linux-sg2042/kernel/futex_compat.c

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/*
* linux/kernel/futex_compat.c
*
* Futex compatibililty routines.
*
* Copyright 2006, Red Hat, Inc., Ingo Molnar
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/futex.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
/*
* Fetch a robust-list pointer. Bit 0 signals PI futexes:
*/
static inline int
fetch_robust_entry(compat_uptr_t *uentry, struct robust_list __user **entry,
compat_uptr_t __user *head, unsigned int *pi)
{
if (get_user(*uentry, head))
return -EFAULT;
*entry = compat_ptr((*uentry) & ~1);
*pi = (unsigned int)(*uentry) & 1;
return 0;
}
static void __user *futex_uaddr(struct robust_list __user *entry,
[FUTEX] Fix address computation in compat code. compat_exit_robust_list() computes a pointer to the futex entry in userspace as follows: (void __user *)entry + futex_offset 'entry' is a 'struct robust_list __user *', and 'futex_offset' is a 'compat_long_t' (typically a 's32'). Things explode if the 32-bit sign bit is set in futex_offset. Type promotion sign extends futex_offset to a 64-bit value before adding it to 'entry'. This triggered a problem on sparc64 running 32-bit applications which would lock up a cpu looping forever in the fault handling for the userspace load in handle_futex_death(). Compat userspace runs with address masking (wherein the cpu zeros out the top 32-bits of every effective address given to a memory operation instruction) so the sparc64 fault handler accounts for this by zero'ing out the top 32-bits of the fault address too. Since the kernel properly uses the compat_uptr interfaces, kernel side accesses to compat userspace work too since they will only use addresses with the top 32-bit clear. Because of this compat futex layer bug we get into the following loop when executing the get_user() load near the top of handle_futex_death(): 1) load from address '0xfffffffff7f16bd8', FAULT 2) fault handler clears upper 32-bits, processes fault for address '0xf7f16bd8' which succeeds 3) goto #1 I want to thank Bernd Zeimetz, Josip Rodin, and Fabio Massimo Di Nitto for their tireless efforts helping me track down this bug. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-07 13:13:56 +08:00
compat_long_t futex_offset)
{
compat_uptr_t base = ptr_to_compat(entry);
void __user *uaddr = compat_ptr(base + futex_offset);
return uaddr;
}
/*
* Walk curr->robust_list (very carefully, it's a userspace list!)
* and mark any locks found there dead, and notify any waiters.
*
* We silently return on any sign of list-walking problem.
*/
void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head = curr->compat_robust_list;
struct robust_list __user *entry, *next_entry, *pending;
unsigned int limit = ROBUST_LIST_LIMIT, pi, pip;
unsigned int uninitialized_var(next_pi);
compat_uptr_t uentry, next_uentry, upending;
compat_long_t futex_offset;
int rc;
futex: runtime enable pi and robust functionality Not all architectures implement futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(). The default implementation returns -ENOSYS, which is currently not handled inside of the futex guts. Futex PI calls and robust list exits with a held futex result in an endless loop in the futex code on architectures which have no support. Fixing up every place where futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() is called would add a fair amount of extra if/else constructs to the already complex code. It is also not possible to disable the robust feature before user space tries to register robust lists. Compile time disabling is not a good idea either, as there are already architectures with runtime detection of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic support. Detect the functionality at runtime instead by calling cmpxchg_futex_value_locked() with a NULL pointer from the futex initialization code. This is guaranteed to fail, but the call of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() happens with pagefaults disabled. On architectures, which use the asm-generic implementation or have a runtime CPU feature detection, a -ENOSYS return value disables the PI/robust features. On architectures with a working implementation the call returns -EFAULT and the PI/robust features are enabled. The relevant syscalls return -ENOSYS and the robust list exit code is blocked, when the detection fails. Fixes http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/11/149 Originally reported by: Lennart Buytenhek Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Lennert Buytenhek <buytenh@wantstofly.org> Cc: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@movial.fi> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-24 07:23:57 +08:00
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return;
/*
* Fetch the list head (which was registered earlier, via
* sys_set_robust_list()):
*/
if (fetch_robust_entry(&uentry, &entry, &head->list.next, &pi))
return;
/*
* Fetch the relative futex offset:
*/
if (get_user(futex_offset, &head->futex_offset))
return;
/*
* Fetch any possibly pending lock-add first, and handle it
* if it exists:
*/
if (fetch_robust_entry(&upending, &pending,
&head->list_op_pending, &pip))
return;
next_entry = NULL; /* avoid warning with gcc */
while (entry != (struct robust_list __user *) &head->list) {
/*
* Fetch the next entry in the list before calling
* handle_futex_death:
*/
rc = fetch_robust_entry(&next_uentry, &next_entry,
(compat_uptr_t __user *)&entry->next, &next_pi);
/*
* A pending lock might already be on the list, so
* dont process it twice:
*/
[FUTEX] Fix address computation in compat code. compat_exit_robust_list() computes a pointer to the futex entry in userspace as follows: (void __user *)entry + futex_offset 'entry' is a 'struct robust_list __user *', and 'futex_offset' is a 'compat_long_t' (typically a 's32'). Things explode if the 32-bit sign bit is set in futex_offset. Type promotion sign extends futex_offset to a 64-bit value before adding it to 'entry'. This triggered a problem on sparc64 running 32-bit applications which would lock up a cpu looping forever in the fault handling for the userspace load in handle_futex_death(). Compat userspace runs with address masking (wherein the cpu zeros out the top 32-bits of every effective address given to a memory operation instruction) so the sparc64 fault handler accounts for this by zero'ing out the top 32-bits of the fault address too. Since the kernel properly uses the compat_uptr interfaces, kernel side accesses to compat userspace work too since they will only use addresses with the top 32-bit clear. Because of this compat futex layer bug we get into the following loop when executing the get_user() load near the top of handle_futex_death(): 1) load from address '0xfffffffff7f16bd8', FAULT 2) fault handler clears upper 32-bits, processes fault for address '0xf7f16bd8' which succeeds 3) goto #1 I want to thank Bernd Zeimetz, Josip Rodin, and Fabio Massimo Di Nitto for their tireless efforts helping me track down this bug. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-07 13:13:56 +08:00
if (entry != pending) {
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(entry, futex_offset);
[FUTEX] Fix address computation in compat code. compat_exit_robust_list() computes a pointer to the futex entry in userspace as follows: (void __user *)entry + futex_offset 'entry' is a 'struct robust_list __user *', and 'futex_offset' is a 'compat_long_t' (typically a 's32'). Things explode if the 32-bit sign bit is set in futex_offset. Type promotion sign extends futex_offset to a 64-bit value before adding it to 'entry'. This triggered a problem on sparc64 running 32-bit applications which would lock up a cpu looping forever in the fault handling for the userspace load in handle_futex_death(). Compat userspace runs with address masking (wherein the cpu zeros out the top 32-bits of every effective address given to a memory operation instruction) so the sparc64 fault handler accounts for this by zero'ing out the top 32-bits of the fault address too. Since the kernel properly uses the compat_uptr interfaces, kernel side accesses to compat userspace work too since they will only use addresses with the top 32-bit clear. Because of this compat futex layer bug we get into the following loop when executing the get_user() load near the top of handle_futex_death(): 1) load from address '0xfffffffff7f16bd8', FAULT 2) fault handler clears upper 32-bits, processes fault for address '0xf7f16bd8' which succeeds 3) goto #1 I want to thank Bernd Zeimetz, Josip Rodin, and Fabio Massimo Di Nitto for their tireless efforts helping me track down this bug. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-07 13:13:56 +08:00
if (handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pi))
return;
}
if (rc)
return;
uentry = next_uentry;
entry = next_entry;
pi = next_pi;
/*
* Avoid excessively long or circular lists:
*/
if (!--limit)
break;
cond_resched();
}
[FUTEX] Fix address computation in compat code. compat_exit_robust_list() computes a pointer to the futex entry in userspace as follows: (void __user *)entry + futex_offset 'entry' is a 'struct robust_list __user *', and 'futex_offset' is a 'compat_long_t' (typically a 's32'). Things explode if the 32-bit sign bit is set in futex_offset. Type promotion sign extends futex_offset to a 64-bit value before adding it to 'entry'. This triggered a problem on sparc64 running 32-bit applications which would lock up a cpu looping forever in the fault handling for the userspace load in handle_futex_death(). Compat userspace runs with address masking (wherein the cpu zeros out the top 32-bits of every effective address given to a memory operation instruction) so the sparc64 fault handler accounts for this by zero'ing out the top 32-bits of the fault address too. Since the kernel properly uses the compat_uptr interfaces, kernel side accesses to compat userspace work too since they will only use addresses with the top 32-bit clear. Because of this compat futex layer bug we get into the following loop when executing the get_user() load near the top of handle_futex_death(): 1) load from address '0xfffffffff7f16bd8', FAULT 2) fault handler clears upper 32-bits, processes fault for address '0xf7f16bd8' which succeeds 3) goto #1 I want to thank Bernd Zeimetz, Josip Rodin, and Fabio Massimo Di Nitto for their tireless efforts helping me track down this bug. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-07 13:13:56 +08:00
if (pending) {
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(pending, futex_offset);
handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pip);
}
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list,
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *, head,
compat_size_t, len)
{
futex: runtime enable pi and robust functionality Not all architectures implement futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(). The default implementation returns -ENOSYS, which is currently not handled inside of the futex guts. Futex PI calls and robust list exits with a held futex result in an endless loop in the futex code on architectures which have no support. Fixing up every place where futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() is called would add a fair amount of extra if/else constructs to the already complex code. It is also not possible to disable the robust feature before user space tries to register robust lists. Compile time disabling is not a good idea either, as there are already architectures with runtime detection of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic support. Detect the functionality at runtime instead by calling cmpxchg_futex_value_locked() with a NULL pointer from the futex initialization code. This is guaranteed to fail, but the call of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() happens with pagefaults disabled. On architectures, which use the asm-generic implementation or have a runtime CPU feature detection, a -ENOSYS return value disables the PI/robust features. On architectures with a working implementation the call returns -EFAULT and the PI/robust features are enabled. The relevant syscalls return -ENOSYS and the robust list exit code is blocked, when the detection fails. Fixes http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/11/149 Originally reported by: Lennart Buytenhek Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Lennert Buytenhek <buytenh@wantstofly.org> Cc: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@movial.fi> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-24 07:23:57 +08:00
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
if (unlikely(len != sizeof(*head)))
return -EINVAL;
current->compat_robust_list = head;
return 0;
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
compat_uptr_t __user *, head_ptr,
compat_size_t __user *, len_ptr)
{
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head;
unsigned long ret;
struct task_struct *p;
futex: runtime enable pi and robust functionality Not all architectures implement futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(). The default implementation returns -ENOSYS, which is currently not handled inside of the futex guts. Futex PI calls and robust list exits with a held futex result in an endless loop in the futex code on architectures which have no support. Fixing up every place where futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() is called would add a fair amount of extra if/else constructs to the already complex code. It is also not possible to disable the robust feature before user space tries to register robust lists. Compile time disabling is not a good idea either, as there are already architectures with runtime detection of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic support. Detect the functionality at runtime instead by calling cmpxchg_futex_value_locked() with a NULL pointer from the futex initialization code. This is guaranteed to fail, but the call of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() happens with pagefaults disabled. On architectures, which use the asm-generic implementation or have a runtime CPU feature detection, a -ENOSYS return value disables the PI/robust features. On architectures with a working implementation the call returns -EFAULT and the PI/robust features are enabled. The relevant syscalls return -ENOSYS and the robust list exit code is blocked, when the detection fails. Fixes http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/11/149 Originally reported by: Lennart Buytenhek Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Lennert Buytenhek <buytenh@wantstofly.org> Cc: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@movial.fi> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-24 07:23:57 +08:00
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
rcu_read_lock();
ret = -ESRCH;
if (!pid)
p = current;
else {
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
goto err_unlock;
}
ret = -EPERM;
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->compat_robust_list;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(ptr_to_compat(head), head_ptr);
err_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(futex, u32 __user *, uaddr, int, op, u32, val,
struct compat_timespec __user *, utime, u32 __user *, uaddr2,
u32, val3)
{
struct timespec ts;
ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
int val2 = 0;
int cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;
if (utime && (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT || cmd == FUTEX_LOCK_PI ||
cmd == FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET ||
cmd == FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI)) {
if (get_compat_timespec(&ts, utime))
return -EFAULT;
if (!timespec_valid(&ts))
return -EINVAL;
t = timespec_to_ktime(ts);
if (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT)
t = ktime_add_safe(ktime_get(), t);
tp = &t;
}
if (cmd == FUTEX_REQUEUE || cmd == FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE ||
cmd == FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI || cmd == FUTEX_WAKE_OP)
val2 = (int) (unsigned long) utime;
return do_futex(uaddr, op, val, tp, uaddr2, val2, val3);
}