Samsung smart phones may need the ability to panic on corruption. Not
all devices provide the bootloader support needed to use the existing
"restart_on_corruption" mode. Additional details for why Samsung needs
this new mode can be found here:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/dm-devel/2020-June/msg00235.html
Signed-off-by: jhs2.lee <jhs2.lee@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
The verification is to support cases where the root hash is not secured
by Trusted Boot, UEFI Secureboot or similar technologies.
One of the use cases for this is for dm-verity volumes mounted after
boot, the root hash provided during the creation of the dm-verity volume
has to be secure and thus in-kernel validation implemented here will be
used before we trust the root hash and allow the block device to be
created.
The signature being provided for verification must verify the root hash
and must be trusted by the builtin keyring for verification to succeed.
The hash is added as a key of type "user" and the description is passed
to the kernel so it can look it up and use it for verification.
Adds CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG which can be turned on if root
hash verification is needed.
Kernel commandline dm_verity module parameter 'require_signatures' will
indicate whether to force root hash signature verification (for all dm
verity volumes).
Signed-off-by: Jaskaran Khurana <jaskarankhurana@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-and-Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this file is released under the gplv2
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 68 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190114.292346262@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This allows platforms that are CPU/memory contrained to verify data
blocks only the first time they are read from the data device, rather
than every time. As such, it provides a reduced level of security
because only offline tampering of the data device's content will be
detected, not online tampering.
Hash blocks are still verified each time they are read from the hash
device, since verification of hash blocks is less performance critical
than data blocks, and a hash block will not be verified any more after
all the data blocks it covers have been verified anyway.
This option introduces a bitset that is used to check if a block has
been validated before or not. A block can be validated more than once
as there is no thread protection for the bitset.
These changes were developed and tested on entry-level Android Go
devices.
Signed-off-by: Patrik Torstensson <totte@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Move dm-bufio.h to include/linux/ so that external GPL'd DM target
modules can use it.
It is better to allow the use of dm-bufio than force external modules
to implement the equivalent buffered IO mechanism in some new way. The
hope is this will encourage the use of dm-bufio; which will then make it
easier for a GPL'd external DM target module to be included upstream.
A couple dm-bufio EXPORT_SYMBOL exports have also been updated to use
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
dm-verity is starting async. crypto ops and waiting for them to complete.
Move it over to generic code doing the same.
This also avoids a future potential data coruption bug created
by the use of wait_for_completion_interruptible() without dealing
correctly with an interrupt aborting the wait prior to the
async op finishing, should this code ever move to a context
where signals are not masked.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
CC: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use of the synchronous digest API limits dm-verity to using pure
CPU based algorithm providers and rules out the use of off CPU
algorithm providers which are normally asynchronous by nature,
potentially freeing CPU cycles.
This can reduce performance per Watt in situations such as during
boot time when a lot of concurrent file accesses are made to the
protected volume.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
CC: Ondrej Mosnáček <omosnacek+linux-crypto@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
If ignore_zero_blocks is enabled dm-verity will return zeroes for blocks
matching a zero hash without validating the content.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Add support for correcting corrupted blocks using Reed-Solomon.
This code uses RS(255, N) interleaved across data and hash
blocks. Each error-correcting block covers N bytes evenly
distributed across the combined total data, so that each byte is a
maximum distance away from the others. This makes it possible to
recover from several consecutive corrupted blocks with relatively
small space overhead.
In addition, using verity hashes to locate erasures nearly doubles
the effectiveness of error correction. Being able to detect
corrupted blocks also improves performance, because only corrupted
blocks need to corrected.
For a 2 GiB partition, RS(255, 253) (two parity bytes for each
253-byte block) can correct up to 16 MiB of consecutive corrupted
blocks if erasures can be located, and 8 MiB if they cannot, with
16 MiB space overhead.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
verity_for_bv_block() will be re-used by optional dm-verity object.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Prepare for an optional verity object to make use of existing dm-verity
structures and functions.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
JeongHyeon Lee