This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The Kconfig lexer supports special characters such as '.' and '/' in
the parameter context. In my understanding, the reason is just to
support bare file paths in the source statement.
I do not see a good reason to complicate Kconfig for the room of
ambiguity.
The majority of code already surrounds file paths with double quotes,
and it makes sense since file paths are constant string literals.
Make it treewide consistent now.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Lots of conflicts, by happily all cases of overlapping
changes, parallel adds, things of that nature.
Thanks to Stephen Rothwell, Saeed Mahameed, and others
for their guidance in these resolutions.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In commit 4f83d5ea64 ("security: integrity: make ima_main explicitly
non-modular") I'd removed <linux/module.h> after assuming that the
function is_module_sig_enforced() was an LSM function and not a core
kernel module function.
Unfortunately the typical .config selections used in build testing
provide an implicit <linux/module.h> presence, and so normal/typical
build testing did not immediately reveal my incorrect assumption.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Only the mount namespace code that implements mount(2) should be using the
MS_* flags. Suppress them inside the kernel unless uapi/linux/mount.h is
included.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
skb_sec_path gains 'const' qualifier to avoid
xt_policy.c: 'skb_sec_path' discards 'const' qualifier from pointer target type
same reasoning as previous conversions: Won't need to touch these
spots anymore when skb->sp is removed.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Start the policy_tokens and the associated enumeration from zero,
simplifying the pt macro.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The code uses a bitmap to check for duplicate tokens during parsing, and
that doesn't work at all for the negative Opt_err token case.
There is absolutely no reason to make Opt_err be negative, and in fact
it only confuses things, since some of the affected functions actually
return a positive Opt_xyz enum _or_ a regular negative error code (eg
-EINVAL), and using -1 for Opt_err makes no sense.
There are similar problems in ima_policy.c and key encryption, but they
don't have the immediate bug wrt bitmap handing, and ima_policy.c in
particular needs a different patch to make the enum values match the
token array index. Mimi is sending that separately.
Reported-by: syzbot+a22e0dc07567662c50bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Fixes: 5208cc8342 ("keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options")
Fixes: 00d60fd3b9 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Cc: James Morris James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
From what I can tell, it has never been used.
Mimi: This was introduced prior to Rusty's decision to use appended
signatures for kernel modules.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-20181217' of git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd into next-tpm
tpmdd updates for Linux v4.21
From Jarkko:
v4.21 updates:
* Support for partial reads of /dev/tpm0.
* Clean up for TPM 1.x code: move the commands to tpm1-cmd.c and make
everything to use the same data structure for building TPM commands
i.e. struct tpm_buf.
From Mimi:
In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load
syscall. Different signature verification methods exist for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image. This pull request adds additional support
in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load
syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime
"secure boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.
In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.
(David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
use case scenario, are included here.)
Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size
of the key to 32bytes.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Export lookup_user_key() symbol in order to allow nvdimm passphrase
update to retrieve user injected keys.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Use the aptly named function rather than open coding the check. No
functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
On secure boot enabled systems, the bootloader verifies the kernel
image and possibly the initramfs signatures based on a set of keys. A
soft reboot(kexec) of the system, with the same kernel image and
initramfs, requires access to the original keys to verify the
signatures.
This patch allows IMA-appraisal access to those original keys, now
loaded on the platform keyring, needed for verifying the kernel image
and initramfs signatures.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: only use platform keyring if it's enabled (Thiago)]
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If a user tells shim to not use the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable
for verification purposes, shim will set a UEFI variable called
MokIgnoreDB. Have the uefi import code look for this and ignore the db
variable if it is found.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: removed reference to "secondary" keyring comment]
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
This patch imports those certificates into the platform keyring. The shim
UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored in the 'MokListRT'
variable. We import those as well.
Secure Boot also maintains a list of disallowed certificates in the 'dbx'
variable. We load those certificates into the system blacklist keyring
and forbid any kernel signed with those from loading.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: dropped Josh's original patch description]
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Add a function to parse an EFI signature blob looking for elements of
interest. A list is made up of a series of sublists, where all the
elements in a sublist are of the same type, but sublists can be of
different types.
For each sublist encountered, the function pointed to by the
get_handler_for_guid argument is called with the type specifier GUID and
returns either a pointer to a function to handle elements of that type or
NULL if the type is not of interest.
If the sublist is of interest, each element is passed to the handler
function in turn.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The patch refactors integrity_load_x509(), making it a wrapper for a new
function named integrity_add_key(). This patch also defines a new
function named integrity_load_cert() for loading the platform keys.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec
additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing
to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In
such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel
image.
It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party
keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable.
The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an
administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage.
In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the
necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to
store platform keys.
This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys
provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to
facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this
keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from
userspace.
This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The Makefile/Kconfig entry controlling compilation of this code is:
security/Makefile:obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o
security/Kconfig:config SECURITYFS
security/Kconfig: bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple traces of modular infrastructure use, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag etc. since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
The removal of module.h uncovered a couple previously hidden implicit
header requirements which are now included explicitly.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.
The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.
Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
The Makefile/Kconfig entry controlling compilation of this code is:
obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o
evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig:config EVM
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig: bool "EVM support"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple traces of modular infrastructure use, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag etc. since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Even though the support can be modular, only one file needs to use
all the macros like MODULE_AUTHOR, MODULE_LICENSE etc. Only the one
responsible for registering/removal with module_init/module_exit
needs to declare these. In this case, that file is "encrypted.c"
and it already has the MODULE_LICENSE that we are removing here.
Since the file does EXPORT_SYMBOL, we add export.h - and build tests
show that module.h (which includes everything) was hiding an implicit
use of string.h - so that is added as well.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
The Makefile/Kconfig entry controlling compilation of this code is:
obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig:config IMA
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig- bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple traces of modular infrastructure use, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag etc. since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Update the builtin IMA policies specified on the boot command line
(eg. ima_policy="tcb|appraise_tcb") to permit accessing efivar files.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
On x86, there are two methods of verifying a kexec'ed kernel image
signature being loaded via the kexec_file_load syscall - an architecture
specific implementaton or a IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraisal rule. Neither
of these methods verify the kexec'ed kernel image signature being loaded
via the kexec_load syscall.
Secure boot enabled systems require kexec images to be signed. Therefore,
this patch loads an IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK policy rule on secure boot
enabled systems not configured with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.
When IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM is configured, different IMA appraise modes
(eg. fix, log) can be specified on the boot command line, allowing unsigned
or invalidly signed kernel images to be kexec'ed. This patch permits
enabling IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM or IMA_ARCH_POLICY, but not both.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Builtin IMA policies can be enabled on the boot command line, and replaced
with a custom policy, normally during early boot in the initramfs. Build
time IMA policy rules were recently added. These rules are automatically
enabled on boot and persist after loading a custom policy.
There is a need for yet another type of policy, an architecture specific
policy, which is derived at runtime during kernel boot, based on the
runtime secure boot flags. Like the build time policy rules, these rules
persist after loading a custom policy.
This patch adds support for loading an architecture specific IMA policy.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Co-Developed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch removes the code duplication in ima_init_policy() by defining
a new function named add_rules(). The new function adds the rules to the
initial IMA policy, the custom policy or both based on the policy mask
(IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY).
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
When CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, the kexec_file_load syscall
requires the kexec'd kernel image to be signed. Distros are concerned
about totally disabling the kexec_load syscall. As a compromise, the
kexec_load syscall will only be disabled when CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
is configured and the system is booted with secureboot enabled.
This patch disables the kexec_load syscall only for systems booted with
secureboot enabled.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: add missing mesage on kexec_load failure]
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Before this patch, during a policy reload the sidtab would become frozen
and trying to map a new context to SID would be unable to add a new
entry to sidtab and fail with -ENOMEM.
Such failures are usually propagated into userspace, which has no way of
distignuishing them from actual allocation failures and thus doesn't
handle them gracefully. Such situation can be triggered e.g. by the
following reproducer:
while true; do load_policy; echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done &
for (( i = 0; i < 1024; i++ )); do
runcon -l s0:c$i echo -n x || break
# or:
# chcon -l s0:c$i <some_file> || break
done
This patch overhauls the sidtab so it doesn't need to be frozen during
policy reload, thus solving the above problem.
The new SID table leverages the fact that SIDs are allocated
sequentially and are never invalidated and stores them in linear buckets
indexed by a tree structure. This brings several advantages:
1. Fast SID -> context lookup - this lookup can now be done in
logarithmic time complexity (usually in less than 4 array lookups)
and can still be done safely without locking.
2. No need to re-search the whole table on reverse lookup miss - after
acquiring the spinlock only the newly added entries need to be
searched, which means that reverse lookups that end up inserting a
new entry are now about twice as fast.
3. No need to freeze sidtab during policy reload - it is now possible
to handle insertion of new entries even during sidtab conversion.
The tree structure of the new sidtab is able to grow automatically to up
to about 2^31 entries (at which point it should not have more than about
4 tree levels). The old sidtab had a theoretical capacity of almost 2^32
entries, but half of that is still more than enough since by that point
the reverse table lookups would become unusably slow anyway...
The number of entries per tree node is selected automatically so that
each node fits into a single page, which should be the easiest size for
kmalloc() to handle.
Note that the cache for reverse lookup is preserved with equivalent
logic. The only difference is that instead of storing pointers to the
hash table nodes it stores just the indices of the cached entries.
The new cache ensures that the indices are loaded/stored atomically, but
it still has the drawback that concurrent cache updates may mess up the
contents of the cache. Such situation however only reduces its
effectivity, not the correctness of lookups.
Tested by selinux-testsuite and thoroughly tortured by this simple
stress test:
```
function rand_cat() {
echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 ))
}
function do_work() {
while true; do
echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \
>/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true
done
}
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done
kill %1
kill %2
kill %3
```
Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/38
Reported-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@nwra.com>
Reported-by: Li Kun <hw.likun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: most of sidtab.c merged by hand due to conflicts]
[PM: checkpatch fixes in mls.c, services.c, sidtab.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This moves handling of initial SIDs into a separate table. Note that the
SIDs stored in the main table are now shifted by SECINITSID_NUM and
converted to/from the actual SIDs transparently by helper functions.
This change doesn't make much sense on its own, but it simplifies
further sidtab overhaul in a succeeding patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: fixed some checkpatch warnings on line length, whitespace]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Function smack_key_permission() only issues smack requests for the
following operations:
- KEY_NEED_READ (issues MAY_READ)
- KEY_NEED_WRITE (issues MAY_WRITE)
- KEY_NEED_LINK (issues MAY_WRITE)
- KEY_NEED_SETATTR (issues MAY_WRITE)
A blank smack request is issued in all other cases, resulting in
smack access being granted if there is any rule defined between
subject and object, or denied with -EACCES otherwise.
Request MAY_READ access for KEY_NEED_SEARCH and KEY_NEED_VIEW.
Fix the logic in the unlikely case when both MAY_READ and
MAY_WRITE are needed. Validate access permission field for valid
contents.
Signed-off-by: Zoran Markovic <zmarkovic@sierrawireless.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181129' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One more SELinux fix for v4.20: add some missing netlink message to
SELinux permission mappings. The netlink messages were added in v4.19,
but unfortunately we didn't catch it then because the mechanism to
catch these things was bypassed.
In addition to adding the mappings, we're adding some comments to the
code to hopefully prevent bypasses in the future"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20181129' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: add support for RTM_NEWCHAIN, RTM_DELCHAIN, and RTM_GETCHAIN
Commit 32a4f5ecd7 ("net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi")
added new RTM_* definitions without properly updating SELinux, this
patch adds the necessary SELinux support.
While there was a BUILD_BUG_ON() in the SELinux code to protect from
exactly this case, it was bypassed in the broken commit. In order to
hopefully prevent this from happening in the future, add additional
comments which provide some instructions on how to resolve the
BUILD_BUG_ON() failures.
Fixes: 32a4f5ecd7 ("net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There are many places, notably audit_log_task_info() and
audit_log_exit(), that take task_struct pointers but in reality they
are always working on the current task. This patch eliminates the
task_struct arguments and uses current directly which allows a number
of cleanups as well.
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
If a superblock has the MS_SUBMOUNT flag set, we should always allow
mounting it. These mounts are done automatically by the kernel either as
part of mounting some parent mount (e.g. debugfs always mounts tracefs
under "tracing" for compatibility) or they are mounted automatically as
needed on subdirectory accesses (e.g. NFS crossmnt mounts). Since such
automounts are either an implicit consequence of the parent mount (which
is already checked) or they can happen during regular accesses (where it
doesn't make sense to check against the current task's context), the
mount permission check should be skipped for them.
Without this patch, attempts to access contents of an automounted
directory can cause unexpected SELinux denials.
In the current kernel tree, the MS_SUBMOUNT flag is set only via
vfs_submount(), which is called only from the following places:
- AFS, when automounting special "symlinks" referencing other cells
- CIFS, when automounting "referrals"
- NFS, when automounting subtrees
- debugfs, when automounting tracefs
In all cases the submounts are meant to be transparent to the user and
it makes sense that if mounting the master is allowed, then so should be
the automounts. Note that CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability checking is already
skipped for (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT) in:
- sget_userns() in fs/super.c:
if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) &&
!(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
- sget() in fs/super.c:
/* Ensure the requestor has permissions over the target filesystem */
if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) && !ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
Verified internally on patched RHEL 7.6 with a reproducer using
NFS+httpd and selinux-tesuite.
Fixes: 93faccbbfa ("fs: Better permission checking for submounts")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This is a purely cosmetic change that encapsulates the three-step sidtab
conversion logic (shutdown -> clone -> map) into a single function
defined in sidtab.c (as opposed to services.c).
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: whitespaces fixes to make checkpatch happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
'shash' algorithms are always synchronous, so passing CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC
in the mask to crypto_alloc_shash() has no effect. Many users therefore
already don't pass it, but some still do. This inconsistency can cause
confusion, especially since the way the 'mask' argument works is
somewhat counterintuitive.
Thus, just remove the unneeded CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC flags.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small SELinux fixes for v4.20.
Ondrej's patch adds a check on user input, and my patch ensures we
don't look past the end of a buffer.
Both patches are quite small and pass the selinux-testsuite"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20181115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix non-MLS handling in mls_context_to_sid()
selinux: check length properly in SCTP bind hook
when compiled without CONFIG_IPV6:
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1601:21: warning: ‘apparmor_ipv6_postroute’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
static unsigned int apparmor_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Reported-by: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Tested-by: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Commit 95ffe19420 ("selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make
it stricter") inadvertently changed how we handle labels that did not
contain MLS information. This patch restores the proper behavior in
mls_context_to_sid() and adds a comment explaining the proper
behavior to help ensure this doesn't happen again.
Fixes: 95ffe19420 ("selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make it stricter")
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
On systems with IMA-appraisal enabled with a policy requiring file
signatures, the "good" signature values are stored on the filesystem as
extended attributes (security.ima). Signature verification failure
would normally be limited to just a particular file (eg. executable),
but during boot signature verification failure could result in a system
hang.
Defining and requiring a new public_key_signature field requires all
callers of asymmetric signature verification to be updated to reflect
the change. This patch updates the integrity asymmetric_verify()
caller.
Fixes: 82f94f2447 ("KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
selinux_sctp_bind_connect() must verify if the address buffer has
sufficient length before accessing the 'sa_family' field. See
__sctp_connect() for a similar check.
The length of the whole address ('len') is already checked in the
callees.
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Fixes: d452930fd3 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.17+
Cc: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
On systems with IMA-appraisal enabled with a policy requiring file
signatures, the "good" signature values are stored on the filesystem as
extended attributes (security.ima). Signature verification failure
would normally be limited to just a particular file (eg. executable),
but during boot signature verification failure could result in a system
hang.
Defining and requiring a new public_key_signature field requires all
callers of asymmetric signature verification to be updated to reflect
the change. This patch updates the integrity asymmetric_verify()
caller.
Fixes: 82f94f2447 ("KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
The TPM specs defines PCR index as a positive number, and there is
no reason to use a signed number. It is also a possible security
issue as currently no functions check for a negative index,
which may become a large number when converted to u32.
Adjust the API to use u32 instead of int in all PCR related
functions.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Do the LE conversions before doing the Infiniband-related range checks.
The incorrect checks are otherwise causing a failure to load any policy
with an ibendportcon rule on BE systems. This can be reproduced by
running (on e.g. ppc64):
cat >my_module.cil <<EOF
(type test_ibendport_t)
(roletype object_r test_ibendport_t)
(ibendportcon mlx4_0 1 (system_u object_r test_ibendport_t ((s0) (s0))))
EOF
semodule -i my_module.cil
Also, fix loading/storing the 64-bit subnet prefix for OCON_IBPKEY to
use a correctly aligned buffer.
Finally, do not use the 'nodebuf' (u32) buffer where 'buf' (__le32)
should be used instead.
Tested internally on a ppc64 machine with a RHEL 7 kernel with this
patch applied.
Cc: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Cc: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.13+
Fixes: a806f7a161 ("selinux: Create policydb version for Infiniband support")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
- replace spin_is_locked() with lockdep
- add base support for secmark labeling and matching
+ Cleanups
- clean an indentation issue, remove extraneous space
- remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack
- fix checkpatch missing spaces error in Parse secmark policy
- fix network performance issue in aa_label_sk_perm
+ Bug fixes
- add #ifdef checks for secmark filtering
- fix an error code in __aa_create_ns()
- don't try to replace stale label in ptrace checks
- fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat
- check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask
- fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query
- fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqname
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"Features/Improvements:
- replace spin_is_locked() with lockdep
- add base support for secmark labeling and matching
Cleanups:
- clean an indentation issue, remove extraneous space
- remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack
- fix checkpatch missing spaces error in Parse secmark policy
- fix network performance issue in aa_label_sk_perm
Bug fixes:
- add #ifdef checks for secmark filtering
- fix an error code in __aa_create_ns()
- don't try to replace stale label in ptrace checks
- fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat
- check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask
- fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query
- fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqname"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: clean an indentation issue, remove extraneous space
apparmor: fix checkpatch error in Parse secmark policy
apparmor: add #ifdef checks for secmark filtering
apparmor: Fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqname
apparmor: don't try to replace stale label in ptraceme check
apparmor: Replace spin_is_locked() with lockdep
apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy
apparmor: Parse secmark policy
apparmor: Add a wildcard secid
apparmor: don't try to replace stale label in ptrace access check
apparmor: Fix network performance issue in aa_label_sk_perm
Trivial fix to clean up an indentation issue, remove space
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This patch exposes some common functionality needed to send TPM commands.
Several functions from keys/trusted.c are exposed for use by the new tpm
key subtype and a module dependency is introduced.
In the future, common functionality between the trusted key type and the
asym_tpm subtype should be factored out into a common utility library.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new
key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys.
(*) Query an asymmetric key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY,
key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved,
struct keyctl_pkey_query *info);
Get information about an asymmetric key. The information is returned
in the keyctl_pkey_query struct:
__u32 supported_ops;
A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported. This is
constructed from a bitwise-OR of:
KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY}
__u32 key_size;
The size in bits of the key.
__u16 max_data_size;
__u16 max_sig_size;
__u16 max_enc_size;
__u16 max_dec_size;
The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature
blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted.
reserved must be set to 0. This is intended for future use to hand
over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key.
If successful, 0 is returned. If the key is not an asymmetric key,
EOPNOTSUPP is returned.
(*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
const void *in2);
Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation
a blob of data.
The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer
values:
__s32 key_id;
__u32 in_len;
__u32 out_len;
__u32 in2_len;
For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows:
Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len
======================= =============== =============== ===========
KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT Raw data Encrypted data -
KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT Encrypted data Raw data -
KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN Raw data Signature -
KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Raw data - Signature
info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary
information.
The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0. This is
intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases
required to unlock a key.
If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data
written into the output buffer. Verification returns 0 on success.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Pull LoadPin updates from James Morris:
"From Kees: This is a small reporting improvement and the param change
needed for the ordering series (but since the loadpin change is
desired and separable, I'm putting it here)"
* 'next-loadpin' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce"
LoadPin: Report friendly block device name
Pull smack updates from James Morris:
"From Casey: three patches for Smack for 4.20. Two clean up warnings
and one is a rarely encountered ptrace capability check"
* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: Mark expected switch fall-through
Smack: ptrace capability use fixes
Smack: remove set but not used variable 'root_inode'
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"From Mimi: This contains a couple of bug fixes, including one for a
recent problem with calculating file hashes on overlayfs, and some
code cleanup"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
MAINTAINERS: add Jarkko as maintainer for trusted keys
ima: open a new file instance if no read permissions
ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count'
security/integrity: remove unnecessary 'init_keyring' variable
security/integrity: constify some read-only data
vfs: require i_size <= SIZE_MAX in kernel_read_file()
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this patchset, there are a couple of minor updates, as well as some
reworking of the LSM initialization code from Kees Cook (these prepare
the way for ordered stackable LSMs, but are a valuable cleanup on
their own)"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures
LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure
LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info
LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()
vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA
LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info
LSM: Remove initcall tracing
LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info
vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section
LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization
security: fix LSM description location
keys: Fix the use of the C++ keyword "private" in uapi/linux/keyctl.h
seccomp: remove unnecessary unlikely()
security: tomoyo: Fix obsolete function
security/capabilities: remove check for -EINVAL
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181022' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Three SELinux patches for v4.20, all fall under the bug-fix or
behave-better category, which is good. All three have pretty good
descriptions too, which is even better"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20181022' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: Add __GFP_NOWARN to allocation at str_read()
selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make it stricter
selinux: fix mounting of cgroup2 under older policies
Pull siginfo updates from Eric Biederman:
"I have been slowly sorting out siginfo and this is the culmination of
that work.
The primary result is in several ways the signal infrastructure has
been made less error prone. The code has been updated so that manually
specifying SEND_SIG_FORCED is never necessary. The conversion to the
new siginfo sending functions is now complete, which makes it
difficult to send a signal without filling in the proper siginfo
fields.
At the tail end of the patchset comes the optimization of decreasing
the size of struct siginfo in the kernel from 128 bytes to about 48
bytes on 64bit. The fundamental observation that enables this is by
definition none of the known ways to use struct siginfo uses the extra
bytes.
This comes at the cost of a small user space observable difference.
For the rare case of siginfo being injected into the kernel only what
can be copied into kernel_siginfo is delivered to the destination, the
rest of the bytes are set to 0. For cases where the signal and the
si_code are known this is safe, because we know those bytes are not
used. For cases where the signal and si_code combination is unknown
the bits that won't fit into struct kernel_siginfo are tested to
verify they are zero, and the send fails if they are not.
I made an extensive search through userspace code and I could not find
anything that would break because of the above change. If it turns out
I did break something it will take just the revert of a single change
to restore kernel_siginfo to the same size as userspace siginfo.
Testing did reveal dependencies on preferring the signo passed to
sigqueueinfo over si->signo, so bit the bullet and added the
complexity necessary to handle that case.
Testing also revealed bad things can happen if a negative signal
number is passed into the system calls. Something no sane application
will do but something a malicious program or a fuzzer might do. So I
have fixed the code that performs the bounds checks to ensure negative
signal numbers are handled"
* 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (80 commits)
signal: Guard against negative signal numbers in copy_siginfo_from_user32
signal: Guard against negative signal numbers in copy_siginfo_from_user
signal: In sigqueueinfo prefer sig not si_signo
signal: Use a smaller struct siginfo in the kernel
signal: Distinguish between kernel_siginfo and siginfo
signal: Introduce copy_siginfo_from_user and use it's return value
signal: Remove the need for __ARCH_SI_PREABLE_SIZE and SI_PAD_SIZE
signal: Fail sigqueueinfo if si_signo != sig
signal/sparc: Move EMT_TAGOVF into the generic siginfo.h
signal/unicore32: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/unicore32: Generate siginfo in ucs32_notify_die
signal/unicore32: Use send_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/arc: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/arc: Push siginfo generation into unhandled_exception
signal/ia64: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/ia64: Use the force_sig(SIGSEGV,...) in ia64_rt_sigreturn
signal/ia64: Use the generic force_sigsegv in setup_frame
signal/arm/kvm: Use send_sig_mceerr
signal/arm: Use send_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/arm: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
...
LoadPin's "enabled" setting is really about enforcement, not whether
or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM
enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening
(for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin
is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue
to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is
centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from
its enforcement).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Instead of only reporting major/minor, include the actual block device
name, at least as seen by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The newly added code fails to build when either SECMARK or
NETFILTER are disabled:
security/apparmor/lsm.c: In function 'apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb':
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1138:12: error: 'struct sk_buff' has no member named 'secmark'; did you mean 'mark'?
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1671:21: error: 'struct nf_hook_state' declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration [-Werror]
Add a set of #ifdef checks around it to only enable the code that
we can compile and that makes sense in that configuration.
Fixes: ab9f211508 ("apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
LSM initialization failures have traditionally been ignored. We should
at least WARN when something goes wrong.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Booting with "lsm.debug" will report future details on how LSM ordering
decisions are being made.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
In preparation for making LSM selections outside of the LSMs, include
the name of LSMs in struct lsm_info.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Instead of using argument-based initializers, switch to defining the
contents of struct lsm_info on a per-LSM basis. This also drops
the final use of the now inaccurate "initcall" naming.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
In preparation for doing more interesting LSM init probing, this converts
the existing initcall system into an explicit call into a function pointer
from a section-collected struct lsm_info array.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This partially reverts commit 58eacfffc4 ("init, tracing: instrument
security and console initcall trace events") since security init calls
are about to no longer resemble regular init calls.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
In preparation for switching from initcall to just a regular set of
pointers in a section, rename the internal section name.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
For a while now, the LSM core has said it was "initializED", rather than
"initializING". This adjust the report to be more accurate (i.e. before
this was reported before any LSMs had been initialized.)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Open a new file instance as opposed to changing file->f_mode when
the file is not readable. This is done to accomodate overlayfs
stacked file operations change. The real struct file is hidden
behind the overlays struct file. So, any file->f_mode manipulations are
not reflected on the real struct file. Open the file again in read mode
if original file cannot be read, read and calculate the hash.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-4.19)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The 12 character temporary buffer is not necessarily long enough to hold
a 'long' value. Increase it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The 'init_keyring' variable actually just gave the value of
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING. We should check the config option
directly instead. No change in behavior; this just simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Constify some static data that is never modified,
so that it is placed in .rodata.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding
member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is
much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying
around in the kernel.
The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is
including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in
the kernel that embed struct siginfo.
So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo. Keeping the
traditional name for the userspace definition. While the version that
is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to
128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo.
The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h
A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have
the same field offsets.
To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same
size as siginfo. The reduction in size comes in a following change.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
begin_current_label_crit_section() must run in sleepable context because
when label_is_stale() is true, aa_replace_current_label() runs, which uses
prepare_creds(), which can sleep.
Until now, the ptraceme access check (which runs with tasklist_lock held)
violated this rule.
Fixes: b2d09ae449 ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels")
Reported-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
lockdep_assert_held() is better suited to checking locking requirements,
since it won't get confused when someone else holds the lock. This is
also a step towards possibly removing spin_is_locked().
Signed-off-by: Lance Roy <ldr709@gmail.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Add support for dropping or accepting packets based on their secmark
tags.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Add support for parsing secmark policy provided by userspace, and
store that in the overall policy.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reserve a secid value that we can use as a wildcard, allowing us to
define policy that's expected to match against all secids.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This changes UAPI, breaking iwd and libell:
ell/key.c: In function 'kernel_dh_compute':
ell/key.c:205:38: error: 'struct keyctl_dh_params' has no member named 'private'; did you mean 'dh_private'?
struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private,
^~~~~~~
dh_private
This reverts commit 8a2336e549.
Fixes: 8a2336e549 ("uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name")
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.
Notice that in this particular case, I replaced "No break" with a
proper "Fall through" annotation, which is what GCC is expecting
to find.
Warning level 2 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=2
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 115051 ("Missing break in switch")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This fixes a pair of problems in the Smack ptrace checks
related to checking capabilities. In both cases, as reported
by Lukasz Pawelczyk, the raw capability calls are used rather
than the Smack wrapper that check addition restrictions.
In one case, as reported by Jann Horn, the wrong task is being
checked for capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
security/smack/smackfs.c: In function 'smk_fill_super':
security/smack/smackfs.c:2856:16: warning:
variable 'root_inode' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This reverts commit 1f40a46cf4.
It turned out that this patch is not sufficient to enable PTI on 32 bit
systems with legacy 2-level page-tables. In this paging mode the huge-page
PTEs are in the top-level page-table directory, where also the mirroring to
the user-space page-table happens. So every huge PTE exits twice, in the
kernel and in the user page-table.
That means that accessed/dirty bits need to be fetched from two PTEs in
this mode to be safe, but this is not trivial to implement because it needs
changes to generic code just for the sake of enabling PTI with 32-bit
legacy paging. As all systems that need PTI should support PAE anyway,
remove support for PTI when 32-bit legacy paging is used.
Fixes: 7757d607c6 ('x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32')
Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536922754-31379-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
this case.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+ac488b9811036cea7ea0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As a comment above begin_current_label_crit_section() explains,
begin_current_label_crit_section() must run in sleepable context because
when label_is_stale() is true, aa_replace_current_label() runs, which uses
prepare_creds(), which can sleep.
Until now, the ptrace access check (which runs with a task lock held)
violated this rule.
Also add a might_sleep() assertion to begin_current_label_crit_section(),
because asserts are less likely to be ignored than comments.
Fixes: b2d09ae449 ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-09-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor fix from John Johansen:
"A fix for an issue syzbot discovered last week:
- Fix for bad debug check when converting secids to secctx"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-09-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: fix bad debug check in apparmor_secid_to_secctx()
The intended behavior change for this patch is to reject any MLS strings
that contain (trailing) garbage if p->mls_enabled is true.
As suggested by Paul Moore, change mls_context_to_sid() so that the two
parts of the range are extracted before the rest of the parsing. Because
now we don't have to scan for two different separators simultaneously
everywhere, we can actually switch to strchr() everywhere instead of the
open-coded loops that scan for two separators at once.
mls_context_to_sid() used to signal how much of the input string was parsed
by updating `*scontext`. However, there is actually no case in which
mls_context_to_sid() only parses a subset of the input and still returns
a success (other than the buggy case with a second '-' in which it
incorrectly claims to have consumed the entire string). Turn `scontext`
into a simple pointer argument and stop redundantly checking whether the
entire input was consumed in string_to_context_struct(). This also lets us
remove the `scontext_len` argument from `string_to_context_struct()`.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
[PM: minor merge fuzz in convert_context()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since this header is in "include/uapi/linux/", apparently people want to
use it in userspace programs -- even in C++ ones. However, the header
uses a C++ reserved keyword ("private"), so change that to "dh_private"
instead to allow the header file to be used in C++ userspace.
Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191051
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0db6c314-1ef4-9bfa-1baa-7214dd2ee061@infradead.org
Fixes: ddbb411487 ("KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit 901ef845fa ("selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs")
broke mounting of cgroup2 under older SELinux policies which lacked
a genfscon rule for cgroup2. This prevents mounting of cgroup2 even
when SELinux is permissive.
Change the handling when there is no genfscon rule in policy to
just mark the inode unlabeled and not return an error to the caller.
This permits mounting and access if allowed by policy, e.g. to
unconfined domains.
I also considered changing the behavior of security_genfs_sid() to
never return -ENOENT, but the current behavior is relied upon by
other callers to perform caller-specific handling.
Fixes: 901ef845fa ("selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
simple_strtoul is obsolete, and use kstrtouint instead
Signed-off-by: Ding Xiang <dingxiang@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps() never returned -EINVAL so remove the
rc == -EINVAL check.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
- apparmor: remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack
+ Bug fixes
- apparmor: fix an error code in __aa_create_ns()
- apparmor: Fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat
- apparmor: Check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask
- apparmor: Fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-08-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"There is nothing major this time just four bug fixes and a patch to
remove some dead code:
Cleanups:
- remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack
Bug fixes:
- fix an error code in __aa_create_ns()
- fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat
- check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask
- fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-08-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack
apparmor: fix an error code in __aa_create_ns()
apparmor: Fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat
apparmor: Fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query
apparmor: Check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask
Pull namespace fixes from Eric Biederman:
"This is a set of four fairly obvious bug fixes:
- a switch from d_find_alias to d_find_any_alias because the xattr
code perversely takes a dentry
- two mutex vs copy_to_user fixes from Jann Horn
- a fix to use a sanitized size not the size userspace passed in from
Christian Brauner"
* 'userns-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
getxattr: use correct xattr length
sys: don't hold uts_sem while accessing userspace memory
userns: move user access out of the mutex
cap_inode_getsecurity: use d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias()
Allow the initcall tables to be emitted using relative references that
are only half the size on 64-bit architectures and don't require fixups
at runtime on relocatable kernels.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180704083651.24360-5-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Acked-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We should return error pointers in this function. Returning NULL
results in a NULL dereference in the caller.
Fixes: 73688d1ed0 ("apparmor: refactor prepare_ns() and make usable from different views")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"This adds support for EVM signatures based on larger digests, contains
a new audit record AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to differentiate the
IMA policy rules from the IMA-audit messages, addresses two deadlocks
due to either loading or searching for crypto algorithms, and cleans
up the audit messages"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs()
integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification.
evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures
evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable
integrity: silence warning when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled
ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not set
ima: Use audit_log_format() rather than audit_log_string()
ima: Call audit_log_string() rather than logging it untrusted
Pull TPM updates from James Morris:
- Migrate away from PM runtime as explicit cmdReady/goIdle transactions
for every command is a spec requirement. PM runtime adds only a layer
of complexity on our case.
- tpm_tis drivers can now specify the hwrng quality.
- TPM 2.0 code uses now tpm_buf for constructing messages. Jarkko
thinks Tomas Winkler has done the same for TPM 1.2, and will start
digging those changes from the patchwork in the near future.
- Bug fixes and clean ups
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: Get rid of ima_used_chip and use ima_tpm_chip != NULL instead
ima: Use tpm_default_chip() and call TPM functions with a tpm_chip
tpm: replace TPM_TRANSMIT_RAW with TPM_TRANSMIT_NESTED
tpm: Convert tpm_find_get_ops() to use tpm_default_chip()
tpm: Implement tpm_default_chip() to find a TPM chip
tpm: rename tpm_chip_find_get() to tpm_find_get_ops()
tpm: Allow tpm_tis drivers to set hwrng quality.
tpm: Return the actual size when receiving an unsupported command
tpm: separate cmd_ready/go_idle from runtime_pm
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: switch to i2c_lock_bus(..., I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT)
tpm_tis_spi: Pass the SPI IRQ down to the driver
tpm: migrate tpm2_get_random() to use struct tpm_buf
tpm: migrate tpm2_get_tpm_pt() to use struct tpm_buf
tpm: migrate tpm2_probe() to use struct tpm_buf
tpm: migrate tpm2_shutdown() to use struct tpm_buf
Pull smack updates from James Morris:
"Minor fixes from Piotr Sawicki"
* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: Inform peer that IPv6 traffic has been blocked
Smack: Check UDP-Lite and DCCP protocols during IPv6 handling
Smack: Fix handling of IPv4 traffic received by PF_INET6 sockets
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
- Gustavo A. R. Silva keeps working on the implicit switch fallthru
changes.
- Support 802.11ax High-Efficiency wireless in cfg80211 et al, From
Luca Coelho.
- Re-enable ASPM in r8169, from Kai-Heng Feng.
- Add virtual XFRM interfaces, which avoids all of the limitations of
existing IPSEC tunnels. From Steffen Klassert.
- Convert GRO over to use a hash table, so that when we have many
flows active we don't traverse a long list during accumluation.
- Many new self tests for routing, TC, tunnels, etc. Too many
contributors to mention them all, but I'm really happy to keep
seeing this stuff.
- Hardware timestamping support for dpaa_eth/fsl-fman from Yangbo Lu.
- Lots of cleanups and fixes in L2TP code from Guillaume Nault.
- Add IPSEC offload support to netdevsim, from Shannon Nelson.
- Add support for slotting with non-uniform distribution to netem
packet scheduler, from Yousuk Seung.
- Add UDP GSO support to mlx5e, from Boris Pismenny.
- Support offloading of Team LAG in NFP, from John Hurley.
- Allow to configure TX queue selection based upon RX queue, from
Amritha Nambiar.
- Support ethtool ring size configuration in aquantia, from Anton
Mikaev.
- Support DSCP and flowlabel per-transport in SCTP, from Xin Long.
- Support list based batching and stack traversal of SKBs, this is
very exciting work. From Edward Cree.
- Busyloop optimizations in vhost_net, from Toshiaki Makita.
- Introduce the ETF qdisc, which allows time based transmissions. IGB
can offload this in hardware. From Vinicius Costa Gomes.
- Add parameter support to devlink, from Moshe Shemesh.
- Several multiplication and division optimizations for BPF JIT in
nfp driver, from Jiong Wang.
- Lots of prepatory work to make more of the packet scheduler layer
lockless, when possible, from Vlad Buslov.
- Add ACK filter and NAT awareness to sch_cake packet scheduler, from
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen.
- Support regions and region snapshots in devlink, from Alex Vesker.
- Allow to attach XDP programs to both HW and SW at the same time on
a given device, with initial support in nfp. From Jakub Kicinski.
- Add TLS RX offload and support in mlx5, from Ilya Lesokhin.
- Use PHYLIB in r8169 driver, from Heiner Kallweit.
- All sorts of changes to support Spectrum 2 in mlxsw driver, from
Ido Schimmel.
- PTP support in mv88e6xxx DSA driver, from Andrew Lunn.
- Make TCP_USER_TIMEOUT socket option more accurate, from Jon
Maxwell.
- Support for templates in packet scheduler classifier, from Jiri
Pirko.
- IPV6 support in RDS, from Ka-Cheong Poon.
- Native tproxy support in nf_tables, from Máté Eckl.
- Maintain IP fragment queue in an rbtree, but optimize properly for
in-order frags. From Peter Oskolkov.
- Improvde handling of ACKs on hole repairs, from Yuchung Cheng"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1996 commits)
bpf: test: fix spelling mistake "REUSEEPORT" -> "REUSEPORT"
hv/netvsc: Fix NULL dereference at single queue mode fallback
net: filter: mark expected switch fall-through
xen-netfront: fix warn message as irq device name has '/'
cxgb4: Add new T5 PCI device ids 0x50af and 0x50b0
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: missing unlock on error path
rds: fix building with IPV6=m
inet/connection_sock: prefer _THIS_IP_ to current_text_addr
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: bitwise vs logical bug
net: sock_diag: Fix spectre v1 gadget in __sock_diag_cmd()
ieee802154: hwsim: using right kind of iteration
net: hns3: Add vlan filter setting by ethtool command -K
net: hns3: Set tx ring' tc info when netdev is up
net: hns3: Remove tx ring BD len register in hns3_enet
net: hns3: Fix desc num set to default when setting channel
net: hns3: Fix for phy link issue when using marvell phy driver
net: hns3: Fix for information of phydev lost problem when down/up
net: hns3: Fix for command format parsing error in hclge_is_all_function_id_zero
net: hns3: Add support for serdes loopback selftest
bnxt_en: take coredump_record structure off stack
...
- verify depmod is installed before modules_install
- support build salt in case build ids must be unique between builds
- allow users to specify additional host compiler flags via HOST*FLAGS,
and rename internal variables to KBUILD_HOST*FLAGS
- update buildtar script to drop vax support, add arm64 support
- update builddeb script for better debarch support
- document the pit-fall of if_changed usage
- fix parallel build of UML with O= option
- make 'samples' target depend on headers_install to fix build errors
- remove deprecated host-progs variable
- add a new coccinelle script for refcount_t vs atomic_t check
- improve double-test coccinelle script
- misc cleanups and fixes
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Merge tag 'kbuild-v4.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- verify depmod is installed before modules_install
- support build salt in case build ids must be unique between builds
- allow users to specify additional host compiler flags via HOST*FLAGS,
and rename internal variables to KBUILD_HOST*FLAGS
- update buildtar script to drop vax support, add arm64 support
- update builddeb script for better debarch support
- document the pit-fall of if_changed usage
- fix parallel build of UML with O= option
- make 'samples' target depend on headers_install to fix build errors
- remove deprecated host-progs variable
- add a new coccinelle script for refcount_t vs atomic_t check
- improve double-test coccinelle script
- misc cleanups and fixes
* tag 'kbuild-v4.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (41 commits)
coccicheck: return proper error code on fail
Coccinelle: doubletest: reduce side effect false positives
kbuild: remove deprecated host-progs variable
kbuild: make samples really depend on headers_install
um: clean up archheaders recipe
kbuild: add %asm-generic to no-dot-config-targets
um: fix parallel building with O= option
scripts: Add Python 3 support to tracing/draw_functrace.py
builddeb: Add automatic support for sh{3,4}{,eb} architectures
builddeb: Add automatic support for riscv* architectures
builddeb: Add automatic support for m68k architecture
builddeb: Add automatic support for or1k architecture
builddeb: Add automatic support for sparc64 architecture
builddeb: Add automatic support for mips{,64}r6{,el} architectures
builddeb: Add automatic support for mips64el architecture
builddeb: Add automatic support for ppc64 and powerpcspe architectures
builddeb: Introduce functions to simplify kconfig tests in set_debarch
builddeb: Drop check for 32-bit s390
builddeb: Change architecture detection fallback to use dpkg-architecture
builddeb: Skip architecture detection when KBUILD_DEBARCH is set
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"There are 16 patches in here but really only one that is of any
significance. That one patch is by nixiaoming and fixes a few places
where we were not properly cleaning up dentry and inode objects in the
selinuxfs error handling code. The rest are either printk->pr_*
conversions, constification tweaks, and a minor tweak to MAINTAINERS.
Everything passes the selinux-testsuite and looks to merge cleanly
against your master branch"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20180814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: cleanup dentry and inodes on error in selinuxfs
selinux: constify write_op[]
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netnode
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in avc
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netif
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netport
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in sidtab
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netlink
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in selinuxfs
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in services
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in avtab
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in hooks
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in policydb
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in ebitmap
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in conditional
MAINTAINERS: update the LSM and SELinux subsystems
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- kstrdup() return value fix from Eric Biggers
- Add new security_load_data hook to differentiate security checking of
kernel-loaded binaries in the case of there being no associated file
descriptor, from Mimi Zohar.
- Add ability to IMA to specify a policy at build-time, rather than
just via command line params or by loading a custom policy, from
Mimi.
- Allow IMA and LSMs to prevent sysfs firmware load fallback (e.g. if
using signed firmware), from Mimi.
- Allow IMA to deny loading of kexec kernel images, as they cannot be
measured by IMA, from Mimi.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append()
security: export security_kernel_load_data function
ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)
module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module
ima: add build time policy
ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)
firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback
ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images
kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data
MAINTAINERS: remove the outdated "LINUX SECURITY MODULE (LSM) FRAMEWORK" entry
- add "hardened_usercopy=off" rare performance needs (Chris von Recklinghausen)
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Merge tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardened usercopy updates from Kees Cook:
"This cleans up a minor Kconfig issue and adds a kernel boot option for
disabling hardened usercopy for distro users that may have corner-case
performance issues (e.g. high bandwidth small-packet UDP traffic).
Summary:
- drop unneeded Kconfig "select BUG" (Kamal Mostafa)
- add "hardened_usercopy=off" rare performance needs (Chris von
Recklinghausen)"
* tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
usercopy: Allow boot cmdline disabling of hardening
usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPY
Pull vfs open-related updates from Al Viro:
- "do we need fput() or put_filp()" rules are gone - it's always fput()
now. We keep track of that state where it belongs - in ->f_mode.
- int *opened mess killed - in finish_open(), in ->atomic_open()
instances and in fs/namei.c code around do_last()/lookup_open()/atomic_open().
- alloc_file() wrappers with saner calling conventions are introduced
(alloc_file_clone() and alloc_file_pseudo()); callers converted, with
much simplification.
- while we are at it, saner calling conventions for path_init() and
link_path_walk(), simplifying things inside fs/namei.c (both on
open-related paths and elsewhere).
* 'work.open3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (40 commits)
few more cleanups of link_path_walk() callers
allow link_path_walk() to take ERR_PTR()
make path_init() unconditionally paired with terminate_walk()
document alloc_file() changes
make alloc_file() static
do_shmat(): grab shp->shm_file earlier, switch to alloc_file_clone()
new helper: alloc_file_clone()
create_pipe_files(): switch the first allocation to alloc_file_pseudo()
anon_inode_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
hugetlb_file_setup(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
ocxlflash_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
cxl_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
... and switch shmem_file_setup() to alloc_file_pseudo()
__shmem_file_setup(): reorder allocations
new wrapper: alloc_file_pseudo()
kill FILE_{CREATED,OPENED}
switch atomic_open() and lookup_open() to returning 0 in all success cases
document ->atomic_open() changes
->atomic_open(): return 0 in all success cases
get rid of 'opened' in path_openat() and the helpers downstream
...
The code in cap_inode_getsecurity(), introduced by commit 8db6c34f1d
("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"), should use
d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias() do handle unhashed dentry
correctly. This is needed, for example, if execveat() is called with an
open but unlinked overlayfs file, because overlayfs unhashes dentry on
unlink.
This is a regression of real life application, first reported at
https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-unionfs/msg05363.html
Below reproducer and setup can reproduce the case.
const char* exec="echo";
const char *newargv[] = { "echo", "hello", NULL};
const char *newenviron[] = { NULL };
int fd, err;
fd = open(exec, O_PATH);
unlink(exec);
err = syscall(322/*SYS_execveat*/, fd, "", newargv, newenviron,
AT_EMPTY_PATH);
if(err<0)
fprintf(stderr, "execveat: %s\n", strerror(errno));
gcc compile into ~/test/a.out
mount -t overlay -orw,lowerdir=/mnt/l,upperdir=/mnt/u,workdir=/mnt/w
none /mnt/m
cd /mnt/m
cp /bin/echo .
~/test/a.out
Expected result:
hello
Actually result:
execveat: Invalid argument
dmesg:
Invalid argument reading file caps for /dev/fd/3
The 2nd reproducer and setup emulates similar case but for
regular filesystem:
const char* exec="echo";
int fd, err;
char buf[256];
fd = open(exec, O_RDONLY);
unlink(exec);
err = fgetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 256);
if(err<0)
fprintf(stderr, "fgetxattr: %s\n", strerror(errno));
gcc compile into ~/test_fgetxattr
cd /tmp
cp /bin/echo .
~/test_fgetxattr
Result:
fgetxattr: Invalid argument
On regular filesystem, for example, ext4 read xattr from
disk and return to execveat(), will not trigger this issue, however,
the overlay attr handler pass real dentry to vfs_getxattr() will.
This reproducer calls fgetxattr() with an unlinked fd, involkes
vfs_getxattr() then reproduced the case that d_find_alias() in
cap_inode_getsecurity() can't find the unlinked dentry.
Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Fixes: 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14
Signed-off-by: Eddie Horng <eddie.horng@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
If the resource requested by d_alloc_name is not added to the linked
list through d_add, then dput needs to be called to release the
subsequent abnormal branch to avoid resource leakage.
Add missing dput to selinuxfs.c
Signed-off-by: nixiaoming <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Get rid of ima_used_chip and use ima_tpm_chip variable instead for
determining whether to use the TPM chip.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Rather than accessing the TPM functions by passing a NULL pointer for
the tpm_chip, which causes a lookup for a suitable chip every time, get a
hold of a tpm_chip and access the TPM functions using it.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Allow user to create, destroy, get and dump chain objects. Do that by
extending rtnl commands by the chain-specific ones. User will now be
able to explicitly create or destroy chains (so far this was done only
automatically according the filter/act needs and refcounting). Also, the
user will receive notification about any chain creation or destuction.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In this patch we're sending an ICMPv6 message to a peer to
immediately inform it that making a connection is not possible.
In case of TCP connections, without this change, the peer
will be waiting until a connection timeout is exceeded.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb() function is checking smack labels
only for UDP and TCP frames carried in IPv6 packets. From now on,
it is able also to handle UDP-Lite and DCCP protocols.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
A socket which has sk_family set to PF_INET6 is able to receive not
only IPv6 but also IPv4 traffic (IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses).
Prior to this patch, the smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6() could have been
called for socket buffers containing IPv4 packets, in result such
traffic was allowed.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In case of error, the function audit_log_start() returns NULL pointer
not ERR_PTR(). The IS_ERR() test in the return value check should be
replaced with NULL test.
Fixes: fa516b66a1 ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cleans up clang warning:
warning: variable 'info' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Fixes: 89dbf1962a ("apparmor: move change_hat mediation to using labels")
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Fully initialize the aa_perms struct in profile_query_cb() to avoid the
potential of using an uninitialized struct member's value in a response
to a query from userspace.
Detected by CoverityScan CID#1415126 ("Uninitialized scalar variable")
Fixes: 4f3b3f2d79 ("apparmor: add profile permission query ability")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Don't read past the end of the buffer containing permissions
characters or write past the end of the destination string.
Detected by CoverityScan CID#1415361, 1415376 ("Out-of-bounds access")
Fixes: e53cfe6c7c ("apparmor: rework perm mapping to a slightly broader set")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This patch aimed to prevent deadlock during digsig verification.The point
of issue - user space utility modprobe and/or it's dependencies (ld-*.so,
libz.so.*, libc-*.so and /lib/modules/ files) that could be used for
kernel modules load during digsig verification and could be signed by
digsig in the same time.
First at all, look at crypto_alloc_tfm() work algorithm:
crypto_alloc_tfm() will first attempt to locate an already loaded
algorithm. If that fails and the kernel supports dynamically loadable
modules, it will then attempt to load a module of the same name or alias.
If that fails it will send a query to any loaded crypto manager to
construct an algorithm on the fly.
We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA
algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to construct
an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use
alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
1) we can't do anything with crypto module work, since it designed to work
exactly in this way;
2) we can't globally filter module requests for modprobe, since it
designed to work with any requests.
In this patch, I propose add an exception for "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)"
module requests only in case of enabled integrity asymmetric keys support.
Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules for
sure, we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification and
avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies also signed
with digsig.
Requested "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel module name formed by:
1) "pkcs1pad(rsa,%s)" in public_key_verify_signature();
2) "crypto-%s" / "crypto-%s-all" in crypto_larval_lookup().
"crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa," part of request is a constant and unique and could
be used as filter.
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
include/linux/integrity.h | 13 +++++++++++++
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
security/security.c | 7 ++++++-
3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
SHA1 is reasonable in HMAC constructs, but it's desirable to be able to
use stronger hashes in digital signatures. Modify the EVM crypto code so
the hash type is imported from the digital signature and passed down to
the hash calculation code, and return the digest size to higher layers
for validation.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
When EVM attempts to appraise a file signed with a crypto algorithm the
kernel doesn't have support for, it will cause the kernel to trigger a
module load. If the EVM policy includes appraisal of kernel modules this
will in turn call back into EVM - since EVM is holding a lock until the
crypto initialisation is complete, this triggers a deadlock. Add a
CRYPTO_NOLOAD flag and skip module loading if it's set, and add that flag
in the EVM case in order to fail gracefully with an error message
instead of deadlocking.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
When CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled, securityfs_create_dir returns
-ENODEV which throws the following error:
"Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: -19"
However, if the feature is disabled, it can't be warning and hence
we need to silence the error. This patch checks for the error -ENODEV
which is returned when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is disabled to stop the error
being thrown.
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines
AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules.
Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the
audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces
the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules:
type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1
type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ res=1
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): arch=c000003e syscall=1 \
success=yes exit=17 a0=1 a1=55bcfcca9030 a2=11 a3=7fcc1b55fb38 \
items=0 ppid=1567 pid=1601 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 \
fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=tty2 ses=2 comm="echo" \
exe="/usr/bin/echo" \
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
If Integrity is not auditing, IMA shouldn't audit, either.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Remove the usage of audit_log_string() and replace it with
audit_log_format().
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The parameters passed to this logging function are all provided by
a privileged user and therefore we can call audit_log_string()
rather than audit_log_untrustedstring().
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The firmware_loader can be built as a loadable module, which now
fails when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, because a call to the
security_kernel_load_data() function got added, and this is
not exported to modules:
ERROR: "security_kernel_load_data" [drivers/base/firmware_loader/firmware_class.ko] undefined!
Add an EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() to make it available here.
Fixes: 6e852651f2 ("firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Commit 8370edea81 ("bin2c: move bin2c in scripts/basic") moved bin2c
to the scripts/basic/ directory, incorrectly stating "Kexec wants to
use bin2c and it wants to use it really early in the build process.
See arch/x86/purgatory/ code in later patches."
Commit bdab125c93 ("Revert "kexec/purgatory: Add clean-up for
purgatory directory"") and commit d6605b6bbe ("x86/build: Remove
unnecessary preparation for purgatory") removed the redundant
purgatory build magic entirely.
That means that the move of bin2c was unnecessary in the first place.
fixdep is the only host program that deserves to sit in the
scripts/basic/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Some systems are memory constrained but they need to load very large
firmwares. The firmware subsystem allows drivers to request this
firmware be loaded from the filesystem, but this requires that the
entire firmware be loaded into kernel memory first before it's provided
to the driver. This can lead to a situation where we map the firmware
twice, once to load the firmware into kernel memory and once to copy the
firmware into the final resting place.
To resolve this problem, commit a098ecd2fa ("firmware: support loading
into a pre-allocated buffer") introduced request_firmware_into_buf() API
that allows drivers to request firmware be loaded directly into a
pre-allocated buffer.
Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the firmware being
accessible to the device prior to the completion of IMA's signature
verification any more than when using two buffers? (Refer to mailing list
discussion[1]).
Only on systems with an IOMMU can the access be prevented. As long as
the signature verification completes prior to the DMA map is performed,
the device can not access the buffer. This implies that the same buffer
can not be re-used. Can we ensure the buffer has not been DMA mapped
before using the pre-allocated buffer?
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/10/56
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly
or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch
replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new
security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes
in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
IMA by default does not measure, appraise or audit files, but can be
enabled at runtime by specifying a builtin policy on the boot command line
or by loading a custom policy.
This patch defines a build time policy, which verifies kernel modules,
firmware, kexec image, and/or the IMA policy signatures. This build time
policy is automatically enabled at runtime and persists after loading a
custom policy.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
With an IMA policy requiring signed firmware, this patch prevents
the sysfs fallback method of loading firmware.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures, nor can
the kexec image be measured. Based on policy, deny the kexec_load
syscall.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Differentiate between the kernel reading a file specified by userspace
from the kernel loading a buffer containing data provided by userspace.
This patch defines a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data().
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
just check ->f_mode in ima_appraise_measurement()
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Some crypto API users allocating a tfm with crypto_alloc_$FOO() are also
specifying the type flags for $FOO, e.g. crypto_alloc_shash() with
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH. But, that's redundant since the crypto API will
override any specified type flag/mask with the correct ones.
So, remove the unneeded flags.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There is no need to "select BUG" when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled.
The kernel thread will always die, regardless of the CONFIG_BUG.
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
[kees: tweak commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One fairly straightforward patch to fix a longstanding issue where a
process could stall while accessing files in selinuxfs and block
everyone else due to a held mutex.
The patch passes all our tests and looks to apply cleanly to your
current tree"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20180629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions
If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace
buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can
stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held.
For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem
to access anything that requires locking.
For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region.
For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access
up above the locked region.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: removed an unused variable in sel_read_policy()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 383203eff7 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array") changed
kdf_ctr() to assume that the length of key material to derive is a
multiple of the digest size. The length was supposed to be rounded up
accordingly. However, the round_up() macro was used which only gives
the correct result on power-of-2 arguments, whereas not all hash
algorithms have power-of-2 digest sizes. In some cases this resulted in
a write past the end of the 'outbuf' buffer.
Fix it by switching to roundup(), which works for non-power-of-2 inputs.
Reported-by: syzbot+486f97f892efeb2075a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+29d17b7898b41ee120a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+8a608baf8751184ec727@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d04e58bd384f1fe0b112@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 383203eff7 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode
/proc clean-up in commit 1bbc55131e
resulted in smack_task_to_inode() being called before smack_d_instantiate.
This resulted in the smk_inode value being ignored, even while present
for files in /proc/self. Marking the inode as instant here fixes that.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings and
replace KERN_CONT with 2 longer prints.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
[PM: fixed some missing newlines identified by Joe Perches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Gives multiple hints for broken references on some files.
Manually use the one that applies for some files.
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
- add support for mapping secids and using secctxes
- add the ability to get a task's secid
- add support for audit rule filtering
+ Cleanups
- multiple typo fixes
- Convert to use match_string() helper
- update git and wiki locations in AppArmor docs
- improve get_buffers macro by using get_cpu_ptr
- Use an IDR to allocate apparmor secids
+ Bug fixes
- fix '*seclen' is never less than zero
- fix mediation of prlimit
- fix memory leak when deduping profile load
- fix ptrace read check
- fix memory leak of rule on error exit path
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-06-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull AppArmor updates from John Johansen:
"Features
- add support for mapping secids and using secctxes
- add the ability to get a task's secid
- add support for audit rule filtering
Cleanups:
- multiple typo fixes
- Convert to use match_string() helper
- update git and wiki locations in AppArmor docs
- improve get_buffers macro by using get_cpu_ptr
- Use an IDR to allocate apparmor secids
Bug fixes:
- fix '*seclen' is never less than zero
- fix mediation of prlimit
- fix memory leak when deduping profile load
- fix ptrace read check
- fix memory leak of rule on error exit path"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-06-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (21 commits)
apparmor: fix ptrace read check
apparmor: fix memory leak when deduping profile load
apparmor: fix mediation of prlimit
apparmor: fixup secid map conversion to using IDR
apparmor: Use an IDR to allocate apparmor secids
apparmor: Fix memory leak of rule on error exit path
apparmor: modify audit rule support to support profile stacks
apparmor: Add support for audit rule filtering
apparmor: update git and wiki locations in AppArmor docs
apparmor: Convert to use match_string() helper
apparmor: improve get_buffers macro by using get_cpu_ptr
apparmor: fix '*seclen' is never less than zero
apparmor: fix typo "preconfinement"
apparmor: fix typo "independent"
apparmor: fix typo "traverse"
apparmor: fix typo "type"
apparmor: fix typo "replace"
apparmor: fix typo "comparison"
apparmor: fix typo "loosen"
apparmor: add the ability to get a task's secid
...
Pull smack update from James Morris:
"From Casey:
One simple patch that fixes a memory leak in kernfs and labeled NFS"
* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: Fix memory leak in smack_inode_getsecctx
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"From Mimi:
- add run time support for specifying additional security xattrs
included in the security.evm HMAC/signature
- some code clean up and bug fixes"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
EVM: unlock on error path in evm_read_xattrs()
EVM: prevent array underflow in evm_write_xattrs()
EVM: Fix null dereference on xattr when xattr fails to allocate
EVM: fix memory leak of temporary buffer 'temp'
IMA: use list_splice_tail_init_rcu() instead of its open coded variant
ima: use match_string() helper
ima: fix updating the ima_appraise flag
ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)
ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name
EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs
EVM: turn evm_config_xattrnames into a list
integrity: Add an integrity directory in securityfs
ima: Remove unused variable ima_initialized
ima: Unify logging
ima: Reflect correct permissions for policy
The ptrace read check is incorrect resulting in policy that is
broader than it needs to be. Fix the check so that read access
permission can be properly detected when other ptrace flags are
set.
Fixes: b2d09ae449 ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
AppArmor is leaking the newly loaded profile and its proxy when
the profile is an exact match to the currently loaded version.
In this case the dedup check results in the profile being skipped and
put without dealing with the proxy ref thus not breaking a circular
refcount and causing a leak.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1750594
Fixes: 5d5182cae4 ("apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
For primit apparmor requires that if target confinement does not match
the setting task's confinement, the setting task requires CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
Unfortunately this was broken when rlimit enforcement was reworked to
support labels.
Fixes: 86b92cb782 ("apparmor: move resource checks to using labels")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The IDR conversion did not handle an error case for when allocating a
mapping fails, and it did not ensure that mappings did not allocate or
use a 0 value, which is used as an invalid secid. Which is used when a
mapping fails.
Fixes: 3ae7eb49a2be ("apparmor: Use an IDR to allocate apparmor secids")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Replace the custom usage of the radix tree to store a list of free IDs
with the IDR.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Currently on the error exit path the allocated rule is not free'd
causing a memory leak. Fix this by calling aa_audit_rule_free().
Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1468966 ("Resource leaks")
Fixes: cb740f574c7b ("apparmor: modify audit rule support to support profile stacks")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Allows for audit rules, where a rule could specify a profile stack
A//&B, while extending the current semantic so if the label specified
in the audit rule is a subset of the secid it is considered a match.
Eg. if the secid resolves to the label stack A//&B//&C
Then an audit rule specifying a label of
A - would match
B - would match
C - would match
D - would not
A//&B - would match as a subset
A//&C - would match as a subset
B//&C - would match as a subset
A//&B//&C - would match
A//&D - would not match, because while A does match, D is also
specified and does not
Note: audit rules are currently assumed to be coming from the root
namespace.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This patch adds support to Apparmor for integrating with audit rule
filtering. Right now it only handles SUBJ_ROLE, interpreting it as a
single component of a label. This is sufficient to get Apparmor working
with IMA's appraisal rules without any modifications on the IMA side.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The new helper returns index of the matching string in an array.
We are going to use it here.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jay Freyensee <why2jjj.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Refactor get_buffers so the cpu_ptr can be obtained in the outer
layer, instead of inside the macro.
This also enables us to cleanup the code and use get_cpu_ptr,
to handle the preempt_disable()
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Add Maglev hashing scheduler to IPVS, from Inju Song.
2) Lots of new TC subsystem tests from Roman Mashak.
3) Add TCP zero copy receive and fix delayed acks and autotuning with
SO_RCVLOWAT, from Eric Dumazet.
4) Add XDP_REDIRECT support to mlx5 driver, from Jesper Dangaard
Brouer.
5) Add ttl inherit support to vxlan, from Hangbin Liu.
6) Properly separate ipv6 routes into their logically independant
components. fib6_info for the routing table, and fib6_nh for sets of
nexthops, which thus can be shared. From David Ahern.
7) Add bpf_xdp_adjust_tail helper, which can be used to generate ICMP
messages from XDP programs. From Nikita V. Shirokov.
8) Lots of long overdue cleanups to the r8169 driver, from Heiner
Kallweit.
9) Add BTF ("BPF Type Format"), from Martin KaFai Lau.
10) Add traffic condition monitoring to iwlwifi, from Luca Coelho.
11) Plumb extack down into fib_rules, from Roopa Prabhu.
12) Add Flower classifier offload support to igb, from Vinicius Costa
Gomes.
13) Add UDP GSO support, from Willem de Bruijn.
14) Add documentation for eBPF helpers, from Quentin Monnet.
15) Add TLS tx offload to mlx5, from Ilya Lesokhin.
16) Allow applications to be given the number of bytes available to read
on a socket via a control message returned from recvmsg(), from
Soheil Hassas Yeganeh.
17) Add x86_32 eBPF JIT compiler, from Wang YanQing.
18) Add AF_XDP sockets, with zerocopy support infrastructure as well.
From Björn Töpel.
19) Remove indirect load support from all of the BPF JITs and handle
these operations in the verifier by translating them into native BPF
instead. From Daniel Borkmann.
20) Add GRO support to ipv6 gre tunnels, from Eran Ben Elisha.
21) Allow XDP programs to do lookups in the main kernel routing tables
for forwarding. From David Ahern.
22) Allow drivers to store hardware state into an ELF section of kernel
dump vmcore files, and use it in cxgb4. From Rahul Lakkireddy.
23) Various RACK and loss detection improvements in TCP, from Yuchung
Cheng.
24) Add TCP SACK compression, from Eric Dumazet.
25) Add User Mode Helper support and basic bpfilter infrastructure, from
Alexei Starovoitov.
26) Support ports and protocol values in RTM_GETROUTE, from Roopa
Prabhu.
27) Support bulking in ->ndo_xdp_xmit() API, from Jesper Dangaard
Brouer.
28) Add lots of forwarding selftests, from Petr Machata.
29) Add generic network device failover driver, from Sridhar Samudrala.
* ra.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1959 commits)
strparser: Add __strp_unpause and use it in ktls.
rxrpc: Fix terminal retransmission connection ID to include the channel
net: hns3: Optimize PF CMDQ interrupt switching process
net: hns3: Fix for VF mailbox receiving unknown message
net: hns3: Fix for VF mailbox cannot receiving PF response
bnx2x: use the right constant
Revert "net: sched: cls: Fix offloading when ingress dev is vxlan"
net: dsa: b53: Fix for brcm tag issue in Cygnus SoC
enic: fix UDP rss bits
netdev-FAQ: clarify DaveM's position for stable backports
rtnetlink: validate attributes in do_setlink()
mlxsw: Add extack messages for port_{un, }split failures
netdevsim: Add extack error message for devlink reload
devlink: Add extack to reload and port_{un, }split operations
net: metrics: add proper netlink validation
ipmr: fix error path when ipmr_new_table fails
ip6mr: only set ip6mr_table from setsockopt when ip6mr_new_table succeeds
net: hns3: remove unused hclgevf_cfg_func_mta_filter
netfilter: provide udp*_lib_lookup for nf_tproxy
qed*: Utilize FW 8.37.2.0
...
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Another reasonable chunk of audit changes for v4.18, thirteen patches
in total.
The thirteen patches can mostly be broken down into one of four
categories: general bug fixes, accessor functions for audit state
stored in the task_struct, negative filter matches on executable
names, and extending the (relatively) new seccomp logging knobs to the
audit subsystem.
The main driver for the accessor functions from Richard are the
changes we're working on to associate audit events with containers,
but I think they have some standalone value too so I figured it would
be good to get them in now.
The seccomp/audit patches from Tyler apply the seccomp logging
improvements from a few releases ago to audit's seccomp logging;
starting with this patchset the changes in
/proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged should apply to both the
standard kernel logging and audit.
As usual, everything passes the audit-testsuite and it happens to
merge cleanly with your tree"
[ Heh, except it had trivial merge conflicts with the SELinux tree that
also came in from Paul - Linus ]
* tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: Fix wrong task in comparison of session ID
audit: use existing session info function
audit: normalize loginuid read access
audit: use new audit_context access funciton for seccomp_actions_logged
audit: use inline function to set audit context
audit: use inline function to get audit context
audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro
seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging
seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl
seccomp: Configurable separator for the actions_logged string
seccomp: Separate read and write code for actions_logged sysctl
audit: allow not equal op for audit by executable
audit: add syscall information to FEATURE_CHANGE records
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"SELinux is back with a quiet pull request for v4.18. Three patches,
all small: two cleanups of the SELinux audit records, and one to
migrate to a newly defined type (vm_fault_t).
Everything passes our test suite, and as of about five minutes ago it
merged cleanly with your tree"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD record
audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record
security: selinux: Change return type to vm_fault_t
Pull security system updates from James Morris:
- incorporate new socketpair() hook into LSM and wire up the SELinux
and Smack modules. From David Herrmann:
"The idea is to allow SO_PEERSEC to be called on AF_UNIX sockets
created via socketpair(2), and return the same information as if
you emulated socketpair(2) via a temporary listener socket.
Right now SO_PEERSEC will return the unlabeled credentials for a
socketpair, rather than the actual credentials of the creating
process."
- remove the unused security_settime LSM hook (Sargun Dhillon).
- remove some stack allocated arrays from the keys code (Tycho
Andersen)
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes
dh key: get rid of stack allocated array
big key: get rid of stack array allocation
smack: provide socketpair callback
selinux: provide socketpair callback
net: hook socketpair() into LSM
security: add hook for socketpair()
security: remove security_settime
Fix memory leak in smack_inode_getsecctx
The implementation of smack_inode_getsecctx() made
incorrect assumptions about how Smack presents a security
context. Smack does not need to allocate memory to support
security contexts, so "releasing" a Smack context is a no-op.
The code made an unnecessary copy and returned that as a
context, which was never freed. The revised implementation
returns the context correctly.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: CHANDAN VN <chandan.vn@samsung.com>
Tested-by: CHANDAN VN <chandan.vn@samsung.com>
Pull userns updates from Eric Biederman:
"This is the last couple of vfs bits to enable root in a user namespace
to mount and manipulate a filesystem with backing store (AKA not a
virtual filesystem like proc, but a filesystem where the unprivileged
user controls the content). The target filesystem for this work is
fuse, and Miklos should be sending you the pull request for the fuse
bits this merge window.
The two key patches are "evm: Don't update hmacs in user ns mounts"
and "vfs: Don't allow changing the link count of an inode with an
invalid uid or gid". Those close small gaps in the vfs that would be a
problem if an unprivileged fuse filesystem is mounted.
The rest of the changes are things that are now safe to allow a root
user in a user namespace to do with a filesystem they have mounted.
The most interesting development is that remount is now safe"
* 'userns-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
fs: Allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in s_user_ns to freeze and thaw filesystems
capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs
fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb()
fs: Allow superblock owner to replace invalid owners of inodes
vfs: Allow userns root to call mknod on owned filesystems.
vfs: Don't allow changing the link count of an inode with an invalid uid or gid
evm: Don't update hmacs in user ns mounts
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Misc bits and pieces not fitting into anything more specific"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
vfs: delete unnecessary assignment in vfs_listxattr
Documentation: filesystems: update filesystem locking documentation
vfs: namei: use path_equal() in follow_dotdot()
fs.h: fix outdated comment about file flags
__inode_security_revalidate() never gets NULL opt_dentry
make xattr_getsecurity() static
vfat: simplify checks in vfat_lookup()
get rid of dead code in d_find_alias()
it's SB_BORN, not MS_BORN...
msdos_rmdir(): kill BS comment
remove rpc_rmdir()
fs: avoid fdput() after failed fdget() in vfs_dedupe_file_range()
Al Viro