The interface for fcntl expects the argument passed for the command
F_ADD_SEALS to be of type int. The current code wrongly treats it as a
long. In order to avoid access to undefined bits, we should explicitly
cast the argument to int.
This commit changes the signature of all the related and helper functions
so that they treat the argument as int instead of long.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230414152459.816046-5-Luca.Vizzarro@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Luca Vizzarro <Luca.Vizzarro@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <Kevin.Brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <Mark.Rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
In order to avoid WX mappings, add F_SEAL_WRITE when apply F_SEAL_EXEC to
an executable memfd, so W^X from start.
This implys application need to fill the content of the memfd first, after
F_SEAL_EXEC is applied, application can no longer modify the content of
the memfd.
Typically, application seals the memfd right after writing to it.
For example:
1. memfd_create(MFD_EXEC).
2. write() code to the memfd.
3. fcntl(F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_EXEC) to convert the memfd to W^X.
4. call exec() on the memfd.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-5-jeffxu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The new MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC flags allows application to set
executable bit at creation time (memfd_create).
When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is set, memfd is created without executable bit
(mode:0666), and sealed with F_SEAL_EXEC, so it can't be chmod to be
executable (mode: 0777) after creation.
when MFD_EXEC flag is set, memfd is created with executable bit
(mode:0777), this is the same as the old behavior of memfd_create.
The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values:
0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like
MFD_EXEC was set.
1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like
MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set.
2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected.
The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old-software that
doesn't set the executable bit, for example, a container with
vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old-software will create non-executable memfd
by default. Also, the value of memfd_noexec is passed to child namespace
at creation time. For example, if the init namespace has
vm.memfd_noexec=2, all its children namespaces will be created with 2.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add stub functions to fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded register_pid_ns_ctl_table_vm() stub, per Jeff]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/pr_warn_ratelimited/pr_warn_once/, per review]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_SYSCTL=n warning]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-4-jeffxu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC", v8.
Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfd have always had their
execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting it
differently.
However, in a secure by default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all
executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by Verified
boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass and
enables “confused deputy attack”. E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm
process created a memfd to share the content with an external process,
however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code and
root escalation. [2] lists more VRP in this kind.
On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use, runc uses memfd’s
seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then
execute them, for such system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's
use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3].
To address those above, this set of patches add following:
1> Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time.
2> Let memfd to be sealed for modifying X bit.
3> A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control the behavior of
X bit.For example, if a container has vm.memfd_noexec=2, then
memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected.
4> A new security hook in memfd_create(). This make it possible to a new
LSM, which rejects or allows executable memfd based on its security policy.
This patch (of 5):
The new F_SEAL_EXEC flag will prevent modification of the exec bits:
written as traditional octal mask, 0111, or as named flags, S_IXUSR |
S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH. Any chmod(2) or similar call that attempts to modify
any of these bits after the seal is applied will fail with errno EPERM.
This will preserve the execute bits as they are at the time of sealing, so
the memfd will become either permanently executable or permanently
un-executable.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-1-jeffxu@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-2-jeffxu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
Co-developed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Wangyong reports: after enabling tmpfs filesystem to support transparent
hugepage with the following command:
echo always > /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/shmem_enabled
the docker program tries to add F_SEAL_WRITE through the following
command, but it fails unexpectedly with errno EBUSY:
fcntl(5, F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_WRITE) = -1.
That is because memfd_tag_pins() and memfd_wait_for_pins() were never
updated for shmem huge pages: checking page_mapcount() against
page_count() is hopeless on THP subpages - they need to check
total_mapcount() against page_count() on THP heads only.
Make memfd_tag_pins() (compared > 1) as strict as memfd_wait_for_pins()
(compared != 1): either can be justified, but given the non-atomic
total_mapcount() calculation, it is better now to be strict. Bear in
mind that total_mapcount() itself scans all of the THP subpages, when
choosing to take an XA_CHECK_SCHED latency break.
Also fix the unlikely xa_is_value() case in memfd_wait_for_pins(): if a
page has been swapped out since memfd_tag_pins(), then its refcount must
have fallen, and so it can safely be untagged.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a4f79248-df75-2c8c-3df-ba3317ccb5da@google.com
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Reported-by: wangyong <wang.yong12@zte.com.cn>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: CGEL ZTE <cgel.zte@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit 21a3c273f8 ("mm, hugetlb: add thread name and pid to
SHM_HUGETLB mlock rlimit warning") marked this as deprecated in 2012,
but it is not deleted yet.
Mike says he still sees that message in log files on occasion, so maybe we
should preserve this warning.
Also remove hugetlbfs related user_shm_unlock in ipc/shm.c and remove the
user_shm_unlock after out.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211103105857.25041-1-zhangyiru3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhangyiru <zhangyiru3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Liu Zixian <liuzixian4@huawei.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: wuxu.wu <wuxu.wu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows
rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already
globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous
user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.
Changelog
v11:
* Fix issue found by lkp robot.
v8:
* Fix issues found by lkp-tests project.
v7:
* Keep only ucounts for RLIMIT_MEMLOCK checks instead of struct cred.
v6:
* Fix bug in hugetlb_file_setup() detected by trinity.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/970d50c70c71bfd4496e0e8d2a0a32feebebb350.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Transparent Huge Pages are currently stored in i_pages as pointers to
consecutive subpages. This patch changes that to storing consecutive
pointers to the head page in preparation for storing huge pages more
efficiently in i_pages.
Large parts of this are "inspired" by Kirill's patch
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170126115819.58875-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com/
Kirill and Huang Ying contributed several fixes.
[willy@infradead.org: use compound_nr, squish uninit-var warning]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190731210400.7419-1-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Reviewed-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Tested-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Tested-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Transparent Huge Pages are currently stored in i_pages as pointers to
consecutive subpages. This patch changes that to storing consecutive
pointers to the head page in preparation for storing huge pages more
efficiently in i_pages.
Large parts of this are "inspired" by Kirill's patch
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170126115819.58875-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com/
[willy@infradead.org: fix swapcache pages]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190324155441.GF10344@bombadil.infradead.org
[kirill@shutemov.name: hugetlb stores pages in page cache differently]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190404134553.vuvhgmghlkiw2hgl@kshutemo-mobl1
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190307153051.18815-1-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Tested-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Song Liu <liu.song.a23@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Android uses ashmem for sharing memory regions. We are looking forward
to migrating all usecases of ashmem to memfd so that we can possibly
remove the ashmem driver in the future from staging while also
benefiting from using memfd and contributing to it. Note staging
drivers are also not ABI and generally can be removed at anytime.
One of the main usecases Android has is the ability to create a region
and mmap it as writeable, then add protection against making any
"future" writes while keeping the existing already mmap'ed
writeable-region active. This allows us to implement a usecase where
receivers of the shared memory buffer can get a read-only view, while
the sender continues to write to the buffer. See CursorWindow
documentation in Android for more details:
https://developer.android.com/reference/android/database/CursorWindow
This usecase cannot be implemented with the existing F_SEAL_WRITE seal.
To support the usecase, this patch adds a new F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal
which prevents any future mmap and write syscalls from succeeding while
keeping the existing mmap active.
A better way to do F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal was discussed [1] last week
where we don't need to modify core VFS structures to get the same
behavior of the seal. This solves several side-effects pointed by Andy.
self-tests are provided in later patch to verify the expected semantics.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181111173650.GA256781@google.com/
Thanks a lot to Andy for suggestions to improve code.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190112203816.85534-2-joel@joelfernandes.org
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc-Andr Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Switch to a batch-processing model like memfd_wait_for_pins() and
use the xa_state previously set up by memfd_wait_for_pins().
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Simplify the locking by taking the spinlock while we walk the tree on
the assumption that many acquires and releases of the lock will be worse
than holding the lock while we process an entire batch of pages.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
... so that it could set both ->f_flags and ->f_mode, without callers
having to set ->f_flags manually.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
With the addition of memfd hugetlbfs support, we now have the situation
where memfd depends on TMPFS -or- HUGETLBFS. Previously, memfd was only
supported on tmpfs, so it made sense that the code resided in shmem.c.
In the current code, memfd is only functional if TMPFS is defined. If
HUGETLFS is defined and TMPFS is not defined, then memfd functionality
will not be available for hugetlbfs. This does not cause BUGs, just a
lack of potentially desired functionality.
Code is restructured in the following way:
- include/linux/memfd.h is a new file containing memfd specific
definitions previously contained in shmem_fs.h.
- mm/memfd.c is a new file containing memfd specific code previously
contained in shmem.c.
- memfd specific code is removed from shmem_fs.h and shmem.c.
- A new config option MEMFD_CREATE is added that is defined if TMPFS
or HUGETLBFS is defined.
No functional changes are made to the code: restructuring only.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415182119.4517-4-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Marc-Andr Lureau <marcandre.lureau@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Luca Vizzarro