linux-sg2042/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c

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/*
* Based on arch/arm/mm/fault.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1995 Linus Torvalds
* Copyright (C) 1995-2004 Russell King
* Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <linux/extable.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/hardirq.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/page-flags.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <linux/preempt.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <asm/bug.h>
#include <asm/cmpxchg.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/exception.h>
#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
#include <asm/esr.h>
#include <asm/sysreg.h>
#include <asm/system_misc.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <acpi/ghes.h>
struct fault_info {
int (*fn)(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs);
int sig;
int code;
const char *name;
};
static const struct fault_info fault_info[];
static inline const struct fault_info *esr_to_fault_info(unsigned int esr)
{
return fault_info + (esr & 63);
}
arm64: Kprobes with single stepping support Add support for basic kernel probes(kprobes) and jump probes (jprobes) for ARM64. Kprobes utilizes software breakpoint and single step debug exceptions supported on ARM v8. A software breakpoint is placed at the probe address to trap the kernel execution into the kprobe handler. ARM v8 supports enabling single stepping before the break exception return (ERET), with next PC in exception return address (ELR_EL1). The kprobe handler prepares an executable memory slot for out-of-line execution with a copy of the original instruction being probed, and enables single stepping. The PC is set to the out-of-line slot address before the ERET. With this scheme, the instruction is executed with the exact same register context except for the PC (and DAIF) registers. Debug mask (PSTATE.D) is enabled only when single stepping a recursive kprobe, e.g.: during kprobes reenter so that probed instruction can be single stepped within the kprobe handler -exception- context. The recursion depth of kprobe is always 2, i.e. upon probe re-entry, any further re-entry is prevented by not calling handlers and the case counted as a missed kprobe). Single stepping from the x-o-l slot has a drawback for PC-relative accesses like branching and symbolic literals access as the offset from the new PC (slot address) may not be ensured to fit in the immediate value of the opcode. Such instructions need simulation, so reject probing them. Instructions generating exceptions or cpu mode change are rejected for probing. Exclusive load/store instructions are rejected too. Additionally, the code is checked to see if it is inside an exclusive load/store sequence (code from Pratyush). System instructions are mostly enabled for stepping, except MSR/MRS accesses to "DAIF" flags in PSTATE, which are not safe for probing. This also changes arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h to use include/asm-generic/ptrace.h. Thanks to Steve Capper and Pratyush Anand for several suggested Changes. Signed-off-by: Sandeepa Prabhu <sandeepa.s.prabhu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-07-09 00:35:48 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
static inline int notify_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr)
{
int ret = 0;
/* kprobe_running() needs smp_processor_id() */
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
preempt_disable();
if (kprobe_running() && kprobe_fault_handler(regs, esr))
ret = 1;
preempt_enable();
}
return ret;
}
#else
static inline int notify_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
static void data_abort_decode(unsigned int esr)
{
pr_alert("Data abort info:\n");
if (esr & ESR_ELx_ISV) {
pr_alert(" Access size = %u byte(s)\n",
1U << ((esr & ESR_ELx_SAS) >> ESR_ELx_SAS_SHIFT));
pr_alert(" SSE = %lu, SRT = %lu\n",
(esr & ESR_ELx_SSE) >> ESR_ELx_SSE_SHIFT,
(esr & ESR_ELx_SRT_MASK) >> ESR_ELx_SRT_SHIFT);
pr_alert(" SF = %lu, AR = %lu\n",
(esr & ESR_ELx_SF) >> ESR_ELx_SF_SHIFT,
(esr & ESR_ELx_AR) >> ESR_ELx_AR_SHIFT);
} else {
pr_alert(" ISV = 0, ISS = 0x%08lx\n", esr & ESR_ELx_ISS_MASK);
}
pr_alert(" CM = %lu, WnR = %lu\n",
(esr & ESR_ELx_CM) >> ESR_ELx_CM_SHIFT,
(esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) >> ESR_ELx_WNR_SHIFT);
}
static void mem_abort_decode(unsigned int esr)
{
pr_alert("Mem abort info:\n");
pr_alert(" ESR = 0x%08x\n", esr);
pr_alert(" Exception class = %s, IL = %u bits\n",
esr_get_class_string(esr),
(esr & ESR_ELx_IL) ? 32 : 16);
pr_alert(" SET = %lu, FnV = %lu\n",
(esr & ESR_ELx_SET_MASK) >> ESR_ELx_SET_SHIFT,
(esr & ESR_ELx_FnV) >> ESR_ELx_FnV_SHIFT);
pr_alert(" EA = %lu, S1PTW = %lu\n",
(esr & ESR_ELx_EA) >> ESR_ELx_EA_SHIFT,
(esr & ESR_ELx_S1PTW) >> ESR_ELx_S1PTW_SHIFT);
if (esr_is_data_abort(esr))
data_abort_decode(esr);
}
/*
* Dump out the page tables associated with 'addr' in the currently active mm.
*/
void show_pte(unsigned long addr)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
pgd_t *pgdp;
pgd_t pgd;
if (addr < TASK_SIZE) {
/* TTBR0 */
mm = current->active_mm;
if (mm == &init_mm) {
pr_alert("[%016lx] user address but active_mm is swapper\n",
addr);
return;
}
} else if (addr >= VA_START) {
/* TTBR1 */
mm = &init_mm;
} else {
pr_alert("[%016lx] address between user and kernel address ranges\n",
addr);
return;
}
pr_alert("%s pgtable: %luk pages, %u-bit VAs, pgdp = %p\n",
mm == &init_mm ? "swapper" : "user", PAGE_SIZE / SZ_1K,
VA_BITS, mm->pgd);
pgdp = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
pgd = READ_ONCE(*pgdp);
pr_alert("[%016lx] pgd=%016llx", addr, pgd_val(pgd));
do {
pud_t *pudp, pud;
pmd_t *pmdp, pmd;
pte_t *ptep, pte;
if (pgd_none(pgd) || pgd_bad(pgd))
break;
pudp = pud_offset(pgdp, addr);
pud = READ_ONCE(*pudp);
pr_cont(", pud=%016llx", pud_val(pud));
if (pud_none(pud) || pud_bad(pud))
break;
pmdp = pmd_offset(pudp, addr);
pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp);
pr_cont(", pmd=%016llx", pmd_val(pmd));
if (pmd_none(pmd) || pmd_bad(pmd))
break;
ptep = pte_offset_map(pmdp, addr);
pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
pr_cont(", pte=%016llx", pte_val(pte));
pte_unmap(ptep);
} while(0);
pr_cont("\n");
}
arm64: Implement ptep_set_access_flags() for hardware AF/DBM When hardware updates of the access and dirty states are enabled, the default ptep_set_access_flags() implementation based on calling set_pte_at() directly is potentially racy. This triggers the "racy dirty state clearing" warning in set_pte_at() because an existing writable PTE is overridden with a clean entry. There are two main scenarios for this situation: 1. The CPU getting an access fault does not support hardware updates of the access/dirty flags. However, a different agent in the system (e.g. SMMU) can do this, therefore overriding a writable entry with a clean one could potentially lose the automatically updated dirty status 2. A more complex situation is possible when all CPUs support hardware AF/DBM: a) Initial state: shareable + writable vma and pte_none(pte) b) Read fault taken by two threads of the same process on different CPUs c) CPU0 takes the mmap_sem and proceeds to handling the fault. It eventually reaches do_set_pte() which sets a writable + clean pte. CPU0 releases the mmap_sem d) CPU1 acquires the mmap_sem and proceeds to handle_pte_fault(). The pte entry it reads is present, writable and clean and it continues to pte_mkyoung() e) CPU1 calls ptep_set_access_flags() If between (d) and (e) the hardware (another CPU) updates the dirty state (clears PTE_RDONLY), CPU1 will override the PTR_RDONLY bit marking the entry clean again. This patch implements an arm64-specific ptep_set_access_flags() function to perform an atomic update of the PTE flags. Fixes: 2f4b829c625e ("arm64: Add support for hardware updates of the access and dirty pte bits") Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reported-by: Ming Lei <tom.leiming@gmail.com> Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.3+ [will: reworded comment] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-13 23:01:22 +08:00
/*
* This function sets the access flags (dirty, accessed), as well as write
* permission, and only to a more permissive setting.
*
* It needs to cope with hardware update of the accessed/dirty state by other
* agents in the system and can safely skip the __sync_icache_dcache() call as,
* like set_pte_at(), the PTE is never changed from no-exec to exec here.
*
* Returns whether or not the PTE actually changed.
*/
int ptep_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep,
pte_t entry, int dirty)
{
pteval_t old_pteval, pteval;
pte_t pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
arm64: Implement ptep_set_access_flags() for hardware AF/DBM When hardware updates of the access and dirty states are enabled, the default ptep_set_access_flags() implementation based on calling set_pte_at() directly is potentially racy. This triggers the "racy dirty state clearing" warning in set_pte_at() because an existing writable PTE is overridden with a clean entry. There are two main scenarios for this situation: 1. The CPU getting an access fault does not support hardware updates of the access/dirty flags. However, a different agent in the system (e.g. SMMU) can do this, therefore overriding a writable entry with a clean one could potentially lose the automatically updated dirty status 2. A more complex situation is possible when all CPUs support hardware AF/DBM: a) Initial state: shareable + writable vma and pte_none(pte) b) Read fault taken by two threads of the same process on different CPUs c) CPU0 takes the mmap_sem and proceeds to handling the fault. It eventually reaches do_set_pte() which sets a writable + clean pte. CPU0 releases the mmap_sem d) CPU1 acquires the mmap_sem and proceeds to handle_pte_fault(). The pte entry it reads is present, writable and clean and it continues to pte_mkyoung() e) CPU1 calls ptep_set_access_flags() If between (d) and (e) the hardware (another CPU) updates the dirty state (clears PTE_RDONLY), CPU1 will override the PTR_RDONLY bit marking the entry clean again. This patch implements an arm64-specific ptep_set_access_flags() function to perform an atomic update of the PTE flags. Fixes: 2f4b829c625e ("arm64: Add support for hardware updates of the access and dirty pte bits") Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reported-by: Ming Lei <tom.leiming@gmail.com> Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.3+ [will: reworded comment] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-13 23:01:22 +08:00
if (pte_same(pte, entry))
arm64: Implement ptep_set_access_flags() for hardware AF/DBM When hardware updates of the access and dirty states are enabled, the default ptep_set_access_flags() implementation based on calling set_pte_at() directly is potentially racy. This triggers the "racy dirty state clearing" warning in set_pte_at() because an existing writable PTE is overridden with a clean entry. There are two main scenarios for this situation: 1. The CPU getting an access fault does not support hardware updates of the access/dirty flags. However, a different agent in the system (e.g. SMMU) can do this, therefore overriding a writable entry with a clean one could potentially lose the automatically updated dirty status 2. A more complex situation is possible when all CPUs support hardware AF/DBM: a) Initial state: shareable + writable vma and pte_none(pte) b) Read fault taken by two threads of the same process on different CPUs c) CPU0 takes the mmap_sem and proceeds to handling the fault. It eventually reaches do_set_pte() which sets a writable + clean pte. CPU0 releases the mmap_sem d) CPU1 acquires the mmap_sem and proceeds to handle_pte_fault(). The pte entry it reads is present, writable and clean and it continues to pte_mkyoung() e) CPU1 calls ptep_set_access_flags() If between (d) and (e) the hardware (another CPU) updates the dirty state (clears PTE_RDONLY), CPU1 will override the PTR_RDONLY bit marking the entry clean again. This patch implements an arm64-specific ptep_set_access_flags() function to perform an atomic update of the PTE flags. Fixes: 2f4b829c625e ("arm64: Add support for hardware updates of the access and dirty pte bits") Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reported-by: Ming Lei <tom.leiming@gmail.com> Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.3+ [will: reworded comment] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-13 23:01:22 +08:00
return 0;
/* only preserve the access flags and write permission */
pte_val(entry) &= PTE_RDONLY | PTE_AF | PTE_WRITE | PTE_DIRTY;
arm64: Implement ptep_set_access_flags() for hardware AF/DBM When hardware updates of the access and dirty states are enabled, the default ptep_set_access_flags() implementation based on calling set_pte_at() directly is potentially racy. This triggers the "racy dirty state clearing" warning in set_pte_at() because an existing writable PTE is overridden with a clean entry. There are two main scenarios for this situation: 1. The CPU getting an access fault does not support hardware updates of the access/dirty flags. However, a different agent in the system (e.g. SMMU) can do this, therefore overriding a writable entry with a clean one could potentially lose the automatically updated dirty status 2. A more complex situation is possible when all CPUs support hardware AF/DBM: a) Initial state: shareable + writable vma and pte_none(pte) b) Read fault taken by two threads of the same process on different CPUs c) CPU0 takes the mmap_sem and proceeds to handling the fault. It eventually reaches do_set_pte() which sets a writable + clean pte. CPU0 releases the mmap_sem d) CPU1 acquires the mmap_sem and proceeds to handle_pte_fault(). The pte entry it reads is present, writable and clean and it continues to pte_mkyoung() e) CPU1 calls ptep_set_access_flags() If between (d) and (e) the hardware (another CPU) updates the dirty state (clears PTE_RDONLY), CPU1 will override the PTR_RDONLY bit marking the entry clean again. This patch implements an arm64-specific ptep_set_access_flags() function to perform an atomic update of the PTE flags. Fixes: 2f4b829c625e ("arm64: Add support for hardware updates of the access and dirty pte bits") Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reported-by: Ming Lei <tom.leiming@gmail.com> Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.3+ [will: reworded comment] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-13 23:01:22 +08:00
/*
* Setting the flags must be done atomically to avoid racing with the
* hardware update of the access/dirty state. The PTE_RDONLY bit must
* be set to the most permissive (lowest value) of *ptep and entry
* (calculated as: a & b == ~(~a | ~b)).
arm64: Implement ptep_set_access_flags() for hardware AF/DBM When hardware updates of the access and dirty states are enabled, the default ptep_set_access_flags() implementation based on calling set_pte_at() directly is potentially racy. This triggers the "racy dirty state clearing" warning in set_pte_at() because an existing writable PTE is overridden with a clean entry. There are two main scenarios for this situation: 1. The CPU getting an access fault does not support hardware updates of the access/dirty flags. However, a different agent in the system (e.g. SMMU) can do this, therefore overriding a writable entry with a clean one could potentially lose the automatically updated dirty status 2. A more complex situation is possible when all CPUs support hardware AF/DBM: a) Initial state: shareable + writable vma and pte_none(pte) b) Read fault taken by two threads of the same process on different CPUs c) CPU0 takes the mmap_sem and proceeds to handling the fault. It eventually reaches do_set_pte() which sets a writable + clean pte. CPU0 releases the mmap_sem d) CPU1 acquires the mmap_sem and proceeds to handle_pte_fault(). The pte entry it reads is present, writable and clean and it continues to pte_mkyoung() e) CPU1 calls ptep_set_access_flags() If between (d) and (e) the hardware (another CPU) updates the dirty state (clears PTE_RDONLY), CPU1 will override the PTR_RDONLY bit marking the entry clean again. This patch implements an arm64-specific ptep_set_access_flags() function to perform an atomic update of the PTE flags. Fixes: 2f4b829c625e ("arm64: Add support for hardware updates of the access and dirty pte bits") Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reported-by: Ming Lei <tom.leiming@gmail.com> Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.3+ [will: reworded comment] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-13 23:01:22 +08:00
*/
pte_val(entry) ^= PTE_RDONLY;
pteval = pte_val(pte);
do {
old_pteval = pteval;
pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
pteval |= pte_val(entry);
pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
pteval = cmpxchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), old_pteval, pteval);
} while (pteval != old_pteval);
arm64: Implement ptep_set_access_flags() for hardware AF/DBM When hardware updates of the access and dirty states are enabled, the default ptep_set_access_flags() implementation based on calling set_pte_at() directly is potentially racy. This triggers the "racy dirty state clearing" warning in set_pte_at() because an existing writable PTE is overridden with a clean entry. There are two main scenarios for this situation: 1. The CPU getting an access fault does not support hardware updates of the access/dirty flags. However, a different agent in the system (e.g. SMMU) can do this, therefore overriding a writable entry with a clean one could potentially lose the automatically updated dirty status 2. A more complex situation is possible when all CPUs support hardware AF/DBM: a) Initial state: shareable + writable vma and pte_none(pte) b) Read fault taken by two threads of the same process on different CPUs c) CPU0 takes the mmap_sem and proceeds to handling the fault. It eventually reaches do_set_pte() which sets a writable + clean pte. CPU0 releases the mmap_sem d) CPU1 acquires the mmap_sem and proceeds to handle_pte_fault(). The pte entry it reads is present, writable and clean and it continues to pte_mkyoung() e) CPU1 calls ptep_set_access_flags() If between (d) and (e) the hardware (another CPU) updates the dirty state (clears PTE_RDONLY), CPU1 will override the PTR_RDONLY bit marking the entry clean again. This patch implements an arm64-specific ptep_set_access_flags() function to perform an atomic update of the PTE flags. Fixes: 2f4b829c625e ("arm64: Add support for hardware updates of the access and dirty pte bits") Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reported-by: Ming Lei <tom.leiming@gmail.com> Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.3+ [will: reworded comment] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-13 23:01:22 +08:00
flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault(vma, address);
return 1;
}
arm64: Handle el1 synchronous instruction aborts cleanly Executing from a non-executable area gives an ugly message: lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_RODATA lkdtm: attempting ok execution at ffff0000084c0e08 lkdtm: attempting bad execution at ffff000008880700 Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected on CPU2, code 0x8400000e -- IABT (current EL) CPU: 2 PID: 998 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc2+ #13 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff800077e35780 ti: ffff800077970000 task.ti: ffff800077970000 PC is at lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing+0x0/0x8 LR is at execute_location+0x74/0x88 The 'IABT (current EL)' indicates the error but it's a bit cryptic without knowledge of the ARM ARM. There is also no indication of the specific address which triggered the fault. The increase in kernel page permissions makes hitting this case more likely as well. Handling the case in the vectors gives a much more familiar looking error message: lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_RODATA lkdtm: attempting ok execution at ffff0000084c0840 lkdtm: attempting bad execution at ffff000008880680 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000008880680 pgd = ffff8000089b2000 [ffff000008880680] *pgd=00000000489b4003, *pud=0000000048904003, *pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 8400000e [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 997 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1+ #24 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff800077f9f080 ti: ffff800008a1c000 task.ti: ffff800008a1c000 PC is at lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing+0x0/0x8 LR is at execute_location+0x74/0x88 Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-08-10 09:25:26 +08:00
static bool is_el1_instruction_abort(unsigned int esr)
{
return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR;
}
static inline bool is_permission_fault(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long addr)
{
unsigned int ec = ESR_ELx_EC(esr);
unsigned int fsc_type = esr & ESR_ELx_FSC_TYPE;
if (ec != ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_CUR && ec != ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR)
return false;
if (fsc_type == ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM)
return true;
if (addr < TASK_SIZE && system_uses_ttbr0_pan())
return fsc_type == ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT &&
(regs->pstate & PSR_PAN_BIT);
return false;
}
static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
const char *msg;
/*
* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault?
arm64: Handle el1 synchronous instruction aborts cleanly Executing from a non-executable area gives an ugly message: lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_RODATA lkdtm: attempting ok execution at ffff0000084c0e08 lkdtm: attempting bad execution at ffff000008880700 Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected on CPU2, code 0x8400000e -- IABT (current EL) CPU: 2 PID: 998 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc2+ #13 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff800077e35780 ti: ffff800077970000 task.ti: ffff800077970000 PC is at lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing+0x0/0x8 LR is at execute_location+0x74/0x88 The 'IABT (current EL)' indicates the error but it's a bit cryptic without knowledge of the ARM ARM. There is also no indication of the specific address which triggered the fault. The increase in kernel page permissions makes hitting this case more likely as well. Handling the case in the vectors gives a much more familiar looking error message: lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_RODATA lkdtm: attempting ok execution at ffff0000084c0840 lkdtm: attempting bad execution at ffff000008880680 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000008880680 pgd = ffff8000089b2000 [ffff000008880680] *pgd=00000000489b4003, *pud=0000000048904003, *pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 8400000e [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 997 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1+ #24 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff800077f9f080 ti: ffff800008a1c000 task.ti: ffff800008a1c000 PC is at lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing+0x0/0x8 LR is at execute_location+0x74/0x88 Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-08-10 09:25:26 +08:00
* We are almost certainly not prepared to handle instruction faults.
*/
arm64: Handle el1 synchronous instruction aborts cleanly Executing from a non-executable area gives an ugly message: lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_RODATA lkdtm: attempting ok execution at ffff0000084c0e08 lkdtm: attempting bad execution at ffff000008880700 Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected on CPU2, code 0x8400000e -- IABT (current EL) CPU: 2 PID: 998 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc2+ #13 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff800077e35780 ti: ffff800077970000 task.ti: ffff800077970000 PC is at lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing+0x0/0x8 LR is at execute_location+0x74/0x88 The 'IABT (current EL)' indicates the error but it's a bit cryptic without knowledge of the ARM ARM. There is also no indication of the specific address which triggered the fault. The increase in kernel page permissions makes hitting this case more likely as well. Handling the case in the vectors gives a much more familiar looking error message: lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_RODATA lkdtm: attempting ok execution at ffff0000084c0840 lkdtm: attempting bad execution at ffff000008880680 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000008880680 pgd = ffff8000089b2000 [ffff000008880680] *pgd=00000000489b4003, *pud=0000000048904003, *pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 8400000e [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 997 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1+ #24 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff800077f9f080 ti: ffff800008a1c000 task.ti: ffff800008a1c000 PC is at lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing+0x0/0x8 LR is at execute_location+0x74/0x88 Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-08-10 09:25:26 +08:00
if (!is_el1_instruction_abort(esr) && fixup_exception(regs))
return;
bust_spinlocks(1);
if (is_permission_fault(esr, regs, addr)) {
if (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR)
msg = "write to read-only memory";
else
msg = "read from unreadable memory";
} else if (addr < PAGE_SIZE) {
msg = "NULL pointer dereference";
} else {
msg = "paging request";
}
pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel %s at virtual address %08lx\n", msg,
addr);
mem_abort_decode(esr);
show_pte(addr);
die("Oops", regs, esr);
bust_spinlocks(0);
do_exit(SIGKILL);
}
static void __do_user_fault(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
unsigned int esr, unsigned int sig, int code,
struct pt_regs *regs, int fault)
{
struct siginfo si;
const struct fault_info *inf;
unsigned int lsb = 0;
if (unhandled_signal(tsk, sig) && show_unhandled_signals_ratelimited()) {
inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
pr_info("%s[%d]: unhandled %s (%d) at 0x%08lx, esr 0x%03x",
tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), inf->name, sig,
addr, esr);
print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT ", in ", regs->pc);
pr_cont("\n");
__show_regs(regs);
}
tsk->thread.fault_address = addr;
tsk->thread.fault_code = esr;
si.si_signo = sig;
si.si_errno = 0;
si.si_code = code;
si.si_addr = (void __user *)addr;
/*
* Either small page or large page may be poisoned.
* In other words, VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE and
* VM_FAULT_HWPOISON are mutually exclusive.
*/
if (fault & VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE)
lsb = hstate_index_to_shift(VM_FAULT_GET_HINDEX(fault));
else if (fault & VM_FAULT_HWPOISON)
lsb = PAGE_SHIFT;
si.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
force_sig_info(sig, &si, tsk);
}
static void do_bad_area(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
const struct fault_info *inf;
/*
* If we are in kernel mode at this point, we have no context to
* handle this fault with.
*/
if (user_mode(regs)) {
inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
__do_user_fault(tsk, addr, esr, inf->sig, inf->code, regs, 0);
} else
__do_kernel_fault(addr, esr, regs);
}
#define VM_FAULT_BADMAP 0x010000
#define VM_FAULT_BADACCESS 0x020000
static int __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
unsigned int mm_flags, unsigned long vm_flags,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int fault;
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
if (unlikely(!vma))
goto out;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > addr))
goto check_stack;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so we can handle
* it.
*/
good_area:
/*
* Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
* occurred.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
goto out;
}
return handle_mm_fault(vma, addr & PAGE_MASK, mm_flags);
check_stack:
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(vma, addr))
goto good_area;
out:
return fault;
}
static bool is_el0_instruction_abort(unsigned int esr)
{
return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW;
}
static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *mm;
int fault, sig, code, major = 0;
unsigned long vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_WRITE;
unsigned int mm_flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE;
arm64: Kprobes with single stepping support Add support for basic kernel probes(kprobes) and jump probes (jprobes) for ARM64. Kprobes utilizes software breakpoint and single step debug exceptions supported on ARM v8. A software breakpoint is placed at the probe address to trap the kernel execution into the kprobe handler. ARM v8 supports enabling single stepping before the break exception return (ERET), with next PC in exception return address (ELR_EL1). The kprobe handler prepares an executable memory slot for out-of-line execution with a copy of the original instruction being probed, and enables single stepping. The PC is set to the out-of-line slot address before the ERET. With this scheme, the instruction is executed with the exact same register context except for the PC (and DAIF) registers. Debug mask (PSTATE.D) is enabled only when single stepping a recursive kprobe, e.g.: during kprobes reenter so that probed instruction can be single stepped within the kprobe handler -exception- context. The recursion depth of kprobe is always 2, i.e. upon probe re-entry, any further re-entry is prevented by not calling handlers and the case counted as a missed kprobe). Single stepping from the x-o-l slot has a drawback for PC-relative accesses like branching and symbolic literals access as the offset from the new PC (slot address) may not be ensured to fit in the immediate value of the opcode. Such instructions need simulation, so reject probing them. Instructions generating exceptions or cpu mode change are rejected for probing. Exclusive load/store instructions are rejected too. Additionally, the code is checked to see if it is inside an exclusive load/store sequence (code from Pratyush). System instructions are mostly enabled for stepping, except MSR/MRS accesses to "DAIF" flags in PSTATE, which are not safe for probing. This also changes arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h to use include/asm-generic/ptrace.h. Thanks to Steve Capper and Pratyush Anand for several suggested Changes. Signed-off-by: Sandeepa Prabhu <sandeepa.s.prabhu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-07-09 00:35:48 +08:00
if (notify_page_fault(regs, esr))
return 0;
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
/*
* If we're in an interrupt or have no user context, we must not take
* the fault.
*/
mm/fault, arch: Use pagefault_disable() to check for disabled pagefaults in the handler Introduce faulthandler_disabled() and use it to check for irq context and disabled pagefaults (via pagefault_disable()) in the pagefault handlers. Please note that we keep the in_atomic() checks in place - to detect whether in irq context (in which case preemption is always properly disabled). In contrast, preempt_disable() should never be used to disable pagefaults. With !CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT, preempt_disable() doesn't modify the preempt counter, and therefore the result of in_atomic() differs. We validate that condition by using might_fault() checks when calling might_sleep(). Therefore, add a comment to faulthandler_disabled(), describing why this is needed. faulthandler_disabled() and pagefault_disable() are defined in linux/uaccess.h, so let's properly add that include to all relevant files. This patch is based on a patch from Thomas Gleixner. Reviewed-and-tested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David.Laight@ACULAB.COM Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: airlied@linux.ie Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de Cc: borntraeger@de.ibm.com Cc: daniel.vetter@intel.com Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Cc: hocko@suse.cz Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: mst@redhat.com Cc: paulus@samba.org Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com Cc: yang.shi@windriver.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1431359540-32227-7-git-send-email-dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-11 23:52:11 +08:00
if (faulthandler_disabled() || !mm)
goto no_context;
if (user_mode(regs))
mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
if (is_el0_instruction_abort(esr)) {
vm_flags = VM_EXEC;
} else if ((esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) && !(esr & ESR_ELx_CM)) {
vm_flags = VM_WRITE;
mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
}
if (addr < TASK_SIZE && is_permission_fault(esr, regs, addr)) {
/* regs->orig_addr_limit may be 0 if we entered from EL0 */
if (regs->orig_addr_limit == KERNEL_DS)
die("Accessing user space memory with fs=KERNEL_DS", regs, esr);
arm64: Handle el1 synchronous instruction aborts cleanly Executing from a non-executable area gives an ugly message: lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_RODATA lkdtm: attempting ok execution at ffff0000084c0e08 lkdtm: attempting bad execution at ffff000008880700 Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected on CPU2, code 0x8400000e -- IABT (current EL) CPU: 2 PID: 998 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc2+ #13 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff800077e35780 ti: ffff800077970000 task.ti: ffff800077970000 PC is at lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing+0x0/0x8 LR is at execute_location+0x74/0x88 The 'IABT (current EL)' indicates the error but it's a bit cryptic without knowledge of the ARM ARM. There is also no indication of the specific address which triggered the fault. The increase in kernel page permissions makes hitting this case more likely as well. Handling the case in the vectors gives a much more familiar looking error message: lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_RODATA lkdtm: attempting ok execution at ffff0000084c0840 lkdtm: attempting bad execution at ffff000008880680 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000008880680 pgd = ffff8000089b2000 [ffff000008880680] *pgd=00000000489b4003, *pud=0000000048904003, *pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 8400000e [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 997 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1+ #24 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff800077f9f080 ti: ffff800008a1c000 task.ti: ffff800008a1c000 PC is at lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing+0x0/0x8 LR is at execute_location+0x74/0x88 Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-08-10 09:25:26 +08:00
if (is_el1_instruction_abort(esr))
die("Attempting to execute userspace memory", regs, esr);
if (!search_exception_tables(regs->pc))
die("Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines", regs, esr);
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, addr);
/*
* As per x86, we may deadlock here. However, since the kernel only
* validly references user space from well defined areas of the code,
* we can bug out early if this is from code which shouldn't.
*/
if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->pc))
goto no_context;
retry:
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
} else {
/*
* The above down_read_trylock() might have succeeded in which
* case, we'll have missed the might_sleep() from down_read().
*/
might_sleep();
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->pc))
goto no_context;
#endif
}
fault = __do_page_fault(mm, addr, mm_flags, vm_flags, tsk);
major |= fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
if (fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
/*
* If we need to retry but a fatal signal is pending,
* handle the signal first. We do not need to release
* the mmap_sem because it would already be released
* in __lock_page_or_retry in mm/filemap.c.
*/
if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
return 0;
}
/*
* Clear FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY to avoid any risk of
* starvation.
*/
if (mm_flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) {
mm_flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_TRIED;
goto retry;
}
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* Handle the "normal" (no error) case first.
*/
if (likely(!(fault & (VM_FAULT_ERROR | VM_FAULT_BADMAP |
VM_FAULT_BADACCESS)))) {
/*
* Major/minor page fault accounting is only done
* once. If we go through a retry, it is extremely
* likely that the page will be found in page cache at
* that point.
*/
if (major) {
tsk->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, regs,
addr);
} else {
tsk->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, regs,
addr);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* If we are in kernel mode at this point, we have no context to
* handle this fault with.
*/
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM) {
/*
* We ran out of memory, call the OOM killer, and return to
* userspace (which will retry the fault, or kill us if we got
* oom-killed).
*/
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return 0;
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS) {
/*
* We had some memory, but were unable to successfully fix up
* this page fault.
*/
sig = SIGBUS;
code = BUS_ADRERR;
} else if (fault & (VM_FAULT_HWPOISON | VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE)) {
sig = SIGBUS;
code = BUS_MCEERR_AR;
} else {
/*
* Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory
* map.
*/
sig = SIGSEGV;
code = fault == VM_FAULT_BADACCESS ?
SEGV_ACCERR : SEGV_MAPERR;
}
__do_user_fault(tsk, addr, esr, sig, code, regs, fault);
return 0;
no_context:
__do_kernel_fault(addr, esr, regs);
return 0;
}
static int __kprobes do_translation_fault(unsigned long addr,
unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (addr < TASK_SIZE)
return do_page_fault(addr, esr, regs);
do_bad_area(addr, esr, regs);
return 0;
}
static int do_alignment_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
do_bad_area(addr, esr, regs);
return 0;
}
static int do_bad(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return 1; /* "fault" */
}
static int do_sea(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct siginfo info;
const struct fault_info *inf;
inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
/*
* Synchronous aborts may interrupt code which had interrupts masked.
* Before calling out into the wider kernel tell the interested
* subsystems.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_SEA)) {
if (interrupts_enabled(regs))
nmi_enter();
ghes_notify_sea();
if (interrupts_enabled(regs))
nmi_exit();
}
info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
info.si_errno = 0;
signal/arm64: Document conflicts with SI_USER and SIGFPE,SIGTRAP,SIGBUS Setting si_code to 0 results in a userspace seeing an si_code of 0. This is the same si_code as SI_USER. Posix and common sense requires that SI_USER not be a signal specific si_code. As such this use of 0 for the si_code is a pretty horribly broken ABI. Further use of si_code == 0 guaranteed that copy_siginfo_to_user saw a value of __SI_KILL and now sees a value of SIL_KILL with the result that uid and pid fields are copied and which might copying the si_addr field by accident but certainly not by design. Making this a very flakey implementation. Utilizing FPE_FIXME, BUS_FIXME, TRAP_FIXME siginfo_layout will now return SIL_FAULT and the appropriate fields will be reliably copied. But folks this is a new and unique kind of bad. This is massively untested code bad. This is inventing new and unique was to get siginfo wrong bad. This is don't even think about Posix or what siginfo means bad. This is lots of eyeballs all missing the fact that the code does the wrong thing bad. This is getting stuck and keep making the same mistake bad. I really hope we can find a non userspace breaking fix for this on a port as new as arm64. Possible ABI fixes include: - Send the signal without siginfo - Don't generate a signal - Possibly assign and use an appropriate si_code - Don't handle cases which can't happen Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Ref: 53631b54c870 ("arm64: Floating point and SIMD") Ref: 32015c235603 ("arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort") Ref: 1d18c47c735e ("arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-04 08:07:12 +08:00
info.si_code = BUS_FIXME;
if (esr & ESR_ELx_FnV)
info.si_addr = NULL;
else
info.si_addr = (void __user *)addr;
arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, &info, esr);
return 0;
}
static const struct fault_info fault_info[] = {
signal/arm64: Document conflicts with SI_USER and SIGFPE,SIGTRAP,SIGBUS Setting si_code to 0 results in a userspace seeing an si_code of 0. This is the same si_code as SI_USER. Posix and common sense requires that SI_USER not be a signal specific si_code. As such this use of 0 for the si_code is a pretty horribly broken ABI. Further use of si_code == 0 guaranteed that copy_siginfo_to_user saw a value of __SI_KILL and now sees a value of SIL_KILL with the result that uid and pid fields are copied and which might copying the si_addr field by accident but certainly not by design. Making this a very flakey implementation. Utilizing FPE_FIXME, BUS_FIXME, TRAP_FIXME siginfo_layout will now return SIL_FAULT and the appropriate fields will be reliably copied. But folks this is a new and unique kind of bad. This is massively untested code bad. This is inventing new and unique was to get siginfo wrong bad. This is don't even think about Posix or what siginfo means bad. This is lots of eyeballs all missing the fact that the code does the wrong thing bad. This is getting stuck and keep making the same mistake bad. I really hope we can find a non userspace breaking fix for this on a port as new as arm64. Possible ABI fixes include: - Send the signal without siginfo - Don't generate a signal - Possibly assign and use an appropriate si_code - Don't handle cases which can't happen Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Ref: 53631b54c870 ("arm64: Floating point and SIMD") Ref: 32015c235603 ("arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort") Ref: 1d18c47c735e ("arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-04 08:07:12 +08:00
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "ttbr address size fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "level 1 address size fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "level 2 address size fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "level 3 address size fault" },
{ do_translation_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, "level 0 translation fault" },
{ do_translation_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, "level 1 translation fault" },
{ do_translation_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, "level 2 translation fault" },
arm64: fault: Route pte translation faults via do_translation_fault We currently route pte translation faults via do_page_fault, which elides the address check against TASK_SIZE before invoking the mm fault handling code. However, this can cause issues with the path walking code in conjunction with our word-at-a-time implementation because load_unaligned_zeropad can end up faulting in kernel space if it reads across a page boundary and runs into a page fault (e.g. by attempting to read from a guard region). In the case of such a fault, load_unaligned_zeropad has registered a fixup to shift the valid data and pad with zeroes, however the abort is reported as a level 3 translation fault and we dispatch it straight to do_page_fault, despite it being a kernel address. This results in calling a sleeping function from atomic context: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:313 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 10290 Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [...] [<ffffff8e016cd0cc>] ___might_sleep+0x134/0x144 [<ffffff8e016cd158>] __might_sleep+0x7c/0x8c [<ffffff8e016977f0>] do_page_fault+0x140/0x330 [<ffffff8e01681328>] do_mem_abort+0x54/0xb0 Exception stack(0xfffffffb20247a70 to 0xfffffffb20247ba0) [...] [<ffffff8e016844fc>] el1_da+0x18/0x78 [<ffffff8e017f399c>] path_parentat+0x44/0x88 [<ffffff8e017f4c9c>] filename_parentat+0x5c/0xd8 [<ffffff8e017f5044>] filename_create+0x4c/0x128 [<ffffff8e017f59e4>] SyS_mkdirat+0x50/0xc8 [<ffffff8e01684e30>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 Code: 36380080 d5384100 f9400800 9402566d (d4210000) ---[ end trace 2d01889f2bca9b9f ]--- Fix this by dispatching all translation faults to do_translation_faults, which avoids invoking the page fault logic for faults on kernel addresses. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Ankit Jain <ankijain@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2017-09-29 19:27:41 +08:00
{ do_translation_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, "level 3 translation fault" },
signal/arm64: Document conflicts with SI_USER and SIGFPE,SIGTRAP,SIGBUS Setting si_code to 0 results in a userspace seeing an si_code of 0. This is the same si_code as SI_USER. Posix and common sense requires that SI_USER not be a signal specific si_code. As such this use of 0 for the si_code is a pretty horribly broken ABI. Further use of si_code == 0 guaranteed that copy_siginfo_to_user saw a value of __SI_KILL and now sees a value of SIL_KILL with the result that uid and pid fields are copied and which might copying the si_addr field by accident but certainly not by design. Making this a very flakey implementation. Utilizing FPE_FIXME, BUS_FIXME, TRAP_FIXME siginfo_layout will now return SIL_FAULT and the appropriate fields will be reliably copied. But folks this is a new and unique kind of bad. This is massively untested code bad. This is inventing new and unique was to get siginfo wrong bad. This is don't even think about Posix or what siginfo means bad. This is lots of eyeballs all missing the fact that the code does the wrong thing bad. This is getting stuck and keep making the same mistake bad. I really hope we can find a non userspace breaking fix for this on a port as new as arm64. Possible ABI fixes include: - Send the signal without siginfo - Don't generate a signal - Possibly assign and use an appropriate si_code - Don't handle cases which can't happen Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Ref: 53631b54c870 ("arm64: Floating point and SIMD") Ref: 32015c235603 ("arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort") Ref: 1d18c47c735e ("arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-04 08:07:12 +08:00
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 8" },
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 1 access flag fault" },
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 2 access flag fault" },
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 3 access flag fault" },
signal/arm64: Document conflicts with SI_USER and SIGFPE,SIGTRAP,SIGBUS Setting si_code to 0 results in a userspace seeing an si_code of 0. This is the same si_code as SI_USER. Posix and common sense requires that SI_USER not be a signal specific si_code. As such this use of 0 for the si_code is a pretty horribly broken ABI. Further use of si_code == 0 guaranteed that copy_siginfo_to_user saw a value of __SI_KILL and now sees a value of SIL_KILL with the result that uid and pid fields are copied and which might copying the si_addr field by accident but certainly not by design. Making this a very flakey implementation. Utilizing FPE_FIXME, BUS_FIXME, TRAP_FIXME siginfo_layout will now return SIL_FAULT and the appropriate fields will be reliably copied. But folks this is a new and unique kind of bad. This is massively untested code bad. This is inventing new and unique was to get siginfo wrong bad. This is don't even think about Posix or what siginfo means bad. This is lots of eyeballs all missing the fact that the code does the wrong thing bad. This is getting stuck and keep making the same mistake bad. I really hope we can find a non userspace breaking fix for this on a port as new as arm64. Possible ABI fixes include: - Send the signal without siginfo - Don't generate a signal - Possibly assign and use an appropriate si_code - Don't handle cases which can't happen Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Ref: 53631b54c870 ("arm64: Floating point and SIMD") Ref: 32015c235603 ("arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort") Ref: 1d18c47c735e ("arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-04 08:07:12 +08:00
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 12" },
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 1 permission fault" },
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 2 permission fault" },
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 3 permission fault" },
signal/arm64: Document conflicts with SI_USER and SIGFPE,SIGTRAP,SIGBUS Setting si_code to 0 results in a userspace seeing an si_code of 0. This is the same si_code as SI_USER. Posix and common sense requires that SI_USER not be a signal specific si_code. As such this use of 0 for the si_code is a pretty horribly broken ABI. Further use of si_code == 0 guaranteed that copy_siginfo_to_user saw a value of __SI_KILL and now sees a value of SIL_KILL with the result that uid and pid fields are copied and which might copying the si_addr field by accident but certainly not by design. Making this a very flakey implementation. Utilizing FPE_FIXME, BUS_FIXME, TRAP_FIXME siginfo_layout will now return SIL_FAULT and the appropriate fields will be reliably copied. But folks this is a new and unique kind of bad. This is massively untested code bad. This is inventing new and unique was to get siginfo wrong bad. This is don't even think about Posix or what siginfo means bad. This is lots of eyeballs all missing the fact that the code does the wrong thing bad. This is getting stuck and keep making the same mistake bad. I really hope we can find a non userspace breaking fix for this on a port as new as arm64. Possible ABI fixes include: - Send the signal without siginfo - Don't generate a signal - Possibly assign and use an appropriate si_code - Don't handle cases which can't happen Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Ref: 53631b54c870 ("arm64: Floating point and SIMD") Ref: 32015c235603 ("arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort") Ref: 1d18c47c735e ("arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-04 08:07:12 +08:00
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "synchronous external abort" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 17" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 18" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 19" },
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "level 0 (translation table walk)" },
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "level 1 (translation table walk)" },
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "level 2 (translation table walk)" },
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "level 3 (translation table walk)" },
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "synchronous parity or ECC error" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 25" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 26" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 27" },
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "level 0 synchronous parity error (translation table walk)" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "level 1 synchronous parity error (translation table walk)" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "level 2 synchronous parity error (translation table walk)" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "level 3 synchronous parity error (translation table walk)" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 32" },
{ do_alignment_fault, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, "alignment fault" },
signal/arm64: Document conflicts with SI_USER and SIGFPE,SIGTRAP,SIGBUS Setting si_code to 0 results in a userspace seeing an si_code of 0. This is the same si_code as SI_USER. Posix and common sense requires that SI_USER not be a signal specific si_code. As such this use of 0 for the si_code is a pretty horribly broken ABI. Further use of si_code == 0 guaranteed that copy_siginfo_to_user saw a value of __SI_KILL and now sees a value of SIL_KILL with the result that uid and pid fields are copied and which might copying the si_addr field by accident but certainly not by design. Making this a very flakey implementation. Utilizing FPE_FIXME, BUS_FIXME, TRAP_FIXME siginfo_layout will now return SIL_FAULT and the appropriate fields will be reliably copied. But folks this is a new and unique kind of bad. This is massively untested code bad. This is inventing new and unique was to get siginfo wrong bad. This is don't even think about Posix or what siginfo means bad. This is lots of eyeballs all missing the fact that the code does the wrong thing bad. This is getting stuck and keep making the same mistake bad. I really hope we can find a non userspace breaking fix for this on a port as new as arm64. Possible ABI fixes include: - Send the signal without siginfo - Don't generate a signal - Possibly assign and use an appropriate si_code - Don't handle cases which can't happen Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Ref: 53631b54c870 ("arm64: Floating point and SIMD") Ref: 32015c235603 ("arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort") Ref: 1d18c47c735e ("arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-04 08:07:12 +08:00
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 34" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 35" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 36" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 37" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 38" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 39" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 40" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 41" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 42" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 43" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 44" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 45" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 46" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 47" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "TLB conflict abort" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "Unsupported atomic hardware update fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 50" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 51" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "implementation fault (lockdown abort)" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "implementation fault (unsupported exclusive)" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 54" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 55" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 56" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 57" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 58" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 59" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 60" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "section domain fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "page domain fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 63" },
};
int handle_guest_sea(phys_addr_t addr, unsigned int esr)
{
int ret = -ENOENT;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_SEA))
ret = ghes_notify_sea();
return ret;
}
asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
const struct fault_info *inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
struct siginfo info;
if (!inf->fn(addr, esr, regs))
return;
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
pr_alert("Unhandled fault at 0x%016lx\n", addr);
mem_abort_decode(esr);
show_pte(addr);
}
info.si_signo = inf->sig;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = inf->code;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)addr;
arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, &info, esr);
}
asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_irq_bp_hardening(void)
{
/* PC has already been checked in entry.S */
arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
}
asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr,
unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/*
* We've taken an instruction abort from userspace and not yet
* re-enabled IRQs. If the address is a kernel address, apply
* BP hardening prior to enabling IRQs and pre-emption.
*/
if (addr > TASK_SIZE)
arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
local_irq_enable();
do_mem_abort(addr, esr, regs);
}
asmlinkage void __exception do_sp_pc_abort(unsigned long addr,
unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct siginfo info;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
if (instruction_pointer(regs) > TASK_SIZE)
arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
local_irq_enable();
}
info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = BUS_ADRALN;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)addr;
arm64_notify_die("SP/PC alignment exception", regs, &info, esr);
}
int __init early_brk64(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs);
/*
* __refdata because early_brk64 is __init, but the reference to it is
* clobbered at arch_initcall time.
* See traps.c and debug-monitors.c:debug_traps_init().
*/
static struct fault_info __refdata debug_fault_info[] = {
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT, "hardware breakpoint" },
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT, "hardware single-step" },
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT, "hardware watchpoint" },
signal/arm64: Document conflicts with SI_USER and SIGFPE,SIGTRAP,SIGBUS Setting si_code to 0 results in a userspace seeing an si_code of 0. This is the same si_code as SI_USER. Posix and common sense requires that SI_USER not be a signal specific si_code. As such this use of 0 for the si_code is a pretty horribly broken ABI. Further use of si_code == 0 guaranteed that copy_siginfo_to_user saw a value of __SI_KILL and now sees a value of SIL_KILL with the result that uid and pid fields are copied and which might copying the si_addr field by accident but certainly not by design. Making this a very flakey implementation. Utilizing FPE_FIXME, BUS_FIXME, TRAP_FIXME siginfo_layout will now return SIL_FAULT and the appropriate fields will be reliably copied. But folks this is a new and unique kind of bad. This is massively untested code bad. This is inventing new and unique was to get siginfo wrong bad. This is don't even think about Posix or what siginfo means bad. This is lots of eyeballs all missing the fact that the code does the wrong thing bad. This is getting stuck and keep making the same mistake bad. I really hope we can find a non userspace breaking fix for this on a port as new as arm64. Possible ABI fixes include: - Send the signal without siginfo - Don't generate a signal - Possibly assign and use an appropriate si_code - Don't handle cases which can't happen Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Ref: 53631b54c870 ("arm64: Floating point and SIMD") Ref: 32015c235603 ("arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort") Ref: 1d18c47c735e ("arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-04 08:07:12 +08:00
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 3" },
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_BRKPT, "aarch32 BKPT" },
signal/arm64: Document conflicts with SI_USER and SIGFPE,SIGTRAP,SIGBUS Setting si_code to 0 results in a userspace seeing an si_code of 0. This is the same si_code as SI_USER. Posix and common sense requires that SI_USER not be a signal specific si_code. As such this use of 0 for the si_code is a pretty horribly broken ABI. Further use of si_code == 0 guaranteed that copy_siginfo_to_user saw a value of __SI_KILL and now sees a value of SIL_KILL with the result that uid and pid fields are copied and which might copying the si_addr field by accident but certainly not by design. Making this a very flakey implementation. Utilizing FPE_FIXME, BUS_FIXME, TRAP_FIXME siginfo_layout will now return SIL_FAULT and the appropriate fields will be reliably copied. But folks this is a new and unique kind of bad. This is massively untested code bad. This is inventing new and unique was to get siginfo wrong bad. This is don't even think about Posix or what siginfo means bad. This is lots of eyeballs all missing the fact that the code does the wrong thing bad. This is getting stuck and keep making the same mistake bad. I really hope we can find a non userspace breaking fix for this on a port as new as arm64. Possible ABI fixes include: - Send the signal without siginfo - Don't generate a signal - Possibly assign and use an appropriate si_code - Don't handle cases which can't happen Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Ref: 53631b54c870 ("arm64: Floating point and SIMD") Ref: 32015c235603 ("arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort") Ref: 1d18c47c735e ("arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-04 08:07:12 +08:00
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_FIXME, "aarch32 vector catch" },
{ early_brk64, SIGTRAP, TRAP_BRKPT, "aarch64 BRK" },
signal/arm64: Document conflicts with SI_USER and SIGFPE,SIGTRAP,SIGBUS Setting si_code to 0 results in a userspace seeing an si_code of 0. This is the same si_code as SI_USER. Posix and common sense requires that SI_USER not be a signal specific si_code. As such this use of 0 for the si_code is a pretty horribly broken ABI. Further use of si_code == 0 guaranteed that copy_siginfo_to_user saw a value of __SI_KILL and now sees a value of SIL_KILL with the result that uid and pid fields are copied and which might copying the si_addr field by accident but certainly not by design. Making this a very flakey implementation. Utilizing FPE_FIXME, BUS_FIXME, TRAP_FIXME siginfo_layout will now return SIL_FAULT and the appropriate fields will be reliably copied. But folks this is a new and unique kind of bad. This is massively untested code bad. This is inventing new and unique was to get siginfo wrong bad. This is don't even think about Posix or what siginfo means bad. This is lots of eyeballs all missing the fact that the code does the wrong thing bad. This is getting stuck and keep making the same mistake bad. I really hope we can find a non userspace breaking fix for this on a port as new as arm64. Possible ABI fixes include: - Send the signal without siginfo - Don't generate a signal - Possibly assign and use an appropriate si_code - Don't handle cases which can't happen Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Ref: 53631b54c870 ("arm64: Floating point and SIMD") Ref: 32015c235603 ("arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort") Ref: 1d18c47c735e ("arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-04 08:07:12 +08:00
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_FIXME, "unknown 7" },
};
void __init hook_debug_fault_code(int nr,
int (*fn)(unsigned long, unsigned int, struct pt_regs *),
int sig, int code, const char *name)
{
BUG_ON(nr < 0 || nr >= ARRAY_SIZE(debug_fault_info));
debug_fault_info[nr].fn = fn;
debug_fault_info[nr].sig = sig;
debug_fault_info[nr].code = code;
debug_fault_info[nr].name = name;
}
asmlinkage int __exception do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr,
unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
const struct fault_info *inf = debug_fault_info + DBG_ESR_EVT(esr);
struct siginfo info;
arm64: mm: Add trace_irqflags annotations to do_debug_exception() With CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKDEP and CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS enabled, lockdep will compare current->hardirqs_enabled with the flags from local_irq_save(). When a debug exception occurs, interrupts are disabled in entry.S, but lockdep isn't told, resulting in: DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(current->hardirqs_enabled) ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: at ../kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3523 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 1752 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.5.0-rc4+ #2204 Hardware name: ARM Juno development board (r1) (DT) task: ffffffc974868000 ti: ffffffc975f40000 task.ti: ffffffc975f40000 PC is at check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 LR is at check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 pc : [<ffffff80080fc93c>] lr : [<ffffff80080fc93c>] pstate: 600003c5 [...] ---[ end trace 74631f9305ef5020 ]--- Call trace: [<ffffff80080fc93c>] check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 [<ffffff80080ffe30>] lock_acquire+0xa8/0xc4 [<ffffff8008093038>] breakpoint_handler+0x118/0x288 [<ffffff8008082434>] do_debug_exception+0x3c/0xa8 [<ffffff80080854b4>] el1_dbg+0x18/0x6c [<ffffff80081e82f4>] do_filp_open+0x64/0xdc [<ffffff80081d6e60>] do_sys_open+0x140/0x204 [<ffffff80081d6f58>] SyS_openat+0x10/0x18 [<ffffff8008085d30>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 possible reason: unannotated irqs-off. irq event stamp: 65857 hardirqs last enabled at (65857): [<ffffff80081fb1c0>] lookup_mnt+0xf4/0x1b4 hardirqs last disabled at (65856): [<ffffff80081fb188>] lookup_mnt+0xbc/0x1b4 softirqs last enabled at (65790): [<ffffff80080bdca4>] __do_softirq+0x1f8/0x290 softirqs last disabled at (65757): [<ffffff80080be038>] irq_exit+0x9c/0xd0 This patch adds the annotations to do_debug_exception(), while trying not to call trace_hardirqs_off() if el1_dbg() interrupted a task that already had irqs disabled. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-13 20:40:00 +08:00
int rv;
arm64: mm: Add trace_irqflags annotations to do_debug_exception() With CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKDEP and CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS enabled, lockdep will compare current->hardirqs_enabled with the flags from local_irq_save(). When a debug exception occurs, interrupts are disabled in entry.S, but lockdep isn't told, resulting in: DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(current->hardirqs_enabled) ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: at ../kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3523 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 1752 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.5.0-rc4+ #2204 Hardware name: ARM Juno development board (r1) (DT) task: ffffffc974868000 ti: ffffffc975f40000 task.ti: ffffffc975f40000 PC is at check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 LR is at check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 pc : [<ffffff80080fc93c>] lr : [<ffffff80080fc93c>] pstate: 600003c5 [...] ---[ end trace 74631f9305ef5020 ]--- Call trace: [<ffffff80080fc93c>] check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 [<ffffff80080ffe30>] lock_acquire+0xa8/0xc4 [<ffffff8008093038>] breakpoint_handler+0x118/0x288 [<ffffff8008082434>] do_debug_exception+0x3c/0xa8 [<ffffff80080854b4>] el1_dbg+0x18/0x6c [<ffffff80081e82f4>] do_filp_open+0x64/0xdc [<ffffff80081d6e60>] do_sys_open+0x140/0x204 [<ffffff80081d6f58>] SyS_openat+0x10/0x18 [<ffffff8008085d30>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 possible reason: unannotated irqs-off. irq event stamp: 65857 hardirqs last enabled at (65857): [<ffffff80081fb1c0>] lookup_mnt+0xf4/0x1b4 hardirqs last disabled at (65856): [<ffffff80081fb188>] lookup_mnt+0xbc/0x1b4 softirqs last enabled at (65790): [<ffffff80080bdca4>] __do_softirq+0x1f8/0x290 softirqs last disabled at (65757): [<ffffff80080be038>] irq_exit+0x9c/0xd0 This patch adds the annotations to do_debug_exception(), while trying not to call trace_hardirqs_off() if el1_dbg() interrupted a task that already had irqs disabled. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-13 20:40:00 +08:00
/*
* Tell lockdep we disabled irqs in entry.S. Do nothing if they were
* already disabled to preserve the last enabled/disabled addresses.
*/
if (interrupts_enabled(regs))
trace_hardirqs_off();
if (user_mode(regs) && instruction_pointer(regs) > TASK_SIZE)
arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
arm64: mm: Add trace_irqflags annotations to do_debug_exception() With CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKDEP and CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS enabled, lockdep will compare current->hardirqs_enabled with the flags from local_irq_save(). When a debug exception occurs, interrupts are disabled in entry.S, but lockdep isn't told, resulting in: DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(current->hardirqs_enabled) ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: at ../kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3523 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 1752 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.5.0-rc4+ #2204 Hardware name: ARM Juno development board (r1) (DT) task: ffffffc974868000 ti: ffffffc975f40000 task.ti: ffffffc975f40000 PC is at check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 LR is at check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 pc : [<ffffff80080fc93c>] lr : [<ffffff80080fc93c>] pstate: 600003c5 [...] ---[ end trace 74631f9305ef5020 ]--- Call trace: [<ffffff80080fc93c>] check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 [<ffffff80080ffe30>] lock_acquire+0xa8/0xc4 [<ffffff8008093038>] breakpoint_handler+0x118/0x288 [<ffffff8008082434>] do_debug_exception+0x3c/0xa8 [<ffffff80080854b4>] el1_dbg+0x18/0x6c [<ffffff80081e82f4>] do_filp_open+0x64/0xdc [<ffffff80081d6e60>] do_sys_open+0x140/0x204 [<ffffff80081d6f58>] SyS_openat+0x10/0x18 [<ffffff8008085d30>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 possible reason: unannotated irqs-off. irq event stamp: 65857 hardirqs last enabled at (65857): [<ffffff80081fb1c0>] lookup_mnt+0xf4/0x1b4 hardirqs last disabled at (65856): [<ffffff80081fb188>] lookup_mnt+0xbc/0x1b4 softirqs last enabled at (65790): [<ffffff80080bdca4>] __do_softirq+0x1f8/0x290 softirqs last disabled at (65757): [<ffffff80080be038>] irq_exit+0x9c/0xd0 This patch adds the annotations to do_debug_exception(), while trying not to call trace_hardirqs_off() if el1_dbg() interrupted a task that already had irqs disabled. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-13 20:40:00 +08:00
if (!inf->fn(addr, esr, regs)) {
rv = 1;
} else {
info.si_signo = inf->sig;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = inf->code;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)addr;
arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, &info, esr);
arm64: mm: Add trace_irqflags annotations to do_debug_exception() With CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKDEP and CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS enabled, lockdep will compare current->hardirqs_enabled with the flags from local_irq_save(). When a debug exception occurs, interrupts are disabled in entry.S, but lockdep isn't told, resulting in: DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(current->hardirqs_enabled) ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: at ../kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3523 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 1752 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.5.0-rc4+ #2204 Hardware name: ARM Juno development board (r1) (DT) task: ffffffc974868000 ti: ffffffc975f40000 task.ti: ffffffc975f40000 PC is at check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 LR is at check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 pc : [<ffffff80080fc93c>] lr : [<ffffff80080fc93c>] pstate: 600003c5 [...] ---[ end trace 74631f9305ef5020 ]--- Call trace: [<ffffff80080fc93c>] check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 [<ffffff80080ffe30>] lock_acquire+0xa8/0xc4 [<ffffff8008093038>] breakpoint_handler+0x118/0x288 [<ffffff8008082434>] do_debug_exception+0x3c/0xa8 [<ffffff80080854b4>] el1_dbg+0x18/0x6c [<ffffff80081e82f4>] do_filp_open+0x64/0xdc [<ffffff80081d6e60>] do_sys_open+0x140/0x204 [<ffffff80081d6f58>] SyS_openat+0x10/0x18 [<ffffff8008085d30>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 possible reason: unannotated irqs-off. irq event stamp: 65857 hardirqs last enabled at (65857): [<ffffff80081fb1c0>] lookup_mnt+0xf4/0x1b4 hardirqs last disabled at (65856): [<ffffff80081fb188>] lookup_mnt+0xbc/0x1b4 softirqs last enabled at (65790): [<ffffff80080bdca4>] __do_softirq+0x1f8/0x290 softirqs last disabled at (65757): [<ffffff80080be038>] irq_exit+0x9c/0xd0 This patch adds the annotations to do_debug_exception(), while trying not to call trace_hardirqs_off() if el1_dbg() interrupted a task that already had irqs disabled. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-13 20:40:00 +08:00
rv = 0;
}
arm64: mm: Add trace_irqflags annotations to do_debug_exception() With CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKDEP and CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS enabled, lockdep will compare current->hardirqs_enabled with the flags from local_irq_save(). When a debug exception occurs, interrupts are disabled in entry.S, but lockdep isn't told, resulting in: DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(current->hardirqs_enabled) ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: at ../kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3523 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 1752 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.5.0-rc4+ #2204 Hardware name: ARM Juno development board (r1) (DT) task: ffffffc974868000 ti: ffffffc975f40000 task.ti: ffffffc975f40000 PC is at check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 LR is at check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 pc : [<ffffff80080fc93c>] lr : [<ffffff80080fc93c>] pstate: 600003c5 [...] ---[ end trace 74631f9305ef5020 ]--- Call trace: [<ffffff80080fc93c>] check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 [<ffffff80080ffe30>] lock_acquire+0xa8/0xc4 [<ffffff8008093038>] breakpoint_handler+0x118/0x288 [<ffffff8008082434>] do_debug_exception+0x3c/0xa8 [<ffffff80080854b4>] el1_dbg+0x18/0x6c [<ffffff80081e82f4>] do_filp_open+0x64/0xdc [<ffffff80081d6e60>] do_sys_open+0x140/0x204 [<ffffff80081d6f58>] SyS_openat+0x10/0x18 [<ffffff8008085d30>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 possible reason: unannotated irqs-off. irq event stamp: 65857 hardirqs last enabled at (65857): [<ffffff80081fb1c0>] lookup_mnt+0xf4/0x1b4 hardirqs last disabled at (65856): [<ffffff80081fb188>] lookup_mnt+0xbc/0x1b4 softirqs last enabled at (65790): [<ffffff80080bdca4>] __do_softirq+0x1f8/0x290 softirqs last disabled at (65757): [<ffffff80080be038>] irq_exit+0x9c/0xd0 This patch adds the annotations to do_debug_exception(), while trying not to call trace_hardirqs_off() if el1_dbg() interrupted a task that already had irqs disabled. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-13 20:40:00 +08:00
if (interrupts_enabled(regs))
trace_hardirqs_on();
arm64: mm: Add trace_irqflags annotations to do_debug_exception() With CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKDEP and CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS enabled, lockdep will compare current->hardirqs_enabled with the flags from local_irq_save(). When a debug exception occurs, interrupts are disabled in entry.S, but lockdep isn't told, resulting in: DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(current->hardirqs_enabled) ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: at ../kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3523 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 1752 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.5.0-rc4+ #2204 Hardware name: ARM Juno development board (r1) (DT) task: ffffffc974868000 ti: ffffffc975f40000 task.ti: ffffffc975f40000 PC is at check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 LR is at check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 pc : [<ffffff80080fc93c>] lr : [<ffffff80080fc93c>] pstate: 600003c5 [...] ---[ end trace 74631f9305ef5020 ]--- Call trace: [<ffffff80080fc93c>] check_flags.part.35+0x17c/0x184 [<ffffff80080ffe30>] lock_acquire+0xa8/0xc4 [<ffffff8008093038>] breakpoint_handler+0x118/0x288 [<ffffff8008082434>] do_debug_exception+0x3c/0xa8 [<ffffff80080854b4>] el1_dbg+0x18/0x6c [<ffffff80081e82f4>] do_filp_open+0x64/0xdc [<ffffff80081d6e60>] do_sys_open+0x140/0x204 [<ffffff80081d6f58>] SyS_openat+0x10/0x18 [<ffffff8008085d30>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 possible reason: unannotated irqs-off. irq event stamp: 65857 hardirqs last enabled at (65857): [<ffffff80081fb1c0>] lookup_mnt+0xf4/0x1b4 hardirqs last disabled at (65856): [<ffffff80081fb188>] lookup_mnt+0xbc/0x1b4 softirqs last enabled at (65790): [<ffffff80080bdca4>] __do_softirq+0x1f8/0x290 softirqs last disabled at (65757): [<ffffff80080be038>] irq_exit+0x9c/0xd0 This patch adds the annotations to do_debug_exception(), while trying not to call trace_hardirqs_off() if el1_dbg() interrupted a task that already had irqs disabled. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-13 20:40:00 +08:00
return rv;
}
arm64: Kprobes with single stepping support Add support for basic kernel probes(kprobes) and jump probes (jprobes) for ARM64. Kprobes utilizes software breakpoint and single step debug exceptions supported on ARM v8. A software breakpoint is placed at the probe address to trap the kernel execution into the kprobe handler. ARM v8 supports enabling single stepping before the break exception return (ERET), with next PC in exception return address (ELR_EL1). The kprobe handler prepares an executable memory slot for out-of-line execution with a copy of the original instruction being probed, and enables single stepping. The PC is set to the out-of-line slot address before the ERET. With this scheme, the instruction is executed with the exact same register context except for the PC (and DAIF) registers. Debug mask (PSTATE.D) is enabled only when single stepping a recursive kprobe, e.g.: during kprobes reenter so that probed instruction can be single stepped within the kprobe handler -exception- context. The recursion depth of kprobe is always 2, i.e. upon probe re-entry, any further re-entry is prevented by not calling handlers and the case counted as a missed kprobe). Single stepping from the x-o-l slot has a drawback for PC-relative accesses like branching and symbolic literals access as the offset from the new PC (slot address) may not be ensured to fit in the immediate value of the opcode. Such instructions need simulation, so reject probing them. Instructions generating exceptions or cpu mode change are rejected for probing. Exclusive load/store instructions are rejected too. Additionally, the code is checked to see if it is inside an exclusive load/store sequence (code from Pratyush). System instructions are mostly enabled for stepping, except MSR/MRS accesses to "DAIF" flags in PSTATE, which are not safe for probing. This also changes arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h to use include/asm-generic/ptrace.h. Thanks to Steve Capper and Pratyush Anand for several suggested Changes. Signed-off-by: Sandeepa Prabhu <sandeepa.s.prabhu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-07-09 00:35:48 +08:00
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_debug_exception);
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PAN
int cpu_enable_pan(void *__unused)
{
/*
* We modify PSTATE. This won't work from irq context as the PSTATE
* is discarded once we return from the exception.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(in_interrupt());
config_sctlr_el1(SCTLR_EL1_SPAN, 0);
asm(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1));
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PAN */