Move and globalize 2 functions from the auxtrace specific sources so
that they can be reused.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401101613.6201-13-adrian.hunter@intel.com
[ Move to pmu.c, as moving to evsel.h breaks the python binding ]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
For reporting purposes, an evsel sample can have a callchain synthesized
from AUX area data. Add support for keeping track of synthesized sample
types. Note, the recorded sample_type cannot be changed because it is
needed to continue to parse events.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401101613.6201-11-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Using 'type' variable for checking for callchains is equivalent to using
evsel__has_callchain(evsel) and is how the other PERF_SAMPLE_ bits are checked
in this function, so use it to be consistent.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401101613.6201-11-adrian.hunter@intel.com
[ split from a larger patch ]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Add a thread stack function to create a call chain for hardware events
where the sample records get created some time after the event occurred.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401101613.6201-10-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Currently, callchains can be synthesized only for synthesized events. Add
an itrace option to synthesize callchains for regular events.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401101613.6201-9-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Add ->evsel_is_auxtrace() callback to identify if a selected event
is an AUX area event.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401101613.6201-2-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
This script works in tandem with d3-flame-graph to generate flame graphs
from perf. It supports two output formats: JSON and HTML (the default).
The HTML format will look for a standalone d3-flame-graph template file
in /usr/share/d3-flame-graph/d3-flamegraph-base.html and fill in the
collected stacks.
Usage:
perf record -a -g -F 99 sleep 60
perf script report flamegraph
Combined:
perf script flamegraph -a -F 99 sleep 60
Committer testing:
Tested both with "PYTHON=python3" and with the default, that uses
python2-devel:
Complete set of instructions:
$ mkdir /tmp/build/perf
$ make PYTHON=python3 -C tools/perf O=/tmp/build/perf install-bin
$ export PATH=~/bin:$PATH
$ perf record -a -g -F 99 sleep 60
$ perf script report flamegraph
Now go and open the generated flamegraph.html file in a browser.
At first this required building with PYTHON=python3, but after I
reported this Andreas was kind enough to send a patch making it work
with both python and python3.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gerstmayr <agerstmayr@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <bgregg@netflix.com>
Cc: Martin Spier <mspier@netflix.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200320151355.66302-1-agerstmayr@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
This patch refactors metricgroup__add_metric function where some part of
it move to function metricgroup__add_metric_param. No logic change.
Signed-off-by: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Anju T Sudhakar <anju@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joe Mario <jmario@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <mamatha4@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401203340.31402-4-kjain@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Add the expr_scanner_ctx object to hold user data for the expr scanner.
Currently it holds only start_token, Kajol Jain will use it to hold 24x7
runtime param.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Anju T Sudhakar <anju@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joe Mario <jmario@redhat.com>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <mamatha4@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401203340.31402-3-kjain@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Adding expr_ prefix for parse_ctx and parse_id, to straighten out the
expr* namespace.
There's no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Anju T Sudhakar <anju@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joe Mario <jmario@redhat.com>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <mamatha4@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401203340.31402-2-kjain@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Reuse an existing char buffer to avoid two PATH_MAX sized char buffers.
Reduces stack frame sizes by 4kb.
perf_event__synthesize_mmap_events before 'sub $0x45b8,%rsp' after
'sub $0x35b8,%rsp'.
perf_event__get_comm_ids before 'sub $0x2028,%rsp' after
'sub $0x1028,%rsp'.
The performance impact of this change is negligible.
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.z@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200402154357.107873-4-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
The xxx_mountpoint() interface provided by fs.c finds mount points for
common pseudo filesystems. The first time xxx_mountpoint() is invoked,
it scans the mount table (/proc/mounts) looking for a match. If found,
it is cached. The price to scan /proc/mounts is paid once if the mount
is found.
When the mount point is not found, subsequent calls to xxx_mountpoint()
scan /proc/mounts over and over again. There is no caching.
This causes a scaling issue in perf record with hugeltbfs__mountpoint().
The function is called for each process found in
synthesize__mmap_events(). If the machine has thousands of processes
and if the /proc/mounts has many entries this could cause major overhead
in perf record. We have observed multi-second slowdowns on some
configurations.
As an example on a laptop:
Before:
$ sudo umount /dev/hugepages
$ strace -e trace=openat -o /tmp/tt perf record -a ls
$ fgrep mounts /tmp/tt
285
After:
$ sudo umount /dev/hugepages
$ strace -e trace=openat -o /tmp/tt perf record -a ls
$ fgrep mounts /tmp/tt
1
One could argue that the non-caching in case the moint point is not
found is intentional. That way subsequent calls may discover a moint
point if the sysadmin mounts the filesystem. But the same argument could
be made against caching the mount point. It could be unmounted causing
errors. It all depends on the intent of the interface. This patch
assumes it is expected to scan /proc/mounts once. The patch documents
the caching behavior in the fs.h header file.
An alternative would be to just fix perf record. But it would solve the
problem with hugetlbs__mountpoint() but there could be similar issues
(possibly down the line) with other xxx_mountpoint() calls in perf or
other tools.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.z@gmail.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200402154357.107873-3-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Event synthesis may occur at the start or end (tail) of a perf command.
In system-wide mode it can scan every process in /proc, which may add
seconds of latency before event recording. Add a new benchmark that
times how long event synthesis takes with and without data synthesis.
An example execution looks like:
$ perf bench internals synthesize
# Running 'internals/synthesize' benchmark:
Average synthesis took: 168.253800 usec
Average data synthesis took: 208.104700 usec
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.z@gmail.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200402154357.107873-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Update the kernel.rst documentation file with the information related to
usage of CAP_PERFMON capability to secure performance monitoring and
observability operations in system.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/84c32383-14a2-fa35-16b6-f9e59bd37240@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Update perf-security.rst documentation file with the information
related to usage of CAP_PERFMON capability to secure performance
monitoring and observability operations in system.
Committer notes:
While testing 'perf top' under cap_perfmon I noticed that it needs
some more capability and Alexey pointed out cap_ipc_lock, as needed by
this kernel chunk:
kernel/events/core.c: 6101
if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_is_paranoid() &&
!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto unlock;
}
So I added it to the documentation, and also mentioned that if the
libcap version doesn't yet supports 'cap_perfmon', its numeric value can
be used instead, i.e. if:
# setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf
Fails, try:
# setcap "38,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf
I also added a paragraph stating that using an unpatched libcap will
fail the check for CAP_PERFMON, as it checks the cap number against a
maximum to see if it is valid, which makes it use as the default the
'cycles:u' event, even tho a cap_perfmon capable perf binary can get
kernel samples, to workaround that just use, e.g.:
# perf top -e cycles
# perf record -e cycles
And it will sample kernel and user modes.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/17278551-9399-9ebe-d665-8827016a217d@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing
the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/691f1096-b15f-9b12-50a0-c2b93918149e@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing
the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/4ec1d6f7-548c-8d1c-f84a-cebeb9674e4e@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing
the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8cc98809-d35b-de0f-de02-4cf554f3cf62@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing
the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Anju T Sudhakar <anju@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ac98cd9f-b59e-673c-c70d-180b3e7695d2@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring
remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to
CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c0a0ae47-8b6e-ff3e-416b-3cd1faaf71c0@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Open access to i915_perf monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to i915_events subsystem remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure i915_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/e3e3292f-f765-ea98-e59c-fbe2db93fd34@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Extend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option to
substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance
monitoring and observability operations. Make
perf_event_paranoid_check() and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of
CAP_PERFMON capability.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.
Committer testing:
Using a libcap with this patch:
diff --git a/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 78b2fd4c8a95..89b5b0279b60 100644
--- a/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -366,8 +366,9 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37
+#define CAP_PERFMON 38
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_PERFMON
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
Note that using '38' in place of 'cap_perfmon' works to some degree with
an old libcap, its only when cap_get_flag() is called that libcap
performs an error check based on the maximum value known for
capabilities that it will fail.
This makes determining the default of perf_event_attr.exclude_kernel to
fail, as it can't determine if CAP_PERFMON is in place.
Using 'perf top -e cycles' avoids the default check and sets
perf_event_attr.exclude_kernel to 1.
As root, with a libcap supporting CAP_PERFMON:
# groupadd perf_users
# adduser perf -g perf_users
# mkdir ~perf/bin
# cp ~acme/bin/perf ~perf/bin/
# chgrp perf_users ~perf/bin/perf
# setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" ~perf/bin/perf
# getcap ~perf/bin/perf
/home/perf/bin/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep
# ls -la ~perf/bin/perf
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 root perf_users 16968552 Apr 9 13:10 /home/perf/bin/perf
As the 'perf' user in the 'perf_users' group:
$ perf top -a --stdio
Error:
Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted)
$
Either add the cap_ipc_lock capability to the perf binary or reduce the
ring buffer size to some smaller value:
$ perf top -m10 -a --stdio
rounding mmap pages size to 64K (16 pages)
Error:
Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted)
$ perf top -m4 -a --stdio
Error:
Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted)
$ perf top -m2 -a --stdio
PerfTop: 762 irqs/sec kernel:49.7% exact: 100.0% lost: 0/0 drop: 0/0 [4000Hz cycles], (all, 4 CPUs)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9.83% perf [.] __symbols__insert
8.58% perf [.] rb_next
5.91% [kernel] [k] module_get_kallsym
5.66% [kernel] [k] kallsyms_expand_symbol.constprop.0
3.98% libc-2.29.so [.] __GI_____strtoull_l_internal
3.66% perf [.] rb_insert_color
2.34% [kernel] [k] vsnprintf
2.30% [kernel] [k] string_nocheck
2.16% libc-2.29.so [.] _IO_getdelim
2.15% [kernel] [k] number
2.13% [kernel] [k] format_decode
1.58% libc-2.29.so [.] _IO_feof
1.52% libc-2.29.so [.] __strcmp_avx2
1.50% perf [.] rb_set_parent_color
1.47% libc-2.29.so [.] __libc_calloc
1.24% [kernel] [k] do_syscall_64
1.17% [kernel] [k] __x86_indirect_thunk_rax
$ perf record -a sleep 1
[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
[ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.552 MB perf.data (74 samples) ]
$ perf evlist
cycles
$ perf evlist -v
cycles: size: 120, { sample_period, sample_freq }: 4000, sample_type: IP|TID|TIME|CPU|PERIOD, read_format: ID, disabled: 1, inherit: 1, mmap: 1, comm: 1, freq: 1, task: 1, precise_ip: 3, sample_id_all: 1, exclude_guest: 1, mmap2: 1, comm_exec: 1, ksymbol: 1, bpf_event: 1
$ perf report | head -20
# To display the perf.data header info, please use --header/--header-only options.
#
#
# Total Lost Samples: 0
#
# Samples: 74 of event 'cycles'
# Event count (approx.): 15694834
#
# Overhead Command Shared Object Symbol
# ........ ............... .......................... ......................................
#
19.62% perf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] strnlen_user
13.88% swapper [kernel.vmlinux] [k] intel_idle
13.83% ksoftirqd/0 [kernel.vmlinux] [k] pfifo_fast_dequeue
13.51% swapper [kernel.vmlinux] [k] kmem_cache_free
6.31% gnome-shell [kernel.vmlinux] [k] kmem_cache_free
5.66% kworker/u8:3+ix [kernel.vmlinux] [k] delay_tsc
4.42% perf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] __set_cpus_allowed_ptr
3.45% kworker/2:1-eve [kernel.vmlinux] [k] shmem_truncate_range
2.29% gnome-shell libgobject-2.0.so.0.6000.7 [.] g_closure_ref
$
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a66d5648-2b8e-577e-e1f2-1d56c017ab5e@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials,
excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more
secure.
perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses
ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface
and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem
remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to
CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/3c129d9a-ba8a-3483-ecc5-ad6c8e7c203f@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Open access to monitoring of kernel code, CPUs, tracepoints and
namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the
access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons the access to perf_events subsystem
remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to
CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/471acaef-bb8a-5ce2-923f-90606b78eef9@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Introduce the CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system
performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON
can assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for
performance monitoring and observability subsystems.
CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance
monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that
is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure.
Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for
performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e:
2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that
states that a process or program be granted only those privileges
(e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function,
and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and
observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to
mass users of a system, and securely unblocks applicability and scalability
of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root
and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.
CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance
monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1]
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel
developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations
is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance
of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues
following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs
in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development
process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring
and observability operations.
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5590d543-82c6-490a-6544-08e6a5517db0@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Add the DSO_BINARY_TYPE__BPF_IMAGE dso binary type to recognize BPF
images that carry trampoline or dispatcher.
Upcoming patches will add support to read the image data, store it
within the BPF feature in perf.data and display it for annotation
purposes.
Currently we only display following message:
# ./perf annotate bpf_trampoline_24456 --stdio
Percent | Source code & Disassembly of . for cycles (504 ...
--------------------------------------------------------------- ...
: to be implemented
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200312195610.346362-16-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
There's no special load action for ksymbol data on map__load/dso__load
action, where the kernel is getting loaded. It only gets confused with
kernel kallsyms/vmlinux load for bpf object, which fails and could mess
up with the map.
Disabling any further load of the map for ksymbol related dso/map.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200312195610.346362-15-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Synthesize bpf images (trampolines/dispatchers) on start, as ksymbol
events from /proc/kallsyms. Having this perf can recognize samples from
those images and perf report and top shows them correctly.
The rest of the ksymbol handling is already in place from for the bpf
programs monitoring, so only the initial state was needed.
perf report output:
# Overhead Command Shared Object Symbol
12.37% test_progs [kernel.vmlinux] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64
11.80% test_progs [kernel.vmlinux] [k] syscall_return_via_sysret
9.63% test_progs bpf_prog_bcf7977d3b93787c_prog2 [k] bpf_prog_bcf7977d3b93787c_prog2
6.90% test_progs bpf_trampoline_24456 [k] bpf_trampoline_24456
6.36% test_progs [kernel.vmlinux] [k] memcpy_erms
Committer notes:
Use scnprintf() instead of strncpy() to overcome this on fedora:32,
rawhide and OpenMandriva Cooker:
CC /tmp/build/perf/util/bpf-event.o
In file included from /usr/include/string.h:495,
from /git/linux/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_common.h:12,
from /git/linux/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h:31,
from util/bpf-event.c:4:
In function 'strncpy',
inlined from 'process_bpf_image' at util/bpf-event.c:323:2,
inlined from 'kallsyms_process_symbol' at util/bpf-event.c:358:9:
/usr/include/bits/string_fortified.h:106:10: error: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 256 equals destination size [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
106 | return __builtin___strncpy_chk (__dest, __src, __len, __bos (__dest));
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200312195610.346362-14-jolsa@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
When --timeout is used and a workload is specified to be started by
'perf stat', i.e.
$ perf stat --timeout 1000 sleep 1h
The --timeout wasn't being honoured, i.e. the workload, 'sleep 1h' in
the above example, should be terminated after 1000ms, but it wasn't,
'perf stat' was waiting for it to finish.
Fix it by sending a SIGTERM when the timeout expires.
Now it works:
# perf stat -e cycles --timeout 1234 sleep 1h
sleep: Terminated
Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1h':
1,066,692 cycles
1.234314838 seconds time elapsed
0.000750000 seconds user
0.000000000 seconds sys
#
Fixes: f1f8ad52f8 ("perf stat: Add support to print counts after a period of time")
Reported-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <hi-angel@yandex.ru>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207243
Tested-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <hi-angel@yandex.ru>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: yuzhoujian <yuzhoujian@didichuxing.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200415153803.GB20324@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
perf stat:
Jin Yao:
- Fix no metric header if --per-socket and --metric-only set
build system:
- Fix python building when built with clang, that was failing if the clang
version doesn't support -fno-semantic-interposition.
tools UAPI headers:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
- Update various copies of kernel headers, some ended up automatically
updating build-time generated tables to enable tools such as 'perf trace'
to decode syscalls and tracepoints arguments.
Now the tools/perf build is free of UAPI drift warnings.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'perf-urgent-for-mingo-5.7-20200414' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux into perf/urgent
Pull perf/urgent fixes from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
perf stat:
Jin Yao:
- Fix no metric header if --per-socket and --metric-only set
build system:
- Fix python building when built with clang, that was failing if the clang
version doesn't support -fno-semantic-interposition.
tools UAPI headers:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
- Update various copies of kernel headers, some ended up automatically
updating build-time generated tables to enable tools such as 'perf trace'
to decode syscalls and tracepoints arguments.
Now the tools/perf build is free of UAPI drift warnings.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'efi-urgent-2020-04-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc EFI fixes, including the boot failure regression caused by the
BSS section not being cleared by the loaders"
* tag 'efi-urgent-2020-04-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efi/x86: Revert struct layout change to fix kexec boot regression
efi/x86: Don't remap text<->rodata gap read-only for mixed mode
efi/x86: Fix the deletion of variables in mixed mode
efi/libstub/file: Merge file name buffers to reduce stack usage
Documentation/x86, efi/x86: Clarify EFI handover protocol and its requirements
efi/arm: Deal with ADR going out of range in efi_enter_kernel()
efi/x86: Always relocate the kernel for EFI handover entry
efi/x86: Move efi stub globals from .bss to .data
efi/libstub/x86: Remove redundant assignment to pointer hdr
efi/cper: Use scnprintf() for avoiding potential buffer overflow
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Merge tag 'hyperv-fixes-signed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux
Pull hyperv fixes from Wei Liu:
- a series from Tianyu Lan to fix crash reporting on Hyper-V
- three miscellaneous cleanup patches
* tag 'hyperv-fixes-signed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux:
x86/Hyper-V: Report crash data in die() when panic_on_oops is set
x86/Hyper-V: Report crash register data when sysctl_record_panic_msg is not set
x86/Hyper-V: Report crash register data or kmsg before running crash kernel
x86/Hyper-V: Trigger crash enlightenment only once during system crash.
x86/Hyper-V: Free hv_panic_page when fail to register kmsg dump
x86/Hyper-V: Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callback
x86: hyperv: report value of misc_features
hv_debugfs: Make hv_debug_root static
hv: hyperv_vmbus.h: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array member
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Merge tag 'for-5.7-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"We have a few regressions and one fix for stable:
- revert fsync optimization
- fix lost i_size update
- fix a space accounting leak
- build fix, add back definition of a deprecated ioctl flag
- fix search condition for old roots in relocation"
* tag 'for-5.7-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: re-instantiate the removed BTRFS_SUBVOL_CREATE_ASYNC definition
btrfs: fix reclaim counter leak of space_info objects
btrfs: make full fsyncs always operate on the entire file again
btrfs: fix lost i_size update after cloning inline extent
btrfs: check commit root generation in should_ignore_root
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Merge tag 'afs-fixes-20200413' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull AFS fixes from David Howells:
- Fix the decoding of fetched file status records so that the xdr
pointer is advanced under all circumstances.
- Fix the decoding of a fetched file status record that indicates an
inline abort (ie. an error) so that it sets the flag saying the
decoder stored the abort code.
- Fix the decoding of the result of the rename operation so that it
doesn't skip the decoding of the second fetched file status (ie. that
of the dest dir) in the case that the source and dest dirs were the
same as this causes the xdr pointer not to be advanced, leading to
incorrect decoding of subsequent parts of the reply.
- Fix the dump of a bad YFSFetchStatus record to dump the full length.
- Fix a race between local editing of directory contents and accessing
the dir for reading or d_revalidate by using the same lock in both.
- Fix afs_d_revalidate() to not accidentally reverse the version on a
dentry when it's meant to be bringing it forward.
* tag 'afs-fixes-20200413' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
afs: Fix afs_d_validate() to set the right directory version
afs: Fix race between post-modification dir edit and readdir/d_revalidate
afs: Fix length of dump of bad YFSFetchStatus record
afs: Fix rename operation status delivery
afs: Fix decoding of inline abort codes from version 1 status records
afs: Fix missing XDR advance in xdr_decode_{AFS,YFS}FSFetchStatus()
To pick up the changes in these csets:
295bcca849 ("linux/bits.h: add compile time sanity check of GENMASK inputs")
3945ff37d2 ("linux/bits.h: Extract common header for vDSO")
To address this tools/perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/linux/bits.h' differs from latest version at 'include/linux/bits.h'
diff -u tools/include/linux/bits.h include/linux/bits.h
This clashes with usage of userspace's static_assert(), that, at least
on glibc, is guarded by a ifnded/endif pair, do the same to our copy of
build_bug.h and avoid that diff in check_headers.sh so that we continue
checking for drifts with the kernel sources master copy.
This will all be tested with the set of build containers that includes
uCLibc, musl libc, lots of glibc versions in lots of distros and cross
build environments.
The tools/objtool, tools/bpf, etc were tested as well.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Rikard Falkeborn <rikard.falkeborn@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Will be needed when syncing the linux/bits.h header, in the next cset.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
To pick the changes from:
d3b1b776ee ("x86/entry/64: Remove ptregs qualifier from syscall table")
cab56d3484 ("x86/entry: Remove ABI prefixes from functions in syscall tables")
27dd84fafc ("x86/entry/64: Use syscall wrappers for x32_rt_sigreturn")
Addressing this tools/perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl'
diff -u tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
That didn't result in any tooling changes, as what is extracted are just
the first two columns, and these patches touched only the third.
$ cp /tmp/build/perf/arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.c /tmp
$ cp arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
$ make -C tools/perf O=/tmp/build/perf install-bin
make: Entering directory '/home/acme/git/perf/tools/perf'
BUILD: Doing 'make -j12' parallel build
DESCEND plugins
CC /tmp/build/perf/util/syscalltbl.o
INSTALL trace_plugins
LD /tmp/build/perf/util/perf-in.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/perf-in.o
LINK /tmp/build/perf/perf
$ diff -u /tmp/build/perf/arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.c /tmp/syscalls_64.c
$
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
To pick the change in:
88be76cdaf ("drm/i915: Allow userspace to specify ringsize on construction")
That don't result in any changes in tooling, just silences this perf
build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h'
diff -u tools/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Picking the changes from:
455e00f141 ("drm: Add getfb2 ioctl")
Silencing these perf build warnings:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/drm/drm.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/drm/drm.h'
diff -u tools/include/uapi/drm/drm.h include/uapi/drm/drm.h
Now 'perf trace' and other code that might use the
tools/perf/trace/beauty autogenerated tables will be able to translate
this new ioctl code into a string:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/drm_ioctl.sh > before
$ cp include/uapi/drm/drm.h tools/include/uapi/drm/drm.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/drm_ioctl.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
--- before 2020-04-14 09:28:45.461821077 -0300
+++ after 2020-04-14 09:28:53.594782685 -0300
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@
[0xCB] = "SYNCOBJ_QUERY",
[0xCC] = "SYNCOBJ_TRANSFER",
[0xCD] = "SYNCOBJ_TIMELINE_SIGNAL",
+ [0xCE] = "MODE_GETFB2",
[DRM_COMMAND_BASE + 0x00] = "I915_INIT",
[DRM_COMMAND_BASE + 0x01] = "I915_FLUSH",
[DRM_COMMAND_BASE + 0x02] = "I915_FLIP",
$
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
To pick up the changes from:
9a5788c615 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add a capability for enabling secure guests")
3c9bd4006b ("KVM: x86: enable dirty log gradually in small chunks")
13da9ae1cd ("KVM: s390: protvirt: introduce and enable KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED")
e0d2773d48 ("KVM: s390: protvirt: UV calls in support of diag308 0, 1")
19e1227768 ("KVM: S390: protvirt: Introduce instruction data area bounce buffer")
29b40f105e ("KVM: s390: protvirt: Add initial vm and cpu lifecycle handling")
So far we're ignoring those arch specific ioctls, we need to revisit
this at some time to have arch specific tables, etc:
$ grep S390 tools/perf/trace/beauty/kvm_ioctl.sh
egrep -v " ((ARM|PPC|S390)_|[GS]ET_(DEBUGREGS|PIT2|XSAVE|TSC_KHZ)|CREATE_SPAPR_TCE_64)" | \
$
This addresses these tools/perf build warnings:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h'
diff -u tools/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jay Zhou <jianjay.zhou@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
To get the changes in:
4c8cf31885 ("vhost: introduce vDPA-based backend")
Silencing this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/linux/vhost.h'
diff -u tools/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h include/uapi/linux/vhost.h
This automatically picks these new ioctls, making tools such as 'perf
trace' aware of them and possibly allowing to use the strings in
filters, etc:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/vhost_virtio_ioctl.sh > before
$ cp include/uapi/linux/vhost.h tools/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/vhost_virtio_ioctl.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
--- before 2020-04-14 09:12:28.559748968 -0300
+++ after 2020-04-14 09:12:38.781696242 -0300
@@ -24,9 +24,16 @@
[0x44] = "SCSI_GET_EVENTS_MISSED",
[0x60] = "VSOCK_SET_GUEST_CID",
[0x61] = "VSOCK_SET_RUNNING",
+ [0x72] = "VDPA_SET_STATUS",
+ [0x74] = "VDPA_SET_CONFIG",
+ [0x75] = "VDPA_SET_VRING_ENABLE",
};
static const char *vhost_virtio_ioctl_read_cmds[] = {
[0x00] = "GET_FEATURES",
[0x12] = "GET_VRING_BASE",
[0x26] = "GET_BACKEND_FEATURES",
+ [0x70] = "VDPA_GET_DEVICE_ID",
+ [0x71] = "VDPA_GET_STATUS",
+ [0x73] = "VDPA_GET_CONFIG",
+ [0x76] = "VDPA_GET_VRING_NUM",
};
$
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.bie@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Adrian Hunter