The previously defined Confidential Computing blob is provided to the
kernel via a setup_data structure or EFI config table entry. Currently,
these are both checked for by boot/compressed kernel to access the CPUID
table address within it for use with SEV-SNP CPUID enforcement.
To also enable that enforcement for the run-time kernel, similar
access to the CPUID table is needed early on while it's still using
the identity-mapped page table set up by boot/compressed, where global
pointers need to be accessed via fixup_pointer().
This isn't much of an issue for accessing setup_data, and the EFI config
table helper code currently used in boot/compressed *could* be used in
this case as well since they both rely on identity-mapping. However, it
has some reliance on EFI helpers/string constants that would need to be
accessed via fixup_pointer(), and fixing it up while making it shareable
between boot/compressed and run-time kernel is fragile and introduces a
good bit of ugliness.
Instead, add a boot_params->cc_blob_address pointer that the
boot/compressed kernel can initialize so that the run-time kernel can
access the CC blob from there instead of re-scanning the EFI config
table.
Also document these in Documentation/x86/zero-page.rst. While there,
add missing documentation for the acpi_rsdp_addr field, which serves a
similar purpose in providing the run-time kernel a pointer to the ACPI
RSDP table so that it does not need to [re-]scan the EFI configuration
table.
[ bp: Fix typos, massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-34-brijesh.singh@amd.com
Commit
a90118c445 ("x86/boot: Save fields explicitly, zero out everything else")
now zeroes the secure boot setting information (enabled/disabled/...)
passed by the boot loader or by the kernel's EFI handover mechanism.
The problem manifests itself with signed kernels using the EFI handoff
protocol with grub and the kernel loses the information whether secure
boot is enabled in the firmware, i.e., the log message "Secure boot
enabled" becomes "Secure boot could not be determined".
efi_main() arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c sets this field early but it
is subsequently zeroed by the above referenced commit.
Include boot_params.secure_boot in the preserve field list.
[ bp: restructure commit message and massage. ]
Fixes: a90118c445 ("x86/boot: Save fields explicitly, zero out everything else")
Signed-off-by: John S. Gruber <JohnSGruber@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAPotdmSPExAuQcy9iAHqX3js_fc4mMLQOTr5RBGvizyCOPcTQQ@mail.gmail.com
commit a90118c445 ("x86/boot: Save fields explicitly, zero out everything
else") had two errors:
* It preserved boot_params.acpi_rsdp_addr, and
* It failed to preserve boot_params.hdr
Therefore, zero out acpi_rsdp_addr, and preserve hdr.
Fixes: a90118c445 ("x86/boot: Save fields explicitly, zero out everything else")
Reported-by: Neil MacLeod <neil@nmacleod.com>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neil MacLeod <neil@nmacleod.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190821192513.20126-1-jhubbard@nvidia.com
Recent gcc compilers (gcc 9.1) generate warnings about an out of bounds
memset, if the memset goes accross several fields of a struct. This
generated a couple of warnings on x86_64 builds in sanitize_boot_params().
Fix this by explicitly saving the fields in struct boot_params
that are intended to be preserved, and zeroing all the rest.
[ tglx: Tagged for stable as it breaks the warning free build there as well ]
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190731054627.5627-2-jhubbard@nvidia.com
Mostly due to x86 and acpi conversion, several documentation
links are still pointing to the old file. Fix them.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Reviewed-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <TheSven73@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Gunnar Krueger reported a systemd-boot failure and bisected it down to:
e6e094e053 ("x86/acpi, x86/boot: Take RSDP address from boot params if available")
In case a broken boot loader doesn't clear its 'struct boot_params', clear
rsdp_addr in sanitize_boot_params().
Reported-by: Gunnar Krueger <taijian@posteo.de>
Tested-by: Gunnar Krueger <taijian@posteo.de>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: sstabellini@kernel.org
Fixes: e6e094e053 ("x86/acpi, x86/boot: Take RSDP address from boot params if available")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181203103811.17056-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
OpenFirmware wasn't quite following the protocol described in boot.txt
and the kernel has detected this through use of the sentinel value
in boot_params. OFW does zero out almost all of the stuff that it should
do, but not the sentinel.
This causes the kernel to clear olpc_ofw_header, which breaks x86 OLPC
support.
OpenFirmware has now been fixed. However, it would be nice if we could
maintain Linux compatibility with old firmware versions. To do that, we just
have to avoid zeroing out olpc_ofw_header.
OFW does not write to any other parts of the header that are being zapped
by the sentinel-detection code, and all users of olpc_ofw_header are
somewhat protected through checking for the OLPC_OFW_SIG magic value
before using it. So this should not cause any problems for anyone.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Drake <dsd@laptop.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130809221420.618E6FAB03@dev.laptop.org
Acked-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.9+
If the sentinel triggers, we do not want the boot loader authors to
just poke it and make the error go away, we want them to actually fix
the problem.
This should help avoid making the incorrect change in non-compliant
bootloaders.
[ hpa: dropped the Documentation/x86/boot.txt hunk pending
clarifications ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1362592823-28967-1-git-send-email-pjones@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
When boot_params->sentinel is set, all we really know is that some
undefined set of fields in struct boot_params contain garbage. In the
particular case of efi_info, however, there is a private magic for
that substructure, so it is generally safe to leave it even if the
bootloader is broken.
kexec (for which we did the initial analysis) did not initialize this
field, but of course all the EFI bootloaders do, and most EFI
bootloaders are broken in this respect (and should be fixed.)
Reported-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B5PVA51-FT14p4CRYKbicykugVb=PiaEycdQ57CK2km_OQuRQ@mail.gmail.com
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Use the new sentinel field to detect bootloaders which fail to follow
protocol and don't initialize fields in struct boot_params that they
do not explicitly initialize to zero.
Based on an original patch and research by Yinghai Lu.
Changed by hpa to be invoked both in the decompression path and in the
kernel proper; the latter for the case where a bootloader takes over
decompression.
Originally-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359058816-7615-26-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Michael Roth