356 lines
14 KiB
ReStructuredText
356 lines
14 KiB
ReStructuredText
The Kernel Address Sanitizer (KASAN)
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====================================
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Overview
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--------
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KernelAddressSANitizer (KASAN) is a dynamic memory error detector designed to
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find out-of-bound and use-after-free bugs. KASAN has two modes: generic KASAN
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(similar to userspace ASan) and software tag-based KASAN (similar to userspace
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HWASan).
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KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation to insert validity checks before every
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memory access, and therefore requires a compiler version that supports that.
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Generic KASAN is supported in both GCC and Clang. With GCC it requires version
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8.3.0 or later. Any supported Clang version is compatible, but detection of
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out-of-bounds accesses for global variables is only supported since Clang 11.
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Tag-based KASAN is only supported in Clang.
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Currently generic KASAN is supported for the x86_64, arm64, xtensa, s390 and
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riscv architectures, and tag-based KASAN is supported only for arm64.
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Usage
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-----
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To enable KASAN configure kernel with::
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CONFIG_KASAN = y
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and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC (to enable generic KASAN) and
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CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS (to enable software tag-based KASAN).
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You also need to choose between CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE.
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Outline and inline are compiler instrumentation types. The former produces
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smaller binary while the latter is 1.1 - 2 times faster.
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Both KASAN modes work with both SLUB and SLAB memory allocators.
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For better bug detection and nicer reporting, enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE.
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To augment reports with last allocation and freeing stack of the physical page,
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it is recommended to enable also CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER and boot with page_owner=on.
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To disable instrumentation for specific files or directories, add a line
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similar to the following to the respective kernel Makefile:
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- For a single file (e.g. main.o)::
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KASAN_SANITIZE_main.o := n
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- For all files in one directory::
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KASAN_SANITIZE := n
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Error reports
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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A typical out-of-bounds access generic KASAN report looks like this::
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==================================================================
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BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmalloc_oob_right+0xa8/0xbc [test_kasan]
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Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801f44ec37b by task insmod/2760
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CPU: 1 PID: 2760 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3+ #698
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Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
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Call Trace:
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dump_stack+0x94/0xd8
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print_address_description+0x73/0x280
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kasan_report+0x144/0x187
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__asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20
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kmalloc_oob_right+0xa8/0xbc [test_kasan]
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kmalloc_tests_init+0x16/0x700 [test_kasan]
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do_one_initcall+0xa5/0x3ae
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do_init_module+0x1b6/0x547
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load_module+0x75df/0x8070
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__do_sys_init_module+0x1c6/0x200
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__x64_sys_init_module+0x6e/0xb0
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do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x2c0
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entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
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RIP: 0033:0x7f96443109da
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RSP: 002b:00007ffcf0b51b08 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af
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RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055dc3ee521a0 RCX: 00007f96443109da
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RDX: 00007f96445cff88 RSI: 0000000000057a50 RDI: 00007f9644992000
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RBP: 000055dc3ee510b0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
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R10: 00007f964430cd0a R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f96445cff88
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R13: 000055dc3ee51090 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
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Allocated by task 2760:
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save_stack+0x43/0xd0
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kasan_kmalloc+0xa7/0xd0
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kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe1/0x1b0
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kmalloc_oob_right+0x56/0xbc [test_kasan]
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kmalloc_tests_init+0x16/0x700 [test_kasan]
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do_one_initcall+0xa5/0x3ae
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do_init_module+0x1b6/0x547
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load_module+0x75df/0x8070
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__do_sys_init_module+0x1c6/0x200
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__x64_sys_init_module+0x6e/0xb0
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do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x2c0
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entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
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Freed by task 815:
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save_stack+0x43/0xd0
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__kasan_slab_free+0x135/0x190
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kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
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kfree+0x93/0x1a0
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umh_complete+0x6a/0xa0
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call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x4c3/0x640
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ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
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The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801f44ec300
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which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
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The buggy address is located 123 bytes inside of
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128-byte region [ffff8801f44ec300, ffff8801f44ec380)
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The buggy address belongs to the page:
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page:ffffea0007d13b00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f7001640 index:0x0
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flags: 0x200000000000100(slab)
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raw: 0200000000000100 ffffea0007d11dc0 0000001a0000001a ffff8801f7001640
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raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
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page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
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Memory state around the buggy address:
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ffff8801f44ec200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
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ffff8801f44ec280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
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>ffff8801f44ec300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
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^
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ffff8801f44ec380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
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ffff8801f44ec400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
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==================================================================
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The header of the report provides a short summary of what kind of bug happened
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and what kind of access caused it. It's followed by a stack trace of the bad
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access, a stack trace of where the accessed memory was allocated (in case bad
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access happens on a slab object), and a stack trace of where the object was
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freed (in case of a use-after-free bug report). Next comes a description of
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the accessed slab object and information about the accessed memory page.
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In the last section the report shows memory state around the accessed address.
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Reading this part requires some understanding of how KASAN works.
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The state of each 8 aligned bytes of memory is encoded in one shadow byte.
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Those 8 bytes can be accessible, partially accessible, freed or be a redzone.
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We use the following encoding for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
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of the corresponding memory region are accessible; number N (1 <= N <= 7) means
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that the first N bytes are accessible, and other (8 - N) bytes are not;
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any negative value indicates that the entire 8-byte word is inaccessible.
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We use different negative values to distinguish between different kinds of
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inaccessible memory like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h).
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In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that
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the accessed address is partially accessible.
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For tag-based KASAN this last report section shows the memory tags around the
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accessed address (see Implementation details section).
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Implementation details
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----------------------
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Generic KASAN
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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From a high level, our approach to memory error detection is similar to that
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of kmemcheck: use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe
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to access, and use compile-time instrumentation to insert checks of shadow
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memory on each memory access.
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Generic KASAN dedicates 1/8th of kernel memory to its shadow memory (e.g. 16TB
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to cover 128TB on x86_64) and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to
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translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
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Here is the function which translates an address to its corresponding shadow
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address::
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static inline void *kasan_mem_to_shadow(const void *addr)
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{
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return ((unsigned long)addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
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+ KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
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}
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where ``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3``.
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Compile-time instrumentation is used to insert memory access checks. Compiler
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inserts function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each
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memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory
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access is valid or not by checking corresponding shadow memory.
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GCC 5.0 has possibility to perform inline instrumentation. Instead of making
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function calls GCC directly inserts the code to check the shadow memory.
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This option significantly enlarges kernel but it gives x1.1-x2 performance
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boost over outline instrumented kernel.
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Generic KASAN prints up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in reports, the last one
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and the second to last.
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Software tag-based KASAN
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Tag-based KASAN uses the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) feature of modern arm64 CPUs to
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store a pointer tag in the top byte of kernel pointers. Like generic KASAN it
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uses shadow memory to store memory tags associated with each 16-byte memory
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cell (therefore it dedicates 1/16th of the kernel memory for shadow memory).
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On each memory allocation tag-based KASAN generates a random tag, tags the
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allocated memory with this tag, and embeds this tag into the returned pointer.
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Software tag-based KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation to insert checks
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before each memory access. These checks make sure that tag of the memory that
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is being accessed is equal to tag of the pointer that is used to access this
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memory. In case of a tag mismatch tag-based KASAN prints a bug report.
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Software tag-based KASAN also has two instrumentation modes (outline, that
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emits callbacks to check memory accesses; and inline, that performs the shadow
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memory checks inline). With outline instrumentation mode, a bug report is
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simply printed from the function that performs the access check. With inline
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instrumentation a brk instruction is emitted by the compiler, and a dedicated
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brk handler is used to print bug reports.
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A potential expansion of this mode is a hardware tag-based mode, which would
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use hardware memory tagging support instead of compiler instrumentation and
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manual shadow memory manipulation.
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What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN?
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--------------------------------------------
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The kernel maps memory in a number of different parts of the address
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space. This poses something of a problem for KASAN, which requires
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that all addresses accessed by instrumented code have a valid shadow
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region.
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The range of kernel virtual addresses is large: there is not enough
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real memory to support a real shadow region for every address that
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could be accessed by the kernel.
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By default
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~~~~~~~~~~
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By default, architectures only map real memory over the shadow region
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for the linear mapping (and potentially other small areas). For all
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other areas - such as vmalloc and vmemmap space - a single read-only
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page is mapped over the shadow area. This read-only shadow page
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declares all memory accesses as permitted.
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This presents a problem for modules: they do not live in the linear
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mapping, but in a dedicated module space. By hooking in to the module
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allocator, KASAN can temporarily map real shadow memory to cover
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them. This allows detection of invalid accesses to module globals, for
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example.
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This also creates an incompatibility with ``VMAP_STACK``: if the stack
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lives in vmalloc space, it will be shadowed by the read-only page, and
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the kernel will fault when trying to set up the shadow data for stack
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variables.
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CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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With ``CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC``, KASAN can cover vmalloc space at the
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cost of greater memory usage. Currently this is only supported on x86.
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This works by hooking into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically
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allocating real shadow memory to back the mappings.
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Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
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page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
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therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
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use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
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``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``.
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Instead, we share backing space across multiple mappings. We allocate
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a backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page
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of the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc
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mappings later on.
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We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
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memory.
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To avoid the difficulties around swapping mappings around, we expect
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that the part of the shadow region that covers the vmalloc space will
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not be covered by the early shadow page, but will be left
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unmapped. This will require changes in arch-specific code.
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This allows ``VMAP_STACK`` support on x86, and can simplify support of
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architectures that do not have a fixed module region.
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CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST & CONFIG_TEST_KASAN_MODULE
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--------------------------------------------------
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``CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST`` utilizes the KUnit Test Framework for testing.
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This means each test focuses on a small unit of functionality and
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there are a few ways these tests can be run.
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Each test will print the KASAN report if an error is detected and then
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print the number of the test and the status of the test:
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pass::
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ok 28 - kmalloc_double_kzfree
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or, if kmalloc failed::
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# kmalloc_large_oob_right: ASSERTION FAILED at lib/test_kasan.c:163
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Expected ptr is not null, but is
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not ok 4 - kmalloc_large_oob_right
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or, if a KASAN report was expected, but not found::
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# kmalloc_double_kzfree: EXPECTATION FAILED at lib/test_kasan.c:629
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Expected kasan_data->report_expected == kasan_data->report_found, but
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kasan_data->report_expected == 1
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kasan_data->report_found == 0
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not ok 28 - kmalloc_double_kzfree
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All test statuses are tracked as they run and an overall status will
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be printed at the end::
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ok 1 - kasan
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or::
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not ok 1 - kasan
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(1) Loadable Module
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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With ``CONFIG_KUNIT`` enabled, ``CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST`` can be built as
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a loadable module and run on any architecture that supports KASAN
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using something like insmod or modprobe. The module is called ``test_kasan``.
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(2) Built-In
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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With ``CONFIG_KUNIT`` built-in, ``CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST`` can be built-in
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on any architecure that supports KASAN. These and any other KUnit
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tests enabled will run and print the results at boot as a late-init
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call.
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(3) Using kunit_tool
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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With ``CONFIG_KUNIT`` and ``CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST`` built-in, we can also
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use kunit_tool to see the results of these along with other KUnit
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tests in a more readable way. This will not print the KASAN reports
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of tests that passed. Use `KUnit documentation <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kunit/index.html>`_ for more up-to-date
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information on kunit_tool.
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.. _KUnit: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kunit/index.html
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``CONFIG_TEST_KASAN_MODULE`` is a set of KASAN tests that could not be
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converted to KUnit. These tests can be run only as a module with
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``CONFIG_TEST_KASAN_MODULE`` built as a loadable module and
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``CONFIG_KASAN`` built-in. The type of error expected and the
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function being run is printed before the expression expected to give
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an error. Then the error is printed, if found, and that test
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should be interpretted to pass only if the error was the one expected
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by the test.
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