selinux_inode_has_perm is a hot path. Instead of declaring the
common_audit_data on the stack move it to a noinline function only used in
the rare case we need to send an audit message.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We pay a rather large overhead initializing the common_audit_data.
Since we only need this information if we actually emit an audit
message there is little need to set it up in the hot path. This patch
splits the functionality of avc_has_perm() into avc_has_perm_noaudit(),
avc_audit_required() and slow_avc_audit(). But we take care of setting
up to audit between required() and the actual audit call. Thus saving
measurable time in a hot path.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We reset the bool names and values array to NULL, but do not reset the
number of entries in these arrays to 0. If we error out and then get back
into this function we will walk these NULL pointers based on the belief
that they are non-zero length.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
cc: stable@kernel.org
I'm not really sure what the idea behind the sel_div function is, but it's
useless. Since a and b are both unsigned, it's impossible for a % b < 0.
That means that part of the function never does anything. Thus it's just a
normal /. Just do that instead. I don't even understand what that operation
was supposed to mean in the signed case however....
If it was signed:
sel_div(-2, 4) == ((-2 / 4) - ((-2 % 4) < 0))
((0) - ((-2) < 0))
((0) - (1))
(-1)
What actually happens:
sel_div(-2, 4) == ((18446744073709551614 / 4) - ((18446744073709551614 % 4) < 0))
((4611686018427387903) - ((2 < 0))
(4611686018427387903 - 0)
((unsigned int)4611686018427387903)
(4294967295)
Neither makes a whole ton of sense to me. So I'm getting rid of the
function entirely.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It's possible that the caller passed a NULL for scontext. However if this
is a defered mapping we might still attempt to call *scontext=kstrdup().
This is bad. Instead just return the len.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We know that some yum operation is causing CAP_MAC_ADMIN failures. This
implies that an RPM is laying down (or attempting to lay down) a file with
an invalid label. The problem is that we don't have any information to
track down the cause. This patch will cause such a failure to report the
failed label in an SELINUX_ERR audit message. This is similar to the
SELINUX_ERR reports on invalid transitions and things like that. It should
help run down problems on what is trying to set invalid labels in the
future.
Resulting records look something like:
type=AVC msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): avc: denied { mac_admin } for pid=2594 comm="chcon" capability=33 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=capability2
type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): op=setxattr invalid_context=unconfined_u:object_r:hello:s0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): arch=c000003e syscall=188 success=no exit=-22 a0=a2c0e0 a1=390341b79b a2=a2d620 a3=1f items=1 ppid=2519 pid=2594 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="chcon" exe="/usr/bin/chcon" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=CWD msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): cwd="/root" type=PATH msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): item=0 name="test" inode=785879 dev=fc:03 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In RH BZ 578841 we realized that the SELinux sandbox program was allowed to
truncate files outside of the sandbox. The reason is because sandbox
confinement is determined almost entirely by the 'open' permission. The idea
was that if the sandbox was unable to open() files it would be unable to do
harm to those files. This turns out to be false in light of syscalls like
truncate() and chmod() which don't require a previous open() call. I looked
at the syscalls that did not have an associated 'open' check and found that
truncate(), did not have a seperate permission and even if it did have a
separate permission such a permission owuld be inadequate for use by
sandbox (since it owuld have to be granted so liberally as to be useless).
This patch checks the OPEN permission on truncate. I think a better solution
for sandbox is a whole new permission, but at least this fixes what we have
today.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Because Fedora shipped userspace based on my development tree we now
have policy version 27 in the wild defining only default user, role, and
range. Thus to add default_type we need a policy.28.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to
determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or
mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This
patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role,
and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either
the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can
either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or
it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file)
examples always are done with
directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512
process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
[no rule]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none
[default user source]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source
[default user target]
system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target
[default role source]
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source
[default role target]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target
[default range source low]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low
[default range source high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high
[default range source low-high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high
[default range target low]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low
[default range target high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high
[default range target low-high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
There is no reason the DAC perms on reading the policy file need to be root
only. There are selinux checks which should control this access.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the
only time those fields are filled are just before calling the
common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those
fields.
So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than
bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is
initialized in hot paths.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Instead of declaring the entire selinux_audit_data on the stack when we
start an operation on declare it on the stack if we are going to use it.
We know it's usefulness at the end of the security decision and can declare
it there.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union. To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack. Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures. I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path. We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull second try at vfs part d#2 from Al Viro:
"Miklos' first series (with do_lookup() rewrite split into edible
chunks) + assorted bits and pieces.
The 'untangling of do_lookup()' series is is a splitup of what used to
be a monolithic patch from Miklos, so this series is basically "how do
I convince myself that his patch is correct (or find a hole in it)".
No holes found and I like the resulting cleanup, so in it went..."
Changes from try 1: Fix a boot problem with selinux, and commit messages
prettied up a bit.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (24 commits)
vfs: fix out-of-date dentry_unhash() comment
vfs: split __lookup_hash
untangling do_lookup() - take __lookup_hash()-calling case out of line.
untangling do_lookup() - switch to calling __lookup_hash()
untangling do_lookup() - merge d_alloc_and_lookup() callers
untangling do_lookup() - merge failure exits in !dentry case
untangling do_lookup() - massage !dentry case towards __lookup_hash()
untangling do_lookup() - get rid of need_reval in !dentry case
untangling do_lookup() - eliminate a loop.
untangling do_lookup() - expand the area under ->i_mutex
untangling do_lookup() - isolate !dentry stuff from the rest of it.
vfs: move MAY_EXEC check from __lookup_hash()
vfs: don't revalidate just looked up dentry
vfs: fix d_need_lookup/d_revalidate order in do_lookup
ext3: move headers to fs/ext3/
migrate ext2_fs.h guts to fs/ext2/ext2.h
new helper: ext2_image_size()
get rid of pointless includes of ext2_fs.h
ext2: No longer export ext2_fs.h to user space
mtdchar: kill persistently held vfsmount
...
Now that all the slow-path code is gone from these functions, we can
inline them into the main caller - avc_has_perm_flags().
Now the compiler can see that 'avc' is allocated on the stack for this
case, which helps register pressure a bit. It also actually shrinks the
total stack frame, because the stack frame that avc_has_perm_flags()
always needed (for that 'avc' allocation) is now sufficient for the
inlined functions too.
Inlining isn't bad - but mindless inlining of cold code (see the
previous commit) is.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The selinux AVC paths remain some of the hottest (and deepest) codepaths
at filename lookup time, and we make it worse by having the slow path
cases take up I$ and stack space even when they don't trigger. Gcc
tends to always want to inline functions that are just called once -
never mind that this might make for slower and worse code in the caller.
So this tries to improve on it a bit by making the slow-path cases
explicitly separate functions that are marked noinline, causing gcc to
at least no longer allocate stack space for them unless they are
actually called. It also seems to help register allocation a tiny bit,
since gcc now doesn't take the slow case code into account.
Uninlining the slow path may also allow us to inline the remaining hot
path into the one caller that actually matters: avc_has_perm_flags().
I'll have to look at that separately, but both avc_audit() and
avc_has_perm_noaudit() are now small and lean enough that inlining them
may make sense.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull x32 support for x86-64 from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree introduces the X32 binary format and execution mode for x86:
32-bit data space binaries using 64-bit instructions and 64-bit kernel
syscalls.
This allows applications whose working set fits into a 32 bits address
space to make use of 64-bit instructions while using a 32-bit address
space with shorter pointers, more compressed data structures, etc."
Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/{Kconfig,vdso/vma.c}
* 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (71 commits)
x32: Fix alignment fail in struct compat_siginfo
x32: Fix stupid ia32/x32 inversion in the siginfo format
x32: Add ptrace for x32
x32: Switch to a 64-bit clock_t
x32: Provide separate is_ia32_task() and is_x32_task() predicates
x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls
x86/x32: Fix the binutils auto-detect
x32: Warn and disable rather than error if binutils too old
x32: Only clear TIF_X32 flag once
x32: Make sure TS_COMPAT is cleared for x32 tasks
fs: Remove missed ->fds_bits from cessation use of fd_set structs internally
fs: Fix close_on_exec pointer in alloc_fdtable
x32: Drop non-__vdso weak symbols from the x32 VDSO
x32: Fix coding style violations in the x32 VDSO code
x32: Add x32 VDSO support
x32: Allow x32 to be configured
x32: If configured, add x32 system calls to system call tables
x32: Handle process creation
x32: Signal-related system calls
x86: Add #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT to <asm/sys_ia32.h>
...
Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h preparatory to splitting and killing
it. Performed with the following command:
perl -p -i -e 's!^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>.*\n!!' `grep -Irl '^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>' *`
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
selinux/xfrm.h needs to #include net/flow.h or else suffer:
In file included from security/selinux/ss/services.c:69:0:
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h: In function 'selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload':
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h:53:14: error: 'flow_cache_genid' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h:53:14: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
avc_audit() did a lot of jumping around and had a big stack frame, all
for the uncommon case.
Split up the uncommon case (which we really can't make go fast anyway)
into its own slow function, and mark the conditional branches
appropriately for the common likely case.
This causes avc_audit() to no longer show up as one of the hottest
functions on the branch profiles (the new "perf -b" thing), and makes
the cycle profiles look really nice and dense too.
The whole audit path is still annoyingly very much one of the biggest
costs of name lookup, so these things are worth optimizing for. I wish
we could just tell people to turn it off, but realistically we do need
it: we just need to make sure that the overhead of the necessary evil is
as low as possible.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Replace the fd_sets in struct fdtable with an array of unsigned longs and then
use the standard non-atomic bit operations rather than the FD_* macros.
This:
(1) Removes the abuses of struct fd_set:
(a) Since we don't want to allocate a full fd_set the vast majority of the
time, we actually, in effect, just allocate a just-big-enough array of
unsigned longs and cast it to an fd_set type - so why bother with the
fd_set at all?
(b) Some places outside of the core fdtable handling code (such as
SELinux) want to look inside the array of unsigned longs hidden inside
the fd_set struct for more efficient iteration over the entire set.
(2) Eliminates the use of FD_*() macros in the kernel completely.
(3) Permits the __FD_*() macros to be deleted entirely where not exposed to
userspace.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174954.23314.48147.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security:
capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition
security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions
capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable
capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit
capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability
capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces
capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod
selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs
selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static
SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()
Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv():
- the interface was removed in commit fd77846152 ("security: remove
the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()")
- a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b9 ("crypto: Add
userspace configuration API")
causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the
issue.
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (32 commits)
ima: fix invalid memory reference
ima: free duplicate measurement memory
security: update security_file_mmap() docs
selinux: Casting (void *) value returned by kmalloc is useless
apparmor: fix module parameter handling
Security: tomoyo: add .gitignore file
tomoyo: add missing rcu_dereference()
apparmor: add missing rcu_dereference()
evm: prevent racing during tfm allocation
evm: key must be set once during initialization
mpi/mpi-mpow: NULL dereference on allocation failure
digsig: build dependency fix
KEYS: Give key types their own lockdep class for key->sem
TPM: fix transmit_cmd error logic
TPM: NSC and TIS drivers X86 dependency fix
TPM: Export wait_for_stat for other vendor specific drivers
TPM: Use vendor specific function for status probe
tpm_tis: add delay after aborting command
tpm_tis: Check return code from getting timeouts/durations
tpm: Introduce function to poll for result of self test
...
Fix up trivial conflict in lib/Makefile due to addition of CONFIG_MPI
and SIGSIG next to CONFIG_DQL addition.
* 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (165 commits)
reiserfs: Properly display mount options in /proc/mounts
vfs: prevent remount read-only if pending removes
vfs: count unlinked inodes
vfs: protect remounting superblock read-only
vfs: keep list of mounts for each superblock
vfs: switch ->show_options() to struct dentry *
vfs: switch ->show_path() to struct dentry *
vfs: switch ->show_devname() to struct dentry *
vfs: switch ->show_stats to struct dentry *
switch security_path_chmod() to struct path *
vfs: prefer ->dentry->d_sb to ->mnt->mnt_sb
vfs: trim includes a bit
switch mnt_namespace ->root to struct mount
vfs: take /proc/*/mounts and friends to fs/proc_namespace.c
vfs: opencode mntget() mnt_set_mountpoint()
vfs: spread struct mount - remaining argument of next_mnt()
vfs: move fsnotify junk to struct mount
vfs: move mnt_devname
vfs: move mnt_list to struct mount
vfs: switch pnode.h macros to struct mount *
...
Once upon a time netlink was not sync and we had to get the effective
capabilities from the skb that was being received. Today we instead get
the capabilities from the current task. This has rendered the entire
purpose of the hook moot as it is now functionally equivalent to the
capable() call.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reading /proc/pid/stat of another process checks if one has ptrace permissions
on that process. If one does have permissions it outputs some data about the
process which might have security and attack implications. If the current
task does not have ptrace permissions the read still works, but those fields
are filled with inocuous (0) values. Since this check and a subsequent denial
is not a violation of the security policy we should not audit such denials.
This can be quite useful to removing ptrace broadly across a system without
flooding the logs when ps is run or something which harmlessly walks proc.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
The capabilities framework is based around credentials, not necessarily the
current task. Yet we still passed the current task down into LSMs from the
security_capable() LSM hook as if it was a meaningful portion of the security
decision. This patch removes the 'generic' passing of current and instead
forces individual LSMs to use current explicitly if they think it is
appropriate. In our case those LSMs are SELinux and AppArmor.
I believe the AppArmor use of current is incorrect, but that is wholely
unrelated to this patch. This patch does not change what AppArmor does, it
just makes it clear in the AppArmor code that it is doing it.
The SELinux code still uses current in it's audit message, which may also be
wrong and needs further investigation. Again this is NOT a change, it may
have always been wrong, this patch just makes it clear what is happening.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Fix several sparse warnings in the SELinux security server code.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
vfs_create() ignores everything outside of 16bit subset of its
mode argument; switching it to umode_t is obviously equivalent
and it's the only caller of the method
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
vfs_mkdir() gets int, but immediately drops everything that might not
fit into umode_t and that's the only caller of ->mkdir()...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Conflicts:
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
Just two overlapping changes, one added an initialization of
a local variable, and another change added a new local variable.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix the following bug in sel_netport_insert() where rcu_dereference() should
be rcu_dereference_protected() as sel_netport_lock is held.
===================================================
[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
security/selinux/netport.c:127 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by ossec-rootcheck/3323:
#0: (sel_netport_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff8117d775>] sel_netport_sid+0xbb/0x226
stack backtrace:
Pid: 3323, comm: ossec-rootcheck Not tainted 3.1.0-rc8-fsdevel+ #1095
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8105cfb7>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xa7/0xb0
[<ffffffff8117d871>] sel_netport_sid+0x1b7/0x226
[<ffffffff8117d6ba>] ? sel_netport_avc_callback+0xbc/0xbc
[<ffffffff8117556c>] selinux_socket_bind+0x115/0x230
[<ffffffff810a5388>] ? might_fault+0x4e/0x9e
[<ffffffff810a53d1>] ? might_fault+0x97/0x9e
[<ffffffff81171cf4>] security_socket_bind+0x11/0x13
[<ffffffff812ba967>] sys_bind+0x56/0x95
[<ffffffff81380dac>] ? sysret_check+0x27/0x62
[<ffffffff8105b767>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11e/0x155
[<ffffffff81076fcd>] ? audit_syscall_entry+0x17b/0x1ae
[<ffffffff811b5eae>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[<ffffffff81380d7b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The semantic patch that makes this change is available
in scripts/coccinelle/api/alloc/drop_kmalloc_cast.cocci.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The ultimate goal is to get the sock_diag module, that works in
family+protocol terms. Currently this is suitable to do on the
inet_diag basis, so rename parts of the code. It will be moved
to sock_diag.c later.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
While parsing through IPv6 extension headers, fragment headers are
skipped making them invisible to the caller. This reports the
fragment offset of the last header in order to make it possible to
determine whether the packet is fragmented and, if so whether it is
a first or last fragment.
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
C assignment can handle struct in6_addr copying.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The pervasive, but implicit presence of <linux/module.h> meant
that things like this file would happily compile as-is. But
with the desire to phase out the module.h being included everywhere,
point this file at export.h which will give it THIS_MODULE and
the EXPORT_SYMBOL variants.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Fix warning:
security/selinux/exports.c:18:6: warning: symbol 'selinux_is_enabled' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary. My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This allows us to move duplicated code in <asm/atomic.h>
(atomic_inc_not_zero() for now) to <linux/atomic.h>
Signed-off-by: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
For a number of file systems that don't have a mount point (e.g. sockfs
and pipefs), they are not marked as long term. Therefore in
mntput_no_expire, all locks in vfs_mount lock are taken instead of just
local cpu's lock to aggregate reference counts when we release
reference to file objects. In fact, only local lock need to have been
taken to update ref counts as these file systems are in no danger of
going away until we are ready to unregister them.
The attached patch marks file systems using kern_mount without
mount point as long term. The contentions of vfs_mount lock
is now eliminated. Before un-registering such file system,
kern_unmount should be called to remove the long term flag and
make the mount point ready to be freed.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (107 commits)
vfs: use ERR_CAST for err-ptr tossing in lookup_instantiate_filp
isofs: Remove global fs lock
jffs2: fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() killing a directory
fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() on ramfs et.al.
mm/truncate.c: fix build for CONFIG_BLOCK not enabled
fs:update the NOTE of the file_operations structure
Remove dead code in dget_parent()
AFS: Fix silly characters in a comment
switch d_add_ci() to d_splice_alias() in "found negative" case as well
simplify gfs2_lookup()
jfs_lookup(): don't bother with . or ..
get rid of useless dget_parent() in btrfs rename() and link()
get rid of useless dget_parent() in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
fs: push i_mutex and filemap_write_and_wait down into ->fsync() handlers
drivers: fix up various ->llseek() implementations
fs: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA properly in all fs's that define their own llseek
Ext4: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA generically
Btrfs: implement our own ->llseek
fs: add SEEK_HOLE and SEEK_DATA flags
reiserfs: make reiserfs default to barrier=flush
...
Fix up trivial conflicts in fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_super.c due to the new
shrinker callout for the inode cache, that clashed with the xfs code to
start the periodic workers later.
* 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
rcu: Fix wrong check in list_splice_init_rcu()
net,rcu: Convert call_rcu(xt_rateest_free_rcu) to kfree_rcu()
sysctl,rcu: Convert call_rcu(free_head) to kfree
vmalloc,rcu: Convert call_rcu(rcu_free_vb) to kfree_rcu()
vmalloc,rcu: Convert call_rcu(rcu_free_va) to kfree_rcu()
ipc,rcu: Convert call_rcu(ipc_immediate_free) to kfree_rcu()
ipc,rcu: Convert call_rcu(free_un) to kfree_rcu()
security,rcu: Convert call_rcu(sel_netport_free) to kfree_rcu()
security,rcu: Convert call_rcu(sel_netnode_free) to kfree_rcu()
ia64,rcu: Convert call_rcu(sn_irq_info_free) to kfree_rcu()
block,rcu: Convert call_rcu(disk_free_ptbl_rcu_cb) to kfree_rcu()
scsi,rcu: Convert call_rcu(fc_rport_free_rcu) to kfree_rcu()
audit_tree,rcu: Convert call_rcu(__put_tree) to kfree_rcu()
security,rcu: Convert call_rcu(whitelist_item_free) to kfree_rcu()
md,rcu: Convert call_rcu(free_conf) to kfree_rcu()
* 'ptrace' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/oleg/misc: (39 commits)
ptrace: do_wait(traced_leader_killed_by_mt_exec) can block forever
ptrace: fix ptrace_signal() && STOP_DEQUEUED interaction
connector: add an event for monitoring process tracers
ptrace: dont send SIGSTOP on auto-attach if PT_SEIZED
ptrace: mv send-SIGSTOP from do_fork() to ptrace_init_task()
ptrace_init_task: initialize child->jobctl explicitly
has_stopped_jobs: s/task_is_stopped/SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED/
ptrace: make former thread ID available via PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG after PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stop
ptrace: wait_consider_task: s/same_thread_group/ptrace_reparented/
ptrace: kill real_parent_is_ptracer() in in favor of ptrace_reparented()
ptrace: ptrace_reparented() should check same_thread_group()
redefine thread_group_leader() as exit_signal >= 0
do not change dead_task->exit_signal
kill task_detached()
reparent_leader: check EXIT_DEAD instead of task_detached()
make do_notify_parent() __must_check, update the callers
__ptrace_detach: avoid task_detached(), check do_notify_parent()
kill tracehook_notify_death()
make do_notify_parent() return bool
ptrace: s/tracehook_tracer_task()/ptrace_parent()/
...
The rcu callback sel_netport_free() just calls a kfree(),
so we use kfree_rcu() instead of the call_rcu(sel_netport_free).
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
The rcu callback sel_netnode_free() just calls a kfree(),
so we use kfree_rcu() instead of the call_rcu(sel_netnode_free).
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
tracehook.h is on the way out. Rename tracehook_tracer_task() to
ptrace_parent() and move it from tracehook.h to ptrace.h.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
When policy version is less than POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
skip file_name_trans_write().
Signed-off-by: Roy.Li <rongqing.li@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This is a rather hot function that is called with a potentially NULL
"struct common_audit_data" pointer argument. And in that case it has to
provide and initialize its own dummy common_audit_data structure.
However, all the _common_ cases already pass it a real audit-data
structure, so that uncommon NULL case not only creates a silly run-time
test, more importantly it causes that function to have a big stack frame
for the dummy variable that isn't even used in the common case!
So get rid of that stupid run-time behavior, and make the (few)
functions that currently call with a NULL pointer just call a new helper
function instead (naturally called inode_has_perm_noapd(), since it has
no adp argument).
This makes the run-time test be a static code generation issue instead,
and allows for a much denser stack since none of the common callers need
the dummy structure. And a denser stack not only means less stack space
usage, it means better cache behavior. So we have a win-win-win from
this simplification: less code executed, smaller stack footprint, and
better cache behavior.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Right now security_get_user_sids() will pass in a NULL avd pointer to
avc_has_perm_noaudit(), which then forces that function to have a dummy
entry for that case and just generally test it.
Don't do it. The normal callers all pass a real avd pointer, and this
helper function is incredibly hot. So don't make avc_has_perm_noaudit()
do conditional stuff that isn't needed for the common case.
This also avoids some duplicated stack space.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I submit the patch again, according to patch submission convension.
This patch enables to accept percent-encoded object names as forth
argument of /selinux/create interface to avoid possible bugs when we
give an object name including whitespace or multibutes.
E.g) if and when a userspace object manager tries to create a new object
named as "resolve.conf but fake", it shall give this name as the forth
argument of the /selinux/create. But sscanf() logic in kernel space
fetches only the part earlier than the first whitespace.
In this case, selinux may unexpectedly answer a default security context
configured to "resolve.conf", but it is bug.
Although I could not test this patch on named TYPE_TRANSITION rules
actually, But debug printk() message seems to me the logic works
correctly.
I assume the libselinux provides an interface to apply this logic
transparently, so nothing shall not be changed from the viewpoint of
application.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kohei.kaigai@emea.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: (39 commits)
b43: fix comment typo reqest -> request
Haavard Skinnemoen has left Atmel
cris: typo in mach-fs Makefile
Kconfig: fix copy/paste-ism for dell-wmi-aio driver
doc: timers-howto: fix a typo ("unsgined")
perf: Only include annotate.h once in tools/perf/util/ui/browsers/annotate.c
md, raid5: Fix spelling error in comment ('Ofcourse' --> 'Of course').
treewide: fix a few typos in comments
regulator: change debug statement be consistent with the style of the rest
Revert "arm: mach-u300/gpio: Fix mem_region resource size miscalculations"
audit: acquire creds selectively to reduce atomic op overhead
rtlwifi: don't touch with treewide double semicolon removal
treewide: cleanup continuations and remove logging message whitespace
ath9k_hw: don't touch with treewide double semicolon removal
include/linux/leds-regulator.h: fix syntax in example code
tty: fix typo in descripton of tty_termios_encode_baud_rate
xtensa: remove obsolete BKL kernel option from defconfig
m68k: fix comment typo 'occcured'
arch:Kconfig.locks Remove unused config option.
treewide: remove extra semicolons
...
There is no point in counting hits - we can calculate it from the number
of lookups and misses.
This makes the avc statistics a bit smaller, and makes the code
generation better too.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
You can turn off the avc cache stats, but distributions seem to not do
that (perhaps because several performance tuning how-to's talk about the
avc cache statistics).
Which is sad, because the code it generates is truly horrendous, with
the statistics update being sandwitched between get_cpu/put_cpu which in
turn causes preemption disables etc. We're talking ten+ instructions
just to increment a per-cpu variable in some pretty hot code.
Fix the craziness by just using 'this_cpu_inc()' instead. Suddenly we
only need a single 'inc' instruction to increment the statistics. This
is quite noticeable in the incredibly hot avc_has_perm_noaudit()
function (which triggers all the statistics by virtue of doing an
avc_lookup() call).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The filename_trans rule processing has some printk(KERN_ERR ) messages
which were intended as debug aids in creating the code but weren't removed
before it was submitted. Remove them.
Reported-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In the interest of keeping userspace from having to create new root
filesystems all the time, let's follow the lead of the other in-kernel
filesystems and provide a proper mount point for it in sysfs.
For selinuxfs, this mount point should be in /sys/fs/selinux/
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzerqung@0pointer.de>
Cc: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
[include kobject.h - Eric Paris]
[use selinuxfs_obj throughout - Eric Paris]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The rcu callback sel_netif_free() just calls a kfree(),
so we use kfree_rcu() instead of the call_rcu(sel_netif_free).
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Change flex_array_prealloc to take the number of elements for which space
should be allocated instead of the last (inclusive) element. Users
and documentation are updated accordingly. flex_arrays got introduced before
they had users. When folks started using it, they ended up needing a
different API than was coded up originally. This swaps over to the API that
folks apparently need.
Based-on-patch-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Chris Richards <gizmo@giz-works.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org [2.6.38+]
New inodes are created in a two stage process. We first will compute the
label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the
operation is allowed. We will then actually re-compute that same label and
apply it in security_inode_init_security(). The change to do new label
calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only
passed the path component information all the way down the
security_inode_init_security hook. Down the security_inode_create hook the
path information did not make it past may_create. Thus the two calculations
came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against
the label that is created. Pass and use the same information in both places
to harmonize the calculations and checks.
Reported-by: Dominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We currently have inode_has_perm and dentry_has_perm. dentry_has_perm just
calls inode_has_perm with additional audit data. But dentry_has_perm can
take either a dentry or a path. Split those to make the code obvious and
to fix the previous problem where I thought dentry_has_perm always had a
valid dentry and mnt.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Change flex_array_prealloc to take the number of elements for which space
should be allocated instead of the last (inclusive) element. Users
and documentation are updated accordingly. flex_arrays got introduced before
they had users. When folks started using it, they ended up needing a
different API than was coded up originally. This swaps over to the API that
folks apparently need.
Based-on-patch-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Chris Richards <gizmo@giz-works.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org [2.6.38+]
New inodes are created in a two stage process. We first will compute the
label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the
operation is allowed. We will then actually re-compute that same label and
apply it in security_inode_init_security(). The change to do new label
calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only
passed the path component information all the way down the
security_inode_init_security hook. Down the security_inode_create hook the
path information did not make it past may_create. Thus the two calculations
came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against
the label that is created. Pass and use the same information in both places
to harmonize the calculations and checks.
Reported-by: Dominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To shorten the list we need to run if filename trans rules exist for the type
of the given parent directory I put them in a hashtable. Given the policy we
are expecting to use in Fedora this takes the worst case list run from about
5,000 entries to 17.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Instead of a hashtab entry counter function only useful for range
transition rules make a function generic for any hashtable to use.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We have custom debug functions like rangetr_hash_eval and symtab_hash_eval
which do the same thing. Just create a generic function that takes the name
of the hash table as an argument instead of having custom functions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Eric Paris