When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.
Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait()
can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects
sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can
in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically
reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove
the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack
already removed its check from its hook.
Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Processes can only alter their own security attributes via
/proc/pid/attr nodes. This is presently enforced by each individual
security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials
implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own credentials.
Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual
security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the security hook,
and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since it can
only ever be the current task.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
During a new file creation we need to make sure new file is created with the
right label. New file is created in upper/ so effectively file should get
label as if task had created file in upper/.
We switched to mounter's creds for actual file creation. Also if there is a
whiteout present, then file will be created in work/ dir first and then
renamed in upper. In none of the cases file will be labeled as we want it to
be.
This patch introduces a new hook dentry_create_files_as(), which determines
the label/context dentry will get if it had been created by task in upper
and modify passed set of creds appropriately. Caller makes use of these new
creds for file creation.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: fix whitespace issues found with checkpatch.pl]
[PM: changes to use stat->mode in ovl_create_or_link()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Provide a security hook which is called when xattrs of a file are being
copied up. This hook is called once for each xattr and LSM can return
0 if the security module wants the xattr to be copied up, 1 if the
security module wants the xattr to be discarded on the copy, -EOPNOTSUPP
if the security module does not handle/manage the xattr, or a -errno
upon an error.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: whitespace cleanup for checkpatch.pl]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied
up from lower layer to upper layer of a overlay/union mount.
This hook can prepare a new set of creds which are suitable for new file
creation during copy up. Caller will use new creds to create file and then
revert back to old creds and release new creds.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: whitespace cleanup to appease checkpatch.pl]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull qstr constification updates from Al Viro:
"Fairly self-contained bunch - surprising lot of places passes struct
qstr * as an argument when const struct qstr * would suffice; it
complicates analysis for no good reason.
I'd prefer to feed that separately from the assorted fixes (those are
in #for-linus and with somewhat trickier topology)"
* 'work.const-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
qstr: constify instances in adfs
qstr: constify instances in lustre
qstr: constify instances in f2fs
qstr: constify instances in ext2
qstr: constify instances in vfat
qstr: constify instances in procfs
qstr: constify instances in fuse
qstr constify instances in fs/dcache.c
qstr: constify instances in nfs
qstr: constify instances in ocfs2
qstr: constify instances in autofs4
qstr: constify instances in hfs
qstr: constify instances in hfsplus
qstr: constify instances in logfs
qstr: constify dentry_init_security
Serge Hallyn pointed out that the current implementation of
security_inode_getsecurity() works if there is only one hook
provided for it, but will fail if there is more than one and
the attribute requested isn't supplied by the first module.
This isn't a problem today, since only SELinux and Smack
provide this hook and there is (currently) no way to enable
both of those modules at the same time. Serge, however, wants
to introduce a capability attribute and an inode_getsecurity
hook in the capability security module to handle it. This
addresses that upcoming problem, will be required for "extreme
stacking" and is just a better implementation.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing
of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this
is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified
cryptographically via dm-verity).
This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by
default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing).
- Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key.
Lots of general fixes and updates.
- SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via
finit_module(). Distinguish non-init user namespace capability
checks. Apply execstack check on thread stacks"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits)
LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting
seccomp: Fix comment typo
ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory
fs: fix over-zealous use of "const"
selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks
selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration
Yama: consolidate error reporting
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable
selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label
selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible
selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it
selinux: Change bool variable name to index.
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
...
Pull 'struct path' constification update from Al Viro:
"'struct path' is passed by reference to a bunch of Linux security
methods; in theory, there's nothing to stop them from modifying the
damn thing and LSM community being what it is, sooner or later some
enterprising soul is going to decide that it's a good idea.
Let's remove the temptation and constify all of those..."
* 'work.const-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
constify ima_d_path()
constify security_sb_pivotroot()
constify security_path_chroot()
constify security_path_{link,rename}
apparmor: remove useless checks for NULL ->mnt
constify security_path_{mkdir,mknod,symlink}
constify security_path_{unlink,rmdir}
apparmor: constify common_perm_...()
apparmor: constify aa_path_link()
apparmor: new helper - common_path_perm()
constify chmod_common/security_path_chmod
constify security_sb_mount()
constify chown_common/security_path_chown
tomoyo: constify assorted struct path *
apparmor_path_truncate(): path->mnt is never NULL
constify vfs_truncate()
constify security_path_truncate()
[apparmor] constify struct path * in a bunch of helpers
security_settime() uses a timespec, which is not year 2038 safe
on 32bit systems. Thus this patch introduces the security_settime64()
function with timespec64 type. We also convert the cap_settime() helper
function to use the 64bit types.
This patch then moves security_settime() to the header file as an
inline helper function so that existing users can be iteratively
converted.
None of the existing hooks is using the timespec argument and therefor
the patch is not making any functional changes.
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
[jstultz: Reworded commit message]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The skb_owned_by hook was added with the commit ca10b9e9a8
("selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hook") and later removed
when said commit was reverted.
Later on, when switching to list of hooks, a field named
'skb_owned_by' was included into the security_hook_head struct,
but without any users nor caller.
This commit removes the said left-over field.
Fixes: b1d9e6b064 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Replace copy_module_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd().
Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_module_from_file
hook, IMA is called, based on policy, to prevent unsigned kernel modules
from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall and to
measure/appraise signed kernel modules.
The security function security_kernel_module_from_file() was called prior
to reading a kernel module. Preventing unsigned kernel modules from being
loaded by the original kernel module syscall remains on the pre-read
kernel_read_file() security hook. Instead of reading the kernel module
twice, once for measuring/appraising and again for loading the kernel
module, the signature validation is moved to the kernel_post_read_file()
security hook.
This patch removes the security_kernel_module_from_file() hook and security
call.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The kernel_read_file security hook is called prior to reading the file
into memory.
Changelog v4+:
- export security_kernel_read_file()
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Replace the fw_read_file_contents with kernel_file_read_from_path().
Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_fw_from_file hook,
IMA is called by the security function to prevent unsigned firmware from
being loaded and to measure/appraise signed firmware, based on policy.
Instead of reading the firmware twice, once for measuring/appraising the
firmware and again for reading the firmware contents into memory, the
kernel_post_read_file() security hook calculates the file hash based on
the in memory file buffer. The firmware is read once.
This patch removes the LSM kernel_fw_from_file() hook and security call.
Changelog v4+:
- revert dropped buf->size assignment - reported by Sergey Senozhatsky
v3:
- remove kernel_fw_from_file hook
- use kernel_file_read_from_path() - requested by Luis
v2:
- reordered and squashed firmware patches
- fix MAX firmware size (Kees Cook)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring
and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into
memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by
the normal IMA policy based processing.
Changelog v5:
- fail ima_post_read_file() if either file or buf is NULL
v3:
- rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file()
v1:
- split patch
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
To differentiate between the kernel_read_file() callers, this patch
defines a new enumeration named kernel_read_file_id and includes the
caller identifier as an argument.
Subsequent patches define READING_KEXEC_IMAGE, READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
READING_FIRMWARE, READING_MODULE, and READING_POLICY.
Changelog v3:
- Replace the IMA specific enumeration with a generic one.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
For a while it was looked down upon to directly read files from Linux.
These days there exists a few mechanisms in the kernel that do just
this though to load a file into a local buffer. There are minor but
important checks differences on each. This patch set is the first
attempt at resolving some of these differences.
This patch introduces a common function for reading files from the kernel
with the corresponding security post-read hook and function.
Changelog v4+:
- export security_kernel_post_read_file() - Fengguang Wu
v3:
- additional bounds checking - Luis
v2:
- To simplify patch review, re-ordered patches
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add a hook to invalidate an inode's security label when the cached
information becomes invalid.
Add the new hook in selinux: set a flag when a security label becomes
invalid.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we
can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that
we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for
module signing. See comments in 3f1e1bea.
** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which
must be installed, e.g. the openssl-devel on Fedora **
- Smack
- add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads
- support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data
- SELinux:
- add ioctl whitelisting (see
http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf)
- fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change
- Seccomp:
- add ptrace options for suspend/resume"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits)
PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them
Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing
scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore
modsign: Handle signing key in source tree
modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key
Move certificate handling to its own directory
sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value
PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module
Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured
sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries
PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type
KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7
PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder
modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file
sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7
PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652]
X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer
PKCS#7: Check content type and versions
MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved
...
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start
implementing executable files, as the there are application today that
are only secure because such files do not exist.
It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that
did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from
/proc/<pid>/ns/*.
It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user
namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)
when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling
unshare. This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling
that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel.
Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of
sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application,
by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes. Apparently that
application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted
on /sys/fs/cgroup.
The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch.
and I expect them to come from there. The bind mount escape is the
last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0.
userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing.
unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm
nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo
mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
While in most cases commit b1d9e6b064 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks")
retained previous error returns, in three cases it altered them without
any explanation in the commit message. Restore all of them - in the
security_old_inode_init_security() case this led to reiserfs using
uninitialized data, sooner or later crashing the system (the only other
user of this function - ocfs2 - was unaffected afaict, since it passes
pre-initialized structures).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded
config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main
Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since
distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively
a no-op change.
Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.
Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.
Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.
The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.
This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.
Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking
work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking,
allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default
monolithic module (e.g. SELinux, Smack, AppArmor).
See
https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/
This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the
mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users. Also, this is a
useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add()
vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq
tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level.
ima: update builtin policies
ima: extend "mask" policy matching support
ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()
Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj()
selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS
selinux: Remove unused permission definitions
selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files
selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.
selinux: update netlink socket classes
signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds()
selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs
Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap
Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs
ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation()
ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure
integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter
...
Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.
The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.
The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.
The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the
security operations vector. The marco versions here do not
change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The security.h header file serves two purposes,
interfaces for users of the security modules and
interfaces for security modules. Users of the
security modules don't need to know about what's
in the security_operations structure, so pull it
out into it's own header, lsm_hooks.h
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
inode_follow_link now takes an inode and rcu flag as well as the
dentry.
inode is used in preference to d_backing_inode(dentry), particularly
in RCU-walk mode.
selinux_inode_follow_link() gets dentry_has_perm() and
inode_has_perm() open-coded into it so that it can call
avc_has_perm_flags() in way that is safe if LOOKUP_RCU is set.
Calling avc_has_perm_flags() with rcu_read_lock() held means
that when avc_has_perm_noaudit calls avc_compute_av(), the attempt
to rcu_read_unlock() before calling security_compute_av() will not
actually drop the RCU read-lock.
However as security_compute_av() is completely in a read_lock()ed
region, it should be safe with the RCU read-lock held.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
No ->inode_follow_link() methods use the nameidata arg, and
it is about to become private to namei.c.
So remove from all inode_follow_link() functions.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This reverts commit ca10b9e9a8.
No longer needed after commit eb8895debe
("tcp: tcp_make_synack() should use sock_wmalloc")
When under SYNFLOOD, we build lot of SYNACK and hit false sharing
because of multiple modifications done on sk_listener->sk_wmem_alloc
Since tcp_make_synack() uses sock_wmalloc(), there is no need
to call skb_set_owner_w() again, as this adds two atomic operations.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Here's the big char/misc driver update for 3.20-rc1.
Lots of little things in here, all described in the changelog. Nothing
major or unusual, except maybe the binder selinux stuff, which was all
acked by the proper selinux people and they thought it best to come
through this tree.
All of this has been in linux-next with no reported issues for a while.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'char-misc-3.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char / misc patches from Greg KH:
"Here's the big char/misc driver update for 3.20-rc1.
Lots of little things in here, all described in the changelog.
Nothing major or unusual, except maybe the binder selinux stuff, which
was all acked by the proper selinux people and they thought it best to
come through this tree.
All of this has been in linux-next with no reported issues for a while"
* tag 'char-misc-3.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (90 commits)
coresight: fix function etm_writel_cp14() parameter order
coresight-etm: remove check for unknown Kconfig macro
coresight: fixing CPU hwid lookup in device tree
coresight: remove the unnecessary function coresight_is_bit_set()
coresight: fix the debug AMBA bus name
coresight: remove the extra spaces
coresight: fix the link between orphan connection and newly added device
coresight: remove the unnecessary replicator property
coresight: fix the replicator subtype value
pdfdocs: Fix 'make pdfdocs' failure for 'uio-howto.tmpl'
mcb: Fix error path of mcb_pci_probe
virtio/console: verify device has config space
ti-st: clean up data types (fix harmless memory corruption)
mei: me: release hw from reset only during the reset flow
mei: mask interrupt set bit on clean reset bit
extcon: max77693: Constify struct regmap_config
extcon: adc-jack: Release IIO channel on driver remove
extcon: Remove duplicated include from extcon-class.c
Drivers: hv: vmbus: hv_process_timer_expiration() can be static
Drivers: hv: vmbus: serialize Offer and Rescind offer
...
Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.
The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement
controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for
controlling what process can become the binder context manager
(binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process
to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction),
controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to
another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability
of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file).
These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3.
(Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver,
changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and
to add inline documentation for the hooks).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Since "BDI: Provide backing device capability information [try #3]" the
backing_dev_info structure also provides flags for the kind of mmap
operation available in a nommu environment, which is entirely unrelated
to it's original purpose.
Introduce a new nommu-only file operation to provide this information to
the nommu mmap code instead. Splitting this from the backing_dev_info
structure allows to remove lots of backing_dev_info instance that aren't
otherwise needed, and entirely gets rid of the concept of providing a
backing_dev_info for a character device. It also removes the need for
the mtd_inodefs filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and
__f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the
callers.
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a
new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built
into the kernel.
This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new
security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's
integrity.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be
a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel
itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious
firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
If flags contain RENAME_EXCHANGE then exchange source and destination files.
There's no restriction on the type of the files; e.g. a directory can be
exchanged with a symlink.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Add flags to security_path_rename() and security_inode_rename() hooks.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm
parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the
permissions mask flags used in key->perm.
Whilst we're at it:
(1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions
with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h.
(2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit
it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related
directly to that.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)
Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.
CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.c
Pull Eric's existing SELinux tree as there are a number of patches in
there that are not yet upstream. There was some minor fixup needed to
resolve a conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_set_mnt_opts()
between the labeled NFS patches and Eric's security_fs_use()
simplification patch.
The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a
multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the
arguments passed to it by the caller. This patch splits the LSM hook
implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the
LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel:
* xfrm_state_alloc
* xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
Also included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux
code; no other LSMs are affected.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"->name but
nobody modifies "struct xattr"->name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure
checking by constifying ->name member of "struct xattr".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> [ocfs2]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The existing NFSv4 xattr handlers do not accept xattr calls to the security
namespace. This patch extends these handlers to accept xattrs from the security
namespace in addition to the default NFSv4 ACL namespace.
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
There is no way to differentiate if a text mount option is passed from user
space or the kernel. A flags field is being added to the
security_sb_set_mnt_opts hook to allow for in kernel security flags to be sent
to the LSM for processing in addition to the text options received from mount.
This patch also updated existing code to fix compilation errors.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr
interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is
important to make sure the requested xattr actually is a MAC label. This allows
us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of
something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
There is a time where we need to calculate a context without the
inode having been created yet. To do this we take the negative dentry and
calculate a context based on the process and the parent directory contexts.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"Just some minor updates across the subsystem"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: eliminate passing d_name.name to process_measurement()
TPM: Retry SaveState command in suspend path
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Add small comment about return value of __i2c_transfer
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c: Add OF attributes type and name to the of_device_id table entries
tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Remove duplicate inclusion of header files
tpm: Add support for new Infineon I2C TPM (SLB 9645 TT 1.2 I2C)
char/tpm: Convert struct i2c_msg initialization to C99 format
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi: use strlcpy instead of strncpy
tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: formatting and white space changes
Smack: include magic.h in smackfs.c
selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch
seccomp: allow BPF_XOR based ALU instructions.
Fix NULL pointer dereference in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir()
Smack: add support for modification of existing rules
smack: SMACK_MAGIC to include/uapi/linux/magic.h
Smack: add missing support for transmute bit in smack_str_from_perm()
Smack: prevent revoke-subject from failing when unseen label is written to it
tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
Commit 90ba9b1986 (tcp: tcp_make_synack() can use alloc_skb())
broke certain SELinux/NetLabel configurations by no longer correctly
assigning the sock to the outgoing SYNACK packet.
Cost of atomic operations on the LISTEN socket is quite big,
and we would like it to happen only if really needed.
This patch introduces a new security_ops->skb_owned_by() method,
that is a void operation unless selinux is active.
Reported-by: Miroslav Vadkerti <mvadkert@redhat.com>
Diagnosed-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the
same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the
second context= option is ignored. For instance:
# mount server:/export /mnt/test1
# mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
# ls -dZ /mnt/test1
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test1
# ls -dZ /mnt/test2
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test2
When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock,
it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an
existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and
presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from
the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this
case cannot take effect.
This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int
return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has
been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on
the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return
success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the
admin why the second mount failed.
Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on
being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount
filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts,
then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways.
For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the
server:
# mount server:/ /mnt/test1
# mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified
...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually
walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch.
The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already
present with the wrong context.
OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work,
because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is
discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into
that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons:
# cd /mnt/test1/scratch/
-bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy
The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that
this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data
under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one.
Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced
with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the
multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its
associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the
device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted
for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent
devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause
the tun device to lose its SELinux label.
We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the
tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g.
SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun
device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new
approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook,
security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a
TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE.
The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the
other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes
use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to
restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux
policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission
the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according
to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
With the addition of the new kernel module syscall, which defines two
arguments - a file descriptor to the kernel module and a pointer to a NULL
terminated string of module arguments - it is now possible to measure and
appraise kernel modules like any other file on the file system.
This patch adds support to measure and appraise kernel modules in an
extensible and consistent manner.
To support filesystems without extended attribute support, additional
patches could pass the signature as the first parameter.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to
the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let
Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its
read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example,
read extended attributes for signatures, etc.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline
attacks
- Integrity: add digital signature verification
- Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions)
- IBM vTPM support on ppc64
- Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM
- Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels"
Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools
ima: change flags container data type
Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix
Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label
Smack: remove task_wait() hook.
ima: audit log hashes
ima: generic IMA action flag handling
ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure
audit: export audit_log_task_info
tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces
samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390
ima: digital signature verification support
ima: add support for different security.ima data types
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls
ima: add inode_post_setattr call
ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock
ima: allocating iint improvements
ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules
ima: integrity appraisal extension
vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
...
Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and
gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules
only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Based on xattr_permission comments, the restriction to modify 'security'
xattr is left up to the underlying fs or lsm. Ensure that not just anyone
can modify or remove 'security.ima'.
Changelog v1:
- Unless IMA-APPRAISE is configured, use stub ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr()
functions. (Moved ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() to ima_appraise.c)
Changelog:
- take i_mutex to fix locking (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- ima_reset_appraise_flags should only be called when modifying or
removing the 'security.ima' xattr. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.
(Incorporated fix from Roberto Sassu)
- Even if allowed to update security.ima, reset the appraisal flags,
forcing re-appraisal.
- Replace CAP_MAC_ADMIN with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
- static inline ima_inode_setxattr()/ima_inode_removexattr() stubs
- ima_protect_xattr should be static
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Unconditionally call Yama when CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED is selected,
no matter what LSM module is primary.
Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora
has voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having multiple
distributions (or LSM authors) carrying these patches, just allow Yama
to be called unconditionally when selected by the new CONFIG.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined
reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP:
security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot':
security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type
security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined
reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP:
security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot':
security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type
security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants into a single function.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The current LSM interface to cred_free is not sufficient for allowing
an LSM to track the life and death of a task. This patch adds the
task_free hook so that an LSM can clean up resources on task death.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security:
capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition
security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions
capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable
capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit
capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability
capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces
capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod
selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs
selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static
SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()
Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv():
- the interface was removed in commit fd77846152 ("security: remove
the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()")
- a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b9 ("crypto: Add
userspace configuration API")
causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the
issue.
Once upon a time netlink was not sync and we had to get the effective
capabilities from the skb that was being received. Today we instead get
the capabilities from the current task. This has rendered the entire
purpose of the hook moot as it is now functionally equivalent to the
capable() call.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The name security_real_capable and security_real_capable_noaudit just don't
make much sense to me. Convert them to use security_capable and
security_capable_noaudit.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Exactly like security_capable except don't audit any denials. This is for
places where the kernel may make decisions about what to do if a task has a
given capability, but which failing that capability is not a sign of a
security policy violation. An example is checking if a task has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN to lower it's likelyhood of being killed by the oom killer.
This check is not a security violation if it is denied.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
security_capable takes ns, cred, cap. But the LSM capable() hook takes
cred, ns, cap. The capability helper functions also take cred, ns, cap.
Rather than flip argument order just to flip it back, leave them alone.
Heck, this should be a little faster since argument will be in the right
place!
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The capabilities framework is based around credentials, not necessarily the
current task. Yet we still passed the current task down into LSMs from the
security_capable() LSM hook as if it was a meaningful portion of the security
decision. This patch removes the 'generic' passing of current and instead
forces individual LSMs to use current explicitly if they think it is
appropriate. In our case those LSMs are SELinux and AppArmor.
I believe the AppArmor use of current is incorrect, but that is wholely
unrelated to this patch. This patch does not change what AppArmor does, it
just makes it clear in the AppArmor code that it is doing it.
The SELinux code still uses current in it's audit message, which may also be
wrong and needs further investigation. Again this is NOT a change, it may
have always been wrong, this patch just makes it clear what is happening.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
vfs_create() ignores everything outside of 16bit subset of its
mode argument; switching it to umode_t is obviously equivalent
and it's the only caller of the method
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
vfs_mkdir() gets int, but immediately drops everything that might not
fit into umode_t and that's the only caller of ->mkdir()...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Commit 1e39f384bb ("evm: fix build problems") makes the stub version
of security_old_inode_init_security() return 0 when CONFIG_SECURITY is
not set.
But that makes callers such as reiserfs_security_init() assume that
security_old_inode_init_security() has set name, value, and len
arguments properly - but security_old_inode_init_security() left them
uninitialized which then results in interesting failures.
Revert security_old_inode_init_security() to the old behavior of
returning EOPNOTSUPP since both callers (reiserfs and ocfs2) handle this
just fine.
[ Also fixed the S_PRIVATE(inode) case of the actual non-stub
security_old_inode_init_security() function to return EOPNOTSUPP
for the same reason, as pointed out by Mimi Zohar.
It got incorrectly changed to match the new function in commit
fb88c2b6cbb1: "evm: fix security/security_old_init_security return
code". - Linus ]
Reported-by: Jorge Bastos <mysql.jorge@decimal.pt>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (95 commits)
TOMOYO: Fix incomplete read after seek.
Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user
TOMOYO: Fix unused kernel config option.
Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access
Smack: compilation fix
Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte
Smack: domain transition protections (v3)
Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED)
Smack: Clean up comments
Smack: Repair processing of fcntl
Smack: Rule list lookup performance
Smack: check permissions from user space (v2)
TOMOYO: Fix quota and garbage collector.
TOMOYO: Remove redundant tasklist_lock.
TOMOYO: Fix domain transition failure warning.
TOMOYO: Remove tomoyo_policy_memory_lock spinlock.
TOMOYO: Simplify garbage collector.
TOMOYO: Fix make namespacecheck warnings.
target: check hex2bin result
encrypted-keys: check hex2bin result
...
The Bluetooth stack has internal connection handlers for all of the various
Bluetooth protocols, and unfortunately, they are currently lacking the LSM
hooks found in the core network stack's connection handlers. I say
unfortunately, because this can cause problems for users who have have an
LSM enabled and are using certain Bluetooth devices. See one problem
report below:
* http://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=741703
In order to keep things simple at this point in time, this patch fixes the
problem by cloning the parent socket's LSM attributes to the newly created
child socket. If we decide we need a more elaborate LSM marking mechanism
for Bluetooth (I somewhat doubt this) we can always revisit this decision
in the future.
Reported-by: James M. Cape <jcape@ignore-your.tv>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
security_inode_init_security previously returned -EOPNOTSUPP, for S_PRIVATE
inodes, and relied on the callers to change it to 0. As the callers do not
change the return code anymore, return 0, intead of -EOPNOTSUPP.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
pass mask instead; kill security_inode_exec_permission() since we can use
security_inode_permission() instead.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Permit changing of security.evm only when valid, unless in fixmode.
Reported-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Changelog v7:
- moved the initialization call to security_inode_init_security,
renaming evm_inode_post_init_security to evm_inode_init_security
- increase size of xattr array for EVM xattr
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(),
evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr()
protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and
evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode.
(Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.)
Changelog:
- Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled.
- xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *'
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.
Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as static
There should be no other functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a
filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes.
This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of
multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function
walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be
optimized to write multiple xattrs at once.
For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet
been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in
reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.
Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
user namespace.
The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.
I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.
Changelog:
11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we
were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
he was the creator. Reverse those checks.
12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
it! Fix the check in cap_capable().
02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
fixing a compile failure.
02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some
couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add
a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations
together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
kernel-doc format.
02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.
(Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version
acked by him)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1480 commits)
bonding: enable netpoll without checking link status
xfrm: Refcount destination entry on xfrm_lookup
net: introduce rx_handler results and logic around that
bonding: get rid of IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE netdev->priv_flag
bonding: wrap slave state work
net: get rid of multiple bond-related netdevice->priv_flags
bonding: register slave pointer for rx_handler
be2net: Bump up the version number
be2net: Copyright notice change. Update to Emulex instead of ServerEngines
e1000e: fix kconfig for crc32 dependency
netfilter ebtables: fix xt_AUDIT to work with ebtables
xen network backend driver
bonding: Improve syslog message at device creation time
bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after register_netdevice
bonding: Incorrect TX queue offset
net_sched: fix ip_tos2prio
xfrm: fix __xfrm_route_forward()
be2net: Fix UDP packet detected status in RX compl
Phonet: fix aligned-mode pipe socket buffer header reserve
netxen: support for GbE port settings
...
Fix up conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmsmac/wl_mac80211.c
with the staging updates.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (33 commits)
AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c
AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly
KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE
KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code
KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vetted
KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro
AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to read
SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook
LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM
SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket
SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute
SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class
TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open.
Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"
selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions
selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting
selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer
selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm
ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure
IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking
...
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (62 commits)
posix-clocks: Check write permissions in posix syscalls
hrtimer: Remove empty hrtimer_init_hres_timer()
hrtimer: Update hrtimer->state documentation
hrtimer: Update base[CLOCK_BOOTTIME].offset correctly
timers: Export CLOCK_BOOTTIME via the posix timers interface
timers: Add CLOCK_BOOTTIME hrtimer base
time: Extend get_xtime_and_monotonic_offset() to also return sleep
time: Introduce get_monotonic_boottime and ktime_get_boottime
hrtimers: extend hrtimer base code to handle more then 2 clockids
ntp: Remove redundant and incorrect parameter check
mn10300: Switch do_timer() to xtimer_update()
posix clocks: Introduce dynamic clocks
posix-timers: Cleanup namespace
posix-timers: Add support for fd based clocks
x86: Add clock_adjtime for x86
posix-timers: Introduce a syscall for clock tuning.
time: Splitout compat timex accessors
ntp: Add ADJ_SETOFFSET mode bit
time: Introduce timekeeping_inject_offset
posix-timer: Update comment
...
Fix up new system-call-related conflicts in
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_32.h
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_64.h
arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S
(name_to_handle_at()/open_by_handle_at() vs clock_adjtime()), and some
due to movement of get_jiffies_64() in:
kernel/time.c
I intend to turn struct flowi into a union of AF specific flowi
structs. There will be a common structure that each variant includes
first, much like struct sock_common.
This is the first step to move in that direction.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove
options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining
options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the
SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls
into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed
to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where
this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will
print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using
xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and
ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called
and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means
and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop
# mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp
# cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp
/dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0
# mount -o remount /mnt/tmp
mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option
# dmesg
EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value
This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Expand security_capable() to include cred, so that it can be usable in a
wider range of call sites.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Both settimeofday() and clock_settime() promise with a 'const'
attribute not to alter the arguments passed in. This patch adds the
missing 'const' attribute into the various kernel functions
implementing these calls.
Signed-off-by: Richard Cochran <richard.cochran@omicron.at>
Acked-by: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
LKML-Reference: <20110201134417.545698637@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The only user for this hook was selinux. sysctl routes every call
through /proc/sys/. Selinux and other security modules use the file
system checks for sysctl too, so no need for this hook any more.
Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.
This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Add calls to path-based security hooks into CacheFiles as, unlike inode-based
security, these aren't implicit in the vfs_mkdir() and similar calls.
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Perform common cases of path lookups without any stores or locking in the
ancestor dentry elements. This is called rcu-walk, as opposed to the current
algorithm which is a refcount based walk, or ref-walk.
This results in far fewer atomic operations on every path element,
significantly improving path lookup performance. It also avoids cacheline
bouncing on common dentries, significantly improving scalability.
The overall design is like this:
* LOOKUP_RCU is set in nd->flags, which distinguishes rcu-walk from ref-walk.
* Take the RCU lock for the entire path walk, starting with the acquiring
of the starting path (eg. root/cwd/fd-path). So now dentry refcounts are
not required for dentry persistence.
* synchronize_rcu is called when unregistering a filesystem, so we can
access d_ops and i_ops during rcu-walk.
* Similarly take the vfsmount lock for the entire path walk. So now mnt
refcounts are not required for persistence. Also we are free to perform mount
lookups, and to assume dentry mount points and mount roots are stable up and
down the path.
* Have a per-dentry seqlock to protect the dentry name, parent, and inode,
so we can load this tuple atomically, and also check whether any of its
members have changed.
* Dentry lookups (based on parent, candidate string tuple) recheck the parent
sequence after the child is found in case anything changed in the parent
during the path walk.
* inode is also RCU protected so we can load d_inode and use the inode for
limited things.
* i_mode, i_uid, i_gid can be tested for exec permissions during path walk.
* i_op can be loaded.
When we reach the destination dentry, we lock it, recheck lookup sequence,
and increment its refcount and mountpoint refcount. RCU and vfsmount locks
are dropped. This is termed "dropping rcu-walk". If the dentry refcount does
not match, we can not drop rcu-walk gracefully at the current point in the
lokup, so instead return -ECHILD (for want of a better errno). This signals the
path walking code to re-do the entire lookup with a ref-walk.
Aside from the final dentry, there are other situations that may be encounted
where we cannot continue rcu-walk. In that case, we drop rcu-walk (ie. take
a reference on the last good dentry) and continue with a ref-walk. Again, if
we can drop rcu-walk gracefully, we return -ECHILD and do the whole lookup
using ref-walk. But it is very important that we can continue with ref-walk
for most cases, particularly to avoid the overhead of double lookups, and to
gain the scalability advantages on common path elements (like cwd and root).
The cases where rcu-walk cannot continue are:
* NULL dentry (ie. any uncached path element)
* parent with d_inode->i_op->permission or ACLs
* dentries with d_revalidate
* Following links
In future patches, permission checks and d_revalidate become rcu-walk aware. It
may be possible eventually to make following links rcu-walk aware.
Uncached path elements will always require dropping to ref-walk mode, at the
very least because i_mutex needs to be grabbed, and objects allocated.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and
it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other"
during stream connects.
However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned
to NULL under the unix_state_lock().
Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead
of the forward mapping.
Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build
failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code
which used the new option was built even though the variable in question
didn't exist.
The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the
LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the
capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization
better to eliminate the hook altogether.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* ima-memory-use-fixes:
IMA: fix the ToMToU logic
IMA: explicit IMA i_flag to remove global lock on inode_delete
IMA: drop refcnt from ima_iint_cache since it isn't needed
IMA: only allocate iint when needed
IMA: move read counter into struct inode
IMA: use i_writecount rather than a private counter
IMA: use inode->i_lock to protect read and write counters
IMA: convert internal flags from long to char
IMA: use unsigned int instead of long for counters
IMA: drop the inode opencount since it isn't needed for operation
IMA: use rbtree instead of radix tree for inode information cache
IMA always allocates an integrity structure to hold information about
every inode, but only needed this structure to track the number of
readers and writers currently accessing a given inode. Since that
information was moved into struct inode instead of the integrity struct
this patch stops allocating the integrity stucture until it is needed.
Thus greatly reducing memory usage.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and
remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge
we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at
least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also
have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of
security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also
make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable.
This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from
security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is
using it.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We can set default LSM module to DAC (which means "enable no LSM module").
If default LSM module was set to DAC, security_module_enable() must return 0
unless overridden via boot time parameter.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux:
unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers
rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall
rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit
rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit
rlimits: add rlimit64 structure
rlimits: do security check under task_lock
rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks
rlimits: split sys_setrlimit
rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lock
rlimits: make sure ->rlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit
rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu
rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit
Fix up various system call number conflicts. We not only added fanotify
system calls in the meantime, but asm-generic/unistd.h added a wait4
along with a range of reserved per-architecture system calls.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/notify: (132 commits)
fanotify: use both marks when possible
fsnotify: pass both the vfsmount mark and inode mark
fsnotify: walk the inode and vfsmount lists simultaneously
fsnotify: rework ignored mark flushing
fsnotify: remove global fsnotify groups lists
fsnotify: remove group->mask
fsnotify: remove the global masks
fsnotify: cleanup should_send_event
fanotify: use the mark in handler functions
audit: use the mark in handler functions
dnotify: use the mark in handler functions
inotify: use the mark in handler functions
fsnotify: send fsnotify_mark to groups in event handling functions
fsnotify: Exchange list heads instead of moving elements
fsnotify: srcu to protect read side of inode and vfsmount locks
fsnotify: use an explicit flag to indicate fsnotify_destroy_mark has been called
fsnotify: use _rcu functions for mark list traversal
fsnotify: place marks on object in order of group memory address
vfs/fsnotify: fsnotify_close can delay the final work in fput
fsnotify: store struct file not struct path
...
Fix up trivial delete/modify conflict in fs/notify/inotify/inotify.c.
When commit be6d3e56a6 "introduce new LSM hooks
where vfsmount is available." was proposed, regarding security_path_truncate(),
only "struct file *" argument (which AppArmor wanted to use) was removed.
But length and time_attrs arguments are not used by TOMOYO nor AppArmor.
Thus, let's remove these arguments.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
introduce a new fsnotify hook, fsnotify_perm(), which is called from the
security code. This hook is used to allow fsnotify groups to make access
control decisions about events on the system. We also must change the
generic fsnotify function to return an error code if we intend these hooks
to be in any way useful.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set
rlimit of task other than current.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
register_security() became __init function.
So do verify() and security_fixup_ops().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Stephen Smalley