crypto_shash_setkey() and crypto_aead_setkey() will do a (small)
GFP_ATOMIC allocation to align the key if it isn't suitably aligned.
It's not a big deal, but at the same time easy to avoid.
The actual alignment requirement is dynamic, queryable with
crypto_shash_alignmask() and crypto_aead_alignmask(), but shouldn't
be stricter than 16 bytes for our algorithms.
Fixes: cd1a677cad ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
auth_signature frame is 68 bytes in plain mode and 96 bytes in
secure mode but we are requesting 68 bytes in both modes. By luck,
this doesn't actually result in any invalid memory accesses because
the allocation is satisfied out of kmalloc-96 slab and so exactly
96 bytes are allocated, but KASAN rightfully complains.
Fixes: cd1a677cad ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)")
Reported-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
adds the option of full in-transit encryption using AES-GCM algorithm
(myself). On top of that we have a series to avoid intermittent
errors during recovery with recover_session=clean and some MDS request
encoding work from Jeff, a cap handling fix and assorted observability
improvements from Luis and Xiubo and a good number of cleanups. Luis
also ran into a corner case with quotas which sadly means that we are
back to denying cross-quota-realm renames.
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Merge tag 'ceph-for-5.11-rc1' of git://github.com/ceph/ceph-client
Pull ceph updates from Ilya Dryomov:
"The big ticket item here is support for msgr2 on-wire protocol, which
adds the option of full in-transit encryption using AES-GCM algorithm
(myself).
On top of that we have a series to avoid intermittent errors during
recovery with recover_session=clean and some MDS request encoding work
from Jeff, a cap handling fix and assorted observability improvements
from Luis and Xiubo and a good number of cleanups.
Luis also ran into a corner case with quotas which sadly means that we
are back to denying cross-quota-realm renames"
* tag 'ceph-for-5.11-rc1' of git://github.com/ceph/ceph-client: (59 commits)
libceph: drop ceph_auth_{create,update}_authorizer()
libceph, ceph: make use of __ceph_auth_get_authorizer() in msgr1
libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)
libceph: introduce connection modes and ms_mode option
libceph, rbd: ignore addr->type while comparing in some cases
libceph, ceph: get and handle cluster maps with addrvecs
libceph: factor out finish_auth()
libceph: drop ac->ops->name field
libceph: amend cephx init_protocol() and build_request()
libceph, ceph: incorporate nautilus cephx changes
libceph: safer en/decoding of cephx requests and replies
libceph: more insight into ticket expiry and invalidation
libceph: move msgr1 protocol specific fields to its own struct
libceph: move msgr1 protocol implementation to its own file
libceph: separate msgr1 protocol implementation
libceph: export remaining protocol independent infrastructure
libceph: export zero_page
libceph: rename and export con->flags bits
libceph: rename and export con->state states
libceph: make con->state an int
...
Implement msgr2.1 wire protocol, available since nautilus 14.2.11
and octopus 15.2.5. msgr2.0 wire protocol is not implemented -- it
has several security, integrity and robustness issues and therefore
considered deprecated.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Ilya Dryomov