linux-sg2042/arch/powerpc/oprofile/backtrace.c

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/**
* Copyright (C) 2005 Brian Rogan <bcr6@cornell.edu>, IBM
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
**/
y2038: globally rename compat_time to old_time32 Christoph Hellwig suggested a slightly different path for handling backwards compatibility with the 32-bit time_t based system calls: Rather than simply reusing the compat_sys_* entry points on 32-bit architectures unchanged, we get rid of those entry points and the compat_time types by renaming them to something that makes more sense on 32-bit architectures (which don't have a compat mode otherwise), and then share the entry points under the new name with the 64-bit architectures that use them for implementing the compatibility. The following types and interfaces are renamed here, and moved from linux/compat_time.h to linux/time32.h: old new --- --- compat_time_t old_time32_t struct compat_timeval struct old_timeval32 struct compat_timespec struct old_timespec32 struct compat_itimerspec struct old_itimerspec32 ns_to_compat_timeval() ns_to_old_timeval32() get_compat_itimerspec64() get_old_itimerspec32() put_compat_itimerspec64() put_old_itimerspec32() compat_get_timespec64() get_old_timespec32() compat_put_timespec64() put_old_timespec32() As we already have aliases in place, this patch addresses only the instances that are relevant to the system call interface in particular, not those that occur in device drivers and other modules. Those will get handled separately, while providing the 64-bit version of the respective interfaces. I'm not renaming the timex, rusage and itimerval structures, as we are still debating what the new interface will look like, and whether we will need a replacement at all. This also doesn't change the names of the syscall entry points, which can be done more easily when we actually switch over the 32-bit architectures to use them, at that point we need to change COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx to SYSCALL_DEFINEx with a new name, e.g. with a _time32 suffix. Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180705222110.GA5698@infradead.org/ Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2018-07-13 18:52:28 +08:00
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/oprofile.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
powerpc/oprofile: Disable pagefaults during user stack read A page fault occurred during reading user stack in oprofile backtrace would lead following calltrace: WARNING: at linux/kernel/smp.c:210 Modules linked in: CPU: 5 PID: 736 Comm: sh Tainted: G W 3.14.23-WR7.0.0.0_standard #1 task: c0000000f6208bc0 ti: c00000007c72c000 task.ti: c00000007c72c000 NIP: c0000000000ed6e4 LR: c0000000000ed5b8 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000007c72f050 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (3.14.23-WR7.0.0 tandard) MSR: 0000000080021000 <CE,ME> CR: 48222482 XER: 00000000 SOFTE: 0 GPR00: c0000000000ed5b8 c00000007c72f2d0 c0000000010aa048 0000000000000005 GPR04: c000000000fdb820 c00000007c72f410 0000000000000001 0000000000000005 GPR08: c0000000010b5768 c000000000f8a048 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000048222482 c00000000fffe580 0000000022222222 0000000010129664 GPR16: 0000000010143cc0 0000000000000000 0000000044444444 0000000000000000 GPR20: c00000007c7221d8 c0000000f638e3c8 000003f15a20120d 0000000000000001 GPR24: 000000005a20120d c00000007c722000 c00000007cdedda8 00003fffef23b160 GPR28: 0000000000000001 c00000007c72f410 c000000000fdb820 0000000000000006 NIP [c0000000000ed6e4] .smp_call_function_single+0x18c/0x248 LR [c0000000000ed5b8] .smp_call_function_single+0x60/0x248 Call Trace: [c00000007c72f2d0] [c0000000000ed5b8] .smp_call_function_single+0x60/0x248 (unreliable) [c00000007c72f3a0] [c000000000030810] .__flush_tlb_page+0x164/0x1b0 [c00000007c72f460] [c00000000002e054] .ptep_set_access_flags+0xb8/0x168 [c00000007c72f500] [c0000000001ad3d8] .handle_mm_fault+0x4a8/0xbac [c00000007c72f5e0] [c000000000bb3238] .do_page_fault+0x3b8/0x868 [c00000007c72f810] [c00000000001e1d0] storage_fault_common+0x20/0x44 Exception: 301 at .__copy_tofrom_user_base+0x54/0x5b0 LR = .op_powerpc_backtrace+0x190/0x20c [c00000007c72fb00] [c000000000a2ec34] .op_powerpc_backtrace+0x204/0x20c (unreliable) [c00000007c72fbc0] [c000000000a2b5fc] .oprofile_add_ext_sample+0xe8/0x118 [c00000007c72fc70] [c000000000a2eee0] .fsl_emb_handle_interrupt+0x20c/0x27c [c00000007c72fd30] [c000000000a2e440] .op_handle_interrupt+0x44/0x58 [c00000007c72fdb0] [c000000000016d68] .performance_monitor_exception+0x74/0x90 [c00000007c72fe30] [c00000000001d8b4] exc_0x260_common+0xfc/0x100 performance_monitor_exception() is executed in a context with interrupt disabled and preemption enabled. When there is a user space page fault happened, do_page_fault() invoke in_atomic() to decide whether kernel should handle such page fault. in_atomic() only check preempt_count. So need call pagefault_disable() to disable preemption before reading user stack. Signed-off-by: Jiang Lu <lu.jiang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2014-11-21 11:23:19 +08:00
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/compat.h>
#include <asm/oprofile_impl.h>
#define STACK_SP(STACK) *(STACK)
#define STACK_LR64(STACK) *((unsigned long *)(STACK) + 2)
#define STACK_LR32(STACK) *((unsigned int *)(STACK) + 1)
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
#define STACK_LR(STACK) STACK_LR64(STACK)
#else
#define STACK_LR(STACK) STACK_LR32(STACK)
#endif
static unsigned int user_getsp32(unsigned int sp, int is_first)
{
unsigned int stack_frame[2];
void __user *p = compat_ptr(sp);
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
if (!access_ok(p, sizeof(stack_frame)))
return 0;
/*
* The most likely reason for this is that we returned -EFAULT,
* which means that we've done all that we can do from
* interrupt context.
*/
if (__copy_from_user_inatomic(stack_frame, p, sizeof(stack_frame)))
return 0;
if (!is_first)
oprofile_add_trace(STACK_LR32(stack_frame));
/*
* We do not enforce increasing stack addresses here because
* we may transition to a different stack, eg a signal handler.
*/
return STACK_SP(stack_frame);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
static unsigned long user_getsp64(unsigned long sp, int is_first)
{
unsigned long stack_frame[3];
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
if (!access_ok((void __user *)sp, sizeof(stack_frame)))
return 0;
if (__copy_from_user_inatomic(stack_frame, (void __user *)sp,
sizeof(stack_frame)))
return 0;
if (!is_first)
oprofile_add_trace(STACK_LR64(stack_frame));
return STACK_SP(stack_frame);
}
#endif
static unsigned long kernel_getsp(unsigned long sp, int is_first)
{
unsigned long *stack_frame = (unsigned long *)sp;
if (!validate_sp(sp, current, STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD))
return 0;
if (!is_first)
oprofile_add_trace(STACK_LR(stack_frame));
/*
* We do not enforce increasing stack addresses here because
* we might be transitioning from an interrupt stack to a kernel
* stack. validate_sp() is designed to understand this, so just
* use it.
*/
return STACK_SP(stack_frame);
}
void op_powerpc_backtrace(struct pt_regs * const regs, unsigned int depth)
{
unsigned long sp = regs->gpr[1];
int first_frame = 1;
/* We ditch the top stackframe so need to loop through an extra time */
depth += 1;
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
while (depth--) {
sp = kernel_getsp(sp, first_frame);
if (!sp)
break;
first_frame = 0;
}
} else {
powerpc/oprofile: Disable pagefaults during user stack read A page fault occurred during reading user stack in oprofile backtrace would lead following calltrace: WARNING: at linux/kernel/smp.c:210 Modules linked in: CPU: 5 PID: 736 Comm: sh Tainted: G W 3.14.23-WR7.0.0.0_standard #1 task: c0000000f6208bc0 ti: c00000007c72c000 task.ti: c00000007c72c000 NIP: c0000000000ed6e4 LR: c0000000000ed5b8 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000007c72f050 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (3.14.23-WR7.0.0 tandard) MSR: 0000000080021000 <CE,ME> CR: 48222482 XER: 00000000 SOFTE: 0 GPR00: c0000000000ed5b8 c00000007c72f2d0 c0000000010aa048 0000000000000005 GPR04: c000000000fdb820 c00000007c72f410 0000000000000001 0000000000000005 GPR08: c0000000010b5768 c000000000f8a048 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000048222482 c00000000fffe580 0000000022222222 0000000010129664 GPR16: 0000000010143cc0 0000000000000000 0000000044444444 0000000000000000 GPR20: c00000007c7221d8 c0000000f638e3c8 000003f15a20120d 0000000000000001 GPR24: 000000005a20120d c00000007c722000 c00000007cdedda8 00003fffef23b160 GPR28: 0000000000000001 c00000007c72f410 c000000000fdb820 0000000000000006 NIP [c0000000000ed6e4] .smp_call_function_single+0x18c/0x248 LR [c0000000000ed5b8] .smp_call_function_single+0x60/0x248 Call Trace: [c00000007c72f2d0] [c0000000000ed5b8] .smp_call_function_single+0x60/0x248 (unreliable) [c00000007c72f3a0] [c000000000030810] .__flush_tlb_page+0x164/0x1b0 [c00000007c72f460] [c00000000002e054] .ptep_set_access_flags+0xb8/0x168 [c00000007c72f500] [c0000000001ad3d8] .handle_mm_fault+0x4a8/0xbac [c00000007c72f5e0] [c000000000bb3238] .do_page_fault+0x3b8/0x868 [c00000007c72f810] [c00000000001e1d0] storage_fault_common+0x20/0x44 Exception: 301 at .__copy_tofrom_user_base+0x54/0x5b0 LR = .op_powerpc_backtrace+0x190/0x20c [c00000007c72fb00] [c000000000a2ec34] .op_powerpc_backtrace+0x204/0x20c (unreliable) [c00000007c72fbc0] [c000000000a2b5fc] .oprofile_add_ext_sample+0xe8/0x118 [c00000007c72fc70] [c000000000a2eee0] .fsl_emb_handle_interrupt+0x20c/0x27c [c00000007c72fd30] [c000000000a2e440] .op_handle_interrupt+0x44/0x58 [c00000007c72fdb0] [c000000000016d68] .performance_monitor_exception+0x74/0x90 [c00000007c72fe30] [c00000000001d8b4] exc_0x260_common+0xfc/0x100 performance_monitor_exception() is executed in a context with interrupt disabled and preemption enabled. When there is a user space page fault happened, do_page_fault() invoke in_atomic() to decide whether kernel should handle such page fault. in_atomic() only check preempt_count. So need call pagefault_disable() to disable preemption before reading user stack. Signed-off-by: Jiang Lu <lu.jiang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2014-11-21 11:23:19 +08:00
pagefault_disable();
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
if (!is_32bit_task()) {
while (depth--) {
sp = user_getsp64(sp, first_frame);
if (!sp)
break;
first_frame = 0;
}
powerpc/oprofile: Disable pagefaults during user stack read A page fault occurred during reading user stack in oprofile backtrace would lead following calltrace: WARNING: at linux/kernel/smp.c:210 Modules linked in: CPU: 5 PID: 736 Comm: sh Tainted: G W 3.14.23-WR7.0.0.0_standard #1 task: c0000000f6208bc0 ti: c00000007c72c000 task.ti: c00000007c72c000 NIP: c0000000000ed6e4 LR: c0000000000ed5b8 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000007c72f050 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (3.14.23-WR7.0.0 tandard) MSR: 0000000080021000 <CE,ME> CR: 48222482 XER: 00000000 SOFTE: 0 GPR00: c0000000000ed5b8 c00000007c72f2d0 c0000000010aa048 0000000000000005 GPR04: c000000000fdb820 c00000007c72f410 0000000000000001 0000000000000005 GPR08: c0000000010b5768 c000000000f8a048 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000048222482 c00000000fffe580 0000000022222222 0000000010129664 GPR16: 0000000010143cc0 0000000000000000 0000000044444444 0000000000000000 GPR20: c00000007c7221d8 c0000000f638e3c8 000003f15a20120d 0000000000000001 GPR24: 000000005a20120d c00000007c722000 c00000007cdedda8 00003fffef23b160 GPR28: 0000000000000001 c00000007c72f410 c000000000fdb820 0000000000000006 NIP [c0000000000ed6e4] .smp_call_function_single+0x18c/0x248 LR [c0000000000ed5b8] .smp_call_function_single+0x60/0x248 Call Trace: [c00000007c72f2d0] [c0000000000ed5b8] .smp_call_function_single+0x60/0x248 (unreliable) [c00000007c72f3a0] [c000000000030810] .__flush_tlb_page+0x164/0x1b0 [c00000007c72f460] [c00000000002e054] .ptep_set_access_flags+0xb8/0x168 [c00000007c72f500] [c0000000001ad3d8] .handle_mm_fault+0x4a8/0xbac [c00000007c72f5e0] [c000000000bb3238] .do_page_fault+0x3b8/0x868 [c00000007c72f810] [c00000000001e1d0] storage_fault_common+0x20/0x44 Exception: 301 at .__copy_tofrom_user_base+0x54/0x5b0 LR = .op_powerpc_backtrace+0x190/0x20c [c00000007c72fb00] [c000000000a2ec34] .op_powerpc_backtrace+0x204/0x20c (unreliable) [c00000007c72fbc0] [c000000000a2b5fc] .oprofile_add_ext_sample+0xe8/0x118 [c00000007c72fc70] [c000000000a2eee0] .fsl_emb_handle_interrupt+0x20c/0x27c [c00000007c72fd30] [c000000000a2e440] .op_handle_interrupt+0x44/0x58 [c00000007c72fdb0] [c000000000016d68] .performance_monitor_exception+0x74/0x90 [c00000007c72fe30] [c00000000001d8b4] exc_0x260_common+0xfc/0x100 performance_monitor_exception() is executed in a context with interrupt disabled and preemption enabled. When there is a user space page fault happened, do_page_fault() invoke in_atomic() to decide whether kernel should handle such page fault. in_atomic() only check preempt_count. So need call pagefault_disable() to disable preemption before reading user stack. Signed-off-by: Jiang Lu <lu.jiang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2014-11-21 11:23:19 +08:00
pagefault_enable();
return;
}
#endif
while (depth--) {
sp = user_getsp32(sp, first_frame);
if (!sp)
break;
first_frame = 0;
}
powerpc/oprofile: Disable pagefaults during user stack read A page fault occurred during reading user stack in oprofile backtrace would lead following calltrace: WARNING: at linux/kernel/smp.c:210 Modules linked in: CPU: 5 PID: 736 Comm: sh Tainted: G W 3.14.23-WR7.0.0.0_standard #1 task: c0000000f6208bc0 ti: c00000007c72c000 task.ti: c00000007c72c000 NIP: c0000000000ed6e4 LR: c0000000000ed5b8 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000007c72f050 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (3.14.23-WR7.0.0 tandard) MSR: 0000000080021000 <CE,ME> CR: 48222482 XER: 00000000 SOFTE: 0 GPR00: c0000000000ed5b8 c00000007c72f2d0 c0000000010aa048 0000000000000005 GPR04: c000000000fdb820 c00000007c72f410 0000000000000001 0000000000000005 GPR08: c0000000010b5768 c000000000f8a048 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000048222482 c00000000fffe580 0000000022222222 0000000010129664 GPR16: 0000000010143cc0 0000000000000000 0000000044444444 0000000000000000 GPR20: c00000007c7221d8 c0000000f638e3c8 000003f15a20120d 0000000000000001 GPR24: 000000005a20120d c00000007c722000 c00000007cdedda8 00003fffef23b160 GPR28: 0000000000000001 c00000007c72f410 c000000000fdb820 0000000000000006 NIP [c0000000000ed6e4] .smp_call_function_single+0x18c/0x248 LR [c0000000000ed5b8] .smp_call_function_single+0x60/0x248 Call Trace: [c00000007c72f2d0] [c0000000000ed5b8] .smp_call_function_single+0x60/0x248 (unreliable) [c00000007c72f3a0] [c000000000030810] .__flush_tlb_page+0x164/0x1b0 [c00000007c72f460] [c00000000002e054] .ptep_set_access_flags+0xb8/0x168 [c00000007c72f500] [c0000000001ad3d8] .handle_mm_fault+0x4a8/0xbac [c00000007c72f5e0] [c000000000bb3238] .do_page_fault+0x3b8/0x868 [c00000007c72f810] [c00000000001e1d0] storage_fault_common+0x20/0x44 Exception: 301 at .__copy_tofrom_user_base+0x54/0x5b0 LR = .op_powerpc_backtrace+0x190/0x20c [c00000007c72fb00] [c000000000a2ec34] .op_powerpc_backtrace+0x204/0x20c (unreliable) [c00000007c72fbc0] [c000000000a2b5fc] .oprofile_add_ext_sample+0xe8/0x118 [c00000007c72fc70] [c000000000a2eee0] .fsl_emb_handle_interrupt+0x20c/0x27c [c00000007c72fd30] [c000000000a2e440] .op_handle_interrupt+0x44/0x58 [c00000007c72fdb0] [c000000000016d68] .performance_monitor_exception+0x74/0x90 [c00000007c72fe30] [c00000000001d8b4] exc_0x260_common+0xfc/0x100 performance_monitor_exception() is executed in a context with interrupt disabled and preemption enabled. When there is a user space page fault happened, do_page_fault() invoke in_atomic() to decide whether kernel should handle such page fault. in_atomic() only check preempt_count. So need call pagefault_disable() to disable preemption before reading user stack. Signed-off-by: Jiang Lu <lu.jiang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2014-11-21 11:23:19 +08:00
pagefault_enable();
}
}