OpenCloudOS-Kernel/fs/crypto/policy.c

268 lines
8.3 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Encryption policy functions for per-file encryption support.
*
* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility.
*
* Written by Michael Halcrow, 2015.
* Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015.
*/
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
/*
* check whether an encryption policy is consistent with an encryption context
*/
static bool is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(
const struct fscrypt_context *ctx,
const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
{
return memcmp(ctx->master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor,
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
(ctx->flags == policy->flags) &&
(ctx->contents_encryption_mode ==
policy->contents_encryption_mode) &&
(ctx->filenames_encryption_mode ==
policy->filenames_encryption_mode);
}
static int create_encryption_context_from_policy(struct inode *inode,
const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
{
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor,
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(policy->contents_encryption_mode,
policy->filenames_encryption_mode))
return -EINVAL;
if (policy->flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
return -EINVAL;
ctx.contents_encryption_mode = policy->contents_encryption_mode;
ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = policy->filenames_encryption_mode;
ctx.flags = policy->flags;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx.nonce) != FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx), NULL);
}
int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
{
struct fscrypt_policy policy;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
int ret;
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
if (copy_from_user(&policy, arg, sizeof(policy)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EACCES;
if (policy.version != 0)
return -EINVAL;
ret = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
if (ret)
return ret;
inode_lock(inode);
ret = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
if (ret == -ENODATA) {
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
ret = -ENOTDIR;
else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
else
ret = create_encryption_context_from_policy(inode,
&policy);
} else if (ret == sizeof(ctx) &&
is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(&ctx,
&policy)) {
/* The file already uses the same encryption policy. */
ret = 0;
} else if (ret >= 0 || ret == -ERANGE) {
/* The file already uses a different encryption policy. */
ret = -EEXIST;
}
inode_unlock(inode);
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy);
int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
struct fscrypt_policy policy;
int res;
if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
return -ENODATA;
res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
if (res < 0 && res != -ERANGE)
return res;
if (res != sizeof(ctx))
return -EINVAL;
if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1)
return -EINVAL;
policy.version = 0;
policy.contents_encryption_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
policy.filenames_encryption_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
policy.flags = ctx.flags;
memcpy(policy.master_key_descriptor, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
if (copy_to_user(arg, &policy, sizeof(policy)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy);
/**
* fscrypt_has_permitted_context() - is a file's encryption policy permitted
* within its directory?
*
* @parent: inode for parent directory
* @child: inode for file being looked up, opened, or linked into @parent
*
* Filesystems must call this before permitting access to an inode in a
* situation where the parent directory is encrypted (either before allowing
* ->lookup() to succeed, or for a regular file before allowing it to be opened)
* and before any operation that involves linking an inode into an encrypted
* directory, including link, rename, and cross rename. It enforces the
* constraint that within a given encrypted directory tree, all files use the
* same encryption policy. The pre-access check is needed to detect potentially
* malicious offline violations of this constraint, while the link and rename
* checks are needed to prevent online violations of this constraint.
*
* Return: 1 if permitted, 0 if forbidden.
*/
int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child)
{
const struct fscrypt_operations *cops = parent->i_sb->s_cop;
const struct fscrypt_info *parent_ci, *child_ci;
struct fscrypt_context parent_ctx, child_ctx;
int res;
/* No restrictions on file types which are never encrypted */
if (!S_ISREG(child->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(child->i_mode) &&
!S_ISLNK(child->i_mode))
return 1;
/* No restrictions if the parent directory is unencrypted */
if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(parent))
return 1;
/* Encrypted directories must not contain unencrypted files */
if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(child))
return 0;
/*
* Both parent and child are encrypted, so verify they use the same
* encryption policy. Compare the fscrypt_info structs if the keys are
* available, otherwise retrieve and compare the fscrypt_contexts.
*
* Note that the fscrypt_context retrieval will be required frequently
* when accessing an encrypted directory tree without the key.
* Performance-wise this is not a big deal because we already don't
* really optimize for file access without the key (to the extent that
* such access is even possible), given that any attempted access
* already causes a fscrypt_context retrieval and keyring search.
*
* In any case, if an unexpected error occurs, fall back to "forbidden".
*/
res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent);
if (res)
return 0;
res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child);
if (res)
return 0;
parent_ci = READ_ONCE(parent->i_crypt_info);
child_ci = READ_ONCE(child->i_crypt_info);
if (parent_ci && child_ci) {
return memcmp(parent_ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
child_ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
(parent_ci->ci_data_mode == child_ci->ci_data_mode) &&
(parent_ci->ci_filename_mode ==
child_ci->ci_filename_mode) &&
(parent_ci->ci_flags == child_ci->ci_flags);
}
res = cops->get_context(parent, &parent_ctx, sizeof(parent_ctx));
if (res != sizeof(parent_ctx))
return 0;
res = cops->get_context(child, &child_ctx, sizeof(child_ctx));
if (res != sizeof(child_ctx))
return 0;
return memcmp(parent_ctx.master_key_descriptor,
child_ctx.master_key_descriptor,
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
(parent_ctx.contents_encryption_mode ==
child_ctx.contents_encryption_mode) &&
(parent_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode ==
child_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode) &&
(parent_ctx.flags == child_ctx.flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_has_permitted_context);
/**
* fscrypt_inherit_context() - Sets a child context from its parent
* @parent: Parent inode from which the context is inherited.
* @child: Child inode that inherits the context from @parent.
* @fs_data: private data given by FS.
* @preload: preload child i_crypt_info if true
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child,
void *fs_data, bool preload)
{
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
struct fscrypt_info *ci;
int res;
res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent);
if (res < 0)
return res;
ci = READ_ONCE(parent->i_crypt_info);
if (ci == NULL)
return -ENOKEY;
ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
ctx.contents_encryption_mode = ci->ci_data_mode;
ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = ci->ci_filename_mode;
ctx.flags = ci->ci_flags;
memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE);
res = parent->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(child, &ctx,
sizeof(ctx), fs_data);
if (res)
return res;
return preload ? fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child): 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_inherit_context);