It's better to set the continueSession attribute for the unseal
operation so that the session object is not removed as a side-effect
when the operation is successful. Since a user process created the
session, it should be also decide when the session is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 5beb0c435b ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy")
In my original patch sealing with policy was done with dynamically
allocated buffer that I changed later into an array so the checks in
tpm2-cmd.c became invalid. This patch fixes the issue.
Fixes: 5beb0c435b ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially
combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data
can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use
authorization policies to seal trusted keys.
Two following new options have been added for trusted keys:
* 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing.
* 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing.
If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this
will result an error because the state of the option would become
mixed.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key()
syscall and documentation for it.
Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support
TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
* hash_algo_name
* hash_digest_size
Includes support for the following hash algorithms:
* sha1
* sha256
* sha384
* sha512
* sm3-256
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
The 'migratable' flag was not added to the key payload. This patch
fixes the problem.
Fixes: 0fe5480303 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <PeterHuewe@gmx.de>
Added tpm_trusted_seal() and tpm_trusted_unseal() API for sealing
trusted keys.
This patch implements basic sealing and unsealing functionality for
TPM 2.0:
* Seal with a parent key using a 20 byte auth value.
* Unseal with a parent key using a 20 byte auth value.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
If during transmission system error was returned, the logic was to
incorrectly deduce that chip is a TPM 1.x chip. This patch fixes this
issue. Also, this patch changes probing so that message tag is used as the
measure for TPM 2.x, which should be much more stable. A separate function
called tpm2_probe() is encapsulated because it can be used with any
chipset.
Fixes: aec04cbdf7 ("tpm: TPM 2.0 FIFO Interface")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Fixed suspend/resume paths for TPM 2.0 and consolidated all the
associated code to the tpm_pm_suspend() and tpm_pm_resume()
functions. Resume path should be handled by the firmware, i.e.
Startup(CLEAR) for hibernate and Startup(STATE) for suspend.
There might be some non-PC embedded devices in the future where
Startup() is not the handled by the FW but fixing the code for
those IMHO should be postponed until there is hardware available
to test the fixes although extra Startup in the driver code is
essentially a NOP.
Added Shutdown(CLEAR) to the remove paths of TIS and CRB drivers.
Changed tpm2_shutdown() to a void function because there isn't
much you can do except print an error message if this fails with
a system error.
Fixes: aec04cbdf7 ("tpm: TPM 2.0 FIFO Interface")
Fixes: 30fc8d138e ("tpm: TPM 2.0 CRB Interface")
[phuewe: both did send TPM_Shutdown on resume which 'disables' the TPM
and did not send TPM2_Shutdown on teardown which leads some TPM2.0 to
believe there was an attack (no TPM2_Shutdown = no orderly shutdown =
attack)]
Reported-by: Peter Hüwe <PeterHuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Scot Doyle <lkml14@scotdoyle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
TPM 2.0 devices are separated by adding a field 'flags' to struct
tpm_chip and defining a flag TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 for tagging them.
This patch adds the following internal functions:
- tpm2_get_random()
- tpm2_get_tpm_pt()
- tpm2_pcr_extend()
- tpm2_pcr_read()
- tpm2_startup()
Additionally, the following exported functions are implemented for
implementing TPM 2.0 device drivers:
- tpm2_do_selftest()
- tpm2_calc_ordinal_durations()
- tpm2_gen_interrupt()
The existing functions that are exported for the use for existing
subsystems have been changed to check the flags field in struct
tpm_chip and use appropriate TPM 2.0 counterpart if
TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 is est.
The code for tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration() and tpm2_startup() were
originally written by Will Arthur.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Arthur <will.c.arthur@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jasob Gunthorpe <jason.gunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
[phuewe: Fixed copy paste error * 2]
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Jarkko Sakkinen