Commit Graph

644 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Deepa Dinamani f8b92ba67c mount: Add mount warning for impending timestamp expiry
The warning reuses the uptime max of 30 years used by
settimeofday().

Note that the warning is only emitted for writable filesystem mounts
through the mount syscall. Automounts do not have the same warning.

Print out the warning in human readable format using the struct tm.
After discussion with Arnd Bergmann, we chose to print only the year number.
The raw s_time_max is also displayed, and the user can easily decode
it e.g. "date -u -d @$((0x7fffffff))". We did not want to consolidate
struct rtc_tm and struct tm just to print the date using a format specifier
as part of this series.
Given that the rtc_tm is not compiled on all architectures, this is not a
trivial patch. This can be added in the future.

Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
2019-08-30 07:27:17 -07:00
Jeff Layton df2474a22c locks: print a warning when mount fails due to lack of "mand" support
Since 9e8925b67a ("locks: Allow disabling mandatory locking at compile
time"), attempts to mount filesystems with "-o mand" will fail.
Unfortunately, there is no other indiciation of the reason for the
failure.

Change how the function is defined for better readability. When
CONFIG_MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING is disabled, printk a warning when
someone attempts to mount with -o mand.

Also, add a blurb to the mandatory-locking.txt file to explain about
the "mand" option, and the behavior one should expect when it is
disabled.

Reported-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
2019-08-16 12:13:48 -04:00
Al Viro 19a1c4092e fix the struct mount leak in umount_tree()
We need to drop everything we remove from the tree, whether
mnt_has_parent() is true or not.  Usually the bug manifests as a slow
memory leak (leaked struct mount for initramfs); it becomes much more
visible in mount_subtree() users, such as btrfs.  There we leak
a struct mount for btrfs superblock being mounted, which prevents
fs shutdown on subsequent umount.

Fixes: 56cbb429d9 ("switch the remnants of releasing the mountpoint away from fs_pin")
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Tested-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-26 07:59:06 -04:00
Al Viro 39145f5f0c filename_mountpoint(): make LOOKUP_NO_EVAL unconditional there
user_path_mountpoint_at() always gets it and the reasons to have it
there (i.e. in umount(2)) apply to kern_path_mountpoint() callers
as well.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-21 18:24:45 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 18253e034d Merge branch 'work.dcache2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull dcache and mountpoint updates from Al Viro:
 "Saner handling of refcounts to mountpoints.

  Transfer the counting reference from struct mount ->mnt_mountpoint
  over to struct mountpoint ->m_dentry. That allows us to get rid of the
  convoluted games with ordering of mount shutdowns.

  The cost is in teaching shrink_dcache_{parent,for_umount} to cope with
  mixed-filesystem shrink lists, which we'll also need for the Slab
  Movable Objects patchset"

* 'work.dcache2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  switch the remnants of releasing the mountpoint away from fs_pin
  get rid of detach_mnt()
  make struct mountpoint bear the dentry reference to mountpoint, not struct mount
  Teach shrink_dcache_parent() to cope with mixed-filesystem shrink lists
  fs/namespace.c: shift put_mountpoint() to callers of unhash_mnt()
  __detach_mounts(): lookup_mountpoint() can't return ERR_PTR() anymore
  nfs: dget_parent() never returns NULL
  ceph: don't open-code the check for dead lockref
2019-07-20 09:15:51 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 933a90bf4f Merge branch 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro:
 "The first part of mount updates.

  Convert filesystems to use the new mount API"

* 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally
  constify ksys_mount() string arguments
  don't bother with registering rootfs
  init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs()
  vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API
  convenience helper: get_tree_single()
  convenience helper get_tree_nodev()
  vfs: Kill sget_userns()
  ...
2019-07-19 10:42:02 -07:00
Al Viro 56cbb429d9 switch the remnants of releasing the mountpoint away from fs_pin
We used to need rather convoluted ordering trickery to guarantee
that dput() of ex-mountpoints happens before the final mntput()
of the same.  Since we don't need that anymore, there's no point
playing with fs_pin for that.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-16 22:52:37 -04:00
Al Viro 2763d11912 get rid of detach_mnt()
Lift getting the original mount (dentry is actually not needed at all)
of the mountpoint into the callers - to do_move_mount() and pivot_root()
level.  That simplifies the cleanup in those and allows to get saner
arguments for attach_mnt_recursive().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-16 22:50:11 -04:00
Al Viro 4edbe133f8 make struct mountpoint bear the dentry reference to mountpoint, not struct mount
Using dput_to_list() to shift the contributing reference from ->mnt_mountpoint
to ->mnt_mp->m_dentry.  Dentries are dropped (with dput_to_list()) as soon
as struct mountpoint is destroyed; in cases where we are under namespace_sem
we use the global list, shrinking it in namespace_unlock().  In case of
detaching stuck MNT_LOCKed children at final mntput_no_expire() we use a local
list and shrink it ourselves.  ->mnt_ex_mountpoint crap is gone.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-16 22:43:40 -04:00
Al Viro 037f11b475 mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally
No point having two call sites (earlier in init_rootfs() from
mnt_init() in case we are going to use shmem-style rootfs,
later from do_basic_setup() unconditionally), along with the
logics in shmem_init() itself to make the second call a no-op...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-04 22:01:59 -04:00
Al Viro 33488845f2 constify ksys_mount() string arguments
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-04 22:01:59 -04:00
Al Viro fd3e007f6c don't bother with registering rootfs
init_mount_tree() can get to rootfs_fs_type directly and that simplifies
a lot of things.  We don't need to register it, we don't need to look
it up *and* we don't need to bother with preventing subsequent userland
mounts.  That's the way we should've done that from the very beginning.

There is a user-visible change, namely the disappearance of "rootfs"
from /proc/filesystems.  Note that it's been unmountable all along
and it didn't show up in /proc/mounts; however, it *is* a user-visible
change and theoretically some script might've been using its presence
in /proc/filesystems to tell 2.4.11+ from earlier kernels.

*IF* any complaints about behaviour change do show up, we could fake
it in /proc/filesystems.  I very much doubt we'll have to, though.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-04 22:01:59 -04:00
Al Viro e4e59906cf fs/namespace.c: shift put_mountpoint() to callers of unhash_mnt()
make unhash_mnt() return the mountpoint to be dropped, let callers
deal with it.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-04 18:58:38 -04:00
Al Viro adc9b5c091 __detach_mounts(): lookup_mountpoint() can't return ERR_PTR() anymore
... not since 1e9c75fb9c ("mnt: fix __detach_mounts infinite loop")

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-04 18:58:37 -04:00
Eric Biggers 570d7a98e7 vfs: move_mount: reject moving kernel internal mounts
sys_move_mount() crashes by dereferencing the pointer MNT_NS_INTERNAL,
a.k.a. ERR_PTR(-EINVAL), if the old mount is specified by fd for a
kernel object with an internal mount, such as a pipe or memfd.

Fix it by checking for this case and returning -EINVAL.

[AV: what we want is is_mounted(); use that instead of making the
condition even more convoluted]

Reproducer:

    #include <unistd.h>

    #define __NR_move_mount         429
    #define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004

    int main()
    {
    	int fds[2];

    	pipe(fds);
        syscall(__NR_move_mount, fds[0], "", -1, "/", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH);
    }

Reported-by: syzbot+6004acbaa1893ad013f0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 2db154b3ea ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-01 10:46:36 -04:00
Christian Brauner d728cf7916 fs/namespace: fix unprivileged mount propagation
When propagating mounts across mount namespaces owned by different user
namespaces it is not possible anymore to move or umount the mount in the
less privileged mount namespace.

Here is a reproducer:

  sudo mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /mnt
  sudo --make-rshared /mnt

  # create unprivileged user + mount namespace and preserve propagation
  unshare -U -m --map-root --propagation=unchanged

  # now change back to the original mount namespace in another terminal:
  sudo mkdir /mnt/aaa
  sudo mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /mnt/aaa

  # now in the unprivileged user + mount namespace
  mount --move /mnt/aaa /opt

Unfortunately, this is a pretty big deal for userspace since this is
e.g. used to inject mounts into running unprivileged containers.
So this regression really needs to go away rather quickly.

The problem is that a recent change falsely locked the root of the newly
added mounts by setting MNT_LOCKED. Fix this by only locking the mounts
on copy_mnt_ns() and not when adding a new mount.

Fixes: 3bd045cc9c ("separate copying and locking mount tree on cross-userns copies")
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-06-17 17:36:09 -04:00
Eric Biggers 1b0b9cc8d3 vfs: fsmount: add missing mntget()
sys_fsmount() needs to take a reference to the new mount when adding it
to the anonymous mount namespace.  Otherwise the filesystem can be
unmounted while it's still in use, as found by syzkaller.

Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+99de05d099a170867f22@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+7008b8b8ba7df475fdc8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 93766fbd26 ("vfs: syscall: Add fsmount() to create a mount for a superblock")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-06-17 17:36:07 -04:00
Thomas Gleixner 59bd9ded4d treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 209
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  released under gpl v2

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 15 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190528171438.895196075@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-30 11:29:53 -07:00
Al Viro c3aabf0780 move mount_capable() further out
Call graph of vfs_get_tree():
	vfs_fsconfig_locked()	# neither kernmount, nor submount
	do_new_mount()		# neither kernmount, nor submount
	fc_mount()
		afs_mntpt_do_automount()	# submount
		mount_one_hugetlbfs()		# kernmount
		pid_ns_prepare_proc()		# kernmount
		mq_create_mount()		# kernmount
		vfs_kern_mount()
			simple_pin_fs()		# kernmount
			vfs_submount()		# submount
			kern_mount()		# kernmount
			init_mount_tree()
			btrfs_mount()
			nfs_do_root_mount()

	The first two need the check (unconditionally).
init_mount_tree() is setting rootfs up; any capability
checks make zero sense for that one.  And btrfs_mount()/
nfs_do_root_mount() have the checks already done in their
callers.

	IOW, we can shift mount_capable() handling into
the two callers - one in the normal case of mount(2),
another - in fsconfig(2) handling of FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE.
I.e. the syscalls that set a new filesystem up.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-05-25 18:00:02 -04:00
Al Viro 05883eee85 do_move_mount(): fix an unsafe use of is_anon_ns()
What triggers it is a race between mount --move and umount -l
of the source; we should reject it (the source is parentless *and*
not the root of anon namespace at that), but the check for namespace
being an anon one is broken in that case - is_anon_ns() needs
ns to be non-NULL.  Better fixed here than in is_anon_ns(), since
the rest of the callers is guaranteed to get a non-NULL argument...

Reported-by: syzbot+494c7ddf66acac0ad747@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-05-09 02:32:50 -04:00
David Howells 93766fbd26 vfs: syscall: Add fsmount() to create a mount for a superblock
Provide a system call by which a filesystem opened with fsopen() and
configured by a series of fsconfig() calls can have a detached mount object
created for it.  This mount object can then be attached to the VFS mount
hierarchy using move_mount() by passing the returned file descriptor as the
from directory fd.

The system call looks like:

	int mfd = fsmount(int fsfd, unsigned int flags,
			  unsigned int attr_flags);

where fsfd is the file descriptor returned by fsopen().  flags can be 0 or
FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC.  attr_flags is a bitwise-OR of the following flags:

	MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY	Mount read-only
	MOUNT_ATTR_NOSUID	Ignore suid and sgid bits
	MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV	Disallow access to device special files
	MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC	Disallow program execution
	MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME	Setting on how atime should be updated
	MOUNT_ATTR_RELATIME	- Update atime relative to mtime/ctime
	MOUNT_ATTR_NOATIME	- Do not update access times
	MOUNT_ATTR_STRICTATIME	- Always perform atime updates
	MOUNT_ATTR_NODIRATIME	Do not update directory access times

In the event that fsmount() fails, it may be possible to get an error
message by calling read() on fsfd.  If no message is available, ENODATA
will be reported.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-20 18:49:06 -04:00
David Howells 44dfd84a6d teach move_mount(2) to work with OPEN_TREE_CLONE
Allow a detached tree created by open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE) to be
attached by move_mount(2).

If by the time of final fput() of OPEN_TREE_CLONE-opened file its tree is
not detached anymore, it won't be dissolved.  move_mount(2) is adjusted
to handle detached source.

That gives us equivalents of mount --bind and mount --rbind.

Thanks also to Alan Jenkins <alan.christopher.jenkins@gmail.com> for
providing a whole bunch of ways to break things using this interface.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-20 18:49:06 -04:00
David Howells 2db154b3ea vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around
Add a move_mount() system call that will move a mount from one place to
another and, in the next commit, allow to attach an unattached mount tree.

The new system call looks like the following:

	int move_mount(int from_dfd, const char *from_path,
		       int to_dfd, const char *to_path,
		       unsigned int flags);

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-20 18:49:06 -04:00
Al Viro a07b200047 vfs: syscall: Add open_tree(2) to reference or clone a mount
open_tree(dfd, pathname, flags)

Returns an O_PATH-opened file descriptor or an error.
dfd and pathname specify the location to open, in usual
fashion (see e.g. fstatat(2)).  flags should be an OR of
some of the following:
	* AT_PATH_EMPTY, AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW -
same meanings as usual
	* OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC - make the resulting descriptor
close-on-exec
	* OPEN_TREE_CLONE or OPEN_TREE_CLONE | AT_RECURSIVE -
instead of opening the location in question, create a detached
mount tree matching the subtree rooted at location specified by
dfd/pathname.  With AT_RECURSIVE the entire subtree is cloned,
without it - only the part within in the mount containing the
location in question.  In other words, the same as mount --rbind
or mount --bind would've taken.  The detached tree will be
dissolved on the final close of obtained file.  Creation of such
detached trees requires the same capabilities as doing mount --bind.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-20 18:49:06 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 7b47a9e7c8 Merge branch 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro:
 "The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the
  old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point
  conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some
  are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series
  outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing
  stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted
  filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the
  next cycle fodder.

  It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is
  probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the
  commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting
  the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better
  to fix it up after -rc1 instead.

  That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which
  should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size
  increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to
  shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next
  cycle"

* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits)
  afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount
  afs: Add fs_context support
  vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log
  vfs: Implement logging through fs_context
  vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API
  vfs: Remove kern_mount_data()
  hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context
  cpuset: Use fs_context
  kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context
  cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context
  cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper
  cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions
  cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context
  cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing
  cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing
  cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic()
  cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree()
  cgroup: start switching to fs_context
  ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context
  proc: Add fs_context support to procfs
  ...
2019-03-12 14:08:19 -07:00
Linus Torvalds be37f21a08 audit/stable-5.1 PR 20190305
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.

  Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
  bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.

  Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
  and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
  all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
  capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
  filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.

  All changes pass the audit-testsuite.  Please merge for v5.1"

* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: mark expected switch fall-through
  audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
  audit: join tty records to their syscall
  audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
  audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
  audit: ignore fcaps on umount
  audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
  audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
  audit: add support for fcaps v3
  audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
  audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
  audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
  audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
2019-03-07 12:20:11 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 4f9020ffde Merge branch 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
 "Assorted fixes that sat in -next for a while, all over the place"

* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  aio: Fix locking in aio_poll()
  exec: Fix mem leak in kernel_read_file
  copy_mount_string: Limit string length to PATH_MAX
  cgroup: saner refcounting for cgroup_root
  fix cgroup_do_mount() handling of failure exits
2019-03-04 13:24:27 -08:00
David Howells d911b4585e vfs: Remove kern_mount_data()
The kern_mount_data() isn't used any more so remove it.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-28 03:29:36 -05:00
David Howells 3e1aeb00e6 vfs: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context
[AV - unfuck kern_mount_data(); we want non-NULL ->mnt_ns on long-living
mounts]
[AV - reordering fs/namespace.c is badly overdue, but let's keep it
separate from that series]
[AV - drop simple_pin_fs() change]
[AV - clean vfs_kern_mount() failure exits up]

Implement a filesystem context concept to be used during superblock
creation for mount and superblock reconfiguration for remount.

The mounting procedure then becomes:

 (1) Allocate new fs_context context.

 (2) Configure the context.

 (3) Create superblock.

 (4) Query the superblock.

 (5) Create a mount for the superblock.

 (6) Destroy the context.

Rather than calling fs_type->mount(), an fs_context struct is created and
fs_type->init_fs_context() is called to set it up.  Pointers exist for the
filesystem and LSM to hang their private data off.

A set of operations has to be set by ->init_fs_context() to provide
freeing, duplication, option parsing, binary data parsing, validation,
mounting and superblock filling.

Legacy filesystems are supported by the provision of a set of legacy
fs_context operations that build up a list of mount options and then invoke
fs_type->mount() from within the fs_context ->get_tree() operation.  This
allows all filesystems to be accessed using fs_context.

It should be noted that, whilst this patch adds a lot of lines of code,
there is quite a bit of duplication with existing code that can be
eliminated should all filesystems be converted over.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-28 03:29:26 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 53a41cb7ed Revert "x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses"
This reverts commit 9da3f2b740.

It was well-intentioned, but wrong.  Overriding the exception tables for
instructions for random reasons is just wrong, and that is what the new
code did.

It caused problems for tracing, and it caused problems for strncpy_from_user(),
because the new checks made perfectly valid use cases break, rather than
catch things that did bad things.

Unchecked user space accesses are a problem, but that's not a reason to
add invalid checks that then people have to work around with silly flags
(in this case, that 'kernel_uaccess_faults_ok' flag, which is just an
odd way to say "this commit was wrong" and was sprinked into random
places to hide the wrongness).

The real fix to unchecked user space accesses is to get rid of the
special "let's not check __get_user() and __put_user() at all" logic.
Make __{get|put}_user() be just aliases to the regular {get|put}_user()
functions, and make it impossible to access user space without having
the proper checks in places.

The raison d'être of the special double-underscore versions used to be
that the range check was expensive, and if you did multiple user
accesses, you'd do the range check up front (like the signal frame
handling code, for example).  But SMAP (on x86) and PAN (on ARM) have
made that optimization pointless, because the _real_ expense is the "set
CPU flag to allow user space access".

Do let's not break the valid cases to catch invalid cases that shouldn't
even exist.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-02-25 09:10:51 -08:00
Chandan Rajendra fbdb440132 copy_mount_string: Limit string length to PATH_MAX
On ppc64le, When a string with PAGE_SIZE - 1 (i.e. 64k-1) length is
passed as a "filesystem type" argument to the mount(2) syscall,
copy_mount_string() ends up allocating 64k (the PAGE_SIZE on ppc64le)
worth of space for holding the string in kernel's address space.

Later, in set_precision() (invoked by get_fs_type() ->
__request_module() -> vsnprintf()), we end up assigning
strlen(fs-type-string) i.e. 65535 as the
value to 'struct printf_spec'->precision member. This field has a width
of 16 bits and it is a signed data type. Hence an invalid value ends
up getting assigned. This causes the "WARN_ONCE(spec->precision != prec,
"precision %d too large", prec)" statement inside set_precision() to be
executed.

This commit fixes the bug by limiting the length of the string passed by
copy_mount_string() to strndup_user() to PATH_MAX.

Signed-off-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Abdul Haleem <abdhalee@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-01 01:57:33 -05:00
Richard Guy Briggs 57d4657716 audit: ignore fcaps on umount
Don't fetch fcaps when umount2 is called to avoid a process hang while
it waits for the missing resource to (possibly never) re-appear.

Note the comment above user_path_mountpoint_at():
 * A umount is a special case for path walking. We're not actually interested
 * in the inode in this situation, and ESTALE errors can be a problem.  We
 * simply want track down the dentry and vfsmount attached at the mountpoint
 * and avoid revalidating the last component.

This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS.

Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in audit_log_fcaps()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-01-30 20:51:47 -05:00
David Howells 8d0347f6c3 convert do_remount_sb() to fs_context
Replace do_remount_sb() with a function, reconfigure_super(), that's
fs_context aware.  The fs_context is expected to be parameterised already
and have ->root pointing to the superblock to be reconfigured.

A legacy wrapper is provided that is intended to be called from the
fs_context ops when those appear, but for now is called directly from
reconfigure_super().  This wrapper invokes the ->remount_fs() superblock op
for the moment.  It is intended that the remount_fs() op will be phased
out.

The fs_context->purpose is set to FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE to indicate
that the context is being used for reconfiguration.

do_umount_root() is provided to consolidate remount-to-R/O for umount and
emergency remount by creating a context and invoking reconfiguration.

do_remount(), do_umount() and do_emergency_remount_callback() are switched
to use the new process.

[AV -- fold UMOUNT and EMERGENCY_REMOUNT in; fixes the
umount / bug, gets rid of pointless complexity]
[AV -- set ->net_ns in all cases; nfs remount will need that]
[AV -- shift security_sb_remount() call into reconfigure_super(); the callers
that didn't do security_sb_remount() have NULL fc->security anyway, so it's
a no-op for them]

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-01-30 17:44:26 -05:00
Al Viro c9ce29ed79 vfs_get_tree(): evict the call of security_sb_kern_mount()
Right now vfs_get_tree() calls security_sb_kern_mount() (i.e.
mount MAC) unless it gets MS_KERNMOUNT or MS_SUBMOUNT in flags.
Doing it that way is both clumsy and imprecise.

Consider the callers' tree of vfs_get_tree():
vfs_get_tree()
        <- do_new_mount()
	<- vfs_kern_mount()
		<- simple_pin_fs()
		<- vfs_submount()
		<- kern_mount_data()
		<- init_mount_tree()
		<- btrfs_mount()
			<- vfs_get_tree()
		<- nfs_do_root_mount()
			<- nfs4_try_mount()
				<- nfs_fs_mount()
					<- vfs_get_tree()
			<- nfs4_referral_mount()

do_new_mount() always does need MAC (we are guaranteed that neither
MS_KERNMOUNT nor MS_SUBMOUNT will be passed there).

simple_pin_fs(), vfs_submount() and kern_mount_data() pass explicit
flags inhibiting that check.  So does nfs4_referral_mount() (the
flags there are ulimately coming from vfs_submount()).

init_mount_tree() is called too early for anything LSM-related; it
doesn't matter whether we attempt those checks, they'll do nothing.

Finally, in case of btrfs_mount() and nfs_fs_mount(), doing MAC
is pointless - either the caller will do it, or the flags are
such that we wouldn't have done it either.

In other words, the one and only case when we want that check
done is when we are called from do_new_mount(), and there we
want it unconditionally.

So let's simply move it there.  The superblock is still locked,
so nobody is going to get access to it (via ustat(2), etc.)
until we get a chance to apply the checks - we are free to
move them to any point up to where we drop ->s_umount (in
do_new_mount_fc()).

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-01-30 17:44:26 -05:00
David Howells 132e460848 new helper: do_new_mount_fc()
Create an fs_context-aware version of do_new_mount().  This takes an
fs_context with a superblock already attached to it.

Make do_new_mount() use do_new_mount_fc() rather than do_new_mount(); this
allows the consolidation of the mount creation, check and add steps.

To make this work, mount_too_revealing() is changed to take a superblock
rather than a mount (which the fs_context doesn't have available), allowing
this check to be done before the mount object is created.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-01-30 17:44:25 -05:00
Al Viro a0c9a8b8fd teach vfs_get_tree() to handle subtype, switch do_new_mount() to it
Roll the handling of subtypes into do_new_mount() and vfs_get_tree().  The
former determines any subtype string and hangs it off the fs_context; the
latter applies it.

Make do_new_mount() create, parameterise and commit an fs_context and
create a mount for itself rather than calling vfs_kern_mount().

[AV -- missing kstrdup()]
[AV -- ... and no kstrdup() if we get to setting ->s_submount - we
simply transfer it from fc, leaving NULL behind]
[AV -- constify ->s_submount, while we are at it]

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-01-30 17:44:25 -05:00
Al Viro 8f2918898e new helpers: vfs_create_mount(), fc_mount()
Create a new helper, vfs_create_mount(), that creates a detached vfsmount
object from an fs_context that has a superblock attached to it.

Almost all uses will be paired with immediately preceding vfs_get_tree();
add a helper for such combination.

Switch vfs_kern_mount() to use this.

NOTE: mild behaviour change; passing NULL as 'device name' to
something like procfs will change /proc/*/mountstats - "device none"
instead on "no device".  That is consistent with /proc/mounts et.al.

[do'h - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL slipped in by mistake; removed]
[AV -- remove confused comment from vfs_create_mount()]
[AV -- removed the second argument]

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-01-30 17:44:24 -05:00
David Howells 9bc61ab18b vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.
Introduce a filesystem context concept to be used during superblock
creation for mount and superblock reconfiguration for remount.  This is
allocated at the beginning of the mount procedure and into it is placed:

 (1) Filesystem type.

 (2) Namespaces.

 (3) Source/Device names (there may be multiple).

 (4) Superblock flags (SB_*).

 (5) Security details.

 (6) Filesystem-specific data, as set by the mount options.

Accessor functions are then provided to set up a context, parameterise it
from monolithic mount data (the data page passed to mount(2)) and tear it
down again.

A legacy wrapper is provided that implements what will be the basic
operations, wrapping access to filesystems that aren't yet aware of the
fs_context.

Finally, vfs_kern_mount() is changed to make use of the fs_context and
mount_fs() is replaced by vfs_get_tree(), called from vfs_kern_mount().
[AV -- add missing kstrdup()]
[AV -- put_cred() can be unconditional - fc->cred can't be NULL]
[AV -- take legacy_validate() contents into legacy_parse_monolithic()]
[AV -- merge KERNEL_MOUNT and USER_MOUNT]
[AV -- don't unlock superblock on success return from vfs_get_tree()]
[AV -- kill 'reference' argument of init_fs_context()]

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-01-30 17:44:23 -05:00
Al Viro 74e831221c saner handling of temporary namespaces
mount_subtree() creates (and soon destroys) a temporary namespace,
so that automounts could function normally.  These beasts should
never become anyone's current namespaces; they don't, but it would
be better to make prevention of that more straightforward.  And
since they don't become anyone's current namespace, we don't need
to bother with reserving procfs inums for those.

Teach alloc_mnt_ns() to skip inum allocation if told so, adjust
put_mnt_ns() accordingly, make mount_subtree() use temporary
(anon) namespace.  is_anon_ns() checks if a namespace is such.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-01-30 17:44:07 -05:00
Al Viro 3bd045cc9c separate copying and locking mount tree on cross-userns copies
Rather than having propagate_mnt() check doing unprivileged copies,
lock them before commit_tree().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-01-30 17:14:50 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 505b050fdf Merge branch 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs mount API prep from Al Viro:
 "Mount API prereqs.

  Mostly that's LSM mount options cleanups. There are several minor
  fixes in there, but nothing earth-shattering (leaks on failure exits,
  mostly)"

* 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (27 commits)
  mount_fs: suppress MAC on MS_SUBMOUNT as well as MS_KERNMOUNT
  smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  smack: get rid of match_token()
  smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helper
  LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()
  selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  selinux: regularize Opt_... names a bit
  selinux: switch away from match_token()
  selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()
  LSM: bury struct security_mnt_opts
  smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts
  selinux: switch to private struct selinux_mnt_opts
  LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code
  selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts()
  LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a method
  nfs_remount(): don't leak, don't ignore LSM options quietly
  btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts use
  selinux; don't open-code a loop in sb_finish_set_opts()
  LSM: split ->sb_set_mnt_opts() out of ->sb_kern_mount()
  new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  ...
2019-01-05 13:25:58 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 9b286efeb5 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull trivial vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "A few cleanups + Neil's namespace_unlock() optimization"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  exec: make prepare_bprm_creds static
  genheaders: %-<width>s had been there since v6; %-*s - since v7
  VFS: use synchronize_rcu_expedited() in namespace_unlock()
  iov_iter: reduce code duplication
2019-01-05 13:18:59 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 96d4f267e4 Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.

It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access.  But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.

A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model.  And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.

This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.

There were a couple of notable cases:

 - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.

 - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
   values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
   really used it)

 - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout

but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.

I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something.  Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 18:57:57 -08:00
Al Viro 204cc0ccf1 LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code
Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the
moment).  Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off
with private structures with several strings in those, rather than
this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays"
ugliness.  This commit allows to do that at leisure, without
disrupting anything outside of given module.

Changes:
	* instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer
initialized to NULL.
	* security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and
security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **);
call sites are unchanged.
	* security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take
it by value (i.e. as void *).
	* new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts().  Takes void *, does
whatever freeing that needs to be done.
	* ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as
mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty".

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:48:34 -05:00
Al Viro f5c0c26d90 new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
combination of alloc_secdata(), security_sb_copy_data(),
security_sb_parse_opt_str() and free_secdata().

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:46:00 -05:00
Al Viro c039bc3c24 LSM: lift extracting and parsing LSM options into the caller of ->sb_remount()
This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:45:41 -05:00
David Howells 43f5e655ef vfs: Separate changing mount flags full remount
Separate just the changing of mount flags (MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND) from full
remount because the mount data will get parsed with the new fs_context
stuff prior to doing a remount - and this causes the syscall to fail under
some circumstances.

To quote Eric's explanation:

  [...] mount(..., MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND, ...) now validates the mount options
  string, which breaks systemd unit files with ProtectControlGroups=yes
  (e.g.  systemd-networkd.service) when systemd does the following to
  change a cgroup (v1) mount to read-only:

    mount(NULL, "/run/systemd/unit-root/sys/fs/cgroup/systemd", NULL,
	  MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND, NULL)

  ... when the kernel has CONFIG_CGROUPS=y but no cgroup subsystems
  enabled, since in that case the error "cgroup1: Need name or subsystem
  set" is hit when the mount options string is empty.

  Probably it doesn't make sense to validate the mount options string at
  all in the MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND case, though maybe you had something else
  in mind.

This is also worthwhile doing because we will need to add a mount_setattr()
syscall to take over the remount-bind function.

Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2018-12-20 16:32:56 +00:00
David Howells e262e32d6b vfs: Suppress MS_* flag defs within the kernel unless explicitly enabled
Only the mount namespace code that implements mount(2) should be using the
MS_* flags.  Suppress them inside the kernel unless uapi/linux/mount.h is
included.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2018-12-20 16:32:56 +00:00
NeilBrown 22cb7405fa VFS: use synchronize_rcu_expedited() in namespace_unlock()
The synchronize_rcu() in namespace_unlock() is called every time
a filesystem is unmounted.  If a great many filesystems are mounted,
this can cause a noticable slow-down in, for example, system shutdown.

The sequence:
  mkdir -p /tmp/Mtest/{0..5000}
  time for i in /tmp/Mtest/*; do mount -t tmpfs tmpfs $i ; done
  time umount /tmp/Mtest/*

on a 4-cpu VM can report 8 seconds to mount the tmpfs filesystems, and
100 seconds to unmount them.

Boot the same VM with 1 CPU and it takes 18 seconds to mount the
tmpfs filesystems, but only 36 to unmount.

If we change the synchronize_rcu() to synchronize_rcu_expedited()
the umount time on a 4-cpu VM drop to 0.6 seconds

I think this 200-fold speed up is worth the slightly high system
impact of using synchronize_rcu_expedited().

Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (from general rcu perspective)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-11-29 18:55:10 -05:00
Benjamin Coddington 1e9c75fb9c mnt: fix __detach_mounts infinite loop
Since commit ff17fa561a ("d_invalidate(): unhash immediately")
immediately unhashes the dentry, we'll never return the mountpoint in
lookup_mountpoint(), which can lead to an unbreakable loop in
d_invalidate().

I have reports of NFS clients getting into this condition after the server
removes an export of an existing mount created through follow_automount(),
but I suspect there are various other ways to produce this problem if we
hunt down users of d_invalidate().  For example, it is possible to get into
this state by using XFS' d_invalidate() call in xfs_vn_unlink():

truncate -s 100m img{1,2}

mkfs.xfs -q -n version=ci img1
mkfs.xfs -q -n version=ci img2

mkdir -p /mnt/xfs
mount img1 /mnt/xfs

mkdir /mnt/xfs/sub1
mount img2 /mnt/xfs/sub1

cat > /mnt/xfs/sub1/foo &
umount -l /mnt/xfs/sub1
mount img2 /mnt/xfs/sub1

mount --make-private /mnt/xfs

mkdir /mnt/xfs/sub2
mount --move /mnt/xfs/sub1 /mnt/xfs/sub2
rmdir /mnt/xfs/sub1

Fix this by moving the check for an unlinked dentry out of the
detach_mounts() path.

Fixes: ff17fa561a ("d_invalidate(): unhash immediately")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-11-12 01:02:34 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman 9c8e0a1b68 mount: Prevent MNT_DETACH from disconnecting locked mounts
Timothy Baldwin <timbaldwin@fastmail.co.uk> wrote:
> As per mount_namespaces(7) unprivileged users should not be able to look under mount points:
>
>   Mounts that come as a single unit from more privileged mount are locked
>   together and may not be separated in a less privileged mount namespace.
>
> However they can:
>
> 1. Create a mount namespace.
> 2. In the mount namespace open a file descriptor to the parent of a mount point.
> 3. Destroy the mount namespace.
> 4. Use the file descriptor to look under the mount point.
>
> I have reproduced this with Linux 4.16.18 and Linux 4.18-rc8.
>
> The setup:
>
> $ sudo sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1
> kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone = 1
> $ mkdir -p A/B/Secret
> $ sudo mount -t tmpfs hide A/B
>
>
> "Secret" is indeed hidden as expected:
>
> $ ls -lR A
> A:
> total 0
> drwxrwxrwt 2 root root 40 Feb 12 21:08 B
>
> A/B:
> total 0
>
>
> The attack revealing "Secret":
>
> $ unshare -Umr sh -c "exec unshare -m ls -lR /proc/self/fd/4/ 4<A"
> /proc/self/fd/4/:
> total 0
> drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 60 Feb 12 21:08 B
>
> /proc/self/fd/4/B:
> total 0
> drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 40 Feb 12 21:08 Secret
>
> /proc/self/fd/4/B/Secret:
> total 0

I tracked this down to put_mnt_ns running passing UMOUNT_SYNC and
disconnecting all of the mounts in a mount namespace.  Fix this by
factoring drop_mounts out of drop_collected_mounts and passing
0 instead of UMOUNT_SYNC.

There are two possible behavior differences that result from this.
- No longer setting UMOUNT_SYNC will no longer set MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT on
  the vfsmounts being unmounted.  This effects the lazy rcu walk by
  kicking the walk out of rcu mode and forcing it to be a non-lazy
  walk.
- No longer disconnecting locked mounts will keep some mounts around
  longer as they stay because the are locked to other mounts.

There are only two users of drop_collected mounts: audit_tree.c and
put_mnt_ns.

In audit_tree.c the mounts are private and there are no rcu lazy walks
only calls to iterate_mounts. So the changes should have no effect
except for a small timing effect as the connected mounts are disconnected.

In put_mnt_ns there may be references from process outside the mount
namespace to the mounts.  So the mounts remaining connected will
be the bug fix that is needed.  That rcu walks are allowed to continue
appears not to be a problem especially as the rcu walk change was about
an implementation detail not about semantics.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5ff9d8a65c ("vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users")
Reported-by: Timothy Baldwin <timbaldwin@fastmail.co.uk>
Tested-by: Timothy Baldwin <timbaldwin@fastmail.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-11-08 01:05:32 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman df7342b240 mount: Don't allow copying MNT_UNBINDABLE|MNT_LOCKED mounts
Jonathan Calmels from NVIDIA reported that he's able to bypass the
mount visibility security check in place in the Linux kernel by using
a combination of the unbindable property along with the private mount
propagation option to allow a unprivileged user to see a path which
was purposefully hidden by the root user.

Reproducer:
  # Hide a path to all users using a tmpfs
  root@castiana:~# mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /sys/devices/
  root@castiana:~#

  # As an unprivileged user, unshare user namespace and mount namespace
  stgraber@castiana:~$ unshare -U -m -r

  # Confirm the path is still not accessible
  root@castiana:~# ls /sys/devices/

  # Make /sys recursively unbindable and private
  root@castiana:~# mount --make-runbindable /sys
  root@castiana:~# mount --make-private /sys

  # Recursively bind-mount the rest of /sys over to /mnnt
  root@castiana:~# mount --rbind /sys/ /mnt

  # Access our hidden /sys/device as an unprivileged user
  root@castiana:~# ls /mnt/devices/
  breakpoint cpu cstate_core cstate_pkg i915 intel_pt isa kprobe
  LNXSYSTM:00 msr pci0000:00 platform pnp0 power software system
  tracepoint uncore_arb uncore_cbox_0 uncore_cbox_1 uprobe virtual

Solve this by teaching copy_tree to fail if a mount turns out to be
both unbindable and locked.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5ff9d8a65c ("vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users")
Reported-by: Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-11-08 00:30:30 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman 25d202ed82 mount: Retest MNT_LOCKED in do_umount
It was recently pointed out that the one instance of testing MNT_LOCKED
outside of the namespace_sem is in ksys_umount.

Fix that by adding a test inside of do_umount with namespace_sem and
the mount_lock held.  As it helps to fail fails the existing test is
maintained with an additional comment pointing out that it may be racy
because the locks are not held.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: 5ff9d8a65c ("vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-11-08 00:14:21 -06:00
Mike Rapoport 57c8a661d9 mm: remove include/linux/bootmem.h
Move remaining definitions and declarations from include/linux/bootmem.h
into include/linux/memblock.h and remove the redundant header.

The includes were replaced with the semantic patch below and then
semi-automated removal of duplicated '#include <linux/memblock.h>

@@
@@
- #include <linux/bootmem.h>
+ #include <linux/memblock.h>

[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: dma-direct: fix up for the removal of linux/bootmem.h]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002185342.133d1680@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: powerpc: fix up for removal of linux/bootmem.h]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181005161406.73ef8727@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: x86/kaslr, ACPI/NUMA: fix for linux/bootmem.h removal]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181008190341.5e396491@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536927045-23536-30-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-31 08:54:16 -07:00
Jann Horn 9da3f2b740 x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses
There have been multiple kernel vulnerabilities that permitted userspace to
pass completely unchecked pointers through to userspace accessors:

 - the waitid() bug - commit 96ca579a1e ("waitid(): Add missing
   access_ok() checks")
 - the sg/bsg read/write APIs
 - the infiniband read/write APIs

These don't happen all that often, but when they do happen, it is hard to
test for them properly; and it is probably also hard to discover them with
fuzzing. Even when an unmapped kernel address is supplied to such buggy
code, it just returns -EFAULT instead of doing a proper BUG() or at least
WARN().

Try to make such misbehaving code a bit more visible by refusing to do a
fixup in the pagefault handler code when a userspace accessor causes a #PF
on a kernel address and the current context isn't whitelisted.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828201421.157735-7-jannh@google.com
2018-09-03 15:12:09 +02:00
Linus Torvalds aba16dc5cf Merge branch 'ida-4.19' of git://git.infradead.org/users/willy/linux-dax
Pull IDA updates from Matthew Wilcox:
 "A better IDA API:

      id = ida_alloc(ida, GFP_xxx);
      ida_free(ida, id);

  rather than the cumbersome ida_simple_get(), ida_simple_remove().

  The new IDA API is similar to ida_simple_get() but better named.  The
  internal restructuring of the IDA code removes the bitmap
  preallocation nonsense.

  I hope the net -200 lines of code is convincing"

* 'ida-4.19' of git://git.infradead.org/users/willy/linux-dax: (29 commits)
  ida: Change ida_get_new_above to return the id
  ida: Remove old API
  test_ida: check_ida_destroy and check_ida_alloc
  test_ida: Convert check_ida_conv to new API
  test_ida: Move ida_check_max
  test_ida: Move ida_check_leaf
  idr-test: Convert ida_check_nomem to new API
  ida: Start new test_ida module
  target/iscsi: Allocate session IDs from an IDA
  iscsi target: fix session creation failure handling
  drm/vmwgfx: Convert to new IDA API
  dmaengine: Convert to new IDA API
  ppc: Convert vas ID allocation to new IDA API
  media: Convert entity ID allocation to new IDA API
  ppc: Convert mmu context allocation to new IDA API
  Convert net_namespace to new IDA API
  cb710: Convert to new IDA API
  rsxx: Convert to new IDA API
  osd: Convert to new IDA API
  sd: Convert to new IDA API
  ...
2018-08-26 11:48:42 -07:00
Matthew Wilcox 169b480e4c fs: Convert namespace IDAs to new API
We don't need to keep track of the starting value; the IDA is efficient.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
2018-08-21 23:54:17 -04:00
Linus Torvalds d9a185f8b4 overlayfs update for 4.19
This contains two new features:
 
  1) Stack file operations: this allows removal of several hacks from the
     VFS, proper interaction of read-only open files with copy-up,
     possibility to implement fs modifying ioctls properly, and others.
 
  2) Metadata only copy-up: when file is on lower layer and only metadata is
     modified (except size) then only copy up the metadata and continue to
     use the data from the lower file.
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Merge tag 'ovl-update-4.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs

Pull overlayfs updates from Miklos Szeredi:
 "This contains two new features:

   - Stack file operations: this allows removal of several hacks from
     the VFS, proper interaction of read-only open files with copy-up,
     possibility to implement fs modifying ioctls properly, and others.

   - Metadata only copy-up: when file is on lower layer and only
     metadata is modified (except size) then only copy up the metadata
     and continue to use the data from the lower file"

* tag 'ovl-update-4.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs: (66 commits)
  ovl: Enable metadata only feature
  ovl: Do not do metacopy only for ioctl modifying file attr
  ovl: Do not do metadata only copy-up for truncate operation
  ovl: add helper to force data copy-up
  ovl: Check redirect on index as well
  ovl: Set redirect on upper inode when it is linked
  ovl: Set redirect on metacopy files upon rename
  ovl: Do not set dentry type ORIGIN for broken hardlinks
  ovl: Add an inode flag OVL_CONST_INO
  ovl: Treat metacopy dentries as type OVL_PATH_MERGE
  ovl: Check redirects for metacopy files
  ovl: Move some dir related ovl_lookup_single() code in else block
  ovl: Do not expose metacopy only dentry from d_real()
  ovl: Open file with data except for the case of fsync
  ovl: Add helper ovl_inode_realdata()
  ovl: Store lower data inode in ovl_inode
  ovl: Fix ovl_getattr() to get number of blocks from lower
  ovl: Add helper ovl_dentry_lowerdata() to get lower data dentry
  ovl: Copy up meta inode data from lowest data inode
  ovl: Modify ovl_lookup() and friends to lookup metacopy dentry
  ...
2018-08-21 18:19:09 -07:00
Al Viro 119e1ef80e fix __legitimize_mnt()/mntput() race
__legitimize_mnt() has two problems - one is that in case of success
the check of mount_lock is not ordered wrt preceding increment of
refcount, making it possible to have successful __legitimize_mnt()
on one CPU just before the otherwise final mntpu() on another,
with __legitimize_mnt() not seeing mntput() taking the lock and
mntput() not seeing the increment done by __legitimize_mnt().
Solved by a pair of barriers.

Another is that failure of __legitimize_mnt() on the second
read_seqretry() leaves us with reference that'll need to be
dropped by caller; however, if that races with final mntput()
we can end up with caller dropping rcu_read_lock() and doing
mntput() to release that reference - with the first mntput()
having freed the damn thing just as rcu_read_lock() had been
dropped.  Solution: in "do mntput() yourself" failure case
grab mount_lock, check if MNT_DOOMED has been set by racing
final mntput() that has missed our increment and if it has -
undo the increment and treat that as "failure, caller doesn't
need to drop anything" case.

It's not easy to hit - the final mntput() has to come right
after the first read_seqretry() in __legitimize_mnt() *and*
manage to miss the increment done by __legitimize_mnt() before
the second read_seqretry() in there.  The things that are almost
impossible to hit on bare hardware are not impossible on SMP
KVM, though...

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Fixes: 48a066e72d ("RCU'd vsfmounts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-08-09 17:51:32 -04:00
Al Viro 9ea0a46ca2 fix mntput/mntput race
mntput_no_expire() does the calculation of total refcount under mount_lock;
unfortunately, the decrement (as well as all increments) are done outside
of it, leading to false positives in the "are we dropping the last reference"
test.  Consider the following situation:
	* mnt is a lazy-umounted mount, kept alive by two opened files.  One
of those files gets closed.  Total refcount of mnt is 2.  On CPU 42
mntput(mnt) (called from __fput()) drops one reference, decrementing component
	* After it has looked at component #0, the process on CPU 0 does
mntget(), incrementing component #0, gets preempted and gets to run again -
on CPU 69.  There it does mntput(), which drops the reference (component #69)
and proceeds to spin on mount_lock.
	* On CPU 42 our first mntput() finishes counting.  It observes the
decrement of component #69, but not the increment of component #0.  As the
result, the total it gets is not 1 as it should've been - it's 0.  At which
point we decide that vfsmount needs to be killed and proceed to free it and
shut the filesystem down.  However, there's still another opened file
on that filesystem, with reference to (now freed) vfsmount, etc. and we are
screwed.

It's not a wide race, but it can be reproduced with artificial slowdown of
the mnt_get_count() loop, and it should be easier to hit on SMP KVM setups.

Fix consists of moving the refcount decrement under mount_lock; the tricky
part is that we want (and can) keep the fast case (i.e. mount that still
has non-NULL ->mnt_ns) entirely out of mount_lock.  All places that zero
mnt->mnt_ns are dropping some reference to mnt and they call synchronize_rcu()
before that mntput().  IOW, if mntput() observes (under rcu_read_lock())
a non-NULL ->mnt_ns, it is guaranteed that there is another reference yet to
be dropped.

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 48a066e72d ("RCU'd vsfmounts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-08-09 17:21:17 -04:00
Miklos Szeredi a6795a5859 vfs: fix freeze protection in mnt_want_write_file() for overlayfs
The underlying real file used by overlayfs still contains the overlay path.
This results in mnt_want_write_file() calls by the filesystem getting
freeze protection on the wrong inode (the overlayfs one instead of the real
one).

Fix by using file_inode(file)->i_sb instead of file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb.

Reported-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2018-07-18 15:44:43 +02:00
Miklos Szeredi 6742cee043 Revert "ovl: don't allow writing ioctl on lower layer"
This reverts commit 7c6893e3c9.

Overlayfs no longer relies on the vfs for checking writability of files.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-07-18 15:44:43 +02:00
Miklos Szeredi d561f21856 Revert "ovl: fix may_write_real() for overlayfs directories"
This reverts commit 954c736f86.

Overlayfs no longer relies on the vfs for checking writability of files.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-07-18 15:44:43 +02:00
Eric W. Biederman bc6155d132 fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb()
Superblock level remounts are currently restricted to global
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as is the path for changing the root mount to
read only on umount. Loosen both of these permission checks to
also allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in any namespace which is privileged
towards the userns which originally mounted the filesystem.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-05-24 12:02:25 -05:00
David Howells a9e5b73288 vfs: Undo an overly zealous MS_RDONLY -> SB_RDONLY conversion
In do_mount() when the MS_* flags are being converted to MNT_* flags,
MS_RDONLY got accidentally convered to SB_RDONLY.

Undo this change.

Fixes: e462ec50cb ("VFS: Differentiate mount flags (MS_*) from internal superblock flags")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-20 09:59:33 -07:00
Al Viro 16a34adb93 Don't leak MNT_INTERNAL away from internal mounts
We want it only for the stuff created by SB_KERNMOUNT mounts, *not* for
their copies.  As it is, creating a deep stack of bindings of /proc/*/ns/*
somewhere in a new namespace and exiting yields a stack overflow.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Alexander Aring <aring@mojatatu.com>
Bisected-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Tested-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Aring <aring@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-04-19 23:52:15 -04:00
Dominik Brodowski 3a18ef5c1b fs: add ksys_umount() helper; remove in-kernel call to sys_umount()
Using this helper allows us to avoid the in-kernel call to the sys_umount()
syscall. The ksys_ prefix denotes that this function is meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, it uses the same calling
convention as ksys_umount().

In the near future, the only fs-external caller of ksys_umount() should be
converted to call do_umount() directly. Then, ksys_umount() can be moved
within sys_umount() again.

This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net

Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-04-02 20:15:48 +02:00
Dominik Brodowski 312db1aa1d fs: add ksys_mount() helper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_mount()
Using this helper allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to the sys_mount()
syscall. The ksys_ prefix denotes that this function is meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, it uses the same calling
convention as sys_mount().

In the near future, all callers of ksys_mount() should be converted to call
do_mount() directly.

This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net

Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-04-02 20:15:48 +02:00
Markus Trippelsdorf d7ee946942 VFS: Handle lazytime in do_mount()
Since commit e462ec50cb ("VFS: Differentiate mount flags (MS_*) from
internal superblock flags") the lazytime mount option doesn't get passed
on anymore.

Fix the issue by handling the option in do_mount().

Reviewed-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-12-09 20:16:33 -05:00
Mark Rutland 6aa7de0591 locking/atomics: COCCINELLE/treewide: Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() patterns to READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()
Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the
coccinelle script shown below and apply its output.

For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in
preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the
former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of
ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in
churn.

However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to
correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write
accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining
ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following
coccinelle script:

----
// Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and
// WRITE_ONCE()

// $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch

virtual patch

@ depends on patch @
expression E1, E2;
@@

- ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2
+ WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2)

@ depends on patch @
expression E;
@@

- ACCESS_ONCE(E)
+ READ_ONCE(E)
----

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au
Cc: shuah@kernel.org
Cc: snitzer@redhat.com
Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-10-25 11:01:08 +02:00
Mimi Zohar 917086ff23 vfs: fix mounting a filesystem with i_version
The mount i_version flag is not enabled in the new sb_flags.  This patch
adds the missing SB_I_VERSION flag.

Fixes: e462ec5 "VFS: Differentiate mount flags (MS_*) from internal
       superblock flags"
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-10-17 02:22:07 -04:00
Amir Goldstein 954c736f86 ovl: fix may_write_real() for overlayfs directories
Overlayfs directory file_inode() is the overlay inode whether the real
inode is upper or lower.

This fixes a regression in xfstest generic/158.

Fixes: 7c6893e3c9 ("ovl: don't allow writing ioctl on lower layer")
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2017-10-05 15:53:18 +02:00
Linus Torvalds 9e0ce554b0 Merge branch 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc leftovers from Al Viro.

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  fix the __user misannotations in asm-generic get_user/put_user
  fput: Don't reinvent the wheel but use existing llist API
  namespace.c: Don't reinvent the wheel but use existing llist API
2017-09-14 20:01:41 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 0f0d12728e Merge branch 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull mount flag updates from Al Viro:
 "Another chunk of fmount preparations from dhowells; only trivial
  conflicts for that part. It separates MS_... bits (very grotty
  mount(2) ABI) from the struct super_block ->s_flags (kernel-internal,
  only a small subset of MS_... stuff).

  This does *not* convert the filesystems to new constants; only the
  infrastructure is done here. The next step in that series is where the
  conflicts would be; that's the conversion of filesystems. It's purely
  mechanical and it's better done after the merge, so if you could run
  something like

	list=$(for i in MS_RDONLY MS_NOSUID MS_NODEV MS_NOEXEC MS_SYNCHRONOUS MS_MANDLOCK MS_DIRSYNC MS_NOATIME MS_NODIRATIME MS_SILENT MS_POSIXACL MS_KERNMOUNT MS_I_VERSION MS_LAZYTIME; do git grep -l $i fs drivers/staging/lustre drivers/mtd ipc mm include/linux; done|sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c$')

	sed -i -e 's/\<MS_RDONLY\>/SB_RDONLY/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_NOSUID\>/SB_NOSUID/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_NODEV\>/SB_NODEV/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_NOEXEC\>/SB_NOEXEC/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_SYNCHRONOUS\>/SB_SYNCHRONOUS/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_MANDLOCK\>/SB_MANDLOCK/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_DIRSYNC\>/SB_DIRSYNC/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_NOATIME\>/SB_NOATIME/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_NODIRATIME\>/SB_NODIRATIME/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_SILENT\>/SB_SILENT/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_POSIXACL\>/SB_POSIXACL/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_KERNMOUNT\>/SB_KERNMOUNT/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_I_VERSION\>/SB_I_VERSION/g' \
	        -e 's/\<MS_LAZYTIME\>/SB_LAZYTIME/g' \
	        $list

  and commit it with something along the lines of 'convert filesystems
  away from use of MS_... constants' as commit message, it would save a
  quite a bit of headache next cycle"

* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  VFS: Differentiate mount flags (MS_*) from internal superblock flags
  VFS: Convert sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY to sb_rdonly(sb)
  vfs: Add sb_rdonly(sb) to query the MS_RDONLY flag on s_flags
2017-09-14 18:54:01 -07:00
Miklos Szeredi 7c6893e3c9 ovl: don't allow writing ioctl on lower layer
Problem with ioctl() is that it's a file operation, yet often used as an
inode operation (i.e. modify the inode despite the file being opened for
read-only).

mnt_want_write_file() is used by filesystems in such cases to get write
access on an arbitrary open file.

Since overlayfs lets filesystems do all file operations, including ioctl,
this can lead to mnt_want_write_file() returning OK for a lower file and
modification of that lower file.

This patch prevents modification by checking if the file is from an
overlayfs lower layer and returning EPERM in that case.

Need to introduce a mnt_want_write_file_path() variant that still does the
old thing for inode operations that can do the copy up + modification
correctly in such cases (fchown, fsetxattr, fremovexattr).

This does not address the correctness of such ioctls on overlayfs (the
correct way would be to copy up and attempt to perform ioctl on upper
file).

In theory this could be a regression.  We very much hope that nobody is
relying on such a hack in any sane setup.

While this patch meddles in VFS code, it has no effect on non-overlayfs
filesystems.

Reported-by: "zhangyi (F)" <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2017-09-05 12:53:12 +02:00
Byungchul Park 2978573578 namespace.c: Don't reinvent the wheel but use existing llist API
Although llist provides proper APIs, they are not used. Make them used.

Signed-off-by: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-08-28 00:50:22 -04:00
David Howells e462ec50cb VFS: Differentiate mount flags (MS_*) from internal superblock flags
Differentiate the MS_* flags passed to mount(2) from the internal flags set
in the super_block's s_flags.  s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names
and the values for the moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're
equivalent to.

In this patch, just the headers are altered and some kernel code where
blind automated conversion isn't necessarily correct.

Note that this shows up some interesting issues:

 (1) Some MS_* flags get translated to MNT_* flags (such as MS_NODEV ->
     MNT_NODEV) without passing this on to the filesystem, but some
     filesystems set such flags anyway.

 (2) The ->remount_fs() methods of some filesystems adjust the *flags
     argument by setting MS_* flags in it, such as MS_NOATIME - but these
     flags are then scrubbed by do_remount_sb() (only the occupants of
     MS_RMT_MASK are permitted: MS_RDONLY, MS_SYNCHRONOUS, MS_MANDLOCK,
     MS_I_VERSION and MS_LAZYTIME)

I'm not sure what's the best way to solve all these cases.

Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-07-17 08:45:35 +01:00
David Howells bc98a42c1f VFS: Convert sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY to sb_rdonly(sb)
Firstly by applying the following with coccinelle's spatch:

	@@ expression SB; @@
	-SB->s_flags & MS_RDONLY
	+sb_rdonly(SB)

to effect the conversion to sb_rdonly(sb), then by applying:

	@@ expression A, SB; @@
	(
	-(!sb_rdonly(SB)) && A
	+!sb_rdonly(SB) && A
	|
	-A != (sb_rdonly(SB))
	+A != sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-A == (sb_rdonly(SB))
	+A == sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-!(sb_rdonly(SB))
	+!sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-A && (sb_rdonly(SB))
	+A && sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-A || (sb_rdonly(SB))
	+A || sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-(sb_rdonly(SB)) != A
	+sb_rdonly(SB) != A
	|
	-(sb_rdonly(SB)) == A
	+sb_rdonly(SB) == A
	|
	-(sb_rdonly(SB)) && A
	+sb_rdonly(SB) && A
	|
	-(sb_rdonly(SB)) || A
	+sb_rdonly(SB) || A
	)

	@@ expression A, B, SB; @@
	(
	-(sb_rdonly(SB)) ? 1 : 0
	+sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-(sb_rdonly(SB)) ? A : B
	+sb_rdonly(SB) ? A : B
	)

to remove left over excess bracketage and finally by applying:

	@@ expression A, SB; @@
	(
	-(A & MS_RDONLY) != sb_rdonly(SB)
	+(bool)(A & MS_RDONLY) != sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-(A & MS_RDONLY) == sb_rdonly(SB)
	+(bool)(A & MS_RDONLY) == sb_rdonly(SB)
	)

to make comparisons against the result of sb_rdonly() (which is a bool)
work correctly.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-07-17 08:45:34 +01:00
Linus Torvalds 78dcf73421 Merge branch 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull ->s_options removal from Al Viro:
 "Preparations for fsmount/fsopen stuff (coming next cycle). Everything
  gets moved to explicit ->show_options(), killing ->s_options off +
  some cosmetic bits around fs/namespace.c and friends. Basically, the
  stuff needed to work with fsmount series with minimum of conflicts
  with other work.

  It's not strictly required for this merge window, but it would reduce
  the PITA during the coming cycle, so it would be nice to have those
  bits and pieces out of the way"

* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  isofs: Fix isofs_show_options()
  VFS: Kill off s_options and helpers
  orangefs: Implement show_options
  9p: Implement show_options
  isofs: Implement show_options
  afs: Implement show_options
  affs: Implement show_options
  befs: Implement show_options
  spufs: Implement show_options
  bpf: Implement show_options
  ramfs: Implement show_options
  pstore: Implement show_options
  omfs: Implement show_options
  hugetlbfs: Implement show_options
  VFS: Don't use save/replace_mount_options if not using generic_show_options
  VFS: Provide empty name qstr
  VFS: Make get_filesystem() return the affected filesystem
  VFS: Clean up whitespace in fs/namespace.c and fs/super.c
  Provide a function to create a NUL-terminated string from unterminated data
2017-07-15 12:00:42 -07:00
David Howells 1d278a8790 VFS: Kill off s_options and helpers
Kill off s_options, save/replace_mount_options() and generic_show_options()
as all filesystems now implement ->show_options() for themselves.  This
should make it easier to implement a context-based mount where the mount
options can be passed individually over a file descriptor.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-07-11 06:09:21 -04:00
Pavel Tatashin 3d375d7859 mm: update callers to use HASH_ZERO flag
Update dcache, inode, pid, mountpoint, and mount hash tables to use
HASH_ZERO, and remove initialization after allocations.  In case of
places where HASH_EARLY was used such as in __pv_init_lock_hash the
zeroed hash table was already assumed, because memblock zeroes the
memory.

CPU: SPARC M6, Memory: 7T
Before fix:
  Dentry cache hash table entries: 1073741824
  Inode-cache hash table entries: 536870912
  Mount-cache hash table entries: 16777216
  Mountpoint-cache hash table entries: 16777216
  ftrace: allocating 20414 entries in 40 pages
  Total time: 11.798s

After fix:
  Dentry cache hash table entries: 1073741824
  Inode-cache hash table entries: 536870912
  Mount-cache hash table entries: 16777216
  Mountpoint-cache hash table entries: 16777216
  ftrace: allocating 20414 entries in 40 pages
  Total time: 3.198s

CPU: Intel Xeon E5-2630, Memory: 2.2T:
Before fix:
  Dentry cache hash table entries: 536870912
  Inode-cache hash table entries: 268435456
  Mount-cache hash table entries: 8388608
  Mountpoint-cache hash table entries: 8388608
  CPU: Physical Processor ID: 0
  Total time: 3.245s

After fix:
  Dentry cache hash table entries: 536870912
  Inode-cache hash table entries: 268435456
  Mount-cache hash table entries: 8388608
  Mountpoint-cache hash table entries: 8388608
  CPU: Physical Processor ID: 0
  Total time: 3.244s

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1488432825-92126-4-git-send-email-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-06 16:24:33 -07:00
David Howells dd111b31e9 VFS: Clean up whitespace in fs/namespace.c and fs/super.c
Clean up line terminal whitespace in fs/namespace.c and fs/super.c.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-07-06 03:27:09 -04:00
Linus Torvalds e5f76a2e0e Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull mnt namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "A big break-through came during this development cycle as a way was
  found to maintain the existing umount -l semantics while allowing for
  optimizations that improve the performance. That is represented by the
  first change in this series moving the reparenting of mounts into
  their own pass. This has allowed addressing the horrific performance
  of umount -l on a carefully crafted tree of mounts with locks held
  (0.06s vs 60s in my testing). What allowed this was not changing where
  umounts propagate to while propgating umounts.

  The next change fixes the case where the order of the mount whose
  umount are being progated visits a tree where the mounts are stacked
  upon each other in another order. This is weird but not hard to
  implement.

  The final change takes advantage of the unchanging mount propgation
  tree to skip parts of the mount propgation tree that have already been
  visited. Yielding a very nice speed up in the worst case.

  There remains one outstanding question about the semantics of umount -l
  that I am still discussiong with Ram Pai. In practice that area of the
  semantics was changed by 1064f874ab ("mnt: Tuck mounts under others
  instead of creating shadow/side mounts.") and no regressions have been
  reported. Still I intend to finish talking that out with him to ensure
  there is not something a more intense use of mount propagation in the
  future will not cause to become significant"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  mnt: Make propagate_umount less slow for overlapping mount propagation trees
  mnt: In propgate_umount handle visiting mounts in any order
  mnt: In umount propagation reparent in a separate pass
2017-07-05 17:00:56 -07:00
Andrei Vagin 4068367c9c fs: don't forget to put old mntns in mntns_install
Fixes: 4f757f3cbf ("make sure that mntns_install() doesn't end up with referral for root")
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-06-15 06:53:05 -04:00
Eric W. Biederman 99b19d1647 mnt: In propgate_umount handle visiting mounts in any order
While investigating some poor umount performance I realized that in
the case of overlapping mount trees where some of the mounts are locked
the code has been failing to unmount all of the mounts it should
have been unmounting.

This failure to unmount all of the necessary
mounts can be reproduced with:

$ cat locked_mounts_test.sh

mount -t tmpfs test-base /mnt
mount --make-shared /mnt
mkdir -p /mnt/b

mount -t tmpfs test1 /mnt/b
mount --make-shared /mnt/b
mkdir -p /mnt/b/10

mount -t tmpfs test2 /mnt/b/10
mount --make-shared /mnt/b/10
mkdir -p /mnt/b/10/20

mount --rbind /mnt/b /mnt/b/10/20

unshare -Urm --propagation unchaged /bin/sh -c 'sleep 5; if [ $(grep test /proc/self/mountinfo | wc -l) -eq 1 ] ; then echo SUCCESS ; else echo FAILURE ; fi'
sleep 1
umount -l /mnt/b
wait %%

$ unshare -Urm ./locked_mounts_test.sh

This failure is corrected by removing the prepass that marks mounts
that may be umounted.

A first pass is added that umounts mounts if possible and if not sets
mount mark if they could be unmounted if they weren't locked and adds
them to a list to umount possibilities.  This first pass reconsiders
the mounts parent if it is on the list of umount possibilities, ensuring
that information of umoutability will pass from child to mount parent.

A second pass then walks through all mounts that are umounted and processes
their children unmounting them or marking them for reparenting.

A last pass cleans up the state on the mounts that could not be umounted
and if applicable reparents them to their first parent that remained
mounted.

While a bit longer than the old code this code is much more robust
as it allows information to flow up from the leaves and down
from the trunk making the order in which mounts are encountered
in the umount propgation tree irrelevant.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0c56fe3142 ("mnt: Don't propagate unmounts to locked mounts")
Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-05-23 08:41:16 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 570487d3fa mnt: In umount propagation reparent in a separate pass
It was observed that in some pathlogical cases that the current code
does not unmount everything it should.  After investigation it
was determined that the issue is that mnt_change_mntpoint can
can change which mounts are available to be unmounted during mount
propagation which is wrong.

The trivial reproducer is:
$ cat ./pathological.sh

mount -t tmpfs test-base /mnt
cd /mnt
mkdir 1 2 1/1
mount --bind 1 1
mount --make-shared 1
mount --bind 1 2
mount --bind 1/1 1/1
mount --bind 1/1 1/1
echo
grep test-base /proc/self/mountinfo
umount 1/1
echo
grep test-base /proc/self/mountinfo

$ unshare -Urm ./pathological.sh

The expected output looks like:
46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
49 54 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
50 53 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
51 49 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
54 47 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
53 48 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
52 50 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000

46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000

The output without the fix looks like:
46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
49 54 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
50 53 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
51 49 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
54 47 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
53 48 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
52 50 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000

46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
52 48 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000

That last mount in the output was in the propgation tree to be unmounted but
was missed because the mnt_change_mountpoint changed it's parent before the walk
through the mount propagation tree observed it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1064f874ab ("mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.")
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-05-23 08:40:32 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 050453295f Merge branch 'work.sane_pwd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Making sure that something like a referral point won't end up as pwd
  or root.

  The main part is the last commit (fixing mntns_install()); that one
  fixes a hard-to-hit race. The fchdir() commit is making fchdir(2) a
  bit more robust - it should be impossible to get opened files (even
  O_PATH ones) for referral points in the first place, so the existing
  checks are OK, but checking the same thing as in chdir(2) is just as
  cheap.

  The path_init() commit removes a redundant check that shouldn't have
  been there in the first place"

* 'work.sane_pwd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  make sure that mntns_install() doesn't end up with referral for root
  path_init(): don't bother with checking MAY_EXEC for LOOKUP_ROOT
  make sure that fchdir() won't accept referral points, etc.
2017-05-12 11:39:59 -07:00
Al Viro 4f757f3cbf make sure that mntns_install() doesn't end up with referral for root
new flag: LOOKUP_DOWN.  If the starting point is overmounted, cross
into whatever's mounted on top, triggering referrals et.al.

Use that instead of follow_down_one() loop in mntns_install(), handle
errors properly.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-04-21 14:05:36 -04:00
Jan Kara 08991e83b7 fsnotify: Free fsnotify_mark_connector when there is no mark attached
Currently we free fsnotify_mark_connector structure only when inode /
vfsmount is getting freed. This can however impose noticeable memory
overhead when marks get attached to inodes only temporarily. So free the
connector structure once the last mark is detached from the object.
Since notification infrastructure can be working with the connector
under the protection of fsnotify_mark_srcu, we have to be careful and
free the fsnotify_mark_connector only after SRCU period passes.

Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
2017-04-10 17:37:35 +02:00
Jan Kara 9dd813c15b fsnotify: Move mark list head from object into dedicated structure
Currently notification marks are attached to object (inode or vfsmnt) by
a hlist_head in the object. The list is also protected by a spinlock in
the object. So while there is any mark attached to the list of marks,
the object must be pinned in memory (and thus e.g. last iput() deleting
inode cannot happen). Also for list iteration in fsnotify() to work, we
must hold fsnotify_mark_srcu lock so that mark itself and
mark->obj_list.next cannot get freed. Thus we are required to wait for
response to fanotify events from userspace process with
fsnotify_mark_srcu lock held. That causes issues when userspace process
is buggy and does not reply to some event - basically the whole
notification subsystem gets eventually stuck.

So to be able to drop fsnotify_mark_srcu lock while waiting for
response, we have to pin the mark in memory and make sure it stays in
the object list (as removing the mark waiting for response could lead to
lost notification events for groups later in the list). However we don't
want inode reclaim to block on such mark as that would lead to system
just locking up elsewhere.

This commit is the first in the series that paves way towards solving
these conflicting lifetime needs. Instead of anchoring the list of marks
directly in the object, we anchor it in a dedicated structure
(fsnotify_mark_connector) and just point to that structure from the
object. The following commits will also add spinlock protecting the list
and object pointer to the structure.

Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
2017-04-10 17:37:34 +02:00
Ingo Molnar 9164bb4a18 sched/headers: Prepare to move 'init_task' and 'init_thread_union' from <linux/sched.h> to <linux/sched/task.h>
Update all usage sites first.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02 08:42:38 +01:00
Ingo Molnar 5b825c3af1 sched/headers: Prepare to remove <linux/cred.h> inclusion from <linux/sched.h>
Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.

Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over
2,200 files ...

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02 08:42:31 +01:00
Eric W. Biederman 1064f874ab mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
Ever since mount propagation was introduced in cases where a mount in
propagated to parent mount mountpoint pair that is already in use the
code has placed the new mount behind the old mount in the mount hash
table.

This implementation detail is problematic as it allows creating
arbitrary length mount hash chains.

Furthermore it invalidates the constraint maintained elsewhere in the
mount code that a parent mount and a mountpoint pair will have exactly
one mount upon them.  Making it hard to deal with and to talk about
this special case in the mount code.

Modify mount propagation to notice when there is already a mount at
the parent mount and mountpoint where a new mount is propagating to
and place that preexisting mount on top of the new mount.

Modify unmount propagation to notice when a mount that is being
unmounted has another mount on top of it (and no other children), and
to replace the unmounted mount with the mount on top of it.

Move the MNT_UMUONT test from __lookup_mnt_last into
__propagate_umount as that is the only call of __lookup_mnt_last where
MNT_UMOUNT may be set on any mount visible in the mount hash table.

These modifications allow:
 - __lookup_mnt_last to be removed.
 - attach_shadows to be renamed __attach_mnt and its shadow
   handling to be removed.
 - commit_tree to be simplified
 - copy_tree to be simplified

The result is an easier to understand tree of mounts that does not
allow creation of arbitrary length hash chains in the mount hash table.

The result is also a very slight userspace visible difference in semantics.
The following two cases now behave identically, where before order
mattered:

case 1: (explicit user action)
	B is a slave of A
	mount something on A/a , it will propagate to B/a
	and than mount something on B/a

case 2: (tucked mount)
	B is a slave of A
	mount something on B/a
	and than mount something on A/a

Histroically umount A/a would fail in case 1 and succeed in case 2.
Now umount A/a succeeds in both configurations.

This very small change in semantics appears if anything to be a bug
fix to me and my survey of userspace leads me to believe that no programs
will notice or care of this subtle semantic change.

v2: Updated to mnt_change_mountpoint to not call dput or mntput
and instead to decrement the counts directly.  It is guaranteed
that there will be other references when mnt_change_mountpoint is
called so this is safe.

v3: Moved put_mountpoint under mount_lock in attach_recursive_mnt
    As the locking in fs/namespace.c changed between v2 and v3.

v4: Reworked the logic in propagate_mount_busy and __propagate_umount
    that detects when a mount completely covers another mount.

v5: Removed unnecessary tests whose result is alwasy true in
    find_topper and attach_recursive_mnt.

v6: Document the user space visible semantic difference.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b90fa9ae8f ("[PATCH] shared mount handling: bind and rbind")
Tested-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-02-04 00:01:06 +13:00
Eric W. Biederman 93faccbbfa fs: Better permission checking for submounts
To support unprivileged users mounting filesystems two permission
checks have to be performed: a test to see if the user allowed to
create a mount in the mount namespace, and a test to see if
the user is allowed to access the specified filesystem.

The automount case is special in that mounting the original filesystem
grants permission to mount the sub-filesystems, to any user who
happens to stumble across the their mountpoint and satisfies the
ordinary filesystem permission checks.

Attempting to handle the automount case by using override_creds
almost works.  It preserves the idea that permission to mount
the original filesystem is permission to mount the sub-filesystem.
Unfortunately using override_creds messes up the filesystems
ordinary permission checks.

Solve this by being explicit that a mount is a submount by introducing
vfs_submount, and using it where appropriate.

vfs_submount uses a new mount internal mount flags MS_SUBMOUNT, to let
sget and friends know that a mount is a submount so they can take appropriate
action.

sget and sget_userns are modified to not perform any permission checks
on submounts.

follow_automount is modified to stop using override_creds as that
has proven problemantic.

do_mount is modified to always remove the new MS_SUBMOUNT flag so
that we know userspace will never by able to specify it.

autofs4 is modified to stop using current_real_cred that was put in
there to handle the previous version of submount permission checking.

cifs is modified to pass the mountpoint all of the way down to vfs_submount.

debugfs is modified to pass the mountpoint all of the way down to
trace_automount by adding a new parameter.  To make this change easier
a new typedef debugfs_automount_t is introduced to capture the type of
the debugfs automount function.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 069d5ac9ae ("autofs:  Fix automounts by using current_real_cred()->uid")
Fixes: aeaa4a79ff ("fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds")
Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-02-02 04:36:12 +13:00
Eric W. Biederman 3895dbf898 mnt: Protect the mountpoint hashtable with mount_lock
Protecting the mountpoint hashtable with namespace_sem was sufficient
until a call to umount_mnt was added to mntput_no_expire.  At which
point it became possible for multiple calls of put_mountpoint on
the same hash chain to happen on the same time.

Kristen Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com> reported:
> This can cause a panic when simultaneous callers of put_mountpoint
> attempt to free the same mountpoint.  This occurs because some callers
> hold the mount_hash_lock, while others hold the namespace lock.  Some
> even hold both.
>
> In this submitter's case, the panic manifested itself as a GP fault in
> put_mountpoint() when it called hlist_del() and attempted to dereference
> a m_hash.pprev that had been poisioned by another thread.

Al Viro observed that the simple fix is to switch from using the namespace_sem
to the mount_lock to protect the mountpoint hash table.

I have taken Al's suggested patch moved put_mountpoint in pivot_root
(instead of taking mount_lock an additional time), and have replaced
new_mountpoint with get_mountpoint a function that does the hash table
lookup and addition under the mount_lock.   The introduction of get_mounptoint
ensures that only the mount_lock is needed to manipulate the mountpoint
hashtable.

d_set_mounted is modified to only set DCACHE_MOUNTED if it is not
already set.  This allows get_mountpoint to use the setting of
DCACHE_MOUNTED to ensure adding a struct mountpoint for a dentry
happens exactly once.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ce07d891a0 ("mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts")
Reported-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-01-10 13:34:43 +13:00
Al Viro faf0dcebd7 Merge branch 'work.namespace' into for-linus 2016-12-22 23:04:31 -05:00
Al Viro 9763f7a4a5 Merge branch 'work.autofs' into for-linus
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-12-16 16:34:52 -05:00
Al Viro 5235d448c4 reorganize do_make_slave()
Make sure that clone_mnt() never returns a mount with MNT_SHARED in
flags, but without a valid ->mnt_group_id.  That allows to demystify
do_make_slave() quite a bit, among other things.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-12-16 16:30:49 -05:00
Al Viro 066715d3fd clone_private_mount() doesn't need to touch namespace_sem
not for CL_PRIVATE clone_mnt()

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-12-16 16:30:49 -05:00
Al Viro f4cc1c3810 remove a bogus claim about namespace_sem being held by callers of mnt_alloc_id()
Hadn't been true for quite a while

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-12-16 16:30:48 -05:00
Al Viro ca71cf71ee namespace.c: constify struct path passed to a bunch of primitives
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-12-05 19:03:12 -05:00
Mickaël Salaün 640eb7e7b5 fs: Constify path_is_under()'s arguments
The function path_is_under() doesn't modify the paths pointed by its
arguments but only browse them. Constifying this pointers make a cleaner
interface to be used by (future) code which may only have access to
const struct path pointers (e.g. LSM hooks).

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-12-05 18:55:47 -05:00
Ian Kent c6609c0a1c vfs: add path_is_mountpoint() helper
d_mountpoint() can only be used reliably to establish if a dentry is
not mounted in any namespace. It isn't aware of the possibility there
may be multiple mounts using a given dentry that may be in a different
namespace.

Add helper functions, path_is_mountpoint(), that checks if a struct path
is a mountpoint for this case.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161011053358.27645.9729.stgit@pluto.themaw.net
Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-12-03 20:51:35 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 9ffc66941d This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as
 possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation
 (due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering,
 thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).
 
 At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for
 how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals.
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 Version: GnuPG v1
 Comment: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
 
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Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull gcc plugins update from Kees Cook:
 "This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
  extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot
  time as possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in
  CPU operation (due to runtime data differences, hardware differences,
  SMP ordering, thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).

  At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example
  for how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  latent_entropy: Mark functions with __latent_entropy
  gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin
2016-10-15 10:03:15 -07:00
Emese Revfy 0766f788eb latent_entropy: Mark functions with __latent_entropy
The __latent_entropy gcc attribute can be used only on functions and
variables.  If it is on a function then the plugin will instrument it for
gathering control-flow entropy. If the attribute is on a variable then
the plugin will initialize it with random contents.  The variable must
be an integer, an integer array type or a structure with integer fields.

These specific functions have been selected because they are init
functions (to help gather boot-time entropy), are called at unpredictable
times, or they have variable loops, each of which provide some level of
latent entropy.

Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
[kees: expanded commit message]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2016-10-10 14:51:45 -07:00
Linus Torvalds abb5a14fa2 Merge branch 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted misc bits and pieces.

  There are several single-topic branches left after this (rename2
  series from Miklos, current_time series from Deepa Dinamani, xattr
  series from Andreas, uaccess stuff from from me) and I'd prefer to
  send those separately"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (39 commits)
  proc: switch auxv to use of __mem_open()
  hpfs: support FIEMAP
  cifs: get rid of unused arguments of CIFSSMBWrite()
  posix_acl: uapi header split
  posix_acl: xattr representation cleanups
  fs/aio.c: eliminate redundant loads in put_aio_ring_file
  fs/internal.h: add const to ns_dentry_operations declaration
  compat: remove compat_printk()
  fs/buffer.c: make __getblk_slow() static
  proc: unsigned file descriptors
  fs/file: more unsigned file descriptors
  fs: compat: remove redundant check of nr_segs
  cachefiles: Fix attempt to read i_blocks after deleting file [ver #2]
  cifs: don't use memcpy() to copy struct iov_iter
  get rid of separate multipage fault-in primitives
  fs: Avoid premature clearing of capabilities
  fs: Give dentry to inode_change_ok() instead of inode
  fuse: Propagate dentry down to inode_change_ok()
  ceph: Propagate dentry down to inode_change_ok()
  xfs: Propagate dentry down to inode_change_ok()
  ...
2016-10-10 13:04:49 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman d29216842a mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.

    mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
    mount --make-rshared /
    for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done

Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.

As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.

Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:

> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.

So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000.  This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts.  Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.

For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.

Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-09-30 12:46:48 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 7872559664 Merge branch 'nsfs-ioctls' into HEAD
From: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>

Each namespace has an owning user namespace and now there is not way
to discover these relationships.

Pid and user namepaces are hierarchical. There is no way to discover
parent-child relationships too.

Why we may want to know relationships between namespaces?

One use would be visualization, in order to understand the running
system.  Another would be to answer the question: what capability does
process X have to perform operations on a resource governed by namespace
Y?

One more use-case (which usually called abnormal) is checkpoint/restart.
In CRIU we are going to dump and restore nested namespaces.

There [1] was a discussion about which interface to choose to determing
relationships between namespaces.

Eric suggested to add two ioctl-s [2]:
> Grumble, Grumble.  I think this may actually a case for creating ioctls
> for these two cases.  Now that random nsfs file descriptors are bind
> mountable the original reason for using proc files is not as pressing.
>
> One ioctl for the user namespace that owns a file descriptor.
> One ioctl for the parent namespace of a namespace file descriptor.

Here is an implementaions of these ioctl-s.

$ man man7/namespaces.7
...
Since  Linux  4.X,  the  following  ioctl(2)  calls are supported for
namespace file descriptors.  The correct syntax is:

      fd = ioctl(ns_fd, ioctl_type);

where ioctl_type is one of the following:

NS_GET_USERNS
      Returns a file descriptor that refers to an owning user names‐
      pace.

NS_GET_PARENT
      Returns  a  file descriptor that refers to a parent namespace.
      This ioctl(2) can be used for pid  and  user  namespaces.  For
      user namespaces, NS_GET_PARENT and NS_GET_USERNS have the same
      meaning.

In addition to generic ioctl(2) errors, the following  specific  ones
can occur:

EINVAL NS_GET_PARENT was called for a nonhierarchical namespace.

EPERM  The  requested  namespace  is outside of the current namespace
      scope.

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/6/158
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/9/101

Changes for v2:
* don't return ENOENT for init_user_ns and init_pid_ns. There is nothing
  outside of the init namespace, so we can return EPERM in this case too.
  > The fewer special cases the easier the code is to get
  > correct, and the easier it is to read. // Eric

Changes for v3:
* rename ns->get_owner() to ns->owner(). get_* usually means that it
  grabs a reference.

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "W. Trevor King" <wking@tremily.us>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
2016-09-22 20:00:36 -05:00
Andrey Vagin bcac25a58b kernel: add a helper to get an owning user namespace for a namespace
Return -EPERM if an owning user namespace is outside of a process
current user namespace.

v2: In a first version ns_get_owner returned ENOENT for init_user_ns.
    This special cases was removed from this version. There is nothing
    outside of init_user_ns, so we can return EPERM.
v3: rename ns->get_owner() to ns->owner(). get_* usually means that it
grabs a reference.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-09-22 19:59:39 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman df75e7748b userns: When the per user per user namespace limit is reached return ENOSPC
The current error codes returned when a the per user per user
namespace limit are hit (EINVAL, EUSERS, and ENFILE) are wrong.  I
asked for advice on linux-api and it we made clear that those were
the wrong error code, but a correct effor code was not suggested.

The best general error code I have found for hitting a resource limit
is ENOSPC.  It is not perfect but as it is unambiguous it will serve
until someone comes up with a better error code.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-09-22 13:25:56 -05:00
Miklos Szeredi c568d68341 locks: fix file locking on overlayfs
This patch allows flock, posix locks, ofd locks and leases to work
correctly on overlayfs.

Instead of using the underlying inode for storing lock context use the
overlay inode.  This allows locks to be persistent across copy-up.

This is done by introducing locks_inode() helper and using it instead of
file_inode() to get the inode in locking code.  For non-overlayfs the two
are equivalent, except for an extra pointer dereference in locks_inode().

Since lock operations are in "struct file_operations" we must also make
sure not to call underlying filesystem's lock operations.  Introcude a
super block flag MS_NOREMOTELOCK to this effect.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
2016-09-16 12:44:20 +02:00
Eric W. Biederman 537f7ccb39 mntns: Add a limit on the number of mount namespaces.
v2: Fixed the very obvious lack of setting ucounts
    on struct mnt_ns reported by Andrei Vagin, and the kbuild
    test report.

Reported-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-31 07:28:35 -05:00
Linus Torvalds a867d7349e Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull userns vfs updates from Eric Biederman:
 "This tree contains some very long awaited work on generalizing the
  user namespace support for mounting filesystems to include filesystems
  with a backing store.  The real world target is fuse but the goal is
  to update the vfs to allow any filesystem to be supported.  This
  patchset is based on a lot of code review and testing to approach that
  goal.

  While looking at what is needed to support the fuse filesystem it
  became clear that there were things like xattrs for security modules
  that needed special treatment.  That the resolution of those concerns
  would not be fuse specific.  That sorting out these general issues
  made most sense at the generic level, where the right people could be
  drawn into the conversation, and the issues could be solved for
  everyone.

  At a high level what this patchset does a couple of simple things:

   - Add a user namespace owner (s_user_ns) to struct super_block.

   - Teach the vfs to handle filesystem uids and gids not mapping into
     to kuids and kgids and being reported as INVALID_UID and
     INVALID_GID in vfs data structures.

  By assigning a user namespace owner filesystems that are mounted with
  only user namespace privilege can be detected.  This allows security
  modules and the like to know which mounts may not be trusted.  This
  also allows the set of uids and gids that are communicated to the
  filesystem to be capped at the set of kuids and kgids that are in the
  owning user namespace of the filesystem.

  One of the crazier corner casees this handles is the case of inodes
  whose i_uid or i_gid are not mapped into the vfs.  Most of the code
  simply doesn't care but it is easy to confuse the inode writeback path
  so no operation that could cause an inode write-back is permitted for
  such inodes (aka only reads are allowed).

  This set of changes starts out by cleaning up the code paths involved
  in user namespace permirted mounts.  Then when things are clean enough
  adds code that cleanly sets s_user_ns.  Then additional restrictions
  are added that are possible now that the filesystem superblock
  contains owner information.

  These changes should not affect anyone in practice, but there are some
  parts of these restrictions that are changes in behavior.

   - Andy's restriction on suid executables that does not honor the
     suid bit when the path is from another mount namespace (think
     /proc/[pid]/fd/) or when the filesystem was mounted by a less
     privileged user.

   - The replacement of the user namespace implicit setting of MNT_NODEV
     with implicitly setting SB_I_NODEV on the filesystem superblock
     instead.

     Using SB_I_NODEV is a stronger form that happens to make this state
     user invisible.  The user visibility can be managed but it caused
     problems when it was introduced from applications reasonably
     expecting mount flags to be what they were set to.

  There is a little bit of work remaining before it is safe to support
  mounting filesystems with backing store in user namespaces, beyond
  what is in this set of changes.

   - Verifying the mounter has permission to read/write the block device
     during mount.

   - Teaching the integrity modules IMA and EVM to handle filesystems
     mounted with only user namespace root and to reduce trust in their
     security xattrs accordingly.

   - Capturing the mounters credentials and using that for permission
     checks in d_automount and the like.  (Given that overlayfs already
     does this, and we need the work in d_automount it make sense to
     generalize this case).

  Furthermore there are a few changes that are on the wishlist:

   - Get all filesystems supporting posix acls using the generic posix
     acls so that posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user and
     posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user may be removed.  [Maintainability]

   - Reducing the permission checks in places such as remount to allow
     the superblock owner to perform them.

   - Allowing the superblock owner to chown files with unmapped uids and
     gids to something that is mapped so the files may be treated
     normally.

  I am not considering even obvious relaxations of permission checks
  until it is clear there are no more corner cases that need to be
  locked down and handled generically.

  Many thanks to Seth Forshee who kept this code alive, and putting up
  with me rewriting substantial portions of what he did to handle more
  corner cases, and for his diligent testing and reviewing of my
  changes"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (30 commits)
  fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds
  fs: Update i_[ug]id_(read|write) to translate relative to s_user_ns
  evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC
  dquot: For now explicitly don't support filesystems outside of init_user_ns
  quota: Handle quota data stored in s_user_ns in quota_setxquota
  quota: Ensure qids map to the filesystem
  vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
  vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
  cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as()
  fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()
  vfs: Verify acls are valid within superblock's s_user_ns.
  userns: Handle -1 in k[ug]id_has_mapping when !CONFIG_USER_NS
  fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns
  selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
  Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
  Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
  fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid
  fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block
  userns: Remove the now unnecessary FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT flag
  userns: Remove implicit MNT_NODEV fragility.
  ...
2016-07-29 15:54:19 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 48c4565ed6 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
 "Tmpfs readdir throughput regression fix (this cycle) + some -stable
  fodder all over the place.

  One missing bit is Miklos' tonight locks.c fix - NFS folks had already
  grabbed that one by the time I woke up ;-)"

[ The locks.c fix came through the nfsd tree just moments ago ]

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  namespace: update event counter when umounting a deleted dentry
  9p: use file_dentry()
  ceph: fix d_obtain_alias() misuses
  lockless next_positive()
  libfs.c: new helper - next_positive()
  dcache_{readdir,dir_lseek}(): don't bother with nested ->d_lock
2016-07-01 15:20:11 -07:00
Andrey Ulanov e06b933e6d namespace: update event counter when umounting a deleted dentry
- m_start() in fs/namespace.c expects that ns->event is incremented each
  time a mount added or removed from ns->list.
- umount_tree() removes items from the list but does not increment event
  counter, expecting that it's done before the function is called.
- There are some codepaths that call umount_tree() without updating
  "event" counter. e.g. from __detach_mounts().
- When this happens m_start may reuse a cached mount structure that no
  longer belongs to ns->list (i.e. use after free which usually leads
  to infinite loop).

This change fixes the above problem by incrementing global event counter
before invoking umount_tree().

Change-Id: I622c8e84dcb9fb63542372c5dbf0178ee86bb589
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ulanov <andreyu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-06-30 23:28:30 -04:00
Andy Lutomirski 380cf5ba6b fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid
If a process gets access to a mount from a different user
namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of
setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem.  Prevent
this by treating mounts from other mount namespaces and those not
owned by current_user_ns() or an ancestor as nosuid.

This will make it safer to allow more complex filesystems to be
mounted in non-root user namespaces.

This does not remove the need for MNT_LOCK_NOSUID.  The setuid,
setgid, and file capability bits can no longer be abused if code in
a user namespace were to clear nosuid on an untrusted filesystem,
but this patch, by itself, is insufficient to protect the system
from abuse of files that, when execed, would increase MAC privilege.

As a more concrete explanation, any task that can manipulate a
vfsmount associated with a given user namespace already has
capabilities in that namespace and all of its descendents.  If they
can cause a malicious setuid, setgid, or file-caps executable to
appear in that mount, then that executable will only allow them to
elevate privileges in exactly the set of namespaces in which they
are already privileges.

On the other hand, if they can cause a malicious executable to
appear with a dangerous MAC label, running it could change the
caller's security context in a way that should not have been
possible, even inside the namespace in which the task is confined.

As a hardening measure, this would have made CVE-2014-5207 much
more difficult to exploit.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-06-24 10:40:41 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 67690f937c userns: Remove implicit MNT_NODEV fragility.
Replace the implict setting of MNT_NODEV on mounts that happen with
just user namespace permissions with an implicit setting of SB_I_NODEV
in s_iflags.  The visibility of the implicit MNT_NODEV has caused
problems in the past.

With this change the fragile case where an implicit MNT_NODEV needs to
be preserved in do_remount is removed.  Using SB_I_NODEV is much less
fragile as s_iflags are set during the original mount and never
changed.

In do_new_mount with the implicit setting of MNT_NODEV gone, the only
code that can affect mnt_flags is fs_fully_visible so simplify the if
statement and reduce the indentation of the code to make that clear.

Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-06-23 15:47:23 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman a1935c1738 mnt: Simplify mount_too_revealing
Verify all filesystems that we check in mount_too_revealing set
SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV in sb->s_iflags.  That is true for today
and it should remain true in the future.

Remove the now unnecessary checks from mnt_already_visibile that
ensure MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_NODEV are
preserved.  Making the code shorter and easier to read.

Relying on SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV instead of the user visible
MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NOEXEC, and MNT_NODEV ensures the many current
systems where proc and sysfs are mounted with "nosuid, nodev, noexec"
and several slightly buggy container applications don't bother to
set those flags continue to work.

Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-06-23 15:41:57 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman a001e74cef mnt: Move the FS_USERNS_MOUNT check into sget_userns
Allowing a filesystem to be mounted by other than root in the initial
user namespace is a filesystem property not a mount namespace property
and as such should be checked in filesystem specific code.  Move the
FS_USERNS_MOUNT test into super.c:sget_userns().

Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-06-23 15:41:55 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 8654df4e2a mnt: Refactor fs_fully_visible into mount_too_revealing
Replace the call of fs_fully_visible in do_new_mount from before the
new superblock is allocated with a call of mount_too_revealing after
the superblock is allocated.   This winds up being a much better location
for maintainability of the code.

The first change this enables is the replacement of FS_USERNS_VISIBLE
with SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE.  Moving the flag from struct filesystem_type
to sb_iflags on the superblock.

Unfortunately mount_too_revealing fundamentally needs to touch
mnt_flags adding several MNT_LOCKED_XXX flags at the appropriate
times.  If the mnt_flags did not need to be touched the code
could be easily moved into the filesystem specific mount code.

Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-06-23 15:41:46 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 695e9df010 mnt: Account for MS_RDONLY in fs_fully_visible
In rare cases it is possible for s_flags & MS_RDONLY to be set but
MNT_READONLY to be clear.  This starting combination can cause
fs_fully_visible to fail to ensure that the new mount is readonly.
Therefore force MNT_LOCK_READONLY in the new mount if MS_RDONLY
is set on the source filesystem of the mount.

In general both MS_RDONLY and MNT_READONLY are set at the same for
mounts so I don't expect any programs to care.  Nor do I expect
MS_RDONLY to be set on proc or sysfs in the initial user namespace,
which further decreases the likelyhood of problems.

Which means this change should only affect system configurations by
paranoid sysadmins who should welcome the additional protection
as it keeps people from wriggling out of their policies.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8c6cf9cc82 ("mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-06-15 06:52:23 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman d71ed6c930 mnt: fs_fully_visible test the proper mount for MNT_LOCKED
MNT_LOCKED implies on a child mount implies the child is locked to the
parent.  So while looping through the children the children should be
tested (not their parent).

Typically an unshare of a mount namespace locks all mounts together
making both the parent and the slave as locked but there are a few
corner cases where other things work.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ceeb0e5d39 ("vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible")
Reported-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-06-06 20:52:03 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 97c1df3e54 mnt: If fs_fully_visible fails call put_filesystem.
Add this trivial missing error handling.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1b852bceb0 ("mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-06-06 20:48:31 -05:00
Al Viro 5955102c99 wrappers for ->i_mutex access
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).

Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
only shared.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-01-22 18:04:28 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 33caf82acf Merge branch 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "All kinds of stuff.  That probably should've been 5 or 6 separate
  branches, but by the time I'd realized how large and mixed that bag
  had become it had been too close to -final to play with rebasing.

  Some fs/namei.c cleanups there, memdup_user_nul() introduction and
  switching open-coded instances, burying long-dead code, whack-a-mole
  of various kinds, several new helpers for ->llseek(), assorted
  cleanups and fixes from various people, etc.

  One piece probably deserves special mention - Neil's
  lookup_one_len_unlocked().  Similar to lookup_one_len(), but gets
  called without ->i_mutex and tries to avoid ever taking it.  That, of
  course, means that it's not useful for any directory modifications,
  but things like getting inode attributes in nfds readdirplus are fine
  with that.  I really should've asked for moratorium on lookup-related
  changes this cycle, but since I hadn't done that early enough...  I
  *am* asking for that for the coming cycle, though - I'm going to try
  and get conversion of i_mutex to rwsem with ->lookup() done under lock
  taken shared.

  There will be a patch closer to the end of the window, along the lines
  of the one Linus had posted last May - mechanical conversion of
  ->i_mutex accesses to inode_lock()/inode_unlock()/inode_trylock()/
  inode_is_locked()/inode_lock_nested().  To quote Linus back then:

    -----
    |    This is an automated patch using
    |
    |        sed 's/mutex_lock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_lock(\1)/'
    |        sed 's/mutex_unlock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_unlock(\1)/'
    |        sed 's/mutex_lock_nested(&\(.*\)->i_mutex,[     ]*I_MUTEX_\([A-Z0-9_]*\))/inode_lock_nested(\1, I_MUTEX_\2)/'
    |        sed 's/mutex_is_locked(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_is_locked(\1)/'
    |        sed 's/mutex_trylock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_trylock(\1)/'
    |
    |    with a very few manual fixups
    -----

  I'm going to send that once the ->i_mutex-affecting stuff in -next
  gets mostly merged (or when Linus says he's about to stop taking
  merges)"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  nfsd: don't hold i_mutex over userspace upcalls
  fs:affs:Replace time_t with time64_t
  fs/9p: use fscache mutex rather than spinlock
  proc: add a reschedule point in proc_readfd_common()
  logfs: constify logfs_block_ops structures
  fcntl: allow to set O_DIRECT flag on pipe
  fs: __generic_file_splice_read retry lookup on AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE
  fs: xattr: Use kvfree()
  [s390] page_to_phys() always returns a multiple of PAGE_SIZE
  nbd: use ->compat_ioctl()
  fs: use block_device name vsprintf helper
  lib/vsprintf: add %*pg format specifier
  fs: use gendisk->disk_name where possible
  poll: plug an unused argument to do_poll
  amdkfd: don't open-code memdup_user()
  cdrom: don't open-code memdup_user()
  rsxx: don't open-code memdup_user()
  mtip32xx: don't open-code memdup_user()
  [um] mconsole: don't open-code memdup_user_nul()
  [um] hostaudio: don't open-code memdup_user()
  ...
2016-01-12 17:11:47 -08:00
Al Viro b40ef8696f saner calling conventions for copy_mount_options()
let it just return NULL, pointer to kernel copy or ERR_PTR().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-01-04 10:28:32 -05:00
Yaowei Bai 25ab4c9b1c fs/namespace.c: path_is_under can be boolean
This patch makes path_is_under return bool to improve
readability due to this particular function only using either
one or zero as its return value.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Yaowei Bai <baiyaowei@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-12-06 21:17:13 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 95ace75414 locks: Don't allow mounts in user namespaces to enable mandatory locking
Since no one uses mandatory locking and files with mandatory locks can
cause problems don't allow them in user namespaces.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
2015-11-16 10:01:34 -05:00
Jeff Layton 9e8925b67a locks: Allow disabling mandatory locking at compile time
Mandatory locking appears to be almost unused and buggy and there
appears no real interest in doing anything with it.  Since effectively
no one uses the code and since the code is buggy let's allow it to be
disabled at compile time.  I would just suggest removing the code but
undoubtedly that will break some piece of userspace code somewhere.

For the distributions that don't care about this piece of code
this gives a nice starting point to make mandatory locking go away.

Cc: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
2015-11-16 09:49:34 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 73b6fa8e49 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start
  implementing executable files, as the there are application today that
  are only secure because such files do not exist.

  It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that
  did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from
  /proc/<pid>/ns/*.

  It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user
  namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)
  when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling
  unshare.  This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling
  that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel.

  Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of
  sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application,
  by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes.  Apparently that
  application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted
  on /sys/fs/cgroup.

  The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch.
  and I expect them to come from there.  The bind mount escape is the
  last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0.
  userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing.
  unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm
  nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo
  mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid  if !SB_I_NOEXEC
  vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
2015-09-01 16:13:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman fe78fcc85a mnt: In detach_mounts detach the appropriate unmounted mount
The handling of in detach_mounts of unmounted but connected mounts is
buggy and can lead to an infinite loop.

Correct the handling of unmounted mounts in detach_mount.  When the
mountpoint of an unmounted but connected mount is connected to a
dentry, and that dentry is deleted we need to disconnect that mount
from the parent mount and the deleted dentry.

Nothing changes for the unmounted and connected children.  They can be
safely ignored.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ce07d891a0 mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-23 11:31:15 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman f2d0a123bc mnt: Clarify and correct the disconnect logic in umount_tree
rmdir mntpoint will result in an infinite loop when there is
a mount locked on the mountpoint in another mount namespace.

This is because the logic to test to see if a mount should
be disconnected in umount_tree is buggy.

Move the logic to decide if a mount should remain connected to
it's mountpoint into it's own function disconnect_mount so that
clarity of expression instead of terseness of expression becomes
a virtue.

When the conditions where it is invalid to leave a mount connected
are first ruled out, the logic for deciding if a mount should
be disconnected becomes much clearer and simpler.

Fixes: e0c9c0afd2 mnt: Update detach_mounts to leave mounts connected
Fixes: ce07d891a0 mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-22 20:33:27 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 77b1a97d21 mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC
The filesystems proc and sysfs do not have executable files do not
have exectuable files today and portions of userspace break if we do
enforce nosuid and noexec consistency of nosuid and noexec flags
between previous mounts and new mounts of proc and sysfs.

Add the code to enforce consistency of the nosuid and noexec flags,
and use the presence of SB_I_NOEXEC to signal that there is no need to
bother.

This results in a completely userspace invisible change that makes it
clear fs_fully_visible can only skip the enforcement of noexec and
nosuid because it is known the filesystems in question do not support
executables.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-10 10:41:13 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 0cbee99269 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized
  that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace
  permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide
  if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all.

  Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could
  be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of
  proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and
  sysfs.  Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced.

  There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement.  Only filesystems
  mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but
  the test for empty directories was insufficient.  So in my tree
  directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are
  created specially.  Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary
  directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and
  shows that the directory is empty.  Special creation of directories
  for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about
  it's purpose.  I asked container developers from the various container
  projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount
  points on proc and sysfs that are created specially.

  This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh
  mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of
  proc and sysfs.  I expected this to be the boring part of the work but
  unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of
  proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags
  on the previous mount of proc and sysfs.  So for now only the atime,
  read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep
  consistent are enforced.  Dealing with the noexec and nosuid
  attributes remains for another time.

  This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file
  descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed.  Recently readlink of
  /proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been
  meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was
  converted) and is not now actively wrong.

  There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that
  I will mention briefly.

  It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount.
  At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can
  be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem.  With user
  namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created
  allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename
  to outside of the bind mount.  This is challenging to fix and doubly
  so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the
  performance part of pathname resolution.

  As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that
  developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable
  files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions
  in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as
  such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once
  they are recognized"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path
  mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories
  sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point
  sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points.
  kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.
  proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points
  sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.
  fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories.
  vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible
  mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime
  mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
2015-07-03 15:20:57 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 7236c85e1b mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories
fs_fully_visible attempts to make fresh mounts of proc and sysfs give
the mounter no more access to proc and sysfs than if they could have
by creating a bind mount.  One aspect of proc and sysfs that makes
this particularly tricky is that there are other filesystems that
typically mount on top of proc and sysfs.  As those filesystems are
mounted on empty directories in practice it is safe to ignore them.
However testing to ensure filesystems are mounted on empty directories
has not been something the in kernel data structures have supported so
the current test for an empty directory which checks to see
if nlink <= 2 is a bit lacking.

proc and sysfs have recently been modified to use the new empty_dir
infrastructure to create all of their dedicated mount points.  Instead
of testing for S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && i_nlink <= 2 to see if a
directory is empty, test for is_empty_dir_inode(inode).  That small
change guaranteess mounts found on proc and sysfs really are safe to
ignore, because the directories are not only empty but nothing can
ever be added to them.  This guarantees there is nothing to worry
about when mounting proc and sysfs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-01 10:36:49 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman ceeb0e5d39 vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible
Limit the mounts fs_fully_visible considers to locked mounts.
Unlocked can always be unmounted so considering them adds hassle
but no security benefit.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-01 10:36:35 -05:00
Yann Droneaud ede1bf0dcf fs: use seq_open_private() for proc_mounts
A patchset to remove support for passing pre-allocated struct seq_file to
seq_open().  Such feature is undocumented and prone to error.

In particular, if seq_release() is used in release handler, it will
kfree() a pointer which was not allocated by seq_open().

So this patchset drops support for pre-allocated struct seq_file: it's
only of use in proc_namespace.c and can be easily replaced by using
seq_open_private()/seq_release_private().

Additionally, it documents the use of file->private_data to hold pointer
to struct seq_file by seq_open().

This patch (of 3):

Since patch described below, from v2.6.15-rc1, seq_open() could use a
struct seq_file already allocated by the caller if the pointer to the
structure is stored in file->private_data before calling the function.

    Commit 1abe77b0fc
    Author: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
    Date:   Mon Nov 7 17:15:34 2005 -0500

        [PATCH] allow callers of seq_open do allocation themselves

        Allow caller of seq_open() to kmalloc() seq_file + whatever else they
        want and set ->private_data to it.  seq_open() will then abstain from
        doing allocation itself.

Such behavior is only used by mounts_open_common().

In order to drop support for such uncommon feature, proc_mounts is
converted to use seq_open_private(), which take care of allocating the
proc_mounts structure, making it available through ->private in struct
seq_file.

Conversely, proc_mounts is converted to use seq_release_private(), in
order to release the private structure allocated by seq_open_private().

Then, ->private is used directly instead of proc_mounts() macro to access
to the proc_mounts structure.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1433193673.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com
Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-30 19:44:56 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 8c6cf9cc82 mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime
Ignore an existing mount if the locked readonly, nodev or atime
attributes are less permissive than the desired attributes
of the new mount.

On success ensure the new mount locks all of the same readonly, nodev and
atime attributes as the old mount.

The nosuid and noexec attributes are not checked here as this change
is destined for stable and enforcing those attributes causes a
regression in lxc and libvirt-lxc where those applications will not
start and there are no known executables on sysfs or proc and no known
way to create exectuables without code modifications

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e51db73532 ("userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-06-04 10:29:25 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 1b852bceb0 mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
Fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are a very special case that works very
much like a bind mount.  Unfortunately the current structure can not
preserve the MNT_LOCK... mount flags.  Therefore refactor the logic
into a form that can be modified to preserve those lock bits.

Add a new filesystem flag FS_USERNS_VISIBLE that requires some mount
of the filesystem be fully visible in the current mount namespace,
before the filesystem may be mounted.

Move the logic for calling fs_fully_visible from proc and sysfs into
fs/namespace.c where it has greater access to mount namespace state.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-05-13 21:44:11 -05:00
Al Viro 294d71ff2f new helper: __legitimize_mnt()
same as legitimize_mnt(), except that it does *not* drop and regain
rcu_read_lock; return values are
0  =>  grabbed a reference, we are fine
1  =>  failed, just go away
-1 =>  failed, go away and mntput(bastard) when outside of rcu_read_lock

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-05-11 08:13:14 -04:00
Eric W. Biederman 7e96c1b0e0 mnt: Fix fs_fully_visible to verify the root directory is visible
This fixes a dumb bug in fs_fully_visible that allows proc or sys to
be mounted if there is a bind mount of part of /proc/ or /sys/ visible.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Eric Windisch <ewindisch@docker.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-05-09 11:55:50 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman e0c9c0afd2 mnt: Update detach_mounts to leave mounts connected
Now that it is possible to lazily unmount an entire mount tree and
leave the individual mounts connected to each other add a new flag
UMOUNT_CONNECTED to umount_tree to force this behavior and use
this flag in detach_mounts.

This closes a bug where the deletion of a file or directory could
trigger an unmount and reveal data under a mount point.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09 11:39:57 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman f53e579751 mnt: Fix the error check in __detach_mounts
lookup_mountpoint can return either NULL or an error value.
Update the test in __detach_mounts to test for an error value
to avoid pathological cases causing a NULL pointer dereferences.

The callers of __detach_mounts should prevent it from ever being
called on an unlinked dentry but don't take any chances.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09 11:39:56 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman ce07d891a0 mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts
Modify umount(MNT_DETACH) to keep mounts in the hash table that are
locked to their parent mounts, when the parent is lazily unmounted.

In mntput_no_expire detach the children from the hash table, depending
on mnt_pin_kill in cleanup_mnt to decrement the mnt_count of the children.

In __detach_mounts if there are any mounts that have been unmounted
but still are on the list of mounts of a mountpoint, remove their
children from the mount hash table and those children to the unmounted
list so they won't linger potentially indefinitely waiting for their
final mntput, now that the mounts serve no purpose.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09 11:39:55 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 6a46c5735c mnt: Factor umount_mnt from umount_tree
For future use factor out a function umount_mnt from umount_tree.
This function unhashes a mount and remembers where the mount
was mounted so that eventually when the code makes it to a
sleeping context the mountpoint can be dput.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09 11:39:54 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 7bdb11de8e mnt: Factor out unhash_mnt from detach_mnt and umount_tree
Create a function unhash_mnt that contains the common code between
detach_mnt and umount_tree, and use unhash_mnt in place of the common
code.  This add a unncessary list_del_init(mnt->mnt_child) into
umount_tree but given that mnt_child is already empty this extra
line is a noop.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09 11:39:54 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman cd4a40174b mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mounts
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c

In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into
collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree
pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path.   In those cases
collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and
if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts
it is reasonable to fail early.

The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path
check.  But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with
the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears
reasonable.

Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit
unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts
that appear in the mount tree.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09 11:38:31 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 5d88457eb5 mnt: On an unmount propagate clearing of MNT_LOCKED
A prerequisite of calling umount_tree is that the point where the tree
is mounted at is valid to unmount.

If we are propagating the effect of the unmount clear MNT_LOCKED in
every instance where the same filesystem is mounted on the same
mountpoint in the mount tree, as we know (by virtue of the fact
that umount_tree was called) that it is safe to reveal what
is at that mountpoint.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-02 20:34:19 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 411a938b5a mnt: Delay removal from the mount hash.
- Modify __lookup_mnt_hash_last to ignore mounts that have MNT_UMOUNTED set.
- Don't remove mounts from the mount hash table in propogate_umount
- Don't remove mounts from the mount hash table in umount_tree before
  the entire list of mounts to be umounted is selected.
- Remove mounts from the mount hash table as the last thing that
  happens in the case where a mount has a parent in umount_tree.
  Mounts without parents are not hashed (by definition).

This paves the way for delaying removal from the mount hash table even
farther and fixing the MNT_LOCKED vs MNT_DETACH issue.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-02 20:34:19 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 590ce4bcbf mnt: Add MNT_UMOUNT flag
In some instances it is necessary to know if the the unmounting
process has begun on a mount.  Add MNT_UMOUNT to make that reliably
testable.

This fix gets used in fixing locked mounts in MNT_DETACH

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-02 20:34:18 -05:00