linux-sg2042/kernel/user.c

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/*
* The "user cache".
*
* (C) Copyright 1991-2000 Linus Torvalds
*
* We have a per-user structure to keep track of how many
* processes, files etc the user has claimed, in order to be
* able to have per-user limits for system resources.
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/sched/user.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
userns: add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace The expected course of development for user namespaces targeted capabilities is laid out at https://wiki.ubuntu.com/UserNamespace. Goals: - Make it safe for an unprivileged user to unshare namespaces. They will be privileged with respect to the new namespace, but this should only include resources which the unprivileged user already owns. - Provide separate limits and accounting for userids in different namespaces. Status: Currently (as of 2.6.38) you can clone with the CLONE_NEWUSER flag to get a new user namespace if you have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SETUID, and CAP_SETGID capabilities. What this gets you is a whole new set of userids, meaning that user 500 will have a different 'struct user' in your namespace than in other namespaces. So any accounting information stored in struct user will be unique to your namespace. However, throughout the kernel there are checks which - simply check for a capability. Since root in a child namespace has all capabilities, this means that a child namespace is not constrained. - simply compare uid1 == uid2. Since these are the integer uids, uid 500 in namespace 1 will be said to be equal to uid 500 in namespace 2. As a result, the lxc implementation at lxc.sf.net does not use user namespaces. This is actually helpful because it leaves us free to develop user namespaces in such a way that, for some time, user namespaces may be unuseful. Bugs aside, this patchset is supposed to not at all affect systems which are not actively using user namespaces, and only restrict what tasks in child user namespace can do. They begin to limit privilege to a user namespace, so that root in a container cannot kill or ptrace tasks in the parent user namespace, and can only get world access rights to files. Since all files currently belong to the initila user namespace, that means that child user namespaces can only get world access rights to *all* files. While this temporarily makes user namespaces bad for system containers, it starts to get useful for some sandboxing. I've run the 'runltplite.sh' with and without this patchset and found no difference. This patch: copy_process() handles CLONE_NEWUSER before the rest of the namespaces. So in the case of clone(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWUTS) the new uts namespace will have the new user namespace as its owner. That is what we want, since we want root in that new userns to be able to have privilege over it. Changelog: Feb 15: don't set uts_ns->user_ns if we didn't create a new uts_ns. Feb 23: Move extern init_user_ns declaration from init/version.c to utsname.h. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-24 07:43:16 +08:00
/*
* userns count is 1 for root user, 1 for init_uts_ns,
* and 1 for... ?
*/
struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid mapping support - Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers - Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed. * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today, leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test. - Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added if a mapping does not exist. - Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping. Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid and gid mapping. Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the slight weirdness worth it. - Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar to what we do with jiffies. - Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are trivial but a little atypical. Performance: In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same. The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache. My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were not in the processors cache. My results: v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled) All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests that ran in the cpu cache. So in summary the performance impact is: 1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out. 8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2011-11-17 16:11:58 +08:00
.uid_map = {
.nr_extents = 1,
{
.extent[0] = {
.first = 0,
.lower_first = 0,
.count = 4294967295U,
},
userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid mapping support - Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers - Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed. * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today, leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test. - Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added if a mapping does not exist. - Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping. Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid and gid mapping. Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the slight weirdness worth it. - Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar to what we do with jiffies. - Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are trivial but a little atypical. Performance: In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same. The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache. My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were not in the processors cache. My results: v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled) All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests that ran in the cpu cache. So in summary the performance impact is: 1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out. 8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2011-11-17 16:11:58 +08:00
},
},
.gid_map = {
.nr_extents = 1,
{
.extent[0] = {
.first = 0,
.lower_first = 0,
.count = 4294967295U,
},
userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid mapping support - Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers - Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed. * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today, leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test. - Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added if a mapping does not exist. - Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping. Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid and gid mapping. Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the slight weirdness worth it. - Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar to what we do with jiffies. - Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are trivial but a little atypical. Performance: In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same. The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache. My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were not in the processors cache. My results: v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled) All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests that ran in the cpu cache. So in summary the performance impact is: 1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out. 8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2011-11-17 16:11:58 +08:00
},
},
.projid_map = {
.nr_extents = 1,
{
.extent[0] = {
.first = 0,
.lower_first = 0,
.count = 4294967295U,
},
},
},
.count = ATOMIC_INIT(3),
.owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
.ns.inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
.ns.ops = &userns_operations,
#endif
2014-12-03 02:27:26 +08:00
.flags = USERNS_INIT_FLAGS,
KEYS: fix uninitialized persistent_keyring_register_sem We run into this bug: [ 2736.063245] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000000 [ 2736.063293] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000037efb0 [ 2736.063300] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] [ 2736.063303] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries [ 2736.063310] Modules linked in: sg nfsv3 rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs fscache nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ipt_MASQUERADE ip6table_mangle ip6table_security ip6table_raw ip6t_REJECT iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 iptable_mangle iptable_security iptable_raw ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter iptable_filter ip_tables ip6table_nat nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 nf_nat nf_conntrack ip6_tables ibmveth pseries_rng nx_crypto nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd sunrpc binfmt_misc xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod crc_t10dif crct10dif_common ibmvfc scsi_transport_fc scsi_tgt dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_multipath dm_mod [ 2736.063383] CPU: 1 PID: 7128 Comm: ssh Not tainted 3.10.0-48.el7.ppc64 #1 [ 2736.063389] task: c000000131930120 ti: c0000001319a0000 task.ti: c0000001319a0000 [ 2736.063394] NIP: c00000000037efb0 LR: c0000000006c40f8 CTR: 0000000000000000 [ 2736.063399] REGS: c0000001319a3870 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.10.0-48.el7.ppc64) [ 2736.063403] MSR: 8000000000009032 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28824242 XER: 20000000 [ 2736.063415] SOFTE: 0 [ 2736.063418] CFAR: c00000000000908c [ 2736.063421] DAR: 0000000000000000, DSISR: 40000000 [ 2736.063425] GPR00: c0000000006c40f8 c0000001319a3af0 c000000001074788 c0000001319a3bf0 GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000020 000000000000000a GPR08: fffffffe00000002 00000000ffff0000 0000000080000001 c000000000924888 GPR12: 0000000028824248 c000000007e00400 00001fffffa0f998 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000022 00001fffffa0f998 0000010022e92470 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR24: 0000000000000000 c000000000f4a828 00003ffffe527108 0000000000000000 GPR28: c000000000f4a730 c000000000f4a828 0000000000000000 c0000001319a3bf0 [ 2736.063498] NIP [c00000000037efb0] .__list_add+0x30/0x110 [ 2736.063504] LR [c0000000006c40f8] .rwsem_down_write_failed+0x78/0x264 [ 2736.063508] PACATMSCRATCH [800000000280f032] [ 2736.063511] Call Trace: [ 2736.063516] [c0000001319a3af0] [c0000001319a3b80] 0xc0000001319a3b80 (unreliable) [ 2736.063523] [c0000001319a3b80] [c0000000006c40f8] .rwsem_down_write_failed+0x78/0x264 [ 2736.063530] [c0000001319a3c50] [c0000000006c1bb0] .down_write+0x70/0x78 [ 2736.063536] [c0000001319a3cd0] [c0000000002e5ffc] .keyctl_get_persistent+0x20c/0x320 [ 2736.063542] [c0000001319a3dc0] [c0000000002e2388] .SyS_keyctl+0x238/0x260 [ 2736.063548] [c0000001319a3e30] [c000000000009e7c] syscall_exit+0x0/0x7c [ 2736.063553] Instruction dump: [ 2736.063556] 7c0802a6 fba1ffe8 fbc1fff0 fbe1fff8 7cbd2b78 7c9e2378 7c7f1b78 f8010010 [ 2736.063566] f821ff71 e8a50008 7fa52040 40de00c0 <e8be0000> 7fbd2840 40de0094 7fbff040 [ 2736.063579] ---[ end trace 2708241785538296 ]--- It's caused by uninitialized persistent_keyring_register_sem. The bug was introduced by commit f36f8c75, two typos are in that commit: CONFIG_KEYS_KERBEROS_CACHE should be CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS and krb_cache_register_sem should be persistent_keyring_register_sem. Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-12-13 15:00:32 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
.persistent_keyring_register_sem =
__RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.persistent_keyring_register_sem),
KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches Add support for per-user_namespace registers of persistent per-UID kerberos caches held within the kernel. This allows the kerberos cache to be retained beyond the life of all a user's processes so that the user's cron jobs can work. The kerberos cache is envisioned as a keyring/key tree looking something like: struct user_namespace \___ .krb_cache keyring - The register \___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache \___ tkt785 big_key - A ccache blob \___ tkt12345 big_key - Another ccache blob Or possibly: struct user_namespace \___ .krb_cache keyring - The register \___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache \___ tkt785 keyring - A ccache \___ krbtgt/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM big_key \___ http/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ afs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ nfs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ krbtgt/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key \___ http/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key What goes into a particular Kerberos cache is entirely up to userspace. Kernel support is limited to giving you the Kerberos cache keyring that you want. The user asks for their Kerberos cache by: krb_cache = keyctl_get_krbcache(uid, dest_keyring); The uid is -1 or the user's own UID for the user's own cache or the uid of some other user's cache (requires CAP_SETUID). This permits rpc.gssd or whatever to mess with the cache. The cache returned is a keyring named "_krb.<uid>" that the possessor can read, search, clear, invalidate, unlink from and add links to. Active LSMs get a chance to rule on whether the caller is permitted to make a link. Each uid's cache keyring is created when it first accessed and is given a timeout that is extended each time this function is called so that the keyring goes away after a while. The timeout is configurable by sysctl but defaults to three days. Each user_namespace struct gets a lazily-created keyring that serves as the register. The cache keyrings are added to it. This means that standard key search and garbage collection facilities are available. The user_namespace struct's register goes away when it does and anything left in it is then automatically gc'd. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
#endif
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
/*
* UID task count cache, to get fast user lookup in "alloc_uid"
* when changing user ID's (ie setuid() and friends).
*/
#define UIDHASH_BITS (CONFIG_BASE_SMALL ? 3 : 7)
#define UIDHASH_SZ (1 << UIDHASH_BITS)
#define UIDHASH_MASK (UIDHASH_SZ - 1)
#define __uidhashfn(uid) (((uid >> UIDHASH_BITS) + uid) & UIDHASH_MASK)
#define uidhashentry(uid) (uidhash_table + __uidhashfn((__kuid_val(uid))))
static struct kmem_cache *uid_cachep;
struct hlist_head uidhash_table[UIDHASH_SZ];
/*
* The uidhash_lock is mostly taken from process context, but it is
* occasionally also taken from softirq/tasklet context, when
* task-structs get RCU-freed. Hence all locking must be softirq-safe.
* But free_uid() is also called with local interrupts disabled, and running
* local_bh_enable() with local interrupts disabled is an error - we'll run
* softirq callbacks, and they can unconditionally enable interrupts, and
* the caller of free_uid() didn't expect that..
*/
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(uidhash_lock);
/* root_user.__count is 1, for init task cred */
struct user_struct root_user = {
.__count = ATOMIC_INIT(1),
.processes = ATOMIC_INIT(1),
.sigpending = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
.locked_shm = 0,
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.ratelimit = RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT(root_user.ratelimit, 0, 0),
};
/*
* These routines must be called with the uidhash spinlock held!
*/
static void uid_hash_insert(struct user_struct *up, struct hlist_head *hashent)
{
hlist_add_head(&up->uidhash_node, hashent);
}
static void uid_hash_remove(struct user_struct *up)
{
hlist_del_init(&up->uidhash_node);
}
static struct user_struct *uid_hash_find(kuid_t uid, struct hlist_head *hashent)
{
struct user_struct *user;
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 09:06:00 +08:00
hlist_for_each_entry(user, hashent, uidhash_node) {
if (uid_eq(user->uid, uid)) {
atomic_inc(&user->__count);
return user;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/* IRQs are disabled and uidhash_lock is held upon function entry.
* IRQ state (as stored in flags) is restored and uidhash_lock released
* upon function exit.
*/
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2) The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are here as well. Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply: 1. The task pins the user struct. 2. The user struct pins its user namespace. 3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it. User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user namespaces). When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty keyrings and a clean group_info. This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here is his original patch description: >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following >changes: > > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user > namespace. > > (2) Fixes eCryptFS. > > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is > superfluous. > > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts > at allocation. > > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred > struct. > > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer. > > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds(). > >David >Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Changelog: Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments 1. leave thread_keyring alone 2. use current_user_ns() in set_user() Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2008-10-16 05:38:45 +08:00
static void free_user(struct user_struct *up, unsigned long flags)
__releases(&uidhash_lock)
{
uid_hash_remove(up);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uidhash_lock, flags);
key_put(up->uid_keyring);
key_put(up->session_keyring);
kmem_cache_free(uid_cachep, up);
}
/*
* Locate the user_struct for the passed UID. If found, take a ref on it. The
* caller must undo that ref with free_uid().
*
* If the user_struct could not be found, return NULL.
*/
struct user_struct *find_user(kuid_t uid)
{
struct user_struct *ret;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&uidhash_lock, flags);
ret = uid_hash_find(uid, uidhashentry(uid));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uidhash_lock, flags);
return ret;
}
void free_uid(struct user_struct *up)
{
unsigned long flags;
if (!up)
return;
local_irq_save(flags);
if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&up->__count, &uidhash_lock))
free_user(up, flags);
else
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
struct user_struct *alloc_uid(kuid_t uid)
{
struct hlist_head *hashent = uidhashentry(uid);
struct user_struct *up, *new;
spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
up = uid_hash_find(uid, hashent);
spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
if (!up) {
new = kmem_cache_zalloc(uid_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
goto out_unlock;
new->uid = uid;
atomic_set(&new->__count, 1);
ratelimit_state_init(&new->ratelimit, HZ, 100);
ratelimit_set_flags(&new->ratelimit, RATELIMIT_MSG_ON_RELEASE);
/*
* Before adding this, check whether we raced
* on adding the same user already..
*/
spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
up = uid_hash_find(uid, hashent);
if (up) {
key_put(new->uid_keyring);
key_put(new->session_keyring);
kmem_cache_free(uid_cachep, new);
} else {
uid_hash_insert(new, hashent);
up = new;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
}
return up;
out_unlock:
return NULL;
}
static int __init uid_cache_init(void)
{
int n;
uid_cachep = kmem_cache_create("uid_cache", sizeof(struct user_struct),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
for(n = 0; n < UIDHASH_SZ; ++n)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(uidhash_table + n);
/* Insert the root user immediately (init already runs as root) */
spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
uid_hash_insert(&root_user, uidhashentry(GLOBAL_ROOT_UID));
spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
return 0;
}
2014-04-04 05:48:35 +08:00
subsys_initcall(uid_cache_init);