kernel/printk/printk.c:365:1: warning: symbol 'log_wait' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220924000454.3319186-3-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
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GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 52 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jilayne Lovejoy <opensource@jilayne.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190519154042.342335923@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 68c4a4f8ab, with
various conflict clean-ups.
The capability check required too much privilege compared to simple DAC
controls. A system builder was forced to have crash handler processes
run with CAP_SYSLOG which would give it the ability to read (and wipe)
the _current_ dmesg, which is much more access than being given access
only to the historical log stored in pstorefs.
With the prior commit to make the root directory 0750, the files are
protected by default but a system builder can now opt to give access
to a specific group (via chgrp on the pstorefs root directory) without
being forced to also give away CAP_SYSLOG.
Suggested-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Patch fixes drawbacks in heck_syslog_permissions() noticed by AKPM:
"from_file handling makes me cry.
That's not a boolean - it's an enumerated value with two values
currently defined.
But the code in check_syslog_permissions() treats it as a boolean and
also hardwires the knowledge that SYSLOG_FROM_PROC == 1 (or == `true`).
And the name is wrong: it should be called from_proc to match
SYSLOG_FROM_PROC."
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When building without CONFIG_PRINTK, we need to provide a stub
check_syslog_permissions. As there is no way to turn on the
dmesg_restrict sysctl without CONFIG_PRINTK, return success.
Reported-by: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Schmidt <yath@yath.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
When the kernel.dmesg_restrict restriction is in place, only users with
CAP_SYSLOG should be able to access crash dumps (like: attacker is
trying to exploit a bug, watchdog reboots, attacker can happily read
crash dumps and logs).
This puts the restriction on console-* types as well as sensitive
information could have been leaked there.
Other log types are unaffected.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Schmidt <yath@yath.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
The dmesg_restrict sysctl currently covers the syslog method for access
dmesg, however /dev/kmsg isn't covered by the same protections. Most
people haven't noticed because util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to using the
syslog method for access in older versions. With util-linux dmesg(1)
defaults to reading directly from /dev/kmsg.
To fix /dev/kmsg, let's compare the existing interfaces and what they
allow:
- /proc/kmsg allows:
- open (SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) if CAP_SYSLOG since it uses a destructive
single-reader interface (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ).
- everything, after an open.
- syslog syscall allows:
- anything, if CAP_SYSLOG.
- SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER, if
dmesg_restrict==0.
- nothing else (EPERM).
The use-cases were:
- dmesg(1) needs to do non-destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALLs.
- sysklog(1) needs to open /proc/kmsg, drop privs, and still issue the
destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READs.
AIUI, dmesg(1) is moving to /dev/kmsg, and systemd-journald doesn't
clear the ring buffer.
Based on the comments in devkmsg_llseek, it sounds like actions besides
reading aren't going to be supported by /dev/kmsg (i.e.
SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), so we have a strict subset of the non-destructive
syslog syscall actions.
To this end, move the check as Josh had done, but also rename the
constants to reflect their new uses (SYSLOG_FROM_CALL becomes
SYSLOG_FROM_READER, and SYSLOG_FROM_FILE becomes SYSLOG_FROM_PROC).
SYSLOG_FROM_READER allows non-destructive actions, and SYSLOG_FROM_PROC
allows destructive actions after a capabilities-constrained
SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN check.
- /dev/kmsg allows:
- open if CAP_SYSLOG or dmesg_restrict==0
- reading/polling, after open
Addresses https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=903192
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use pr_warn_once()]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Right now the syslog "type" action are just raw numbers which makes
the source difficult to follow. This patch replaces the raw numbers
with defined constants for some level of sanity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating
from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls. By default, the commoncaps
will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg
file descriptor. For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop
privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Thomas Gleixner