linux-sg2042/Documentation/device-mapper/dm-crypt.txt

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dm-crypt
=========
Device-Mapper's "crypt" target provides transparent encryption of block devices
using the kernel crypto API.
dm crypt: add TCW IV mode for old CBC TCRYPT containers dm-crypt can already activate TCRYPT (TrueCrypt compatible) containers in LRW or XTS block encryption mode. TCRYPT containers prior to version 4.1 use CBC mode with some additional tweaks, this patch adds support for these containers. This new mode is implemented using special IV generator named TCW (TrueCrypt IV with whitening). TCW IV only supports containers that are encrypted with one cipher (Tested with AES, Twofish, Serpent, CAST5 and TripleDES). While this mode is legacy and is known to be vulnerable to some watermarking attacks (e.g. revealing of hidden disk existence) it can still be useful to activate old containers without using 3rd party software or for independent forensic analysis of such containers. (Both the userspace and kernel code is an independent implementation based on the format documentation and it completely avoids use of original source code.) The TCW IV generator uses two additional keys: Kw (whitening seed, size is always 16 bytes - TCW_WHITENING_SIZE) and Kiv (IV seed, size is always the IV size of the selected cipher). These keys are concatenated at the end of the main encryption key provided in mapping table. While whitening is completely independent from IV, it is implemented inside IV generator for simplification. The whitening value is always 16 bytes long and is calculated per sector from provided Kw as initial seed, xored with sector number and mixed with CRC32 algorithm. Resulting value is xored with ciphertext sector content. IV is calculated from the provided Kiv as initial IV seed and xored with sector number. Detailed calculation can be found in the Truecrypt documentation for version < 4.1 and will also be described on dm-crypt site, see: http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/DMCrypt The experimental support for activation of these containers is already present in git devel brach of cryptsetup. Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2013-10-29 06:21:04 +08:00
For a more detailed description of supported parameters see:
https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt
dm crypt: add TCW IV mode for old CBC TCRYPT containers dm-crypt can already activate TCRYPT (TrueCrypt compatible) containers in LRW or XTS block encryption mode. TCRYPT containers prior to version 4.1 use CBC mode with some additional tweaks, this patch adds support for these containers. This new mode is implemented using special IV generator named TCW (TrueCrypt IV with whitening). TCW IV only supports containers that are encrypted with one cipher (Tested with AES, Twofish, Serpent, CAST5 and TripleDES). While this mode is legacy and is known to be vulnerable to some watermarking attacks (e.g. revealing of hidden disk existence) it can still be useful to activate old containers without using 3rd party software or for independent forensic analysis of such containers. (Both the userspace and kernel code is an independent implementation based on the format documentation and it completely avoids use of original source code.) The TCW IV generator uses two additional keys: Kw (whitening seed, size is always 16 bytes - TCW_WHITENING_SIZE) and Kiv (IV seed, size is always the IV size of the selected cipher). These keys are concatenated at the end of the main encryption key provided in mapping table. While whitening is completely independent from IV, it is implemented inside IV generator for simplification. The whitening value is always 16 bytes long and is calculated per sector from provided Kw as initial seed, xored with sector number and mixed with CRC32 algorithm. Resulting value is xored with ciphertext sector content. IV is calculated from the provided Kiv as initial IV seed and xored with sector number. Detailed calculation can be found in the Truecrypt documentation for version < 4.1 and will also be described on dm-crypt site, see: http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/DMCrypt The experimental support for activation of these containers is already present in git devel brach of cryptsetup. Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2013-10-29 06:21:04 +08:00
Parameters: <cipher> <key> <iv_offset> <device path> \
<offset> [<#opt_params> <opt_params>]
<cipher>
dm crypt: introduce new format of cipher with "capi:" prefix For the new authenticated encryption we have to support generic composed modes (combination of encryption algorithm and authenticator) because this is how the kernel crypto API accesses such algorithms. To simplify the interface, we accept an algorithm directly in crypto API format. The new format is recognised by the "capi:" prefix. The dmcrypt internal IV specification is the same as for the old format. The crypto API cipher specifications format is: capi:cipher_api_spec-ivmode[:ivopts] Examples: capi:cbc(aes)-essiv:sha256 (equivalent to old aes-cbc-essiv:sha256) capi:xts(aes)-plain64 (equivalent to old aes-xts-plain64) Examples of authenticated modes: capi:gcm(aes)-random capi:authenc(hmac(sha256),xts(aes))-random capi:rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)-random Authenticated modes can only be configured using the new cipher format. Note that this format allows user to specify arbitrary combinations that can be insecure. (Policy decision is done in cryptsetup userspace.) Authenticated encryption algorithms can be of two types, either native modes (like GCM) that performs both encryption and authentication internally, or composed modes where user can compose AEAD with separate specification of encryption algorithm and authenticator. For composed mode with HMAC (length-preserving encryption mode like an XTS and HMAC as an authenticator) we have to calculate HMAC digest size (the separate authentication key is the same size as the HMAC digest). Introduce crypt_ctr_auth_cipher() to parse the crypto API string to get HMAC algorithm and retrieve digest size from it. Also, for HMAC composed mode we need to parse the crypto API string to get the cipher mode nested in the specification. For native AEAD mode (like GCM), we can use crypto_tfm_alg_name() API to get the cipher specification. Because the HMAC composed mode is not processed the same as the native AEAD mode, the CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_HMAC flag is no longer needed and "hmac" specification for the table integrity argument is removed. Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2017-03-16 22:39:40 +08:00
Encryption cipher, encryption mode and Initial Vector (IV) generator.
The cipher specifications format is:
cipher[:keycount]-chainmode-ivmode[:ivopts]
Examples:
aes-cbc-essiv:sha256
dm crypt: introduce new format of cipher with "capi:" prefix For the new authenticated encryption we have to support generic composed modes (combination of encryption algorithm and authenticator) because this is how the kernel crypto API accesses such algorithms. To simplify the interface, we accept an algorithm directly in crypto API format. The new format is recognised by the "capi:" prefix. The dmcrypt internal IV specification is the same as for the old format. The crypto API cipher specifications format is: capi:cipher_api_spec-ivmode[:ivopts] Examples: capi:cbc(aes)-essiv:sha256 (equivalent to old aes-cbc-essiv:sha256) capi:xts(aes)-plain64 (equivalent to old aes-xts-plain64) Examples of authenticated modes: capi:gcm(aes)-random capi:authenc(hmac(sha256),xts(aes))-random capi:rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)-random Authenticated modes can only be configured using the new cipher format. Note that this format allows user to specify arbitrary combinations that can be insecure. (Policy decision is done in cryptsetup userspace.) Authenticated encryption algorithms can be of two types, either native modes (like GCM) that performs both encryption and authentication internally, or composed modes where user can compose AEAD with separate specification of encryption algorithm and authenticator. For composed mode with HMAC (length-preserving encryption mode like an XTS and HMAC as an authenticator) we have to calculate HMAC digest size (the separate authentication key is the same size as the HMAC digest). Introduce crypt_ctr_auth_cipher() to parse the crypto API string to get HMAC algorithm and retrieve digest size from it. Also, for HMAC composed mode we need to parse the crypto API string to get the cipher mode nested in the specification. For native AEAD mode (like GCM), we can use crypto_tfm_alg_name() API to get the cipher specification. Because the HMAC composed mode is not processed the same as the native AEAD mode, the CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_HMAC flag is no longer needed and "hmac" specification for the table integrity argument is removed. Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2017-03-16 22:39:40 +08:00
aes-xts-plain64
serpent-xts-plain64
Cipher format also supports direct specification with kernel crypt API
format (selected by capi: prefix). The IV specification is the same
as for the first format type.
This format is mainly used for specification of authenticated modes.
dm crypt: introduce new format of cipher with "capi:" prefix For the new authenticated encryption we have to support generic composed modes (combination of encryption algorithm and authenticator) because this is how the kernel crypto API accesses such algorithms. To simplify the interface, we accept an algorithm directly in crypto API format. The new format is recognised by the "capi:" prefix. The dmcrypt internal IV specification is the same as for the old format. The crypto API cipher specifications format is: capi:cipher_api_spec-ivmode[:ivopts] Examples: capi:cbc(aes)-essiv:sha256 (equivalent to old aes-cbc-essiv:sha256) capi:xts(aes)-plain64 (equivalent to old aes-xts-plain64) Examples of authenticated modes: capi:gcm(aes)-random capi:authenc(hmac(sha256),xts(aes))-random capi:rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)-random Authenticated modes can only be configured using the new cipher format. Note that this format allows user to specify arbitrary combinations that can be insecure. (Policy decision is done in cryptsetup userspace.) Authenticated encryption algorithms can be of two types, either native modes (like GCM) that performs both encryption and authentication internally, or composed modes where user can compose AEAD with separate specification of encryption algorithm and authenticator. For composed mode with HMAC (length-preserving encryption mode like an XTS and HMAC as an authenticator) we have to calculate HMAC digest size (the separate authentication key is the same size as the HMAC digest). Introduce crypt_ctr_auth_cipher() to parse the crypto API string to get HMAC algorithm and retrieve digest size from it. Also, for HMAC composed mode we need to parse the crypto API string to get the cipher mode nested in the specification. For native AEAD mode (like GCM), we can use crypto_tfm_alg_name() API to get the cipher specification. Because the HMAC composed mode is not processed the same as the native AEAD mode, the CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_HMAC flag is no longer needed and "hmac" specification for the table integrity argument is removed. Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2017-03-16 22:39:40 +08:00
The crypto API cipher specifications format is:
capi:cipher_api_spec-ivmode[:ivopts]
Examples:
capi:cbc(aes)-essiv:sha256
capi:xts(aes)-plain64
Examples of authenticated modes:
capi:gcm(aes)-random
capi:authenc(hmac(sha256),xts(aes))-random
capi:rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)-random
The /proc/crypto contains a list of curently loaded crypto modes.
<key>
Key used for encryption. It is encoded either as a hexadecimal number
or it can be passed as <key_string> prefixed with single colon
character (':') for keys residing in kernel keyring service.
dm crypt: add TCW IV mode for old CBC TCRYPT containers dm-crypt can already activate TCRYPT (TrueCrypt compatible) containers in LRW or XTS block encryption mode. TCRYPT containers prior to version 4.1 use CBC mode with some additional tweaks, this patch adds support for these containers. This new mode is implemented using special IV generator named TCW (TrueCrypt IV with whitening). TCW IV only supports containers that are encrypted with one cipher (Tested with AES, Twofish, Serpent, CAST5 and TripleDES). While this mode is legacy and is known to be vulnerable to some watermarking attacks (e.g. revealing of hidden disk existence) it can still be useful to activate old containers without using 3rd party software or for independent forensic analysis of such containers. (Both the userspace and kernel code is an independent implementation based on the format documentation and it completely avoids use of original source code.) The TCW IV generator uses two additional keys: Kw (whitening seed, size is always 16 bytes - TCW_WHITENING_SIZE) and Kiv (IV seed, size is always the IV size of the selected cipher). These keys are concatenated at the end of the main encryption key provided in mapping table. While whitening is completely independent from IV, it is implemented inside IV generator for simplification. The whitening value is always 16 bytes long and is calculated per sector from provided Kw as initial seed, xored with sector number and mixed with CRC32 algorithm. Resulting value is xored with ciphertext sector content. IV is calculated from the provided Kiv as initial IV seed and xored with sector number. Detailed calculation can be found in the Truecrypt documentation for version < 4.1 and will also be described on dm-crypt site, see: http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/DMCrypt The experimental support for activation of these containers is already present in git devel brach of cryptsetup. Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2013-10-29 06:21:04 +08:00
You can only use key sizes that are valid for the selected cipher
in combination with the selected iv mode.
Note that for some iv modes the key string can contain additional
keys (for example IV seed) so the key contains more parts concatenated
into a single string.
<key_string>
The kernel keyring key is identified by string in following format:
<key_size>:<key_type>:<key_description>.
<key_size>
The encryption key size in bytes. The kernel key payload size must match
the value passed in <key_size>.
<key_type>
Either 'logon' or 'user' kernel key type.
<key_description>
The kernel keyring key description crypt target should look for
when loading key of <key_type>.
<keycount>
Multi-key compatibility mode. You can define <keycount> keys and
then sectors are encrypted according to their offsets (sector 0 uses key0;
sector 1 uses key1 etc.). <keycount> must be a power of two.
<iv_offset>
The IV offset is a sector count that is added to the sector number
before creating the IV.
<device path>
This is the device that is going to be used as backend and contains the
encrypted data. You can specify it as a path like /dev/xxx or a device
number <major>:<minor>.
<offset>
Starting sector within the device where the encrypted data begins.
<#opt_params>
Number of optional parameters. If there are no optional parameters,
the optional paramaters section can be skipped or #opt_params can be zero.
Otherwise #opt_params is the number of following arguments.
Example of optional parameters section:
3 allow_discards same_cpu_crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus
allow_discards
Block discard requests (a.k.a. TRIM) are passed through the crypt device.
The default is to ignore discard requests.
WARNING: Assess the specific security risks carefully before enabling this
option. For example, allowing discards on encrypted devices may lead to
the leak of information about the ciphertext device (filesystem type,
used space etc.) if the discarded blocks can be located easily on the
device later.
same_cpu_crypt
Perform encryption using the same cpu that IO was submitted on.
The default is to use an unbound workqueue so that encryption work
is automatically balanced between available CPUs.
submit_from_crypt_cpus
Disable offloading writes to a separate thread after encryption.
There are some situations where offloading write bios from the
encryption threads to a single thread degrades performance
significantly. The default is to offload write bios to the same
thread because it benefits CFQ to have writes submitted using the
same context.
dm crypt: add cryptographic data integrity protection (authenticated encryption) Allow the use of per-sector metadata, provided by the dm-integrity module, for integrity protection and persistently stored per-sector Initialization Vector (IV). The underlying device must support the "DM-DIF-EXT-TAG" dm-integrity profile. The per-bio integrity metadata is allocated by dm-crypt for every bio. Example of low-level mapping table for various types of use: DEV=/dev/sdb SIZE=417792 # Additional HMAC with CBC-ESSIV, key is concatenated encryption key + HMAC key SIZE_INT=389952 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 32 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:32:hmac(sha256)" # AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data) - GCM with random IVs # GCM in kernel uses 96bits IV and we store 128bits auth tag (so 28 bytes metadata space) SIZE_INT=393024 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 28 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-gcm-random \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:28:aead" # Random IV only for XTS mode (no integrity protection but provides atomic random sector change) SIZE_INT=401272 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 16 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-xts-random \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:16:none" # Random IV with XTS + HMAC integrity protection SIZE_INT=377656 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 48 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-xts-random \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:48:hmac(sha256)" Both AEAD and HMAC protection authenticates not only data but also sector metadata. HMAC protection is implemented through autenc wrapper (so it is processed the same way as an authenticated mode). In HMAC mode there are two keys (concatenated in dm-crypt mapping table). First is the encryption key and the second is the key for authentication (HMAC). (It is userspace decision if these keys are independent or somehow derived.) The sector request for AEAD/HMAC authenticated encryption looks like this: |----- AAD -------|------ DATA -------|-- AUTH TAG --| | (authenticated) | (auth+encryption) | | | sector_LE | IV | sector in/out | tag in/out | For writes, the integrity fields are calculated during AEAD encryption of every sector and stored in bio integrity fields and sent to underlying dm-integrity target for storage. For reads, the integrity metadata is verified during AEAD decryption of every sector (they are filled in by dm-integrity, but the integrity fields are pre-allocated in dm-crypt). There is also an experimental support in cryptsetup utility for more friendly configuration (part of LUKS2 format). Because the integrity fields are not valid on initial creation, the device must be "formatted". This can be done by direct-io writes to the device (e.g. dd in direct-io mode). For now, there is available trivial tool to do this, see: https://github.com/mbroz/dm_int_tools Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Vashek Matyas <matyas@fi.muni.cz> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2017-01-05 03:23:54 +08:00
integrity:<bytes>:<type>
dm crypt: introduce new format of cipher with "capi:" prefix For the new authenticated encryption we have to support generic composed modes (combination of encryption algorithm and authenticator) because this is how the kernel crypto API accesses such algorithms. To simplify the interface, we accept an algorithm directly in crypto API format. The new format is recognised by the "capi:" prefix. The dmcrypt internal IV specification is the same as for the old format. The crypto API cipher specifications format is: capi:cipher_api_spec-ivmode[:ivopts] Examples: capi:cbc(aes)-essiv:sha256 (equivalent to old aes-cbc-essiv:sha256) capi:xts(aes)-plain64 (equivalent to old aes-xts-plain64) Examples of authenticated modes: capi:gcm(aes)-random capi:authenc(hmac(sha256),xts(aes))-random capi:rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)-random Authenticated modes can only be configured using the new cipher format. Note that this format allows user to specify arbitrary combinations that can be insecure. (Policy decision is done in cryptsetup userspace.) Authenticated encryption algorithms can be of two types, either native modes (like GCM) that performs both encryption and authentication internally, or composed modes where user can compose AEAD with separate specification of encryption algorithm and authenticator. For composed mode with HMAC (length-preserving encryption mode like an XTS and HMAC as an authenticator) we have to calculate HMAC digest size (the separate authentication key is the same size as the HMAC digest). Introduce crypt_ctr_auth_cipher() to parse the crypto API string to get HMAC algorithm and retrieve digest size from it. Also, for HMAC composed mode we need to parse the crypto API string to get the cipher mode nested in the specification. For native AEAD mode (like GCM), we can use crypto_tfm_alg_name() API to get the cipher specification. Because the HMAC composed mode is not processed the same as the native AEAD mode, the CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_HMAC flag is no longer needed and "hmac" specification for the table integrity argument is removed. Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2017-03-16 22:39:40 +08:00
The device requires additional <bytes> metadata per-sector stored
in per-bio integrity structure. This metadata must by provided
by underlying dm-integrity target.
dm crypt: add cryptographic data integrity protection (authenticated encryption) Allow the use of per-sector metadata, provided by the dm-integrity module, for integrity protection and persistently stored per-sector Initialization Vector (IV). The underlying device must support the "DM-DIF-EXT-TAG" dm-integrity profile. The per-bio integrity metadata is allocated by dm-crypt for every bio. Example of low-level mapping table for various types of use: DEV=/dev/sdb SIZE=417792 # Additional HMAC with CBC-ESSIV, key is concatenated encryption key + HMAC key SIZE_INT=389952 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 32 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:32:hmac(sha256)" # AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data) - GCM with random IVs # GCM in kernel uses 96bits IV and we store 128bits auth tag (so 28 bytes metadata space) SIZE_INT=393024 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 28 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-gcm-random \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:28:aead" # Random IV only for XTS mode (no integrity protection but provides atomic random sector change) SIZE_INT=401272 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 16 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-xts-random \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:16:none" # Random IV with XTS + HMAC integrity protection SIZE_INT=377656 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 48 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-xts-random \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:48:hmac(sha256)" Both AEAD and HMAC protection authenticates not only data but also sector metadata. HMAC protection is implemented through autenc wrapper (so it is processed the same way as an authenticated mode). In HMAC mode there are two keys (concatenated in dm-crypt mapping table). First is the encryption key and the second is the key for authentication (HMAC). (It is userspace decision if these keys are independent or somehow derived.) The sector request for AEAD/HMAC authenticated encryption looks like this: |----- AAD -------|------ DATA -------|-- AUTH TAG --| | (authenticated) | (auth+encryption) | | | sector_LE | IV | sector in/out | tag in/out | For writes, the integrity fields are calculated during AEAD encryption of every sector and stored in bio integrity fields and sent to underlying dm-integrity target for storage. For reads, the integrity metadata is verified during AEAD decryption of every sector (they are filled in by dm-integrity, but the integrity fields are pre-allocated in dm-crypt). There is also an experimental support in cryptsetup utility for more friendly configuration (part of LUKS2 format). Because the integrity fields are not valid on initial creation, the device must be "formatted". This can be done by direct-io writes to the device (e.g. dd in direct-io mode). For now, there is available trivial tool to do this, see: https://github.com/mbroz/dm_int_tools Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Vashek Matyas <matyas@fi.muni.cz> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2017-01-05 03:23:54 +08:00
dm crypt: introduce new format of cipher with "capi:" prefix For the new authenticated encryption we have to support generic composed modes (combination of encryption algorithm and authenticator) because this is how the kernel crypto API accesses such algorithms. To simplify the interface, we accept an algorithm directly in crypto API format. The new format is recognised by the "capi:" prefix. The dmcrypt internal IV specification is the same as for the old format. The crypto API cipher specifications format is: capi:cipher_api_spec-ivmode[:ivopts] Examples: capi:cbc(aes)-essiv:sha256 (equivalent to old aes-cbc-essiv:sha256) capi:xts(aes)-plain64 (equivalent to old aes-xts-plain64) Examples of authenticated modes: capi:gcm(aes)-random capi:authenc(hmac(sha256),xts(aes))-random capi:rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)-random Authenticated modes can only be configured using the new cipher format. Note that this format allows user to specify arbitrary combinations that can be insecure. (Policy decision is done in cryptsetup userspace.) Authenticated encryption algorithms can be of two types, either native modes (like GCM) that performs both encryption and authentication internally, or composed modes where user can compose AEAD with separate specification of encryption algorithm and authenticator. For composed mode with HMAC (length-preserving encryption mode like an XTS and HMAC as an authenticator) we have to calculate HMAC digest size (the separate authentication key is the same size as the HMAC digest). Introduce crypt_ctr_auth_cipher() to parse the crypto API string to get HMAC algorithm and retrieve digest size from it. Also, for HMAC composed mode we need to parse the crypto API string to get the cipher mode nested in the specification. For native AEAD mode (like GCM), we can use crypto_tfm_alg_name() API to get the cipher specification. Because the HMAC composed mode is not processed the same as the native AEAD mode, the CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_HMAC flag is no longer needed and "hmac" specification for the table integrity argument is removed. Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2017-03-16 22:39:40 +08:00
The <type> can be "none" if metadata is used only for persistent IV.
dm crypt: add cryptographic data integrity protection (authenticated encryption) Allow the use of per-sector metadata, provided by the dm-integrity module, for integrity protection and persistently stored per-sector Initialization Vector (IV). The underlying device must support the "DM-DIF-EXT-TAG" dm-integrity profile. The per-bio integrity metadata is allocated by dm-crypt for every bio. Example of low-level mapping table for various types of use: DEV=/dev/sdb SIZE=417792 # Additional HMAC with CBC-ESSIV, key is concatenated encryption key + HMAC key SIZE_INT=389952 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 32 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:32:hmac(sha256)" # AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data) - GCM with random IVs # GCM in kernel uses 96bits IV and we store 128bits auth tag (so 28 bytes metadata space) SIZE_INT=393024 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 28 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-gcm-random \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:28:aead" # Random IV only for XTS mode (no integrity protection but provides atomic random sector change) SIZE_INT=401272 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 16 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-xts-random \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:16:none" # Random IV with XTS + HMAC integrity protection SIZE_INT=377656 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 48 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-xts-random \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:48:hmac(sha256)" Both AEAD and HMAC protection authenticates not only data but also sector metadata. HMAC protection is implemented through autenc wrapper (so it is processed the same way as an authenticated mode). In HMAC mode there are two keys (concatenated in dm-crypt mapping table). First is the encryption key and the second is the key for authentication (HMAC). (It is userspace decision if these keys are independent or somehow derived.) The sector request for AEAD/HMAC authenticated encryption looks like this: |----- AAD -------|------ DATA -------|-- AUTH TAG --| | (authenticated) | (auth+encryption) | | | sector_LE | IV | sector in/out | tag in/out | For writes, the integrity fields are calculated during AEAD encryption of every sector and stored in bio integrity fields and sent to underlying dm-integrity target for storage. For reads, the integrity metadata is verified during AEAD decryption of every sector (they are filled in by dm-integrity, but the integrity fields are pre-allocated in dm-crypt). There is also an experimental support in cryptsetup utility for more friendly configuration (part of LUKS2 format). Because the integrity fields are not valid on initial creation, the device must be "formatted". This can be done by direct-io writes to the device (e.g. dd in direct-io mode). For now, there is available trivial tool to do this, see: https://github.com/mbroz/dm_int_tools Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Vashek Matyas <matyas@fi.muni.cz> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2017-01-05 03:23:54 +08:00
dm crypt: introduce new format of cipher with "capi:" prefix For the new authenticated encryption we have to support generic composed modes (combination of encryption algorithm and authenticator) because this is how the kernel crypto API accesses such algorithms. To simplify the interface, we accept an algorithm directly in crypto API format. The new format is recognised by the "capi:" prefix. The dmcrypt internal IV specification is the same as for the old format. The crypto API cipher specifications format is: capi:cipher_api_spec-ivmode[:ivopts] Examples: capi:cbc(aes)-essiv:sha256 (equivalent to old aes-cbc-essiv:sha256) capi:xts(aes)-plain64 (equivalent to old aes-xts-plain64) Examples of authenticated modes: capi:gcm(aes)-random capi:authenc(hmac(sha256),xts(aes))-random capi:rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)-random Authenticated modes can only be configured using the new cipher format. Note that this format allows user to specify arbitrary combinations that can be insecure. (Policy decision is done in cryptsetup userspace.) Authenticated encryption algorithms can be of two types, either native modes (like GCM) that performs both encryption and authentication internally, or composed modes where user can compose AEAD with separate specification of encryption algorithm and authenticator. For composed mode with HMAC (length-preserving encryption mode like an XTS and HMAC as an authenticator) we have to calculate HMAC digest size (the separate authentication key is the same size as the HMAC digest). Introduce crypt_ctr_auth_cipher() to parse the crypto API string to get HMAC algorithm and retrieve digest size from it. Also, for HMAC composed mode we need to parse the crypto API string to get the cipher mode nested in the specification. For native AEAD mode (like GCM), we can use crypto_tfm_alg_name() API to get the cipher specification. Because the HMAC composed mode is not processed the same as the native AEAD mode, the CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_HMAC flag is no longer needed and "hmac" specification for the table integrity argument is removed. Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2017-03-16 22:39:40 +08:00
For Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD)
the <type> is "aead". An AEAD mode additionally calculates and verifies
integrity for the encrypted device. The additional space is then
used for storing authentication tag (and persistent IV if needed).
dm crypt: add cryptographic data integrity protection (authenticated encryption) Allow the use of per-sector metadata, provided by the dm-integrity module, for integrity protection and persistently stored per-sector Initialization Vector (IV). The underlying device must support the "DM-DIF-EXT-TAG" dm-integrity profile. The per-bio integrity metadata is allocated by dm-crypt for every bio. Example of low-level mapping table for various types of use: DEV=/dev/sdb SIZE=417792 # Additional HMAC with CBC-ESSIV, key is concatenated encryption key + HMAC key SIZE_INT=389952 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 32 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:32:hmac(sha256)" # AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data) - GCM with random IVs # GCM in kernel uses 96bits IV and we store 128bits auth tag (so 28 bytes metadata space) SIZE_INT=393024 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 28 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-gcm-random \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:28:aead" # Random IV only for XTS mode (no integrity protection but provides atomic random sector change) SIZE_INT=401272 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 16 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-xts-random \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:16:none" # Random IV with XTS + HMAC integrity protection SIZE_INT=377656 dmsetup create x --table "0 $SIZE_INT integrity $DEV 0 48 J 0" dmsetup create y --table "0 $SIZE_INT crypt aes-xts-random \ 11ff33c6fb942655efb3e30cf4c0fd95f5ef483afca72166c530ae26151dd83b \ 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff \ 0 /dev/mapper/x 0 1 integrity:48:hmac(sha256)" Both AEAD and HMAC protection authenticates not only data but also sector metadata. HMAC protection is implemented through autenc wrapper (so it is processed the same way as an authenticated mode). In HMAC mode there are two keys (concatenated in dm-crypt mapping table). First is the encryption key and the second is the key for authentication (HMAC). (It is userspace decision if these keys are independent or somehow derived.) The sector request for AEAD/HMAC authenticated encryption looks like this: |----- AAD -------|------ DATA -------|-- AUTH TAG --| | (authenticated) | (auth+encryption) | | | sector_LE | IV | sector in/out | tag in/out | For writes, the integrity fields are calculated during AEAD encryption of every sector and stored in bio integrity fields and sent to underlying dm-integrity target for storage. For reads, the integrity metadata is verified during AEAD decryption of every sector (they are filled in by dm-integrity, but the integrity fields are pre-allocated in dm-crypt). There is also an experimental support in cryptsetup utility for more friendly configuration (part of LUKS2 format). Because the integrity fields are not valid on initial creation, the device must be "formatted". This can be done by direct-io writes to the device (e.g. dd in direct-io mode). For now, there is available trivial tool to do this, see: https://github.com/mbroz/dm_int_tools Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Vashek Matyas <matyas@fi.muni.cz> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2017-01-05 03:23:54 +08:00
sector_size:<bytes>
Use <bytes> as the encryption unit instead of 512 bytes sectors.
This option can be in range 512 - 4096 bytes and must be power of two.
Virtual device will announce this size as a minimal IO and logical sector.
iv_large_sectors
IV generators will use sector number counted in <sector_size> units
instead of default 512 bytes sectors.
For example, if <sector_size> is 4096 bytes, plain64 IV for the second
sector will be 8 (without flag) and 1 if iv_large_sectors is present.
The <iv_offset> must be multiple of <sector_size> (in 512 bytes units)
if this flag is specified.
Example scripts
===============
LUKS (Linux Unified Key Setup) is now the preferred way to set up disk
encryption with dm-crypt using the 'cryptsetup' utility, see
https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup
[[
#!/bin/sh
# Create a crypt device using dmsetup
dmsetup create crypt1 --table "0 `blockdev --getsz $1` crypt aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 babebabebabebabebabebabebabebabe 0 $1 0"
]]
[[
#!/bin/sh
# Create a crypt device using dmsetup when encryption key is stored in keyring service
dmsetup create crypt2 --table "0 `blockdev --getsize $1` crypt aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 :32:logon:my_prefix:my_key 0 $1 0"
]]
[[
#!/bin/sh
# Create a crypt device using cryptsetup and LUKS header with default cipher
cryptsetup luksFormat $1
cryptsetup luksOpen $1 crypt1
]]