c2460>] get_page_from_freelist+0x1460/0x2ca0 [<a0000001003c6be0>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3c0/0x660 [<a0000001003ed690>] alloc_pages_vma+0xb0/0x500 [<a00000010037deb0>] __handle_mm_fault+0x1230/0x1fe0 [<a00000010037ef70>] handle_mm_fault+0x310/0x4e0 [<a00000010005dc70>] ia64_do_page_fault+0x1f0/0xb80 [<a00000010000ca00>] ia64_leave_kernel+0x0/0x270 page_owner tracks the page as freed page allocated via order 0, migratetype Movable, gfp_mask 0x100dca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE|__GFP_ZERO), pid 37, ts 8173444098740 __reset_page_owner+0x40/0x200 free_pcp_prepare+0x4d0/0x600 free_unref_page+0x20/0x1c0 __put_page+0x110/0x1a0 migrate_pages+0x16d0/0x1dc0 compact_zone+0xfc0/0x1aa0 proactive_compact_node+0xd0/0x1e0 kcompactd+0x550/0x600 kthread+0x2c0/0x2e0 call_payload+0x50/0x80 Here we can see that page was freed by page migration but something managed to write to it afterwards. [slyfox@gentoo.org: s/dump_page_owner/dump_page/, per Vlastimil] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210407230800.1086854-1-slyfox@gentoo.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210404141735.2152984-1-slyfox@gentoo.org Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-30 13:55:12 +08:00
static void check_poison_mem(struct page *page, unsigned char *mem, size_t bytes)
{
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(ratelimit, 5 * HZ, 10);
unsigned char *start;
unsigned char *end;
start = memchr_inv(mem, PAGE_POISON, bytes);
if (!start)
return;
for (end = mem + bytes - 1; end > start; end--) {
if (*end != PAGE_POISON)
break;
}
if (!__ratelimit(&ratelimit))
return;
else if (start == end && single_bit_flip(*start, PAGE_POISON))
pr_err("pagealloc: single bit error\n");
else
pr_err("pagealloc: memory corruption\n");
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, start,
end - start + 1, 1);
dump_stack();
mm: page_poison: print page info when corruption is caught When page_poison detects page corruption it's useful to see who freed a page recently to have a guess where write-after-free corruption happens. After this change corruption report has extra page data. Example report from real corruption (includes only page_pwner part): pagealloc: memory corruption e00000014cd61d10: 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 1d d2 ff ff 0f 00 60 ........0......` e00000014cd61d20: b0 1d d2 ff ff 0f 00 60 90 fe 1c 00 08 00 00 20 .......`....... ... CPU: 1 PID: 220402 Comm: cc1plus Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5-00107-g9720c6f59ecf #245 Hardware name: hp server rx3600, BIOS 04.03 04/08/2008 ... Call Trace: [<a000000100015210>] show_stack+0x90/0xc0 [<a000000101163390>] dump_stack+0x150/0x1c0 [<a0000001003f1e90>] __kernel_unpoison_pages+0x410/0x440 [<a0000001003c2460>] get_page_from_freelist+0x1460/0x2ca0 [<a0000001003c6be0>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3c0/0x660 [<a0000001003ed690>] alloc_pages_vma+0xb0/0x500 [<a00000010037deb0>] __handle_mm_fault+0x1230/0x1fe0 [<a00000010037ef70>] handle_mm_fault+0x310/0x4e0 [<a00000010005dc70>] ia64_do_page_fault+0x1f0/0xb80 [<a00000010000ca00>] ia64_leave_kernel+0x0/0x270 page_owner tracks the page as freed page allocated via order 0, migratetype Movable, gfp_mask 0x100dca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE|__GFP_ZERO), pid 37, ts 8173444098740 __reset_page_owner+0x40/0x200 free_pcp_prepare+0x4d0/0x600 free_unref_page+0x20/0x1c0 __put_page+0x110/0x1a0 migrate_pages+0x16d0/0x1dc0 compact_zone+0xfc0/0x1aa0 proactive_compact_node+0xd0/0x1e0 kcompactd+0x550/0x600 kthread+0x2c0/0x2e0 call_payload+0x50/0x80 Here we can see that page was freed by page migration but something managed to write to it afterwards. [slyfox@gentoo.org: s/dump_page_owner/dump_page/, per Vlastimil] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210407230800.1086854-1-slyfox@gentoo.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210404141735.2152984-1-slyfox@gentoo.org Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-30 13:55:12 +08:00
dump_page(page, "pagealloc: corrupted page details");
}
static void unpoison_page(struct page *page)
{
void *addr;
addr = kmap_atomic(page);
kasan_disable_current();
/*
* Page poisoning when enabled poisons each and every page
* that is freed to buddy. Thus no extra check is done to
* see if a page was poisoned.
*/
mm: page_poison: print page info when corruption is caught When page_poison detects page corruption it's useful to see who freed a page recently to have a guess where write-after-free corruption happens. After this change corruption report has extra page data. Example report from real corruption (includes only page_pwner part): pagealloc: memory corruption e00000014cd61d10: 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 1d d2 ff ff 0f 00 60 ........0......` e00000014cd61d20: b0 1d d2 ff ff 0f 00 60 90 fe 1c 00 08 00 00 20 .......`....... ... CPU: 1 PID: 220402 Comm: cc1plus Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5-00107-g9720c6f59ecf #245 Hardware name: hp server rx3600, BIOS 04.03 04/08/2008 ... Call Trace: [<a000000100015210>] show_stack+0x90/0xc0 [<a000000101163390>] dump_stack+0x150/0x1c0 [<a0000001003f1e90>] __kernel_unpoison_pages+0x410/0x440 [<a0000001003c2460>] get_page_from_freelist+0x1460/0x2ca0 [<a0000001003c6be0>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3c0/0x660 [<a0000001003ed690>] alloc_pages_vma+0xb0/0x500 [<a00000010037deb0>] __handle_mm_fault+0x1230/0x1fe0 [<a00000010037ef70>] handle_mm_fault+0x310/0x4e0 [<a00000010005dc70>] ia64_do_page_fault+0x1f0/0xb80 [<a00000010000ca00>] ia64_leave_kernel+0x0/0x270 page_owner tracks the page as freed page allocated via order 0, migratetype Movable, gfp_mask 0x100dca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE|__GFP_ZERO), pid 37, ts 8173444098740 __reset_page_owner+0x40/0x200 free_pcp_prepare+0x4d0/0x600 free_unref_page+0x20/0x1c0 __put_page+0x110/0x1a0 migrate_pages+0x16d0/0x1dc0 compact_zone+0xfc0/0x1aa0 proactive_compact_node+0xd0/0x1e0 kcompactd+0x550/0x600 kthread+0x2c0/0x2e0 call_payload+0x50/0x80 Here we can see that page was freed by page migration but something managed to write to it afterwards. [slyfox@gentoo.org: s/dump_page_owner/dump_page/, per Vlastimil] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210407230800.1086854-1-slyfox@gentoo.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210404141735.2152984-1-slyfox@gentoo.org Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-30 13:55:12 +08:00
check_poison_mem(page, kasan_reset_tag(addr), PAGE_SIZE);
kasan_enable_current();
kunmap_atomic(addr);
}
mm, page_poison: use static key more efficiently Commit 11c9c7edae06 ("mm/page_poison.c: replace bool variable with static key") changed page_poisoning_enabled() to a static key check. However, the function is not inlined, so each check still involves a function call with overhead not eliminated when page poisoning is disabled. Analogically to how debug_pagealloc is handled, this patch converts page_poisoning_enabled() back to boolean check, and introduces page_poisoning_enabled_static() for fast paths. Both functions are inlined. The function kernel_poison_pages() is also called unconditionally and does the static key check inside. Remove it from there and put it to callers. Also split it to two functions kernel_poison_pages() and kernel_unpoison_pages() instead of the confusing bool parameter. Also optimize the check that enables page poisoning instead of debug_pagealloc for architectures without proper debug_pagealloc support. Move the check to init_mem_debugging_and_hardening() to enable a single static key instead of having two static branches in page_poisoning_enabled_static(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113104033.22907-3-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@kernel.org> Cc: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 11:13:34 +08:00
void __kernel_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, int n)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
unpoison_page(page + i);
}
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
void __kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable)
{
/* This function does nothing, all work is done via poison pages */
}
#endif