ce114c8668
solved and the nightmare is complete, here's the next one: speculating after RET instructions and leaking privileged information using the now pretty much classical covert channels. It is called RETBleed and the mitigation effort and controlling functionality has been modelled similar to what already existing mitigations provide. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmLKqAgACgkQEsHwGGHe VUoM5w/8CSvwPZ3otkhmu8MrJPtWc7eLDPjYN4qQP+19e+bt094MoozxeeWG2wmp hkDJAYHT2Oik/qDuEdhFgNYwS7XGgbV3Py3B8syO4//5SD5dkOSG+QqFXvXMdFri YsVqqNkjJOWk/YL9Ql5RS/xQewsrr0OqEyWWocuI6XAvfWV4kKvlRSd+6oPqtZEO qYlAHTXElyIrA/gjmxChk1HTt5HZtK3uJLf4twNlUfzw7LYFf3+sw3bdNuiXlyMr WcLXMwGpS0idURwP3mJa7JRuiVBzb4+kt8mWwWqA02FkKV45FRRRFhFUsy667r00 cdZBaWdy+b7dvXeliO3FN/x1bZwIEUxmaNy1iAClph4Ifh0ySPUkxAr8EIER7YBy bstDJEaIqgYg8NIaD4oF1UrG0ZbL0ImuxVaFdhG1hopQsh4IwLSTLgmZYDhfn/0i oSqU0Le+A7QW9s2A2j6qi7BoAbRW+gmBuCgg8f8ECYRkFX1ZF6mkUtnQxYrU7RTq rJWGW9nhwM9nRxwgntZiTjUUJ2HtyXEgYyCNjLFCbEBfeG5QTg7XSGFhqDbgoymH 85vsmSXYxgTgQ/kTW7Fs26tOqnP2h1OtLJZDL8rg49KijLAnISClEgohYW01CWQf ZKMHtz3DM0WBiLvSAmfGifScgSrLB5AjtvFHT0hF+5/okEkinVk= =09fW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_bugs_retbleed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 retbleed fixes from Borislav Petkov: "Just when you thought that all the speculation bugs were addressed and solved and the nightmare is complete, here's the next one: speculating after RET instructions and leaking privileged information using the now pretty much classical covert channels. It is called RETBleed and the mitigation effort and controlling functionality has been modelled similar to what already existing mitigations provide" * tag 'x86_bugs_retbleed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (54 commits) x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n ... |
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Documentation | ||
arch/x86 | ||
include/objtool | ||
.gitignore | ||
Build | ||
Makefile | ||
builtin-check.c | ||
check.c | ||
elf.c | ||
objtool.c | ||
orc_dump.c | ||
orc_gen.c | ||
special.c | ||
sync-check.sh | ||
weak.c |