Commit 18107f8a2d ("arm64: Support execute-only permissions with
Enhanced PAN") re-introduced execute-only permissions when EPAN is
available. When EPAN is not available, arch_filter_pgprot() is supposed
to change a PAGE_EXECONLY permission into PAGE_READONLY_EXEC. However,
if BTI or MTE are present, such check does not detect the execute-only
pgprot in the presence of PTE_GP (BTI) or MT_NORMAL_TAGGED (MTE),
allowing the user to request PROT_EXEC with PROT_BTI or PROT_MTE.
Remove the arch_filter_pgprot() function, change the default VM_EXEC
permissions to PAGE_READONLY_EXEC and update the protection_map[] array
at core_initcall() if EPAN is detected.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Fixes: 18107f8a2d ("arm64: Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.13.x
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Tested-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Commit 507d664450 ("arm64: mm: Remove unused header file") removed
a bunch of apparently "unused" header inclusions from our mm/mmap.c
implementation, but in doing so introduced the following warning when
building with W=1:
>> arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c:17:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'valid_phys_addr_range' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
17 | int valid_phys_addr_range(phys_addr_t addr, size_t size)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c:36:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'valid_mmap_phys_addr_range' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
36 | int valid_mmap_phys_addr_range(unsigned long pfn, size_t size)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Add back the linux/io.h header inclusion to pull in the missing
prototypes.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202101271438.V9TmBC31-lkp@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
I recently copied this into lib/ for use by the RISC-V port.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
arm64 handles top-down mmap layout in a way that can be easily reused by
other architectures, so make it available in mm. It then introduces a new
config ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT that can be set by other
architectures to benefit from those functions. Note that this new config
depends on MMU being enabled, if selected without MMU support, a warning
will be thrown.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-5-alex@ghiti.fr
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Do not offset mmap base address because of stack randomization if current
task does not want randomization. Note that x86 already implements this
behaviour.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-4-alex@ghiti.fr
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Each architecture has its own way to determine if a task is a compat task,
by using is_compat_task in arch_mmap_rnd, it allows more genericity and
then it prepares its moving to mm/.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-3-alex@ghiti.fr
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation this program is
distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general
public license along with this program if not see http www gnu org
licenses
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 503 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190602204653.811534538@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec".
Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec
continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues
around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3]
other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to
be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it
can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only
way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack
limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the
functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements
the approach.
[1] 04e35f4495 ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()")
[2] 779f4e1c6c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"")
[3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?"
This patch (of 3):
Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during
exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process
calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the
per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the
bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is
finalized.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When RLIMIT_STACK is, for example, 256MB, the current code results in a
gap between the top of the task and mmap_base of 256MB, failing to take
into account the amount by which the stack address was randomized. In
other words, the stack gets less than RLIMIT_STACK space.
Ensure that the gap between the stack and mmap_base always takes stack
randomization and the stack guard gap into account.
Obtained from Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622200033.25714-3-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When running lscpu on an AArch64 system that has SMBIOS version 2.0
tables, it will segfault in the following way:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff8000bfff0000
pgd = ffff8000f9615000
[ffff8000bfff0000] *pgd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1284 Comm: lscpu Not tainted 4.11.0-rc3+ #103
Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
task: ffff8000fa78e800 task.stack: ffff8000f9780000
PC is at __arch_copy_to_user+0x90/0x220
LR is at read_mem+0xcc/0x140
This is caused by the fact that lspci issues a read() on /dev/mem at the
offset where it expects to find the SMBIOS structure array. However, this
region is classified as EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICE_DATA (as per the UEFI spec),
and so it is omitted from the linear mapping.
So let's restrict /dev/mem read/write access to those areas that are
covered by the linear region.
Reported-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Fixes: 4dffbfc48d ("arm64/efi: mark UEFI reserved regions as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
We are going to split more MM APIs out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from a couple of .c files.
The APIs that we are going to move are:
arch_pick_mmap_layout()
arch_get_unmapped_area()
arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown()
mm_update_next_owner()
Include the header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
arch_pick_mmap_layout is only called by fs/exec.c which is always built into
kernel, it looks the EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL is pointless and no architectures export
it other than ARM64.
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long)
with calls to get_random_long(). Also address shifting bug which, in
case of x86 removed entropy mask for mmap_rnd_bits values > 31 bits.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
arm64: arch_mmap_rnd() uses STACK_RND_MASK to generate the random offset
for the mmap base address. This value represents a compromise between
increased ASLR effectiveness and avoiding address-space fragmentation.
Replace it with a Kconfig option, which is sensibly bounded, so that
platform developers may choose where to place this compromise. Keep
default values as new minimums.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location,
a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base.
In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries
separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as
arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
for describing this feature on architectures that support it
(which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390
already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the
ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com>
Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this refactors the use of
mmap_rnd() to be used similarly to arm and x86. This additionally
enables mmap ASLR on legacy mmap layouts, which appeared to be missing
on arm64, and was already supported on arm. Additionally removes a
copy/pasted declaration of an unused function.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Since commit 8a0a9bd4db ('random: make get_random_int() more
random'), get_random_int() returns a random value for each call,
so comment and hack introduced in mmap_rnd() as part of commit
1d18c47c73 ('arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management')
are incorrects.
Commit 1d18c47c73 seems to use the same hack introduced by
commit a5adc91a4b ('powerpc: Ensure random space between stack
and mmaps'), latter copied in commit 5a0efea09f ('sparc64: Sharpen
address space randomization calculations.').
But both architectures were cleaned up as part of commit
fa8cbaaf5a ('powerpc+sparc64/mm: Remove hack in mmap randomize
layout') as hack is no more needed since commit 8a0a9bd4db.
So the present patch removes the comment and the hack around
get_random_int() on AArch64's mmap_rnd().
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Dan McGee <dpmcgee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Change the type of physical address from unsigned long to phys_addr_t,
make valid_phys_addr_range more readable.
Signed-off-by: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Since all architectures have been converted to use vm_unmapped_area(),
there is no remaining use for the free_area_cache.
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch adds support for the handling of the MMU faults (exception
entry code introduced by a previous patch) and page table management.
The user translation table is pointed to by TTBR0 and the kernel one
(swapper_pg_dir) by TTBR1. There is no translation information shared or
address space overlapping between user and kernel page tables.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Catalin Marinas