When direct I/O is used, the data buffer may not always align to page
boundaries. Introduce a page offset in transport data structures to
describe the location of the buffer within the page.
Also change the function to pass the page offset when sending data to
transport.
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
And make SMB2_close just a wrapper for SMB2_close_flags.
We need this as we will start to send SMB2_CLOSE pdus using special
flags.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
In SMB2_open(), if we got a lease we need to store this in the fid structure
or else we will never be able to map a lease break back to which file/fid
it applies to.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Now signing is supported with RDMA transport.
Remove the code that disabled it.
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
The data buffer allocated on the stack can't be DMA'ed, ib_dma_map_page will
return an invalid DMA address for a buffer on stack. Even worse, this
incorrect address can't be detected by ib_dma_mapping_error. Sending data
from this address to hardware will not fail, but the remote peer will get
junk data.
Fix this by allocating the request on the heap in smb3_validate_negotiate.
Changes in v2:
Removed duplicated code on freeing buffers on function exit.
(Thanks to Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>)
Fixed typo in the patch title.
Changes in v3:
Added "Fixes" to the patch.
Changed several sizeof() to use *pointer in place of struct.
Changes in v4:
Added detailed comments on the failure through RDMA.
Allocate request buffer using GPF_NOFS.
Fixed possible memory leak.
Changes in v5:
Removed variable ret for checking return value.
Changed to use pneg_inbuf->Dialects[0] to calculate unused space in pneg_inbuf.
Fixes: ff1c038add ("Check SMB3 dialects against downgrade attacks")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Talpey <ttalpey@microsoft.com>
SMB server will not sign data transferred through RDMA read/write. When
signing is used, it's a good idea to have all the data signed.
In this case, use RDMA send/recv for all data transfers. This will degrade
performance as this is not generally configured in RDMA environemnt. So
warn the user on signing and RDMA send/recv.
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Temporarily disable AES-GCM, as AES-CCM is only currently
enabled mechanism on client side. This fixes SMB3.11
encrypted mounts to Windows.
Also the tree connect request itself should be encrypted if
requested encryption ("seal" on mount), in addition we should be
enabling encryption in 3.11 based on whether we got any valid
encryption ciphers back in negprot (the corresponding session flag is
not set as it is in 3.0 and 3.02)
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
More cleanup of use of hardcoded 4 byte RFC1001 field size
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
SMB3.11 crypto and hash contexts were not being checked strictly enough.
Add parsing and validity checking for the security contexts in the SMB3.11
negotiate response.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Adding an extra debug message to show if a tree connect failure during
reconnect (and made it a log once so it doesn't spam the logs).
Saw a case recently where tree connect repeatedly returned
access denied on reconnect and it wasn't as easy to spot as it
should have been.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
tcon->ses is being dereferenced before it is null checked, hence
there is a potential null pointer dereference.
Fix this by moving the pointer dereference after tcon->ses has
been properly null checked.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1467426 ("Dereference before null check")
Fixes: 93012bf984 ("cifs: add server->vals->header_preamble_size")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Check for unknown security mode flags during negotiate protocol
if debugging enabled.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
This variable is set to 4 for all protocol versions and replaces
the hardcoded constant 4 throughought the code.
This will later be updated to reflect whether a response packet
has a 4 byte length preamble or not once we start removing this
field from the SMB2+ dialects.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
SMB3.1.1 tree connect was only being signed when signing was mandatory
but needs to always be signed (for non-guest users).
See MS-SMB2 section 3.2.4.1.1
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
SMB3.11 clients must implement pre-authentification integrity.
* new mechanism to certify requests/responses happening before Tree
Connect.
* supersedes VALIDATE_NEGOTIATE
* fixes signing for SMB3.11
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Minor cleanup of some sparse warnings (including a few misc
endian fixes for the new smb3 rdma code)
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Since IPC now has a tcon object, the caller can just pass it. This
allows domain-based DFS requests to work with smb2+.
Link: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12917
Fixes: 9d49640a21 ("CIFS: implement get_dfs_refer for SMB2+")
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
* Remove ses->ipc_tid.
* Make IPC$ regular tcon.
* Add a direct pointer to it in ses->tcon_ipc.
* Distinguish PIPE tcon from IPC tcon by adding a tcon->pipe flag. All
IPC tcons are pipes but not all pipes are IPC.
* All TreeConnect functions now cannot take a NULL tcon object.
The IPC tcon has the same lifetime as the session it belongs to. It is
created when the session is created and destroyed when the session is
destroyed.
Since no mounts directly refer to the IPC tcon, its refcount should
always be set to initialisation value (1). Thus we make sure
cifs_put_tcon() skips it.
If the mount request resulting in a new session being created requires
encryption, try to require it too for IPC.
* set SERVER_NAME_LENGTH to serverName actual size
The maximum length of an ipv6 string representation is defined in
INET6_ADDRSTRLEN as 45+1 for null but lets keep what we know works.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Autonegotiation gives a security settings mismatch error if the SMB
server selects an SMBv3 dialect that isn't SMB3.02. The exact error is
"protocol revalidation - security settings mismatch".
This can be tested using Samba v4.2 or by setting the global Samba
setting max protocol = SMB3_00.
The check that fails in smb3_validate_negotiate is the dialect
verification of the negotiate info response. This is because it tries
to verify against the protocol_id in the global smbdefault_values. The
protocol_id in smbdefault_values is SMB3.02.
In SMB2_negotiate the protocol_id in smbdefault_values isn't updated,
it is global so it probably shouldn't be, but server->dialect is.
This patch changes the check in smb3_validate_negotiate to use
server->dialect instead of server->vals->protocol_id. The patch works
with autonegotiate and when using a specific version in the vers mount
option.
Signed-off-by: Daniel N Pettersson <danielnp@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Currently the CIFS SMB Direct implementation (experimental) doesn't properly
support signing. Disable it when SMB Direct is in use for transport.
Signing will be enabled in future after it is implemented.
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
If I/O size is larger than rdma_readwrite_threshold, use RDMA write for
SMB read by specifying channel SMB2_CHANNEL_RDMA_V1 or
SMB2_CHANNEL_RDMA_V1_INVALIDATE in the SMB packet, depending on SMB dialect
used. Append a smbd_buffer_descriptor_v1 to the end of the SMB packet and fill
in other values to indicate this SMB read uses RDMA write.
There is no need to read from the transport for incoming payload. At the time
SMB read response comes back, the data is already transferred and placed in the
pages by RDMA hardware.
When SMB read is finished, deregister the memory regions if RDMA write is used
for this SMB read. smbd_deregister_mr may need to do local invalidation and
sleep, if server remote invalidation is not used.
There are situations where the MID may not be created on I/O failure, under
which memory region is deregistered when read data context is released.
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
When sending I/O, if size is larger than rdma_readwrite_threshold we prepare
to send SMB write packet for a RDMA read via memory registration. The actual
I/O is done by remote peer through local RDMA hardware. Modify the relevant
fields in the packet accordingly, and append a smbd_buffer_descriptor_v1 to
the end of the SMB write packet.
On write I/O finish, deregister the memory region if this was for a RDMA read.
If remote invalidation is not used, the call to smbd_deregister_mr will do
local invalidation and possibly wait. Memory region is normally deregistered
in MID callback as soon as it's used. There are situations where the MID may
not be created on I/O failure, under which memory region is deregistered when
write data context is released.
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
This patch is for preparing upper layer for doing SMB read via RDMA write.
When we assemble the SMB read packet header, we need to know the I/O layout
if this request is to use a RDMA write. rdata has all the information we need
for memory registration. Add rdata to smb2_new_read_req.
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber.redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
According to MS-SMB2 3.2.55 validate_negotiate request must
always be signed. Some Windows can fail the request if you send it unsigned
See kernel bugzilla bug 197311
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber.redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Long Li