mirror of https://github.com/xwiki-labs/cryptpad
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/accessibility' into accessibility
This commit is contained in:
commit
338e43ce56
|
@ -144,6 +144,7 @@
|
|||
display: flex;
|
||||
|
||||
> * {
|
||||
overflow:auto;
|
||||
width: 100%;
|
||||
min-width: 260px;
|
||||
max-width: 500px;
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -135,9 +135,9 @@
|
|||
&>div {
|
||||
margin: 10px 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
//button.btn {
|
||||
// margin: 0 5px 0 0;
|
||||
//}
|
||||
button.btn {
|
||||
margin: 0 0.5rem 0 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
span.cp-password-container {
|
||||
margin-bottom: 1rem;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
|
|||
# This file is included strictly as an example of how Nginx can be configured
|
||||
# to work with CryptPad. This example WILL NOT WORK AS IS. For best results,
|
||||
# compare the sections of this configuration file against a working CryptPad
|
||||
# installation (http server by the Nodejs process). If you are using CryptPad
|
||||
# in production and require professional support please contact sales@cryptpad.fr
|
||||
|
||||
server {
|
||||
listen 443 ssl http2;
|
||||
listen [::]:443 ssl http2;
|
||||
|
||||
# Let's Encrypt webroot
|
||||
include letsencrypt-webroot;
|
||||
|
||||
# CryptPad serves static assets over these two domains.
|
||||
# `main_domain` is what users will enter in their address bar.
|
||||
# Privileged computation such as key management is handled in this scope
|
||||
# UI content is loaded via the `sandbox_domain`.
|
||||
# "Content Security Policy" headers prevent content loaded via the sandbox
|
||||
# from accessing privileged information.
|
||||
# These variables must be different to take advantage of CryptPad's sandboxing techniques.
|
||||
# In the event of an XSS vulnerability in CryptPad's front-end code
|
||||
# this will limit the amount of information accessible to attackers.
|
||||
set $main_domain "your-main-domain.com";
|
||||
set $sandbox_domain "your-sandbox-domain.com";
|
||||
|
||||
# By default CryptPad forbids remote domains from embedding CryptPad documents in iframes.
|
||||
# The sandbox domain must always be permitted in order for the platform to function.
|
||||
# If you wish to enable remote embedding you may change the value below to "*"
|
||||
# as per the commented value.
|
||||
set $allowed_origins "https://${sandbox_domain}";
|
||||
#set $allowed_origins "*";
|
||||
|
||||
# CryptPad's dynamic content (websocket traffic and encrypted blobs)
|
||||
# can be served over separate domains. Using dedicated domains (or subdomains)
|
||||
# for these purposes allows you to move them to a separate machine at a later date
|
||||
# if you find that a single machine cannot handle all of your users.
|
||||
# If you don't use dedicated domains, this can be the same as $main_domain
|
||||
# If you do, they can be added as exceptions to any rules which block connections to remote domains.
|
||||
# You can find these variables referenced below in the relevant places
|
||||
set $api_domain "api.your-main-domain.com";
|
||||
set $files_domain "files.your-main-domain.com";
|
||||
|
||||
# nginx doesn't let you set server_name via variables, so you need to hardcode your domains here
|
||||
server_name your-main-domain.com your-sandbox-domain.com;
|
||||
|
||||
# You'll need to Set the path to your certificates and keys here
|
||||
# IMPORTANT: this config is intended to serve assets for at least two domains
|
||||
# (your main domain and your sandbox domain). As such, you'll need to generate a single SSL certificate
|
||||
# that includes both domains in order for things to work as expected.
|
||||
ssl_certificate /etc/ssl/lets-encrypt/your-main-domain.com/cert;
|
||||
ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/lets-encrypt/your-main-domain.com/key;
|
||||
|
||||
# diffie-hellman parameters are used to negotiate keys for your session
|
||||
# generate strong parameters using the following command
|
||||
ssl_dhparam /etc/nginx/dhparam.pem; # openssl dhparam -out /etc/nginx/dhparam.pem 4096
|
||||
|
||||
# Speeds things up a little bit when resuming a session
|
||||
ssl_session_timeout 1d;
|
||||
ssl_session_cache shared:MozSSL:10m;
|
||||
ssl_session_tickets off;
|
||||
|
||||
ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
|
||||
ssl_ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384;
|
||||
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers off;
|
||||
|
||||
# HSTS (ngx_http_headers_module is required) (63072000 seconds)
|
||||
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains" always;
|
||||
|
||||
# OCSP stapling
|
||||
ssl_stapling on;
|
||||
ssl_stapling_verify on;
|
||||
|
||||
# verify chain of trust of OCSP response using Root CA and Intermediate certs
|
||||
ssl_trusted_certificate /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt;
|
||||
|
||||
# replace with the IP address of your resolver
|
||||
resolver 8.8.8.8 8.8.4.4 1.1.1.1 1.0.0.1 9.9.9.9 149.112.112.112 208.67.222.222 208.67.220.220;
|
||||
|
||||
add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block";
|
||||
add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff;
|
||||
add_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin "${allowed_origins}";
|
||||
add_header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials true;
|
||||
# add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN";
|
||||
|
||||
# Opt out of Google's FLoC Network
|
||||
add_header Permissions-Policy interest-cohort=();
|
||||
|
||||
# Enable SharedArrayBuffer in Firefox (for .xlsx export)
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy cross-origin;
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy require-corp;
|
||||
|
||||
# Insert the path to your CryptPad repository root here
|
||||
root /home/cryptpad/cryptpad;
|
||||
index index.html;
|
||||
error_page 404 /customize.dist/404.html;
|
||||
|
||||
# any static assets loaded with "ver=" in their URL will be cached for a year
|
||||
if ($args ~ ver=) {
|
||||
set $cacheControl max-age=31536000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
# This rule overrides the above caching directive and makes things somewhat less efficient.
|
||||
# We had inverted them as an optimization, but Safari 16 introduced a bug that interpreted
|
||||
# some important headers incorrectly when loading these files from cache.
|
||||
# This is why we can't have nice things :(
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^(\/|.*\/|.*\.html)$) {
|
||||
set $cacheControl no-cache;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Will not set any header if it is emptystring
|
||||
add_header Cache-Control $cacheControl;
|
||||
|
||||
# CSS can be dynamically set inline, loaded from the same domain, or from $main_domain
|
||||
set $styleSrc "'unsafe-inline' 'self' https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# connect-src restricts URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces
|
||||
# if you have configured your instance to use a dedicated $files_domain or $api_domain
|
||||
# you will need to add them below as: https://${files_domain} and https://${api_domain}
|
||||
set $connectSrc "'self' https://${main_domain} blob: wss://${api_domain} https://${sandbox_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# fonts can be loaded from data-URLs or the main domain
|
||||
set $fontSrc "'self' data: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# images can be loaded from anywhere, though we'd like to deprecate this as it allows the use of images for tracking
|
||||
set $imgSrc "'self' data: blob: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# frame-src specifies valid sources for nested browsing contexts.
|
||||
# this prevents loading any iframes from anywhere other than the sandbox domain
|
||||
set $frameSrc "'self' https://${sandbox_domain} blob:";
|
||||
|
||||
# specifies valid sources for loading media using video or audio
|
||||
set $mediaSrc "blob:";
|
||||
|
||||
# defines valid sources for webworkers and nested browser contexts
|
||||
# deprecated in favour of worker-src and frame-src
|
||||
set $childSrc "https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# specifies valid sources for Worker, SharedWorker, or ServiceWorker scripts.
|
||||
# supercedes child-src but is unfortunately not yet universally supported.
|
||||
set $workerSrc "'self'";
|
||||
|
||||
# script-src specifies valid sources for javascript, including inline handlers
|
||||
set $scriptSrc "'self' resource: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# frame-ancestors specifies which origins can embed your CryptPad instance
|
||||
# this must include 'self' and your main domain (over HTTPS) in order for CryptPad to work
|
||||
# if you have enabled remote embedding via the admin panel then this must be more permissive.
|
||||
# note: cryptpad.fr permits web pages served via https: and vector: (element desktop app)
|
||||
set $frameAncestors "'self' https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
# set $frameAncestors "'self' https: vector:";
|
||||
|
||||
set $unsafe 0;
|
||||
# the following assets are loaded via the sandbox domain
|
||||
# they unfortunately still require exceptions to the sandboxing to work correctly.
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/(sheet|doc|presentation)\/inner.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/common\/onlyoffice\/.*\/.*\.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
# everything except the sandbox domain is a privileged scope, as they might be used to handle keys
|
||||
if ($host != $sandbox_domain) { set $unsafe 0; }
|
||||
# this iframe is an exception. Office file formats are converted outside of the sandboxed scope
|
||||
# because of bugs in Chromium-based browsers that incorrectly ignore headers that are supposed to enable
|
||||
# the use of some modern APIs that we require when javascript is run in a cross-origin context.
|
||||
# We've applied other sandboxing techniques to mitigate the risk of running WebAssembly in this privileged scope
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/unsafeiframe\/inner\.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
# draw.io uses inline script tags in it's index.html. The hashes are added here.
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/components\/drawio\/src\/main\/webapp\/index.html.*$) {
|
||||
set $scriptSrc "'self' 'sha256-6zAB96lsBZREqf0sT44BhH1T69sm7HrN34rpMOcWbNo=' 'sha256-6g514VrT/cZFZltSaKxIVNFF46+MFaTSDTPB8WfYK+c=' resource: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# privileged contexts allow a few more rights than unprivileged contexts, though limits are still applied
|
||||
if ($unsafe) {
|
||||
set $scriptSrc "'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' resource: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Finally, set all the rules you composed above.
|
||||
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'none'; child-src $childSrc; worker-src $workerSrc; media-src $mediaSrc; style-src $styleSrc; script-src $scriptSrc; connect-src $connectSrc; font-src $fontSrc; img-src $imgSrc; frame-src $frameSrc; frame-ancestors $frameAncestors";
|
||||
|
||||
# The nodejs process can handle all traffic whether accessed over websocket or as static assets
|
||||
# We prefer to serve static content from nginx directly and to leave the API server to handle
|
||||
# the dynamic content that only it can manage. This is primarily an optimization
|
||||
location ^~ /cryptpad_websocket {
|
||||
# XXX
|
||||
# static assets like blobs and blocks are served by clustered workers in the API server
|
||||
# Websocket traffic still needs to be handled by the main process, which means it needs
|
||||
# to be hosted on a different port. By default 3003 will be used, though this is configurable
|
||||
# via config.websocketPort
|
||||
proxy_pass http://localhost:3003;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Host $host;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
|
||||
|
||||
# WebSocket support (nginx 1.4)
|
||||
proxy_http_version 1.1;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Connection upgrade;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
location ^~ /customize.dist/ {
|
||||
# This is needed in order to prevent infinite recursion between /customize/ and the root
|
||||
}
|
||||
# try to load customizeable content via /customize/ and fall back to the default content
|
||||
# located at /customize.dist/
|
||||
# This is what allows you to override behaviour.
|
||||
location ^~ /customize/ {
|
||||
rewrite ^/customize/(.*)$ $1 break;
|
||||
try_files /customize/$uri /customize.dist/$uri;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# /api/config is loaded once per page load and is used to retrieve
|
||||
# the caching variable which is applied to every other resource
|
||||
# which is loaded during that session.
|
||||
location ~ ^/api/.*$ {
|
||||
proxy_pass http://localhost:3000;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Host $host;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
|
||||
|
||||
# These settings prevent both NGINX and the API server
|
||||
# from setting the same headers and creating duplicates
|
||||
proxy_hide_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy;
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy cross-origin;
|
||||
proxy_hide_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy;
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy require-corp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Requests for blobs and blocks are now proxied to the API server
|
||||
# This simplifies NGINX path configuration in the event they are being hosted in a non-standard location
|
||||
# or with odd unexpected permissions. Serving blobs in this manner also means that it will be possible to
|
||||
# enforce access control for them, though this is not yet implemented.
|
||||
# Access control (via TOTP 2FA) has been added to blocks, so they can be handled with the same directives.
|
||||
location ~ ^/(blob|block)/.*$ {
|
||||
if ($request_method = 'OPTIONS') {
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' "${allowed_origins}";
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Credentials' true;
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods' 'GET, POST, OPTIONS';
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Headers' 'DNT,X-CustomHeader,Keep-Alive,User-Agent,X-Requested-With,If-Modified-Since,Cache-Control,Content-Type,Content-Range,Range';
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Max-Age' 1728000;
|
||||
add_header 'Content-Type' 'application/octet-stream; charset=utf-8';
|
||||
add_header 'Content-Length' 0;
|
||||
return 204;
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Since we are proxying to the API server these headers can get duplicated
|
||||
# so we hide them
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'X-Content-Type-Options';
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin';
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'Permissions-Policy';
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'X-XSS-Protection';
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy';
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy';
|
||||
proxy_pass http://localhost:3000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# The nodejs server has some built-in forwarding rules to prevent
|
||||
# URLs like /pad from resulting in a 404. This simply adds a trailing slash
|
||||
# to a variety of applications.
|
||||
location ~ ^/(register|login|recovery|settings|user|pad|drive|poll|slide|code|whiteboard|file|media|profile|contacts|todo|filepicker|debug|kanban|sheet|support|admin|notifications|teams|calendar|presentation|doc|form|report|convert|checkup|diagram)$ {
|
||||
rewrite ^(.*)$ $1/ redirect;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Finally, serve anything the above exceptions don't govern.
|
||||
try_files /customize/www/$uri /customize/www/$uri/index.html /www/$uri /www/$uri/index.html /customize/$uri;
|
||||
}
|
|
@ -12,35 +12,14 @@ server {
|
|||
include letsencrypt-webroot;
|
||||
|
||||
# CryptPad serves static assets over these two domains.
|
||||
# `main_domain` is what users will enter in their address bar.
|
||||
# `your-main-domain` is what users will enter in their address bar.
|
||||
# Privileged computation such as key management is handled in this scope
|
||||
# UI content is loaded via the `sandbox_domain`.
|
||||
# UI content is loaded via the `your-sandbox-domain`.
|
||||
# "Content Security Policy" headers prevent content loaded via the sandbox
|
||||
# from accessing privileged information.
|
||||
# These variables must be different to take advantage of CryptPad's sandboxing techniques.
|
||||
# This setup allows to take advantage of CryptPad's sandboxing techniques.
|
||||
# In the event of an XSS vulnerability in CryptPad's front-end code
|
||||
# this will limit the amount of information accessible to attackers.
|
||||
set $main_domain "your-main-domain.com";
|
||||
set $sandbox_domain "your-sandbox-domain.com";
|
||||
|
||||
# By default CryptPad forbids remote domains from embedding CryptPad documents in iframes.
|
||||
# The sandbox domain must always be permitted in order for the platform to function.
|
||||
# If you wish to enable remote embedding you may change the value below to "*"
|
||||
# as per the commented value.
|
||||
set $allowed_origins "https://${sandbox_domain}";
|
||||
#set $allowed_origins "*";
|
||||
|
||||
# CryptPad's dynamic content (websocket traffic and encrypted blobs)
|
||||
# can be served over separate domains. Using dedicated domains (or subdomains)
|
||||
# for these purposes allows you to move them to a separate machine at a later date
|
||||
# if you find that a single machine cannot handle all of your users.
|
||||
# If you don't use dedicated domains, this can be the same as $main_domain
|
||||
# If you do, they can be added as exceptions to any rules which block connections to remote domains.
|
||||
# You can find these variables referenced below in the relevant places
|
||||
set $api_domain "api.your-main-domain.com";
|
||||
set $files_domain "files.your-main-domain.com";
|
||||
|
||||
# nginx doesn't let you set server_name via variables, so you need to hardcode your domains here
|
||||
server_name your-main-domain.com your-sandbox-domain.com;
|
||||
|
||||
# You'll need to Set the path to your certificates and keys here
|
||||
|
@ -76,185 +55,15 @@ server {
|
|||
# replace with the IP address of your resolver
|
||||
resolver 8.8.8.8 8.8.4.4 1.1.1.1 1.0.0.1 9.9.9.9 149.112.112.112 208.67.222.222 208.67.220.220;
|
||||
|
||||
add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block";
|
||||
add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff;
|
||||
add_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin "${allowed_origins}";
|
||||
add_header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials true;
|
||||
# add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN";
|
||||
location / {
|
||||
proxy_pass http://localhost:3000;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Host $host;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
|
||||
client_max_body_size 150m;
|
||||
|
||||
# Opt out of Google's FLoC Network
|
||||
add_header Permissions-Policy interest-cohort=();
|
||||
|
||||
# Enable SharedArrayBuffer in Firefox (for .xlsx export)
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy cross-origin;
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy require-corp;
|
||||
|
||||
# Insert the path to your CryptPad repository root here
|
||||
root /home/cryptpad/cryptpad;
|
||||
index index.html;
|
||||
error_page 404 /customize.dist/404.html;
|
||||
|
||||
# any static assets loaded with "ver=" in their URL will be cached for a year
|
||||
if ($args ~ ver=) {
|
||||
set $cacheControl max-age=31536000;
|
||||
proxy_http_version 1.1;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Connection upgrade;
|
||||
}
|
||||
# This rule overrides the above caching directive and makes things somewhat less efficient.
|
||||
# We had inverted them as an optimization, but Safari 16 introduced a bug that interpreted
|
||||
# some important headers incorrectly when loading these files from cache.
|
||||
# This is why we can't have nice things :(
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^(\/|.*\/|.*\.html)$) {
|
||||
set $cacheControl no-cache;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Will not set any header if it is emptystring
|
||||
add_header Cache-Control $cacheControl;
|
||||
|
||||
# CSS can be dynamically set inline, loaded from the same domain, or from $main_domain
|
||||
set $styleSrc "'unsafe-inline' 'self' https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# connect-src restricts URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces
|
||||
# if you have configured your instance to use a dedicated $files_domain or $api_domain
|
||||
# you will need to add them below as: https://${files_domain} and https://${api_domain}
|
||||
set $connectSrc "'self' https://${main_domain} blob: wss://${api_domain} https://${sandbox_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# fonts can be loaded from data-URLs or the main domain
|
||||
set $fontSrc "'self' data: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# images can be loaded from anywhere, though we'd like to deprecate this as it allows the use of images for tracking
|
||||
set $imgSrc "'self' data: blob: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# frame-src specifies valid sources for nested browsing contexts.
|
||||
# this prevents loading any iframes from anywhere other than the sandbox domain
|
||||
set $frameSrc "'self' https://${sandbox_domain} blob:";
|
||||
|
||||
# specifies valid sources for loading media using video or audio
|
||||
set $mediaSrc "blob:";
|
||||
|
||||
# defines valid sources for webworkers and nested browser contexts
|
||||
# deprecated in favour of worker-src and frame-src
|
||||
set $childSrc "https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# specifies valid sources for Worker, SharedWorker, or ServiceWorker scripts.
|
||||
# supercedes child-src but is unfortunately not yet universally supported.
|
||||
set $workerSrc "'self'";
|
||||
|
||||
# script-src specifies valid sources for javascript, including inline handlers
|
||||
set $scriptSrc "'self' resource: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# frame-ancestors specifies which origins can embed your CryptPad instance
|
||||
# this must include 'self' and your main domain (over HTTPS) in order for CryptPad to work
|
||||
# if you have enabled remote embedding via the admin panel then this must be more permissive.
|
||||
# note: cryptpad.fr permits web pages served via https: and vector: (element desktop app)
|
||||
set $frameAncestors "'self' https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
# set $frameAncestors "'self' https: vector:";
|
||||
|
||||
set $unsafe 0;
|
||||
# the following assets are loaded via the sandbox domain
|
||||
# they unfortunately still require exceptions to the sandboxing to work correctly.
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/(sheet|doc|presentation)\/inner.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/common\/onlyoffice\/.*\/.*\.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
# everything except the sandbox domain is a privileged scope, as they might be used to handle keys
|
||||
if ($host != $sandbox_domain) { set $unsafe 0; }
|
||||
# this iframe is an exception. Office file formats are converted outside of the sandboxed scope
|
||||
# because of bugs in Chromium-based browsers that incorrectly ignore headers that are supposed to enable
|
||||
# the use of some modern APIs that we require when javascript is run in a cross-origin context.
|
||||
# We've applied other sandboxing techniques to mitigate the risk of running WebAssembly in this privileged scope
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/unsafeiframe\/inner\.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
# draw.io uses inline script tags in it's index.html. The hashes are added here.
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/components\/drawio\/src\/main\/webapp\/index.html.*$) {
|
||||
set $scriptSrc "'self' 'sha256-6zAB96lsBZREqf0sT44BhH1T69sm7HrN34rpMOcWbNo=' 'sha256-6g514VrT/cZFZltSaKxIVNFF46+MFaTSDTPB8WfYK+c=' resource: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# privileged contexts allow a few more rights than unprivileged contexts, though limits are still applied
|
||||
if ($unsafe) {
|
||||
set $scriptSrc "'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' resource: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Finally, set all the rules you composed above.
|
||||
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'none'; child-src $childSrc; worker-src $workerSrc; media-src $mediaSrc; style-src $styleSrc; script-src $scriptSrc; connect-src $connectSrc; font-src $fontSrc; img-src $imgSrc; frame-src $frameSrc; frame-ancestors $frameAncestors";
|
||||
|
||||
# The nodejs process can handle all traffic whether accessed over websocket or as static assets
|
||||
# We prefer to serve static content from nginx directly and to leave the API server to handle
|
||||
# the dynamic content that only it can manage. This is primarily an optimization
|
||||
location ^~ /cryptpad_websocket {
|
||||
# XXX
|
||||
# static assets like blobs and blocks are served by clustered workers in the API server
|
||||
# Websocket traffic still needs to be handled by the main process, which means it needs
|
||||
# to be hosted on a different port. By default 3003 will be used, though this is configurable
|
||||
# via config.websocketPort
|
||||
proxy_pass http://localhost:3003;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Host $host;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
|
||||
|
||||
# WebSocket support (nginx 1.4)
|
||||
proxy_http_version 1.1;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Connection upgrade;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
location ^~ /customize.dist/ {
|
||||
# This is needed in order to prevent infinite recursion between /customize/ and the root
|
||||
}
|
||||
# try to load customizeable content via /customize/ and fall back to the default content
|
||||
# located at /customize.dist/
|
||||
# This is what allows you to override behaviour.
|
||||
location ^~ /customize/ {
|
||||
rewrite ^/customize/(.*)$ $1 break;
|
||||
try_files /customize/$uri /customize.dist/$uri;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# /api/config is loaded once per page load and is used to retrieve
|
||||
# the caching variable which is applied to every other resource
|
||||
# which is loaded during that session.
|
||||
location ~ ^/api/.*$ {
|
||||
proxy_pass http://localhost:3000;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Host $host;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
|
||||
|
||||
# These settings prevent both NGINX and the API server
|
||||
# from setting the same headers and creating duplicates
|
||||
proxy_hide_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy;
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy cross-origin;
|
||||
proxy_hide_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy;
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy require-corp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Requests for blobs and blocks are now proxied to the API server
|
||||
# This simplifies NGINX path configuration in the event they are being hosted in a non-standard location
|
||||
# or with odd unexpected permissions. Serving blobs in this manner also means that it will be possible to
|
||||
# enforce access control for them, though this is not yet implemented.
|
||||
# Access control (via TOTP 2FA) has been added to blocks, so they can be handled with the same directives.
|
||||
location ~ ^/(blob|block)/.*$ {
|
||||
if ($request_method = 'OPTIONS') {
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' "${allowed_origins}";
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Credentials' true;
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods' 'GET, POST, OPTIONS';
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Headers' 'DNT,X-CustomHeader,Keep-Alive,User-Agent,X-Requested-With,If-Modified-Since,Cache-Control,Content-Type,Content-Range,Range';
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Max-Age' 1728000;
|
||||
add_header 'Content-Type' 'application/octet-stream; charset=utf-8';
|
||||
add_header 'Content-Length' 0;
|
||||
return 204;
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Since we are proxying to the API server these headers can get duplicated
|
||||
# so we hide them
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'X-Content-Type-Options';
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin';
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'Permissions-Policy';
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'X-XSS-Protection';
|
||||
proxy_pass http://localhost:3000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# The nodejs server has some built-in forwarding rules to prevent
|
||||
# URLs like /pad from resulting in a 404. This simply adds a trailing slash
|
||||
# to a variety of applications.
|
||||
location ~ ^/(register|login|recovery|settings|user|pad|drive|poll|slide|code|whiteboard|file|media|profile|contacts|todo|filepicker|debug|kanban|sheet|support|admin|notifications|teams|calendar|presentation|doc|form|report|convert|checkup|diagram)$ {
|
||||
rewrite ^(.*)$ $1/ redirect;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Finally, serve anything the above exceptions don't govern.
|
||||
try_files /customize/www/$uri /customize/www/$uri/index.html /www/$uri /www/$uri/index.html /customize/$uri;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ module.exports.create = function (config) {
|
|||
|
||||
removeDonateButton: config.removeDonateButton,
|
||||
httpPort: isValidPort(config.httpPort)? config.httpPort: 3000,
|
||||
httpAddress: typeof(config.httpAddress) === 'string'? config.httpAddress: '127.0.0.1',
|
||||
httpAddress: typeof(config.httpAddress) === 'string'? config.httpAddress: 'localhost',
|
||||
websocketPath: config.externalWebsocketURL,
|
||||
|
||||
OFFLINE_MODE: false,
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -127,23 +127,15 @@ var getHeaders = function (Env, type) {
|
|||
csp = Default.contentSecurity(Env);
|
||||
}
|
||||
headers['Content-Security-Policy'] = csp;
|
||||
|
||||
if (Env.NO_SANDBOX) { // handles correct configuration for local development
|
||||
// https://stackoverflow.com/questions/11531121/add-duplicate-http-response-headers-in-nodejs
|
||||
headers["Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy"] = 'cross-origin';
|
||||
headers["Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy"] = 'require-corp';
|
||||
}
|
||||
headers["Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy"] = 'cross-origin';
|
||||
headers["Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy"] = 'require-corp';
|
||||
cacheHeaders(Env, key, headers);
|
||||
|
||||
// Don't set CSP headers on /api/ endpoints
|
||||
// because they aren't necessary and they cause problems
|
||||
// when duplicated by NGINX in production environments
|
||||
if (type === 'api') {
|
||||
cacheHeaders(Env, key, headers);
|
||||
return headers;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (type === 'api') { delete headers['Content-Security-Policy']; }
|
||||
|
||||
headers["Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy"] = 'cross-origin';
|
||||
cacheHeaders(Env, key, headers);
|
||||
return headers;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -514,6 +514,7 @@ define([
|
|||
});
|
||||
return dialog.nav(navs);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
dialog.customModal = function (msg, opt) {
|
||||
var force = false;
|
||||
if (typeof(opt) === 'object') {
|
||||
|
@ -539,7 +540,6 @@ define([
|
|||
message,
|
||||
dialog.getButtons(opt.buttons, opt.onClose)
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
if (opt.forefront) { $(frame).addClass('forefront'); }
|
||||
return frame;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue