Always initialize *scontext and *scontext_len in security_sid_to_context.
(via http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/2/23/135)
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Below is a patch which demotes many printk lines to KERN_DEBUG from
KERN_INFO. It should help stop the spamming of logs with messages in
which users are not interested nor is there any action that users should
take. It also promotes some KERN_INFO to KERN_ERR such as when there
are improper attempts to register/unregister security modules.
A similar patch was discussed a while back on list:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=116656343500003&r=1&w=2
This patch addresses almost all of the issues raised. I believe the
only advice not taken was in the demoting of messages related to
undefined permissions and classes.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 +++---
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't truly
private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks
beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading
and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other
filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the
security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across
execve). So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as
below. Note however that the use of the private flag here could be confusing,
as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and
security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control over
them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I goofed and when reenabling the fine grained selinux labels for
sysctls and forgot to add the "/sys" prefix before consulting
the policy database. When computing the same path using
proc_dir_entries we got the "/sys" for free as it was part
of the tree, but it isn't true for clt_table trees.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It isn't needed anymore, all of the users are gone, and all of the ctl_table
initializers have been converted to use explicit names of the fields they are
initializing.
[akpm@osdl.org: NTFS fix]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h
recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.
There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need
anything defined in there. Presumably these includes were once needed for
macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the
course of cleaning it up.
To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only
removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.
Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,
arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,
allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all
configs in arch/arm/configs on arm. I also checked that no new warnings were
introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted
by unnecessarily included header files).
Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Replace a small number of expressions with a call to the "container_of()"
macro.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Replace appropriate pairs of "kmem_cache_alloc()" + "memset(0)" with the
corresponding "kmem_cache_zalloc()" call.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@steeleye.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <Joel.Becker@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix the key serial number collision avoidance code in key_alloc_serial().
This didn't use to be so much of a problem as the key serial numbers were
allocated from a simple incremental counter, and it would have to go through
two billion keys before it could possibly encounter a collision. However, now
that random numbers are used instead, collisions are much more likely.
This is fixed by finding a hole in the rbtree where the next unused serial
number ought to be and using that by going almost back to the top of the
insertion routine and redoing the insertion with the new serial number rather
than trying to be clever and attempting to work out the insertion point
pointer directly.
This fixes kernel BZ #7727.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch is an incremental fix to the flow_cache_genid
patch for selinux that breaks the build of 2.6.20-rc6 when
xfrm is not configured.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently, old flow cache entries remain valid even after
a reload of SELinux policy.
This patch increments the flow cache generation id
on policy (re)loads so that flow cache entries are
revalidated as needed.
Thanks to Herbet Xu for pointing this out. See:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-netdev&m=116841378704536&w=2
There's also a general issue as well as a solution proposed
by David Miller for when flow_cache_genid wraps. I might be
submitting a separate patch for that later.
I request that this be applied to 2.6.20 since it's
a security relevant fix.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The spinlock protecting the update of the "sksec->nlbl_state" variable is not
currently softirq safe which can lead to problems. This patch fixes this by
changing the spin_{un}lock() functions into spin_{un}lock_bh() functions.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This deletes mls_copy_context() in favor of mls_context_cpy() and
replaces mls_scopy_context() with mls_context_cpy_low().
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
do not call a sleeping lock API in an RCU read section.
lock_sock_nested can sleep, its BH counterpart doesn't.
selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() needs to use the BH counterpart
unconditionally.
Compile tested.
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
added BH disabling, because this function can be called from non-atomic
contexts too, so a naked bh_lock_sock() would be deadlock-prone.
Boot-tested the resulting kernel.
Signed-off-by: Parag Warudkar <paragw@paragw.zapto.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Currently, each fdtable supports three dynamically-sized arrays of data: the
fdarray and two fdsets. The code allows the number of fds supported by the
fdarray (fdtable->max_fds) to differ from the number of fds supported by each
of the fdsets (fdtable->max_fdset).
In practice, it is wasteful for these two sizes to differ: whenever we hit a
limit on the smaller-capacity structure, we will reallocate the entire fdtable
and all the dynamic arrays within it, so any delta in the memory used by the
larger-capacity structure will never be touched at all.
Rather than hogging this excess, we shouldn't even allocate it in the first
place, and keep the capacities of the fdarray and the fdsets equal. This
patch removes fdtable->max_fdset. As an added bonus, most of the supporting
code becomes simpler.
Signed-off-by: Vadim Lobanov <vlobanov@speakeasy.net>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Fix the locking of signal->tty.
Use ->sighand->siglock to protect ->signal->tty; this lock is already used
by most other members of ->signal/->sighand. And unless we are 'current'
or the tasklist_lock is held we need ->siglock to access ->signal anyway.
(NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt ->sighand locking rules)
Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding
tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid. Otherwise the lifetime of ttys
are governed by their open file handles. This leaves some holes for tty
access from signal->tty (or any other non file related tty access).
It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing.
(NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to
be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think
it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info
invocations)
[schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Name some of the remaning 'old_style_spin_init' locks
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache.
The patch was generated using the following script:
#!/bin/sh
#
# Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources.
#
set -e
for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do
quilt add $file
sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file >/tmp/$$
mv /tmp/$$ $file
quilt refresh
done
The script was run like this
sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache"
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
SLAB_KERNEL is an alias of GFP_KERNEL.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
SLAB_ATOMIC is an alias of GFP_ATOMIC
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Conflicts:
drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c
include/linux/libata.h
Futher merge of Linus's head and compilation fixups.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
drivers/infiniband/core/iwcm.c
drivers/net/chelsio/cxgb2.c
drivers/net/wireless/bcm43xx/bcm43xx_main.c
drivers/net/wireless/prism54/islpci_eth.c
drivers/usb/core/hub.h
drivers/usb/input/hid-core.c
net/core/netpoll.c
Fix up merge failures with Linus's head and fix new compilation failures.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
We're seeing increasing namespace conflicts between the global
class_destroy() function declared in linux/device.h, and the private
function in the SELinux core code. This patch renames the SELinux
function to cls_destroy() to avoid this conflict.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The original NetLabel category bitmap was a straight char bitmap which worked
fine for the initial release as it only supported 240 bits due to limitations
in the CIPSO restricted bitmap tag (tag type 0x01). This patch converts that
straight char bitmap into an extensibile/sparse bitmap in order to lay the
foundation for other CIPSO tag types and protocols.
This patch also has a nice side effect in that all of the security attributes
passed by NetLabel into the LSM are now in a format which is in the host's
native byte/bit ordering which makes the LSM specific code much simpler; look
at the changes in security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c as an example.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Now that labeled IPsec makes use of the peer_sid field in the
sk_security_struct we can remove a lot of the special cases between labeled
IPsec and NetLabel. In addition, create a new function,
security_skb_extlbl_sid(), which we can use in several places to get the
security context of the packet's external label which allows us to further
simplify the code in a few places.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch does a lot of cleanup in the SELinux NetLabel support code. A
summary of the changes include:
* Use RCU locking for the NetLabel state variable in the skk_security_struct
instead of using the inode_security_struct mutex.
* Remove unnecessary parameters in selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create().
* Rename selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security() to
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone() to better fit the other NetLabel
sk_security functions.
* Improvements to selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() to help reduce the cost of
the common case.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The existing netlbl_lsm_secattr struct required the LSM to check all of the
fields to determine if any security attributes were present resulting in a lot
of work in the common case of no attributes. This patch adds a 'flags' field
which is used to indicate which attributes are present in the structure; this
should allow the LSM to do a quick comparison to determine if the structure
holds any security attributes.
Example:
if (netlbl_lsm_secattr->flags)
/* security attributes present */
else
/* NO security attributes present */
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
RTM_GETPREFIX is completely unused and is thus removed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch implements SELinux kernel support for DCCP
(http://linux-net.osdl.org/index.php/DCCP), which is similar in
operation to TCP in terms of connected state between peers.
The SELinux support for DCCP is thus modeled on existing handling of
TCP.
A new DCCP socket class is introduced, to allow protocol
differentation. The permissions for this class inherit all of the
socket permissions, as well as the current TCP permissions (node_bind,
name_bind etc). IPv4 and IPv6 are supported, although labeled
networking is not, at this stage.
Patches for SELinux userspace are at:
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/dccp/user/
I've performed some basic testing, and it seems to be working as
expected. Adding policy support is similar to TCP, the only real
difference being that it's a different protocol.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same
context as the originating socket/flow. This eliminates the SELinux
policy's ability to use/sendto SAs with contexts other than the socket's.
With this patch applied, the SELinux policy will require one or more of the
following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs:
1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom }
2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t self:association { sendto };
allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom };
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix SO_PEERSEC for tcp sockets to return the security context of
the peer (as represented by the SA from the peer) as opposed to the
SA used by the local/source socket.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Since the upstreaming of the mlsxfrm modification a few months back,
testing has resulted in the identification of the following issues/bugs that
are resolved in this patch set.
1. Fix the security context used in the IKE negotiation to be the context
of the socket as opposed to the context of the SPD rule.
2. Fix SO_PEERSEC for tcp sockets to return the security context of
the peer as opposed to the source.
3. Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same
context as the originating socket/flow.
The following would be the result of applying this patchset:
- SO_PEERSEC will now correctly return the peer's context.
- IKE deamons will receive the context of the source socket/flow
as opposed to the SPD rule's context so that the negotiated SA
will be at the same context as the source socket/flow.
- The SELinux policy will require one or more of the
following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs:
1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom }
2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t self:association { sendto };
allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom };
This Patch: Pass correct security context to IKE for use in negotiation
Fix the security context passed to IKE for use in negotiation to be the
context of the socket as opposed to the context of the SPD rule so that
the SA carries the label of the originating socket/flow.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'for-2.6.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
SELinux: validate kernel object classes and permissions
SELinux: ensure keys constant in hashtab_search
SELinux: export object class and permission definitions
SELinux: remove current object class and permission validation mechanism
This is a new object class and permission validation scheme that validates
against the defined kernel headers. This scheme allows extra classes
and permissions that do not conflict with the kernel definitions to be
added to the policy. This validation is now done for all policy loads,
not just subsequent loads after the first policy load.
The implementation walks the three structrures containing the defined
object class and permission values and ensures their values are the
same in the policy being loaded. This includes verifying the object
classes themselves, the permissions they contain, and the permissions
they inherit from commons. Classes or permissions that are present in the
kernel but missing from the policy cause a warning (printed to KERN_INFO)
to be printed, but do not stop the policy from loading, emulating current
behavior. Any other inconsistencies cause the load to fail.
Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Makes the key argument passed into hashtab_search and all the functions
it calls constant. These functions include hash table function pointers
hash_value and keycmp. The only implementations of these currently
are symhash and symcmp, which do not modify the key. The key parameter
should never be changed by any of these, so it should be const. This
is necessary to allow calling these functions with keys found in kernel
object class and permission definitions.
Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Moves the definition of the 3 structs containing object class and
permission definitions from avc.c to avc_ss.h so that the security
server can access them for validation on policy load. This also adds
a new struct type, defined_classes_perms_t, suitable for allowing the
security server to access these data structures from the avc.
Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Removes the current SELinux object class and permission validation code,
as the current code makes it impossible to change or remove object classes
and permissions on a running system. Additionally, the current code does
not actually validate that the classes and permissions are correct, but
instead merely validates that they do not change between policy reloads.
Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The return value of dentry_open() shoud be checked by IS_ERR().
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Pass the work_struct pointer to the work function rather than context data.
The work function can use container_of() to work out the data.
For the cases where the container of the work_struct may go away the moment the
pending bit is cleared, it is made possible to defer the release of the
structure by deferring the clearing of the pending bit.
To make this work, an extra flag is introduced into the management side of the
work_struct. This governs auto-release of the structure upon execution.
Ordinarily, the work queue executor would release the work_struct for further
scheduling or deallocation by clearing the pending bit prior to jumping to the
work function. This means that, unless the driver makes some guarantee itself
that the work_struct won't go away, the work function may not access anything
else in the work_struct or its container lest they be deallocated.. This is a
problem if the auxiliary data is taken away (as done by the last patch).
However, if the pending bit is *not* cleared before jumping to the work
function, then the work function *may* access the work_struct and its container
with no problems. But then the work function must itself release the
work_struct by calling work_release().
In most cases, automatic release is fine, so this is the default. Special
initiators exist for the non-auto-release case (ending in _NAR).
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This patch makes two changes to protect applications from either removing or
tampering with the CIPSOv4 IP option on a socket. The first is the requirement
that applications have the CAP_NET_RAW capability to set an IPOPT_CIPSO option
on a socket; this prevents untrusted applications from setting their own
CIPSOv4 security attributes on the packets they send. The second change is to
SELinux and it prevents applications from setting any IPv4 options when there
is an IPOPT_CIPSO option already present on the socket; this prevents
applications from removing CIPSOv4 security attributes from the packets they
send.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Upon inspection it looked like the error handling for mls_export_cat() was
rather poor. This patch addresses this by NULL'ing out kfree()'d pointers
before returning and checking the return value of the function everywhere
it is called.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch fixes two bugs in policydb_destroy. Two list pointers
(policydb.ocontexts[i] and policydb.genfs) were not being reset to NULL when
the lists they pointed to were being freed. This caused a problem when the
initial policy load failed, as the policydb being destroyed was not a
temporary new policydb that was thrown away, but rather was the global
(active) policydb. Consequently, later functions, particularly
sys_bind->selinux_socket_bind->security_node_sid and
do_rw_proc->selinux_sysctl->selinux_proc_get_sid->security_genfs_sid tried
to dereference memory that had previously been freed.
Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
xfrm(s) applied.
The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
"deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
default" in the above case.
This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.
With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).
Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.
The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.
Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).
This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.
This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
with the IPSec policy rule.
Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
is now handled properly.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes NetLabel to use SECINITSID_UNLABLELED as it's source of
SELinux type information when generating a NetLabel context.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Testing revealed a problem with the NetLabel cache where a cached entry could
be freed while in use by the LSM layer causing an oops and other problems.
This patch fixes that problem by introducing a reference counter to the cache
entry so that it is only freed when it is no longer in use.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This is mostly included for parity with dec_nlink(), where we will have some
more hooks. This one should stay pretty darn straightforward for now.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Accepted connections of types other than AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX won't
have an appropriate label derived from the peer, so don't use it.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This is an updated version of Eric Biederman's is_init() patch.
(http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/2/6/280). It applies cleanly to 2.6.18-rc3 and
replaces a few more instances of ->pid == 1 with is_init().
Further, is_init() checks pid and thus removes dependency on Eric's other
patches for now.
Eric's original description:
There are a lot of places in the kernel where we test for init
because we give it special properties. Most significantly init
must not die. This results in code all over the kernel test
->pid == 1.
Introduce is_init to capture this case.
With multiple pid spaces for all of the cases affected we are
looking for only the first process on the system, not some other
process that has pid == 1.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: <lxc-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This code has suffered from broken core design and lack of developer
attention. Broken security modules are too dangerous to leave around. It
is time to remove this one.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Allows commas to be embedded into context mount options (i.e. "-o
context=some_selinux_context_t"), to better support multiple categories,
which are separated by commas and confuse mount.
For example, with the current code:
mount -t iso9660 /dev/cdrom /media/cdrom -o \
ro,context=system_u:object_r:iso9660_t:s0:c1,c3,c4,exec
The context option that will be interpreted by SELinux is
context=system_u:object_r:iso9660_t:s0:c1
instead of
context=system_u:object_r:iso9660_t:s0:c1,c3,c4
The options that will be passed on to the file system will be
ro,c3,c4,exec.
The proposed solution is to allow/require the SELinux context option
specified to mount to use quotes when the context contains a comma.
This patch modifies the option parsing in parse_opts(), contained in
mount.c, to take options after finding a comma only if it hasn't seen a
quote or if the quotes are matched. It also introduces a new function that
will strip the quotes from the context option prior to translation. The
quotes are replaced after the translation is completed to insure that in
the event the raw context contains commas the kernel will be able to
interpret the correct context.
Signed-off-by: Cory Olmo <colmo@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This eliminates the i_blksize field from struct inode. Filesystems that want
to provide a per-inode st_blksize can do so by providing their own getattr
routine instead of using the generic_fillattr() function.
Note that some filesystems were providing pretty much random (and incorrect)
values for i_blksize.
[bunk@stusta.de: cleanup]
[akpm@osdl.org: generic_fillattr() fix]
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The following patches reduce the size of the VFS inode structure by 28 bytes
on a UP x86. (It would be more on an x86_64 system). This is a 10% reduction
in the inode size on a UP kernel that is configured in a production mode
(i.e., with no spinlock or other debugging functions enabled; if you want to
save memory taken up by in-core inodes, the first thing you should do is
disable the debugging options; they are responsible for a huge amount of bloat
in the VFS inode structure).
This patch:
The filesystem or device-specific pointer in the inode is inside a union,
which is pretty pointless given that all 30+ users of this field have been
using the void pointer. Get rid of the union and rename it to i_private, with
a comment to explain who is allowed to use the void pointer. This is just a
cleanup, but it allows us to reuse the union 'u' for something something where
the union will actually be used.
[judith@osdl.org: powerpc build fix]
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Judith Lebzelter <judith@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Take tty_mutex when accessing ->signal->tty in selinux code. Noted by Alan
Cox. Longer term, we are looking at refactoring the code to provide better
encapsulation of the tty layer, but this is a simple fix that addresses the
immediate bug.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch converts the semaphore in the superblock security struct to a
mutex. No locking changes or other code changes are done.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch converts the remaining isec->sem into a mutex. Very similar
locking is provided as before only in the faster smaller mutex rather than a
semaphore. An out_unlock path is introduced rather than the conditional
unlocking found in the original code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
inode_security_set_sid is only called by security_inode_init_security, which
is called when a new file is being created and needs to have its incore
security state initialized and its security xattr set. This helper used to be
called in other places in the past, but now only has the one. So this patch
rolls inode_security_set_sid directly back into security_inode_init_security.
There also is no need to hold the isec->sem while doing this, as the inode is
not available to other threads at this point in time.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Introduces support for policy version 21. This version of the binary
kernel policy allows for defining range transitions on security classes
other than the process security class. As always, backwards compatibility
for older formats is retained. The security class is read in as specified
when using the new format, while the "process" security class is assumed
when using an older policy format.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Enable configuration of SELinux maximum supported policy version to support
legacy userland (init) that does not gracefully handle kernels that support
newer policy versions two or more beyond the installed policy, as in FC3
and FC4.
[bunk@stusta.de: improve Kconfig help text]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Replace ctxid with sid in selinux_audit_rule_match interface for
consistency with other interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Rename selinux_ctxid_to_string to selinux_sid_to_string to be
consistent with other interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Eliminate selinux_task_ctxid since it duplicates selinux_task_get_sid.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Change NetLabel to use the 'recvfrom' socket permission and the
SECINITSID_NETMSG SELinux SID as the NetLabel base SID for incoming packets.
This patch effectively makes the old, and currently unused, SELinux NETMSG
permissions NetLabel permissions.
Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix a problem where NetLabel would always set the value of
sk_security_struct->peer_sid in selinux_netlbl_sock_graft() to the context of
the socket, causing problems when users would query the context of the
connection. This patch fixes this so that the value in
sk_security_struct->peer_sid is only set when the connection is NetLabel based,
otherwise the value is untouched.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The following fixes a bug where random mem is being tampered with in the
non-mls case; encountered by Jashua Brindle on a gentoo box.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add some missing include files to the NetLabel related header files.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Uninline the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() at the request of
Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Rewrite ebitmap_import() so it is a bit cleaner and easier to read.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix a problem where the NetLabel specific fields of the sk_security_struct
structure were not being initialized early enough in some cases.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch makes four needlessly global functions static.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the
socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code. The most
significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into
the following SELinux LSM hooks:
* selinux_file_permission()
* selinux_socket_sendmsg()
* selinux_socket_post_create()
* selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
* selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream()
* selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram()
* selinux_sock_graft()
* selinux_inet_conn_request()
The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are
"NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security
attributes are checked via the additional hook in
selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(). NetLabel itself is only a labeling
mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the
SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks.
In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes
some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security
(mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out
of NetLabel.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The following patch will fix the build problem (encountered by Andrew
Morton) when SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM is not enabled.
As compared to git-net-selinux_xfrm_decode_session-build-fix.patch in
-mm, this patch sets the return parameter sid to SECSID_NULL in
selinux_xfrm_decode_session() and handles this value in the caller
selinux_inet_conn_request() appropriately.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This automatically labels the TCP, Unix stream, and dccp child sockets
as well as openreqs to be at the same MLS level as the peer. This will
result in the selection of appropriately labeled IPSec Security
Associations.
This also uses the sock's sid (as opposed to the isec sid) in SELinux
enforcement of secmark in rcv_skb and postroute_last hooks.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This defaults the label of socket-specific IPSec policies to be the
same as the socket they are set on.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the
flows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can
be used.
The following protos are currently not handled, but they should
continue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently
do.
ipmr
ip_gre
ipip
igmp
sit
sctp
ip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device)
decnet
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and
state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary
SELinux enforcement pieces.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This adds security for IP sockets at the sock level. Security at the
sock level is needed to enforce the SELinux security policy for
security associations even when a sock is orphaned (such as in the TCP
LAST_ACK state).
This will also be used to enforce SELinux controls over data arriving
at or leaving a child socket while it's still waiting to be accepted.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This defines a routine that combines the Type Enforcement portion of
one sid with the MLS portion from the other sid to arrive at a new
sid. This would be used to define a sid for a security association
that is to be negotiated by IKE as well as for determing the sid for
open requests and connection-oriented child sockets.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The current approach to labeling Security Associations for SELinux
purposes uses a one-to-one mapping between xfrm policy rules and
security associations.
This doesn't address the needs of real world MLS (Multi-level System,
traditional Bell-LaPadula) environments where a single xfrm policy
rule (pertaining to a range, classified to secret for example) might
need to map to multiple Security Associations (one each for
classified, secret, top secret and all the compartments applicable to
these security levels).
This patch set addresses the above problem by allowing for the mapping
of a single xfrm policy rule to multiple security associations, with
each association used in the security context it is defined for. It
also includes the security context to be used in IKE negotiation in
the acquire messages sent to the IKE daemon so that a unique SA can be
negotiated for each unique security context. A couple of bug fixes are
also included; checks to make sure the SAs used by a packet match
policy (security context-wise) on the inbound and also that the bundle
used for the outbound matches the security context of the flow. This
patch set also makes the use of the SELinux sid in flow cache lookups
seemless by including the sid in the flow key itself. Also, open
requests as well as connection-oriented child sockets are labeled
automatically to be at the same level as the peer to allow for use of
appropriately labeled IPSec associations.
Description of changes:
A "sid" member has been added to the flow cache key resulting in the
sid being available at all needed locations and the flow cache lookups
automatically using the sid. The flow sid is derived from the socket
on the outbound and the SAs (unlabeled where an SA was not used) on
the inbound.
Outbound case:
1. Find policy for the socket.
2. OLD: Find an SA that matches the policy.
NEW: Find an SA that matches BOTH the policy and the flow/socket.
This is necessary since not every SA that matches the policy
can be used for the flow/socket. Consider policy range Secret-TS,
and SAs each for Secret and TS. We don't want a TS socket to
use the Secret SA. Hence the additional check for the SA Vs. flow/socket.
3. NEW: When looking thru bundles for a policy, make sure the
flow/socket can use the bundle. If a bundle is not found,
create one, calling for IKE if necessary. If using IKE,
include the security context in the acquire message to the IKE
daemon.
Inbound case:
1. OLD: Find policy for the socket.
NEW: Find policy for the incoming packet based on the sid of the
SA(s) it used or the unlabeled sid if no SAs were
used. (Consider a case where a socket is "authorized" for two
policies (unclassified-confidential, secret-top_secret). If the
packet has come in using a secret SA, we really ought to be
using the latter policy (secret-top_secret).)
2. OLD: BUG: No check to see if the SAs used by the packet agree with
the policy sec_ctx-wise.
(It was indicated in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() that
this was being accomplished by
(x->id.spi == tmpl->id.spi || !tmpl->id.spi) in xfrm_state_ok,
but it turns out tmpl->id.spi
would normally be zero (unless xfrm policy rules specify one
at the template level, which they usually don't).
NEW: The socket is checked for access to the SAs used (based on the
sid of the SAs) in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb().
Forward case:
This would be Step 1 from the Inbound case, followed by Steps 2 and 3
from the Outbound case.
Outstanding items/issues:
- Timewait acknowledgements and such are generated in the
current/upstream implementation using a NULL socket resulting in the
any_socket sid (SYSTEM_HIGH) to be used. This problem is not addressed
by this patch set.
This patch: Add new flask definitions to SELinux
Adds a new avperm "polmatch" to arbitrate flow/state access to a xfrm
policy rule.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the
original unix datagram getpeersec patch. Instead of creating a
security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the
security context when the receiver requests it.
This new design requires modification of the current
unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely,
secid_to_secctx and release_secctx. The former retrieves the security
context and the latter releases it. A hook is required for releasing
the security context because it is up to the security module to decide
how that's done. In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree
operation.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Initializes newcontext sooner to allow for its destruction in all cases.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch fixes a memory leak when a policydb structure is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
After some discussion on the actual meaning of the filesystem class
security check in try context mount it was determined that the checks for
the context= mount options were not correct if fscontext mount option had
already been used.
When labeling the superblock we should be checking relabel_from and
relabel_to. But if the superblock has already been labeled (with
fscontext) then context= is actually labeling the inodes, and so we should
be checking relabel_from and associate. This patch fixes which checks are
called depending on the mount options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Introduce a new rootcontext= option to FS mounting. This option will allow
you to explicitly label the root inode of an FS being mounted before that
FS or inode because visible to userspace. This was found to be useful for
things like stateless linux, see
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=190001
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove the conflict between fscontext and context mount options. If
context= is specified without fscontext it will operate just as before, if
both are specified we will use mount point labeling and all inodes will get
the label specified by context=. The superblock will be labeled with the
label of fscontext=, thus affecting operations which check the superblock
security context, such as associate permissions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements
of the SELinux context.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
kernel/auditfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming
avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++----
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add a new security hook definition for the sys_ioprio_get operation. At
present, the SELinux hook function implementation for this hook is
identical to the getscheduler implementation but a separate hook is
introduced to allow this check to be specialized in the future if
necessary.
This patch also creates a helper function get_task_ioprio which handles the
access check in addition to retrieving the ioprio value for the task.
Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch extends the security_task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO
completion. In this case, the secid of the task responsible for the signal
needs to be obtained and saved earlier, so a security_task_getsecid() hook is
added, and then this saved value is passed subsequently to the extended
task_kill hook for use in checking.
Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.
Patch purpose:
This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.
Patch design and implementation:
The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.
An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:
toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
}
}
sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.
Testing:
We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stephen Smalley