On reconnects, we need to reopen file and then obtain all byte-range
locks held by the client. SMB2 protocol provides feature to make
this process atomic by reconnecting to the same file handle
with all it's byte-range locks. This patch adds this capability
for SMB2 shares.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven French <steven@steven-GA-970A-DS3.(none)>
Commit 9ddec56131 (cifs: move handling of signed connections into
separate function) broke signing on SMB2/3 connections. While the code
to enable signing on the connections was very similar between the two,
the bits that get set in the sec_mode are different.
Declare a couple of new smb_version_values fields and set them
appropriately for SMB1 and SMB2/3. Then change cifs_enable_signing to
use those instead.
Reported-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Fix build warning in Shirish's recent SMB3 signing patch
which occurs when SMB2 support is disabled in Kconfig.
fs/built-in.o: In function `cifs_setup_session':
>> (.text+0xa1767): undefined reference to `generate_smb3signingkey'
Pointed out by: automated 0-DAY kernel build testing backend
Intel Open Source Technology Center
CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
SMB3 uses a much faster method of signing (which is also better in other ways),
AES-CMAC. With the kernel now supporting AES-CMAC since last release, we
are overdue to allow SMB3 signing (today only CIFS and SMB2 and SMB2.1,
but not SMB3 and SMB3.1 can sign) - and we need this also for checking
secure negotation and also per-share encryption (two other new SMB3 features
which we need to implement).
This patch needs some work in a few areas - for example we need to
move signing for SMB2/SMB3 from per-socket to per-user (we may be able to
use the "nosharesock" mount option in the interim for the multiuser case),
and Shirish found a bug in the earlier authentication overhaul
(setting signing flags properly) - but those can be done in followon
patches.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
SMB3 protocol adds various optional per-share capabilities (and
SMB3.02 adds one more beyond that). Add ability to dump
(/proc/fs/cifs/DebugData) the share capabilities and share flags to
improve debugging.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
The new Windows update supports SMB3.02 dialect, a minor update to SMB3.
This patch adds support for mounting with vers=3.02
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Before this patchset, the global_secflags could only offer up a single
sectype. With the new set though we have the ability to allow different
sectypes since we sort out the one to use after talking to the server.
Change the global_secflags to allow NTLMSSP or NTLMv2 by default. If the
server sets the extended security bit in the Negotiate response, then
we'll use NTLMSSP. If it doesn't then we'll use raw NTLMv2. Mounting a
LANMAN server will still require a sec= option by default.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Now that we track what sort of NEGOTIATE response was received, stop
mandating that every session on a socket use the same type of auth.
Push that decision out into the session setup code, and make the sectype
a per-session property. This should allow us to mix multiple sectypes on
a socket as long as they are compatible with the NEGOTIATE response.
With this too, we can now eliminate the ses->secFlg field since that
info is redundant and harder to work with than a securityEnum.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Currently, we determine this according to flags in the sec_mode, flags
in the global_secflags and via other methods. That makes the semantics
very hard to follow and there are corner cases where we don't handle
this correctly.
Add a new bool to the TCP_Server_Info that acts as a simple flag to tell
us whether signing is enabled on this connection or not, and fix up the
places that need to determine this to use that flag.
This is a bit weird for the SMB2 case, where signing is per-session.
SMB2 needs work in this area already though. The existing SMB2 code has
similar logic to what we're using here, so there should be no real
change in behavior. These changes should make it easier to implement
per-session signing in the future though.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
We have this to some degree already in secFlgs, but those get "or'ed" so
there's no way to know what the last option requested was. Add new fields
that will eventually supercede the secFlgs field in the cifs_ses.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Currently we have the overrideSecFlg field, but it's quite cumbersome
to work with. Add some new fields that will eventually supercede it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Track what sort of NEGOTIATE response we get from the server, as that
will govern what sort of authentication types this socket will support.
There are three possibilities:
LANMAN: server sent legacy LANMAN-type response
UNENCAP: server sent a newer-style response, but extended security bit
wasn't set. This socket will only support unencapsulated auth types.
EXTENDED: server sent a newer-style response with the extended security
bit set. This is necessary to support krb5 and ntlmssp auth types.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Add a new securityEnum value to cover the case where a sec= option
was not explicitly set.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
This field is completely unused:
CIFS_SES_W9X is completely unused. CIFS_SES_LANMAN and CIFS_SES_OS2
are set but never checked. CIFS_SES_NT4 is checked, but never set.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
The field that held this was removed quite some time ago.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Some servers set max_vcs to 1 and actually do enforce that limit. Add a
new mount option to work around this behavior that forces a mount
request to open a new socket to the server instead of reusing an
existing one.
I'd prefer to come up with a solution that doesn't require this, so
consider this a debug patch that you can use to determine whether this
is the real problem.
Cc: Jim McDonough <jmcd@samba.org>
Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Pull user namespace and namespace infrastructure changes from Eric W Biederman:
"This set of changes starts with a few small enhnacements to the user
namespace. reboot support, allowing more arbitrary mappings, and
support for mounting devpts, ramfs, tmpfs, and mqueuefs as just the
user namespace root.
I do my best to document that if you care about limiting your
unprivileged users that when you have the user namespace support
enabled you will need to enable memory control groups.
There is a minor bug fix to prevent overflowing the stack if someone
creates way too many user namespaces.
The bulk of the changes are a continuation of the kuid/kgid push down
work through the filesystems. These changes make using uids and gids
typesafe which ensures that these filesystems are safe to use when
multiple user namespaces are in use. The filesystems converted for
3.9 are ceph, 9p, afs, ocfs2, gfs2, ncpfs, nfs, nfsd, and cifs. The
changes for these filesystems were a little more involved so I split
the changes into smaller hopefully obviously correct changes.
XFS is the only filesystem that remains. I was hoping I could get
that in this release so that user namespace support would be enabled
with an allyesconfig or an allmodconfig but it looks like the xfs
changes need another couple of days before it they are ready."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (93 commits)
cifs: Enable building with user namespaces enabled.
cifs: Convert struct cifs_ses to use a kuid_t and a kgid_t
cifs: Convert struct cifs_sb_info to use kuids and kgids
cifs: Modify struct smb_vol to use kuids and kgids
cifs: Convert struct cifsFileInfo to use a kuid
cifs: Convert struct cifs_fattr to use kuid and kgids
cifs: Convert struct tcon_link to use a kuid.
cifs: Modify struct cifs_unix_set_info_args to hold a kuid_t and a kgid_t
cifs: Convert from a kuid before printing current_fsuid
cifs: Use kuids and kgids SID to uid/gid mapping
cifs: Pass GLOBAL_ROOT_UID and GLOBAL_ROOT_GID to keyring_alloc
cifs: Use BUILD_BUG_ON to validate uids and gids are the same size
cifs: Override unmappable incoming uids and gids
nfsd: Enable building with user namespaces enabled.
nfsd: Properly compare and initialize kuids and kgids
nfsd: Store ex_anon_uid and ex_anon_gid as kuids and kgids
nfsd: Modify nfsd4_cb_sec to use kuids and kgids
nfsd: Handle kuids and kgids in the nfs4acl to posix_acl conversion
nfsd: Convert nfsxdr to use kuids and kgids
nfsd: Convert nfs3xdr to use kuids and kgids
...
Add two helper functions get_option_uid and get_option_gid to handle
the work of parsing uid and gids paramaters from the command line and
making kuids and kgids out of them.
Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
In cifs_unix_to_basic_fattr only update the cifs_fattr with an id if
it is valid after conversion.
Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
If we have mandatory byte-range locks on a file we can't cache reads
because pagereading may have conflicts with these locks on the server.
That's why we should allow level2 oplocks for files without mandatory
locks only.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
that solution has data races and can end up two identical writes to the
server: when clientCanCacheAll value can be changed during the execution
of __generic_file_aio_write.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
If we have a read oplock and set a read lock in it, we can't write to the
locked area - so, filemap_fdatawrite may fail with a no information for a
userspace application even if we request a write to non-locked area. Fix
this by populating the page cache without marking affected pages dirty
after a successful write directly to the server.
Also remove CONFIG_CIFS_SMB2 ifdefs because it's suitable for both CIFS
and SMB2 protocols.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Restructure code to make SMB2 vs. SMB3 signing a protocol
specific op. SMB3 signing (AES_CMAC) is not enabled yet,
but this restructuring at least makes sure we don't send
an smb2 signature on an smb3 signed connection. A followon
patch will add AES_CMAC and enable smb3 signing.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Take advantage of accelerated strchr() on arches that support it.
Also, no caller ever passes in a NULL pointer. Get rid of the unneeded
NULL pointer check.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Passing this around as a string is contorted and painful. Instead, just
convert these to a sockaddr as soon as possible, since that's how we're
going to work with it later anyway.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
This patch enables optional for original SMB2 (SMB2.02) dialect
by specifying vers=2.0 on mount.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
because the is no difference here. This also adds support of prefixpath
mount option for SMB2.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
We had planned to upgrade to ntlmv2 security a few releases ago,
and have been warning users in dmesg on mount about the impending
upgrade, but had to make a change (to use nltmssp with ntlmv2) due
to testing issues with some non-Windows, non-Samba servers.
The approach in this patch is simpler than earlier patches,
and changes the default authentication mechanism to ntlmv2
password hashes (encapsulated in ntlmssp) from ntlm (ntlm is
too weak for current use and ntlmv2 has been broadly
supported for many, many years).
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Based on whether the user (on mount command) chooses:
vers=3.0 (for smb3.0 support)
vers=2.1 (for smb2.1 support)
or (with subsequent patch, which will allow SMB2 support)
vers=2.0 (for original smb2.02 dialect support)
send only one dialect at a time during negotiate (we
had been sending a list).
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Now we walk though cifsFileInfo's list for every incoming lease
break and look for an equivalent there. That approach misses lease
breaks that come just after an open response - we don't have time
to populate new cifsFileInfo structure to the list. Fix this by
adding new list of pending opens and look for a lease there if we
didn't find it in the list of cifsFileInfo structures.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
and allow several processes to walk through the lock list and read
can_cache_brlcks value if they are not going to modify them.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Now we need to lock/unlock a spinlock while processing brlock ops
on the inode. Move brlocks of a fid to a separate list and attach
all such lists to the inode. This let us not hold a spinlock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Now that we aren't abusing the kmap address space, there's no need for
this lock or to impose a limit on the rsize.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Replace the "marshal_iov" function with a "read_into_pages" function.
That function will copy the read data off the socket and into the
pages array, kmapping and reading pages one at a time.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
We'll need an array to put into a smb_rqst, so convert this into an array
instead of (ab)using the lru list_head.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Eventually, we're going to want to append a list of pages to
cifs_readdata instead of a list of kvecs. To prepare for that, turn
the kvec array allocation into a separate one and just keep a
pointer to it in the readdata.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
For now, none of the callers populate rq_pages. That will be done for
writes in a later patch. While we're at it, change the prototype of
setup_async_request not to need a return pointer argument. Just
return the pointer to the mid_q_entry or an ERR_PTR.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
We need a way to represent a call to be sent on the wire that does not
require having all of the page data kmapped. Behold the smb_rqst struct.
This new struct represents an array of kvecs immediately followed by an
array of pages.
Convert the signing routines to use these structs under the hood and
turn the existing functions for this into wrappers around that. For now,
we're just changing these functions to take different args. Later, we'll
teach them how to deal with arrays of pages.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Pavel Shilovsky