seliunx_xfrm_policy_lookup() is hooks of security_xfrm_policy_lookup().
The dir argument is uselss in security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). So
remove the dir argument from selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() and
security_xfrm_policy_lookup().
Signed-off-by: Zhongjun Tan <tanzhongjun@yulong.com>
[PM: reformat the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
We can do the allocation + copying of expr.nodes in one go using
kmemdup().
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A typo is found out by codespell tool in 383th line of smackfs.c:
$ codespell ./security/smack/
./smackfs.c:383: numer ==> number
Fix a typo found by codespell.
Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This pull request just has a single 3-line code cleanup CL to eliminate
some unnecessary 'break' statements. No other work was done on SafeSetID
for the v5.13 merge window.
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Merge tag 'safesetid-5.13' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux
Pull SafeSetID update from Micah Morton:
"Simple code cleanup
This just has a single three-line code cleanup to eliminate some
unnecessary 'break' statements"
* tag 'safesetid-5.13' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
LSM: SafeSetID: Fix code specification by scripts/checkpatch.pl
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted stuff all over the place"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
useful constants: struct qstr for ".."
hostfs_open(): don't open-code file_dentry()
whack-a-mole: kill strlen_user() (again)
autofs: should_expire() argument is guaranteed to be positive
apparmor:match_mn() - constify devpath argument
buffer: a small optimization in grow_buffers
get rid of autofs_getpath()
constify dentry argument of dentry_path()/dentry_path_raw()
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Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"In addition to loading the kernel module signing key onto the builtin
keyring, load it onto the IMA keyring as well.
Also six trivial changes and bug fixes"
* tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependencies
ima: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
integrity: Add declarations to init_once void arguments.
ima: Fix function name error in comment.
ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring
ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key
keys: cleanup build time module signing keys
ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value
ima: without an IMA policy loaded, return quickly
Core:
- bpf:
- allow bpf programs calling kernel functions (initially to
reuse TCP congestion control implementations)
- enable task local storage for tracing programs - remove the
need to store per-task state in hash maps, and allow tracing
programs access to task local storage previously added for
BPF_LSM
- add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper, allowing programs to
walk all map elements in a more robust and easier to verify
fashion
- sockmap: support UDP and cross-protocol BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT
redirection
- lpm: add support for batched ops in LPM trie
- add BTF_KIND_FLOAT support - mostly to allow use of BTF
on s390 which has floats in its headers files
- improve BPF syscall documentation and extend the use of kdoc
parsing scripts we already employ for bpf-helpers
- libbpf, bpftool: support static linking of BPF ELF files
- improve support for encapsulation of L2 packets
- xdp: restructure redirect actions to avoid a runtime lookup,
improving performance by 4-8% in microbenchmarks
- xsk: build skb by page (aka generic zerocopy xmit) - improve
performance of software AF_XDP path by 33% for devices
which don't need headers in the linear skb part (e.g. virtio)
- nexthop: resilient next-hop groups - improve path stability
on next-hops group changes (incl. offload for mlxsw)
- ipv6: segment routing: add support for IPv4 decapsulation
- icmp: add support for RFC 8335 extended PROBE messages
- inet: use bigger hash table for IP ID generation
- tcp: deal better with delayed TX completions - make sure we don't
give up on fast TCP retransmissions only because driver is
slow in reporting that it completed transmitting the original
- tcp: reorder tcp_congestion_ops for better cache locality
- mptcp:
- add sockopt support for common TCP options
- add support for common TCP msg flags
- include multiple address ids in RM_ADDR
- add reset option support for resetting one subflow
- udp: GRO L4 improvements - improve 'forward' / 'frag_list'
co-existence with UDP tunnel GRO, allowing the first to take
place correctly even for encapsulated UDP traffic
- micro-optimize dev_gro_receive() and flow dissection, avoid
retpoline overhead on VLAN and TEB GRO
- use less memory for sysctls, add a new sysctl type, to allow using
u8 instead of "int" and "long" and shrink networking sysctls
- veth: allow GRO without XDP - this allows aggregating UDP
packets before handing them off to routing, bridge, OvS, etc.
- allow specifing ifindex when device is moved to another namespace
- netfilter:
- nft_socket: add support for cgroupsv2
- nftables: add catch-all set element - special element used
to define a default action in case normal lookup missed
- use net_generic infra in many modules to avoid allocating
per-ns memory unnecessarily
- xps: improve the xps handling to avoid potential out-of-bound
accesses and use-after-free when XPS change race with other
re-configuration under traffic
- add a config knob to turn off per-cpu netdev refcnt to catch
underflows in testing
Device APIs:
- add WWAN subsystem to organize the WWAN interfaces better and
hopefully start driving towards more unified and vendor-
-independent APIs
- ethtool:
- add interface for reading IEEE MIB stats (incl. mlx5 and
bnxt support)
- allow network drivers to dump arbitrary SFP EEPROM data,
current offset+length API was a poor fit for modern SFP
which define EEPROM in terms of pages (incl. mlx5 support)
- act_police, flow_offload: add support for packet-per-second
policing (incl. offload for nfp)
- psample: add additional metadata attributes like transit delay
for packets sampled from switch HW (and corresponding egress
and policy-based sampling in the mlxsw driver)
- dsa: improve support for sandwiched LAGs with bridge and DSA
- netfilter:
- flowtable: use direct xmit in topologies with IP
forwarding, bridging, vlans etc.
- nftables: counter hardware offload support
- Bluetooth:
- improvements for firmware download w/ Intel devices
- add support for reading AOSP vendor capabilities
- add support for virtio transport driver
- mac80211:
- allow concurrent monitor iface and ethernet rx decap
- set priority and queue mapping for injected frames
- phy: add support for Clause-45 PHY Loopback
- pci/iov: add sysfs MSI-X vector assignment interface
to distribute MSI-X resources to VFs (incl. mlx5 support)
New hardware/drivers:
- dsa: mv88e6xxx: add support for Marvell mv88e6393x -
11-port Ethernet switch with 8x 1-Gigabit Ethernet
and 3x 10-Gigabit interfaces.
- dsa: support for legacy Broadcom tags used on BCM5325, BCM5365
and BCM63xx switches
- Microchip KSZ8863 and KSZ8873; 3x 10/100Mbps Ethernet switches
- ath11k: support for QCN9074 a 802.11ax device
- Bluetooth: Broadcom BCM4330 and BMC4334
- phy: Marvell 88X2222 transceiver support
- mdio: add BCM6368 MDIO mux bus controller
- r8152: support RTL8153 and RTL8156 (USB Ethernet) chips
- mana: driver for Microsoft Azure Network Adapter (MANA)
- Actions Semi Owl Ethernet MAC
- can: driver for ETAS ES58X CAN/USB interfaces
Pure driver changes:
- add XDP support to: enetc, igc, stmmac
- add AF_XDP support to: stmmac
- virtio:
- page_to_skb() use build_skb when there's sufficient tailroom
(21% improvement for 1000B UDP frames)
- support XDP even without dedicated Tx queues - share the Tx
queues with the stack when necessary
- mlx5:
- flow rules: add support for mirroring with conntrack,
matching on ICMP, GTP, flex filters and more
- support packet sampling with flow offloads
- persist uplink representor netdev across eswitch mode
changes
- allow coexistence of CQE compression and HW time-stamping
- add ethtool extended link error state reporting
- ice, iavf: support flow filters, UDP Segmentation Offload
- dpaa2-switch:
- move the driver out of staging
- add spanning tree (STP) support
- add rx copybreak support
- add tc flower hardware offload on ingress traffic
- ionic:
- implement Rx page reuse
- support HW PTP time-stamping
- octeon: support TC hardware offloads - flower matching on ingress
and egress ratelimitting.
- stmmac:
- add RX frame steering based on VLAN priority in tc flower
- support frame preemption (FPE)
- intel: add cross time-stamping freq difference adjustment
- ocelot:
- support forwarding of MRP frames in HW
- support multiple bridges
- support PTP Sync one-step timestamping
- dsa: mv88e6xxx, dpaa2-switch: offload bridge port flags like
learning, flooding etc.
- ipa: add IPA v4.5, v4.9 and v4.11 support (Qualcomm SDX55, SM8350,
SC7280 SoCs)
- mt7601u: enable TDLS support
- mt76:
- add support for 802.3 rx frames (mt7915/mt7615)
- mt7915 flash pre-calibration support
- mt7921/mt7663 runtime power management fixes
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'net-next-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"Core:
- bpf:
- allow bpf programs calling kernel functions (initially to
reuse TCP congestion control implementations)
- enable task local storage for tracing programs - remove the
need to store per-task state in hash maps, and allow tracing
programs access to task local storage previously added for
BPF_LSM
- add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper, allowing programs to walk
all map elements in a more robust and easier to verify fashion
- sockmap: support UDP and cross-protocol BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT
redirection
- lpm: add support for batched ops in LPM trie
- add BTF_KIND_FLOAT support - mostly to allow use of BTF on
s390 which has floats in its headers files
- improve BPF syscall documentation and extend the use of kdoc
parsing scripts we already employ for bpf-helpers
- libbpf, bpftool: support static linking of BPF ELF files
- improve support for encapsulation of L2 packets
- xdp: restructure redirect actions to avoid a runtime lookup,
improving performance by 4-8% in microbenchmarks
- xsk: build skb by page (aka generic zerocopy xmit) - improve
performance of software AF_XDP path by 33% for devices which don't
need headers in the linear skb part (e.g. virtio)
- nexthop: resilient next-hop groups - improve path stability on
next-hops group changes (incl. offload for mlxsw)
- ipv6: segment routing: add support for IPv4 decapsulation
- icmp: add support for RFC 8335 extended PROBE messages
- inet: use bigger hash table for IP ID generation
- tcp: deal better with delayed TX completions - make sure we don't
give up on fast TCP retransmissions only because driver is slow in
reporting that it completed transmitting the original
- tcp: reorder tcp_congestion_ops for better cache locality
- mptcp:
- add sockopt support for common TCP options
- add support for common TCP msg flags
- include multiple address ids in RM_ADDR
- add reset option support for resetting one subflow
- udp: GRO L4 improvements - improve 'forward' / 'frag_list'
co-existence with UDP tunnel GRO, allowing the first to take place
correctly even for encapsulated UDP traffic
- micro-optimize dev_gro_receive() and flow dissection, avoid
retpoline overhead on VLAN and TEB GRO
- use less memory for sysctls, add a new sysctl type, to allow using
u8 instead of "int" and "long" and shrink networking sysctls
- veth: allow GRO without XDP - this allows aggregating UDP packets
before handing them off to routing, bridge, OvS, etc.
- allow specifing ifindex when device is moved to another namespace
- netfilter:
- nft_socket: add support for cgroupsv2
- nftables: add catch-all set element - special element used to
define a default action in case normal lookup missed
- use net_generic infra in many modules to avoid allocating
per-ns memory unnecessarily
- xps: improve the xps handling to avoid potential out-of-bound
accesses and use-after-free when XPS change race with other
re-configuration under traffic
- add a config knob to turn off per-cpu netdev refcnt to catch
underflows in testing
Device APIs:
- add WWAN subsystem to organize the WWAN interfaces better and
hopefully start driving towards more unified and vendor-
independent APIs
- ethtool:
- add interface for reading IEEE MIB stats (incl. mlx5 and bnxt
support)
- allow network drivers to dump arbitrary SFP EEPROM data,
current offset+length API was a poor fit for modern SFP which
define EEPROM in terms of pages (incl. mlx5 support)
- act_police, flow_offload: add support for packet-per-second
policing (incl. offload for nfp)
- psample: add additional metadata attributes like transit delay for
packets sampled from switch HW (and corresponding egress and
policy-based sampling in the mlxsw driver)
- dsa: improve support for sandwiched LAGs with bridge and DSA
- netfilter:
- flowtable: use direct xmit in topologies with IP forwarding,
bridging, vlans etc.
- nftables: counter hardware offload support
- Bluetooth:
- improvements for firmware download w/ Intel devices
- add support for reading AOSP vendor capabilities
- add support for virtio transport driver
- mac80211:
- allow concurrent monitor iface and ethernet rx decap
- set priority and queue mapping for injected frames
- phy: add support for Clause-45 PHY Loopback
- pci/iov: add sysfs MSI-X vector assignment interface to distribute
MSI-X resources to VFs (incl. mlx5 support)
New hardware/drivers:
- dsa: mv88e6xxx: add support for Marvell mv88e6393x - 11-port
Ethernet switch with 8x 1-Gigabit Ethernet and 3x 10-Gigabit
interfaces.
- dsa: support for legacy Broadcom tags used on BCM5325, BCM5365 and
BCM63xx switches
- Microchip KSZ8863 and KSZ8873; 3x 10/100Mbps Ethernet switches
- ath11k: support for QCN9074 a 802.11ax device
- Bluetooth: Broadcom BCM4330 and BMC4334
- phy: Marvell 88X2222 transceiver support
- mdio: add BCM6368 MDIO mux bus controller
- r8152: support RTL8153 and RTL8156 (USB Ethernet) chips
- mana: driver for Microsoft Azure Network Adapter (MANA)
- Actions Semi Owl Ethernet MAC
- can: driver for ETAS ES58X CAN/USB interfaces
Pure driver changes:
- add XDP support to: enetc, igc, stmmac
- add AF_XDP support to: stmmac
- virtio:
- page_to_skb() use build_skb when there's sufficient tailroom
(21% improvement for 1000B UDP frames)
- support XDP even without dedicated Tx queues - share the Tx
queues with the stack when necessary
- mlx5:
- flow rules: add support for mirroring with conntrack, matching
on ICMP, GTP, flex filters and more
- support packet sampling with flow offloads
- persist uplink representor netdev across eswitch mode changes
- allow coexistence of CQE compression and HW time-stamping
- add ethtool extended link error state reporting
- ice, iavf: support flow filters, UDP Segmentation Offload
- dpaa2-switch:
- move the driver out of staging
- add spanning tree (STP) support
- add rx copybreak support
- add tc flower hardware offload on ingress traffic
- ionic:
- implement Rx page reuse
- support HW PTP time-stamping
- octeon: support TC hardware offloads - flower matching on ingress
and egress ratelimitting.
- stmmac:
- add RX frame steering based on VLAN priority in tc flower
- support frame preemption (FPE)
- intel: add cross time-stamping freq difference adjustment
- ocelot:
- support forwarding of MRP frames in HW
- support multiple bridges
- support PTP Sync one-step timestamping
- dsa: mv88e6xxx, dpaa2-switch: offload bridge port flags like
learning, flooding etc.
- ipa: add IPA v4.5, v4.9 and v4.11 support (Qualcomm SDX55, SM8350,
SC7280 SoCs)
- mt7601u: enable TDLS support
- mt76:
- add support for 802.3 rx frames (mt7915/mt7615)
- mt7915 flash pre-calibration support
- mt7921/mt7663 runtime power management fixes"
* tag 'net-next-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2451 commits)
net: selftest: fix build issue if INET is disabled
net: netrom: nr_in: Remove redundant assignment to ns
net: tun: Remove redundant assignment to ret
net: phy: marvell: add downshift support for M88E1240
net: dsa: ksz: Make reg_mib_cnt a u8 as it never exceeds 255
net/sched: act_ct: Remove redundant ct get and check
icmp: standardize naming of RFC 8335 PROBE constants
bpf, selftests: Update array map tests for per-cpu batched ops
bpf: Add batched ops support for percpu array
bpf: Implement formatted output helpers with bstr_printf
seq_file: Add a seq_bprintf function
sfc: adjust efx->xdp_tx_queue_count with the real number of initialized queues
net:nfc:digital: Fix a double free in digital_tg_recv_dep_req
net: fix a concurrency bug in l2tp_tunnel_register()
net/smc: Remove redundant assignment to rc
mpls: Remove redundant assignment to err
llc2: Remove redundant assignment to rc
net/tls: Remove redundant initialization of record
rds: Remove redundant assignment to nr_sig
dt-bindings: net: mdio-gpio: add compatible for microchip,mdio-smi0
...
- Refactoring powerpc and arm64 kexec DT handling to common code. This
enables IMA on arm64.
- Add kbuild support for applying DT overlays at build time. The first
user are the DT unittests.
- Fix kerneldoc formatting and W=1 warnings in drivers/of/
- Fix handling 64-bit flag on PCI resources
- Bump dtschema version required to v2021.2.1
- Enable undocumented compatible checks for dtbs_check. This allows
tracking of missing binding schemas.
- DT docs improvements. Regroup the DT docs and add the example schema
and DT kernel ABI docs to the doc build.
- Convert Broadcom Bluetooth and video-mux bindings to schema
- Add QCom sm8250 Venus video codec binding schema
- Add vendor prefixes for AESOP, YIC System Co., Ltd, and Siliconfile
Technologies Inc.
- Cleanup of DT schema type references on common properties and
standard unit properties
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Merge tag 'devicetree-for-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux
Pull devicetree updates from Rob Herring:
- Refactor powerpc and arm64 kexec DT handling to common code. This
enables IMA on arm64.
- Add kbuild support for applying DT overlays at build time. The first
user are the DT unittests.
- Fix kerneldoc formatting and W=1 warnings in drivers/of/
- Fix handling 64-bit flag on PCI resources
- Bump dtschema version required to v2021.2.1
- Enable undocumented compatible checks for dtbs_check. This allows
tracking of missing binding schemas.
- DT docs improvements. Regroup the DT docs and add the example schema
and DT kernel ABI docs to the doc build.
- Convert Broadcom Bluetooth and video-mux bindings to schema
- Add QCom sm8250 Venus video codec binding schema
- Add vendor prefixes for AESOP, YIC System Co., Ltd, and Siliconfile
Technologies Inc.
- Cleanup of DT schema type references on common properties and
standard unit properties
* tag 'devicetree-for-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux: (64 commits)
powerpc: If kexec_build_elf_info() fails return immediately from elf64_load()
powerpc: Free fdt on error in elf64_load()
of: overlay: Fix kerneldoc warning in of_overlay_remove()
of: linux/of.h: fix kernel-doc warnings
of/pci: Add IORESOURCE_MEM_64 to resource flags for 64-bit memory addresses
dt-bindings: bcm4329-fmac: add optional brcm,ccode-map
docs: dt: update writing-schema.rst references
dt-bindings: media: venus: Add sm8250 dt schema
of: base: Fix spelling issue with function param 'prop'
docs: dt: Add DT API documentation
of: Add missing 'Return' section in kerneldoc comments
of: Fix kerneldoc output formatting
docs: dt: Group DT docs into relevant sub-sections
docs: dt: Make 'Devicetree' wording more consistent
docs: dt: writing-schema: Include the example schema in the doc build
docs: dt: writing-schema: Remove spurious indentation
dt-bindings: Fix reference in submitting-patches.rst to the DT ABI doc
dt-bindings: ddr: Add optional manufacturer and revision ID to LPDDR3
dt-bindings: media: video-interfaces: Drop the example
devicetree: bindings: clock: Minor typo fix in the file armada3700-tbg-clock.txt
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add support for measuring the SELinux state and policy capabilities
using IMA.
- A handful of SELinux/NFS patches to compare the SELinux state of one
mount with a set of mount options. Olga goes into more detail in the
patch descriptions, but this is important as it allows more
flexibility when using NFS and SELinux context mounts.
- Properly differentiate between the subjective and objective LSM
credentials; including support for the SELinux and Smack. My clumsy
attempt at a proper fix for AppArmor didn't quite pass muster so John
is working on a proper AppArmor patch, in the meantime this set of
patches shouldn't change the behavior of AppArmor in any way. This
change explains the bulk of the diffstat beyond security/.
- Fix a problem where we were not properly terminating the permission
list for two SELinux object classes.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissions
smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials
selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials
lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants
nfs: account for selinux security context when deciding to share superblock
nfs: remove unneeded null check in nfs_fill_super()
lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount
selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
selinux: measure state and policy capabilities
selinux: Allow context mounts for unpriviliged overlayfs
First, the code is found to be irregular through checkpatch.pl.
Then I found break is really useless here.
Signed-off-by: Yanwei Gao <gaoyanwei.tx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- crypto_destroy_tfm now ignores errors as well as NULL pointers
Algorithms:
- Add explicit curve IDs in ECDH algorithm names
- Add NIST P384 curve parameters
- Add ECDSA
Drivers:
- Add support for Green Sardine in ccp
- Add ecdh/curve25519 to hisilicon/hpre
- Add support for AM64 in sa2ul"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (184 commits)
fsverity: relax build time dependency on CRYPTO_SHA256
fscrypt: relax Kconfig dependencies for crypto API algorithms
crypto: camellia - drop duplicate "depends on CRYPTO"
crypto: s5p-sss - consistently use local 'dev' variable in probe()
crypto: s5p-sss - remove unneeded local variable initialization
crypto: s5p-sss - simplify getting of_device_id match data
ccp: ccp - add support for Green Sardine
crypto: ccp - Make ccp_dev_suspend and ccp_dev_resume void functions
crypto: octeontx2 - add support for OcteonTX2 98xx CPT block.
crypto: chelsio/chcr - Remove useless MODULE_VERSION
crypto: ux500/cryp - Remove duplicate argument
crypto: chelsio - remove unused function
crypto: sa2ul - Add support for AM64
crypto: sa2ul - Support for per channel coherency
dt-bindings: crypto: ti,sa2ul: Add new compatible for AM64
crypto: hisilicon - enable new error types for QM
crypto: hisilicon - add new error type for SEC
crypto: hisilicon - support new error types for ZIP
crypto: hisilicon - dynamic configuration 'err_info'
crypto: doc - fix kernel-doc notation in chacha.c and af_alg.c
...
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Merge tag 'keys-cve-2020-26541-v3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull x509 dbx/mokx UEFI support from David Howells:
"Here's a set of patches from Eric Snowberg[1] that add support for
EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries in the dbx and mokx UEFI tables (such
entries cause matching certificates to be rejected).
These are currently ignored and only the hash entries are made use of.
Additionally Eric included his patches to allow such certificates to
be preloaded.
These patches deal with CVE-2020-26541.
To quote Eric:
'This is the fifth patch series for adding support for
EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries [2]. It has been expanded to not only
include dbx entries but also entries in the mokx. Additionally
my series to preload these certificate [3] has also been
included'"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com [1]
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-security-module/patch/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/cover/1315485/ [3]
* tag 'keys-cve-2020-26541-v3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring
certs: Add ability to preload revocation certs
certs: Move load_system_certificate_list to a common function
certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries
Fix a regression in the TPM trusted keys caused by the generic rework
to add ARM TEE based trusted keys. Without this fix, the TPM trusted
key subsystem fails to add or load any keys.
Signed-off-by: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
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Merge tag 'queue' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/tpmdd
Pull tpm fixes from James Bottomley:
"Fix a regression in the TPM trusted keys caused by the generic rework
to add ARM TEE based trusted keys.
Without this fix, the TPM trusted key subsystem fails to add or load
any keys"
* tag 'queue' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: fix TPM trusted keys for generic framework
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"New features:
- ARM TEE backend for kernel trusted keys to complete the existing
TPM backend
- ASN.1 format for TPM2 trusted keys to make them interact with the
user space stack, such as OpenConnect VPN
Other than that, a bunch of bug fixes"
* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: Fix missing null return from kzalloc call
char: tpm: fix error return code in tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_recv()
MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source
KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys
KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable
security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs
security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys
lib: Add ASN.1 encoder
tpm: vtpm_proxy: Avoid reading host log when using a virtual device
tpm: acpi: Check eventlog signature before using it
tpm: efi: Use local variable for calculating final log size
Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to
landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI
version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security
approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole
sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of
protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features
provided by the running kernel.
This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock
features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem
interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing
multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New
Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version
number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for
each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space
libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes
as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs.
This is a much more lighter approach than the previous
landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space
libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions:
selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version.
Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
These 3 system calls are designed to be used by unprivileged processes
to sandbox themselves:
* landlock_create_ruleset(2): Creates a ruleset and returns its file
descriptor.
* landlock_add_rule(2): Adds a rule (e.g. file hierarchy access) to a
ruleset, identified by the dedicated file descriptor.
* landlock_restrict_self(2): Enforces a ruleset on the calling thread
and its future children (similar to seccomp). This syscall has the
same usage restrictions as seccomp(2): the caller must have the
no_new_privs attribute set or have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user
namespace.
All these syscalls have a "flags" argument (not currently used) to
enable extensibility.
Here are the motivations for these new syscalls:
* A sandboxed process may not have access to file systems, including
/dev, /sys or /proc, but it should still be able to add more
restrictions to itself.
* Neither prctl(2) nor seccomp(2) (which was used in a previous version)
fit well with the current definition of a Landlock security policy.
All passed structs (attributes) are checked at build time to ensure that
they don't contain holes and that they are aligned the same way for each
architecture.
See the user and kernel documentation for more details (provided by a
following commit):
* Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
* Documentation/security/landlock.rst
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-9-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
The sb_delete security hook is called when shutting down a superblock,
which may be useful to release kernel objects tied to the superblock's
lifetime (e.g. inodes).
This new hook is needed by Landlock to release (ephemerally) tagged
struct inodes. This comes from the unprivileged nature of Landlock
described in the next commit.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-7-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes
according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to
express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file)
and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through
landlock_add_rule(2). When checking if a file access request is
allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following
the different mount layers. The access to each "tagged" inodes are
collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create
access to the requested file hierarchy. This makes possible to identify
a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the
filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user
has from the filesystem.
Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not
keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are
in use.
This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control
which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions. This is the
result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease
review. Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control
without breaking user space will not be a problem. Moreover, seccomp
filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may
not be currently handled by Landlock.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-8-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the security infrastructure.
Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is
allocated there.
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead
to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker
to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing
malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of
the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee.
A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process
and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating
processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a
target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target
process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer).
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Process's credentials point to a Landlock domain, which is underneath
implemented with a ruleset. In the following commits, this domain is
used to check and enforce the ptrace and filesystem security policies.
A domain is inherited from a parent to its child the same way a thread
inherits a seccomp policy.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-4-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
A Landlock ruleset is mainly a red-black tree with Landlock rules as
nodes. This enables quick update and lookup to match a requested
access, e.g. to a file. A ruleset is usable through a dedicated file
descriptor (cf. following commit implementing syscalls) which enables a
process to create and populate a ruleset with new rules.
A domain is a ruleset tied to a set of processes. This group of rules
defines the security policy enforced on these processes and their future
children. A domain can transition to a new domain which is the
intersection of all its constraints and those of a ruleset provided by
the current process. This modification only impact the current process.
This means that a process can only gain more constraints (i.e. lose
accesses) over time.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode).
A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rules
are grouped in rulesets that may be tied to a set of processes (i.e.
subjects) to enforce a scoped access-control (i.e. a domain).
Because Landlock's goal is to empower any process (especially
unprivileged ones) to sandbox themselves, we cannot rely on a
system-wide object identification such as file extended attributes.
Indeed, we need innocuous, composable and modular access-controls.
The main challenge with these constraints is to identify kernel objects
while this identification is useful (i.e. when a security policy makes
use of this object). But this identification data should be freed once
no policy is using it. This ephemeral tagging should not and may not be
written in the filesystem. We then need to manage the lifetime of a
rule according to the lifetime of its objects. To avoid a global lock,
this implementation make use of RCU and counters to safely reference
objects.
A following commit uses this generic object management for inodes.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
This patch adds the missing NULL termination to the "bpf" and
"perf_event" object class permission lists.
This missing NULL termination should really only affect the tools
under scripts/selinux, with the most important being genheaders.c,
although in practice this has not been an issue on any of my dev/test
systems. If the problem were to manifest itself it would likely
result in bogus permissions added to the end of the object class;
thankfully with no access control checks using these bogus
permissions and no policies defining these permissions the impact
would likely be limited to some noise about undefined permissions
during policy load.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ec27c3568a ("selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations")
Fixes: da97e18458 ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The generic framework patch broke the current TPM trusted keys because
it doesn't correctly remove the values consumed by the generic parser
before passing them on to the implementation specific parser. Fix
this by having the generic parser return the string minus the consumed
tokens.
Additionally, there may be no tokens left for the implementation
specific parser, so make it handle the NULL case correctly and finally
fix a TPM 1.2 specific check for no keyhandle.
Fixes: 5d0682be31 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Tested-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
The original patch 8c657a0590 ("KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal
and unseal operations") was correct on the mailing list:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210128235621.127925-4-jarkko@kernel.org/
But somehow got rebased so that the tpm_try_get_ops() in
tpm2_seal_trusted() got lost. This causes an imbalanced put of the
TPM ops and causes oopses on TIS based hardware.
This fix puts back the lost tpm_try_get_ops()
Fixes: 8c657a0590 ("KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations")
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix multiple
warnings by explicitly adding multiple break statements instead of just
letting the code fall through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
- keep the ZC code, drop the code related to reinit
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
- fix build after move to net_generic
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK and CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE both enable KASAN stack
instrumentation, but we should only need one config, so that we remove
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE and make CONFIG_KASAN_STACK workable. see [1].
When enable KASAN stack instrumentation, then for gcc we could do no
prompt and default value y, and for clang prompt and default value n.
This patch fixes the following compilation warning:
include/linux/kasan.h:333:30: warning: 'CONFIG_KASAN_STACK' is not defined, evaluates to 0 [-Wundef]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix merge snafu]
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221 [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210226012531.29231-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com
Fixes: d9b571c885 ("kasan: fix KASAN_STACK dependency for HW_TAGS")
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix kernel-doc notation in commoncap.c.
Use correct (matching) function name in comments as in code.
Use correct function argument names in kernel-doc comments.
Use kernel-doc's "Return:" format for function return values.
Fixes these kernel-doc warnings:
../security/commoncap.c:1206: warning: expecting prototype for cap_task_ioprio(). Prototype was for cap_task_setioprio() instead
../security/commoncap.c:1219: warning: expecting prototype for cap_task_ioprio(). Prototype was for cap_task_setnice() instead
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
The kzalloc call can return null with the GFP_KERNEL flag so
add a null check and exit via a new error exit label. Use the
same exit error label for another error path too.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Dereference null return value")
Fixes: 830027e2cb55 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality
to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key.
Refer to Documentation/staging/tee.rst for detailed information about TEE.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
which contains necessary functions of a backend.
Also, define a module parameter in order to select a particular trust
source in case a platform support multiple trust sources. In case its
not specified then implementation itetrates through trust sources list
starting with TPM and assign the first trust source as a backend which
has initiazed successfully during iteration.
Note that current implementation only supports a single trust source at
runtime which is either selectable at compile time or during boot via
aforementioned module parameter.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
The current implementation appends a migratable flag to the end of a
key, meaning the format isn't exactly interoperable because the using
party needs to know to strip this extra byte. However, all other
consumers of TPM sealed blobs expect the unseal to return exactly the
key. Since TPM2 keys have a key property flag that corresponds to
migratable, use that flag instead and make the actual key the only
sealed quantity. This is secure because the key properties are bound
to a hash in the private part, so if they're altered the key won't
load.
Backwards compatibility is implemented by detecting whether we're
loading a new format key or not and correctly setting migratable from
the last byte of old format keys.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the
ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior
trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities
representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the
export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format.
The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the
exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine,
openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy
specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy
handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you
don't have to keep passing it in each time.
This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so
keys with passwords but no policy.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually
recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1
hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this
hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex
number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length
passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted
keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this
into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys.
so before
keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u
after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new
directly supplied password:
keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u
Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct
password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator
for which form is input.
Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM
2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty
authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in
20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the
Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch
makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys.
Fixes: 0fe5480303 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips")
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Conflicts:
MAINTAINERS
- keep Chandrasekar
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c
- simple fix + trust the code re-added to param.c in -next is fine
include/linux/bpf.h
- trivial
include/linux/ethtool.h
- trivial, fix kdoc while at it
include/linux/skmsg.h
- move to relevant place in tcp.c, comment re-wrapped
net/core/skmsg.c
- add the sk = sk // sk = NULL around calls
net/tipc/crypto.c
- trivial
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210409' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Three SELinux fixes.
These fix known problems relating to (re)loading SELinux policy or
changing the policy booleans, and pass our test suite without problem"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210409' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix race between old and new sidtab
selinux: fix cond_list corruption when changing booleans
selinux: make nslot handling in avtab more robust
init_once is a callback to kmem_cache_create. The parameter
type of this function is void *, so it's better to give a
explicit cast here.
Signed-off-by: Jiele Zhao <unclexiaole@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The original function name was ima_path_check(). The policy parsing
still supports PATH_CHECK. Commit 9bbb6cad01 ("ima: rename
ima_path_check to ima_file_check") renamed the function to
ima_file_check(), but missed modifying the function name in the
comment.
Fixes: 9bbb6cad01 ("ima: rename ima_path_check to ima_file_check").
Signed-off-by: Jiele Zhao <unclexiaole@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The kernel currently only loads the kernel module signing key onto the
builtin trusted keyring. Load the module signing key onto the IMA keyring
as well.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Since commit 1b8b31a2e6 ("selinux: convert policy read-write lock to
RCU"), there is a small window during policy load where the new policy
pointer has already been installed, but some threads may still be
holding the old policy pointer in their read-side RCU critical sections.
This means that there may be conflicting attempts to add a new SID entry
to both tables via sidtab_context_to_sid().
See also (and the rest of the thread):
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAFqZXNvfux46_f8gnvVvRYMKoes24nwm2n3sPbMjrB8vKTW00g@mail.gmail.com/
Fix this by installing the new policy pointer under the old sidtab's
spinlock along with marking the old sidtab as "frozen". Then, if an
attempt to add new entry to a "frozen" sidtab is detected, make
sidtab_context_to_sid() return -ESTALE to indicate that a new policy
has been installed and that the caller will have to abort the policy
transaction and try again after re-taking the policy pointer (which is
guaranteed to be a newer policy). This requires adding a retry-on-ESTALE
logic to all callers of sidtab_context_to_sid(), but fortunately these
are easy to determine and aren't that many.
This seems to be the simplest solution for this problem, even if it
looks somewhat ugly. Note that other places in the kernel (e.g.
do_mknodat() in fs/namei.c) use similar stale-retry patterns, so I think
it's reasonable.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1b8b31a2e6 ("selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Currently, duplicate_policydb_cond_list() first copies the whole
conditional avtab and then tries to link to the correct entries in
cond_dup_av_list() using avtab_search(). However, since the conditional
avtab may contain multiple entries with the same key, this approach
often fails to find the right entry, potentially leading to wrong rules
being activated/deactivated when booleans are changed.
To fix this, instead start with an empty conditional avtab and add the
individual entries one-by-one while building the new av_lists. This
approach leads to the correct result, since each entry is present in the
av_lists exactly once.
The issue can be reproduced with Fedora policy as follows:
# sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
# setsebool ftpd_anon_write=off ftpd_connect_all_unreserved=off ftpd_connect_db=off ftpd_full_access=off
On fixed kernels, the sesearch output is the same after the setsebool
command:
# sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
While on the broken kernels, it will be different:
# sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
While there, also simplify the computation of nslots. This changes the
nslots values for nrules 2 or 3 to just two slots instead of 4, which
makes the sequence more consistent.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c7c556f1e8 ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
1. Make sure all fileds are initialized in avtab_init().
2. Slightly refactor avtab_alloc() to use the above fact.
3. Use h->nslot == 0 as a sentinel in the access functions to prevent
dereferencing h->htable when it's not allocated.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since commit 3bfe610669 ("io-wq: fork worker threads from original
task") stopped using PF_KTHREAD flag for the io_uring PF_IO_WORKER threads,
tomoyo_kernel_service() no longer needs to check PF_IO_WORKER flag.
(This is a 5.12+ patch. Please don't send to stable kernels.)
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Add support for IMA signature verification for EC keys. Since SHA type
of hashes can be used by RSA and ECDSA signature schemes we need to
look at the key and derive from the key which signature scheme to use.
Since this can be applied to all types of keys, we change the selection
of the encoding type to be driven by the key's signature scheme rather
than by the hash type.
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.12-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity fix from Mimi Zohar:
"Just one patch to address a NULL ptr dereferencing when there is a
mismatch between the user enabled LSMs and IMA/EVM"
* tag 'integrity-v5.12-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized
gcc-11 introdces a harmless warning for cap_inode_getsecurity:
security/commoncap.c: In function ‘cap_inode_getsecurity’:
security/commoncap.c:440:33: error: ‘memcpy’ reading 16 bytes from a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread]
440 | memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The problem here is that tmpbuf is initialized to NULL, so gcc assumes
it is not accessible unless it gets set by vfs_getxattr_alloc(). This is
a legitimate warning as far as I can tell, but the code is correct since
it correctly handles the error when that function fails.
Add a separate NULL check to tell gcc about it as well.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
In ima_restore_measurement_list(), hdr[HDR_PCR].data is pointing to a
buffer of type u8, which contains the dumped 32-bit pcr value.
Currently, only the least significant byte is used to restore the pcr
value. We should convert hdr[HDR_PCR].data to a pointer of type u32
before fetching the value to restore the correct pcr value.
Fixes: 47fdee60b4 ("ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers")
Signed-off-by: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
With the split of the security_task_getsecid() into subjective and
objective variants it's time to update Smack to ensure it is using
the correct task creds.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux has a function, task_sid(), which returns the task's
objective credentials, but unfortunately is used in a few places
where the subjective task credentials should be used. Most notably
in the new security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook.
This patch fixes this and attempts to make things more obvious by
introducing a new function, task_sid_subj(), and renaming the
existing task_sid() function to task_sid_obj().
This patch also adds an interesting function in task_sid_binder().
The task_sid_binder() function has a comment which hopefully
describes it's reason for being, but it basically boils down to the
simple fact that we can't safely access another task's subjective
credentials so in the case of binder we need to stick with the
objective credentials regardless.
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
credentials.
This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change
the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
implementations and return the correct credentials.
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a new hook that takes an existing super block and a new mount
with new options and determines if new options confict with an
existing mount or not.
A filesystem can use this new hook to determine if it can share
the an existing superblock with a new superblock for the new mount.
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line, fix tab/space problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Three SELinux patches:
- Fix a problem where a local variable is used outside its associated
function. Thankfully this can only be triggered by reloading the
SELinux policy, which is a restricted operation for other obvious
reasons.
- Fix some incorrect, and inconsistent, audit and printk messages
when loading the SELinux policy.
All three patches are relatively minor and have been through our
testing with no failures"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinuxfs: unify policy load error reporting
selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversion
selinux: don't log MAC_POLICY_LOAD record on failed policy load
Let's drop the pr_err()s from sel_make_policy_nodes() and just add one
pr_warn_ratelimited() call to the sel_make_policy_nodes() error path in
sel_write_load().
Changing from error to warning makes sense, since after 02a52c5c8c
("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs"), this error
path no longer leads to a broken selinuxfs tree (it's just kept in the
original state and policy load is aborted).
I also added _ratelimited to be consistent with the other prtin in the
same function (it's probably not necessary, but can't really hurt...
there are likely more important error messages to be printed when
filesystem entry creation starts erroring out).
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 02a52c5c8c ("selinux: move policy commit after updating
selinuxfs") moved the selinux_policy_commit() call out of
security_load_policy() into sel_write_load(), which caused a subtle yet
rather serious bug.
The problem is that security_load_policy() passes a reference to the
convert_params local variable to sidtab_convert(), which stores it in
the sidtab, where it may be accessed until the policy is swapped over
and RCU synchronized. Before 02a52c5c8c, selinux_policy_commit() was
called directly from security_load_policy(), so the convert_params
pointer remained valid all the way until the old sidtab was destroyed,
but now that's no longer the case and calls to sidtab_context_to_sid()
on the old sidtab after security_load_policy() returns may cause invalid
memory accesses.
This can be easily triggered using the stress test from commit
ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve
performance"):
```
function rand_cat() {
echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 ))
}
function do_work() {
while true; do
echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \
>/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true
done
}
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done
kill %1
kill %2
kill %3
```
Fix this by allocating the temporary sidtab convert structures
dynamically and passing them among the
selinux_policy_{load,cancel,commit} functions.
Fixes: 02a52c5c8c ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in security.h and services.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
If sel_make_policy_nodes() fails, we should jump to 'out', not 'out1',
as the latter would incorrectly log an MAC_POLICY_LOAD audit record,
even though the policy hasn't actually been reloaded. The 'out1' jump
label now becomes unused and can be removed.
Fixes: 02a52c5c8c ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It turns out that there are in fact userspace implementations that
care and this recent change caused a regression.
https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071
As the motivation for the original change was future development,
and the impact is existing real world code just revert this change
and allow the ambiguity in v3 file caps.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 95ebabde38 ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- RTM_NEWNEXTHOP et.al. that handle resilient groups will have a new nested
attribute, NHA_RES_GROUP, whose elements are attributes NHA_RES_GROUP_*.
- RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET et.al. is a suite of new messages that will
currently serve only for dumping of individual buckets of resilient next
hop groups. For nexthop group buckets, these messages will carry a nested
attribute NHA_RES_BUCKET, whose elements are attributes NHA_RES_BUCKET_*.
There are several reasons why a new suite of messages is created for
nexthop buckets instead of overloading the information on the existing
RTM_{NEW,DEL,GET}NEXTHOP messages.
First, a nexthop group can contain a large number of nexthop buckets (4k
is not unheard of). This imposes limits on the amount of information that
can be encoded for each nexthop bucket given a netlink message is limited
to 64k bytes.
Second, while RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET is only used for notifications at
this point, in the future it can be extended to provide user space with
control over nexthop buckets configuration.
- The new group type is NEXTHOP_GRP_TYPE_RES. Note that nexthop code is
adjusted to bounce groups with that type for now.
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A typo is f out by codespell tool in 422th line of security.h:
$ codespell ./security/selinux/include/
./security.h:422: thie ==> the, this
Fix a typo found by codespell.
Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A typo is found out by codespell tool in 16th line of hashtab.c
$ codespell ./security/selinux/ss/
./hashtab.c:16: rouding ==> rounding
Fix a typo found by codespell.
Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux stores the configuration state and the policy capabilities
in kernel memory. Changes to this data at runtime would have an impact
on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring this data
through IMA subsystem provides a tamper-resistant way for
an attestation service to remotely validate it at runtime.
Measure the configuration state and policy capabilities by calling
the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data().
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
Sample measurement of SELinux state and policy capabilities:
10 2122...65d8 ima-buf sha256:13c2...1292 selinux-state 696e...303b
Execute the following command to extract the measured data
from the IMA's runtime measurements list:
grep "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p
The output should be a list of key-value pairs. For example,
initialized=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
To verify the measurement is consistent with the current SELinux state
reported on the system, compare the integer values in the following
files with those set in the IMA measurement (using the following commands):
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities/[capability_file]
Note that the actual verification would be against an expected state
and done on a separate system (likely an attestation server) requiring
"initialized=1;enforcing=1;checkreqprot=0;"
for a secure state and then whatever policy capabilities are actually
set in the expected policy (which can be extracted from the policy
itself via seinfo, for example).
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Now overlayfs allow unpriviliged mounts. That is root inside a non-init
user namespace can mount overlayfs. This is being added in 5.11 kernel.
Giuseppe tried to mount overlayfs with option "context" and it failed
with error -EACCESS.
$ su test
$ unshare -rm
$ mkdir -p lower upper work merged
$ mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=lower,workdir=work,upperdir=upper,userxattr,context='system_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0' none merged
This fails with -EACCESS. It works if option "-o context" is not specified.
Little debugging showed that selinux_set_mnt_opts() returns -EACCESS.
So this patch adds "overlay" to the list, where it is fine to specific
context from non init_user_ns.
Reported-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
[PM: trimmed the changelog from the description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The functions defined in "arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c" handle setting up
and freeing the resources required to carry over the IMA measurement
list from the current kernel to the next kernel across kexec system call.
These functions do not have architecture specific code, but are
currently limited to powerpc.
Move remove_ima_buffer() and setup_ima_buffer() calls into
of_kexec_alloc_and_setup_fdt() defined in "drivers/of/kexec.c".
Move the remaining architecture independent functions from
"arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c" to "drivers/of/kexec.c".
Delete "arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c" and "arch/powerpc/include/asm/ima.h".
Remove references to the deleted files and functions in powerpc and
in ima.
Co-developed-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210221174930.27324-11-nramas@linux.microsoft.com
The fields ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size in "struct kimage_arch"
for powerpc are used to carry forward the IMA measurement list across
kexec system call. These fields are not architecture specific, but are
currently limited to powerpc.
arch_ima_add_kexec_buffer() defined in "arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c"
sets ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size for the kexec system call.
This function does not have architecture specific code, but is
currently limited to powerpc.
Move ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size to "struct kimage".
Set ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size in ima_add_kexec_buffer()
in security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c.
Co-developed-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210221174930.27324-9-nramas@linux.microsoft.com
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Merge tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:
"Here's a set of minor keyrings fixes/cleanups that I've collected from
various people for the upcoming merge window.
A couple of them might, in theory, be visible to userspace:
- Make blacklist_vet_description() reject uppercase letters as they
don't match the all-lowercase hex string generated for a blacklist
search.
This may want reconsideration in the future, but, currently, you
can't add to the blacklist keyring from userspace and the only
source of blacklist keys generates lowercase descriptions.
- Fix blacklist_init() to use a new KEY_ALLOC_* flag to indicate that
it wants KEY_FLAG_KEEP to be set rather than passing KEY_FLAG_KEEP
into keyring_alloc() as KEY_FLAG_KEEP isn't a valid alloc flag.
This isn't currently a problem as the blacklist keyring isn't
currently writable by userspace.
The rest of the patches are cleanups and I don't think they should
have any visible effect"
* tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
watch_queue: rectify kernel-doc for init_watch()
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
PKCS#7: Fix missing include
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
crypto: public_key: Remove redundant header file from public_key.h
keys: remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code
PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_one
encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h
KEYS: remove redundant memset
security: keys: delete repeated words in comments
KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldoc
security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive()
watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue
keys: Remove outdated __user annotations
security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdfhttps://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
1d7b902e28
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
Pull user namespace update from Eric Biederman:
"There are several pieces of active development, but only a single
change made it through the gauntlet to be ready for v5.12. That change
is tightening up the semantics of the v3 capabilities xattr. It is
just short of being a bug-fix/security issue as no user space is known
to even generate the problem case"
* 'userns-for-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities
Pull RCU-safe common_lsm_audit() from Al Viro:
"Make common_lsm_audit() non-blocking and usable from RCU pathwalk
context.
We don't really need to grab/drop dentry in there - rcu_read_lock() is
enough. There's a couple of followups using that to simplify the
logics in selinux, but those hadn't soaked in -next yet, so they'll
have to go in next window"
* 'work.audit' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
make dump_common_audit_data() safe to be called from RCU pathwalk
new helper: d_find_alias_rcu()
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.12-rc1-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"New features:
- Cr50 I2C TPM driver
- sysfs exports of PCR registers in TPM 2.0 chips
Bug fixes:
- bug fixes for tpm_tis driver, which had a racy wait for hardware
state change to be ready to send a command to the TPM chip. The bug
has existed already since 2006, but has only made itself known in
recent past. This is the same as the "last time" :-)
- Otherwise there's bunch of fixes for not as alarming regressions. I
think the list is about the same as last time, except I added fixes
for some disjoint bugs in trusted keys that I found some time ago"
* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.12-rc1-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing
KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()
tpm/ppi: Constify static struct attribute_group
ABI: add sysfs description for tpm exports of PCR registers
tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers
keys: Update comment for restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain
tpm: Remove tpm_dev_wq_lock
char: tpm: add i2c driver for cr50
tpm: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
tpm_tis: Clean up locality release
tpm_tis: Fix check_locality for correct locality acquisition
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"New is IMA support for measuring kernel critical data, as per usual
based on policy. The first example measures the in memory SELinux
policy. The second example measures the kernel version.
In addition are four bug fixes to address memory leaks and a missing
'static' function declaration"
* tag 'integrity-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Make function integrity_add_key() static
ima: Free IMA measurement buffer after kexec syscall
ima: Free IMA measurement buffer on error
IMA: Measure kernel version in early boot
selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy
IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the measurement based on a label
IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash
IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs
evm: Fix memleak in init_desc
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210215' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got a good handful of patches for SELinux this time around; with
everything passing the selinux-testsuite and applying cleanly to your
tree as of a few minutes ago. The highlights are:
- Add support for labeling anonymous inodes, and extend this new
support to userfaultfd.
- Fallback to SELinux genfs file labeling if the filesystem does not
have xattr support. This is useful for virtiofs which can vary in
its xattr support depending on the backing filesystem.
- Classify and handle MPTCP the same as TCP in SELinux.
- Ensure consistent behavior between inode_getxattr and
inode_listsecurity when the SELinux policy is not loaded. This
fixes a known problem with overlayfs.
- A couple of patches to prune some unused variables from the SELinux
code, mark private variables as static, and mark other variables as
__ro_after_init or __read_mostly"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210215' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
fs: anon_inodes: rephrase to appropriate kernel-doc
userfaultfd: use secure anon inodes for userfaultfd
selinux: teach SELinux about anonymous inodes
fs: add LSM-supporting anon-inode interface
security: add inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook
selinux: fall back to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS if no xattr support
selinux: mark selinux_xfrm_refcount as __read_mostly
selinux: mark some global variables __ro_after_init
selinux: make selinuxfs_mount static
selinux: drop the unnecessary aurule_callback variable
selinux: remove unused global variables
selinux: fix inconsistency between inode_getxattr and inode_listsecurity
selinux: handle MPTCP consistently with TCP
When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem,
the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(),
which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The
ownership is only taken inside tpm_send(), but this is not sufficient,
as in the key load TPM2_CC_LOAD, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL and TPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXT
need to be done as a one single atom.
Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with
tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), and use tpm_transmit_cmd() to send
TPM commands instead of tpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour.
Fixes: 2e19e10131 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code")
Reported-by: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Acked-by Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Consider the following transcript:
$ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle=80000000 migratable=1" @u
add_key: Invalid argument
The documentation has the following description:
migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
default 1 (resealing allowed)
The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by
allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL.
[*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fixes: d00a1c72f7 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
When tpm_get_random() was introduced, it defined the following API for the
return value:
1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated.
2. A negative value on error.
However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would
only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read
counts to the user space does not make any possible sense.
Fix this by returning -EIO when tpm_get_random() returns a positive value.
Fixes: 41ab999c80 ("tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The sparse tool complains as follows:
security/integrity/digsig.c:146:12: warning:
symbol 'integrity_add_key' was not declared. Should it be static?
This function is not used outside of digsig.c, so this
commit marks it static.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 60740accf7 ("integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. This buffer is not freed before
completing the kexec system call resulting in memory leak.
Add ima_buffer field in "struct kimage" to store the virtual address
of the buffer allocated for the IMA measurement list.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: 7b8589cc29 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. In error code paths this memory
is not freed resulting in memory leak.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
the error code paths in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: 7b8589cc29 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where
bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds
GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger than PAGE_SIZE.
Per smackfs doc, smk_write_net4addr accepts any label or -CIPSO,
smk_write_net6addr accepts any label or -DELETE. I couldn't find
any general rule for other label lengths except SMK_LABELLEN,
SMK_LONGLABEL, SMK_CIPSOMAX which are documented.
Let's constrain, in general, smackfs label lengths for PAGE_SIZE.
Although fuzzer crashes write to smackfs/netlabel on 0x400000 length.
Here is a quick way to reproduce the WARNING:
python -c "print('A' * 0x400000)" > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel
Reported-by: syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Commit db68ce10c4 ("new helper: uaccess_kernel()") replaced
segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS) with uaccess_kernel(). But the correct
method for tomoyo to check whether current is a kernel thread in order
to assume that kernel threads are privileged for socket operations was
(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD). Now that uaccess_kernel() became 0 on x86,
tomoyo has to fix this problem. Do like commit 942cb357ae ("Smack:
Handle io_uring kernel thread privileges") does.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
syzbot is reporting that tomoyo's quota check is racy [1]. But this check
is tolerant of some degree of inaccuracy. Thus, teach KCSAN to ignore
this data race.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=999533deec7ba6337f8aa25d8bd1a4d5f7e50476
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+0789a72b46fd91431bd8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
If a capability is stored on disk in v2 format cap_inode_getsecurity() will
currently return in v2 format unconditionally.
This is wrong: v2 cap should be equivalent to a v3 cap with zero rootid,
and so the same conversions performed on it.
If the rootid cannot be mapped, v3 is returned unconverted. Fix this so
that both v2 and v3 return -EOVERFLOW if the rootid (or the owner of the fs
user namespace in case of v2) cannot be mapped into the current user
namespace.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The integrity of a kernel can be verified by the boot loader on cold
boot, and during kexec, by the current running kernel, before it is
loaded. However, it is still possible that the new kernel being
loaded is older than the current kernel, and/or has known
vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is imperative that an attestation
service be able to verify the version of the kernel being loaded on
the client, from cold boot and subsequent kexec system calls,
ensuring that only kernels with versions known to be good are loaded.
Measure the kernel version using ima_measure_critical_data() early on
in the boot sequence, reducing the chances of known kernel
vulnerabilities being exploited. With IMA being part of the kernel,
this overall approach makes the measurement itself more trustworthy.
To enable measuring the kernel version "ima_policy=critical_data"
needs to be added to the kernel command line arguments.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset ima_policy=critical_data
If runtime measurement of the kernel version is ever needed, the
following should be added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=kernel_info
To extract the measured data after boot, the following command can be used:
grep -m 1 "kernel_version" \
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
Sample output from the command above:
10 a8297d408e9d5155728b619761d0dd4cedf5ef5f ima-buf
sha256:5660e19945be0119bc19cbbf8d9c33a09935ab5d30dad48aa11f879c67d70988
kernel_version 352e31312e302d7263332d31363138372d676564623634666537383234342d6469727479
The above hex-ascii string corresponds to the kernel version
(e.g. xxd -r -p):
5.11.0-rc3-16187-gedb64fe78244-dirty
Signed-off-by: Raphael Gianotti <raphgi@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA does sometimes access the inode's i_uid and compares it against the
rules' fowner. Enable IMA to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the
mount's user namespace. We simply make use of the helpers we introduced
before. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so
non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-27-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The i_uid and i_gid are mostly used when logging for AppArmor. This is
broken in a bunch of places where the global root id is reported instead
of the i_uid or i_gid of the file. Nonetheless, be kind and log the
mapped inode if we're coming from an idmapped mount. If the initial user
namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see
identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-26-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Extend some inode methods with an additional user namespace argument. A
filesystem that is aware of idmapped mounts will receive the user
namespace the mount has been marked with. This can be used for
additional permission checking and also to enable filesystems to
translate between uids and gids if they need to. We have implemented all
relevant helpers in earlier patches.
As requested we simply extend the exisiting inode method instead of
introducing new ones. This is a little more code churn but it's mostly
mechanical and doesnt't leave us with additional inode methods.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-25-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware
filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to
determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the
caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main
infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are
called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not
technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks
security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(),
security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and
makes them aware of idmapped mounts.
In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the
capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper.
For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored
alongside the capabilities.
In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem
capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according
to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0
according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem
capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds
the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root
uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk
enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability
must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the
caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the
superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside
user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't
usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an
idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which
is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not
mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true
because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace.
If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped
mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Zhongjun Tan