There wasn't an LKDTM test to distinguish between -fstack-protector and
-fstack-protector-strong in use. This adds CORRUPT_STACK_STRONG to see
the difference. Also adjusts the stack-clobber value to 0xff so execution
won't potentially jump into userspace when the stack protector is missing.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Two new tests STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING and STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING
attempt to read the byte before and after, respectively, of the current
stack frame, which should fault.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
While not a crash test, this does provide two tight atomic_t and
refcount_t loops for performance comparisons:
cd /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash
perf stat -B -- cat <(echo ATOMIC_TIMING) > DIRECT
perf stat -B -- cat <(echo REFCOUNT_TIMING) > DIRECT
Looking a CPU cycles is the best way to example the fast-path (rather
than instruction counts, since conditional jumps will be executed but
will be negligible due to branch-prediction).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The existing REFCOUNT_* LKDTM tests were designed only for testing a narrow
portion of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL. This moves the tests to their own file and
expands their testing to poke each boundary condition.
Since the protections (CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL and x86-fast) use different
saturation values and reach-zero behavior, those have to be build-time
set so the tests can actually validate things are happening at the
right places.
Notably, the x86-fast protection will fail REFCOUNT_INC_ZERO and
REFCOUNT_ADD_ZERO since those conditions are not checked (only overflow
is critical to protecting refcount_t). CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL will warn for
each REFCOUNT_*_NEGATIVE test since it provides zero-pinning behaviors
(which allows it to pass REFCOUNT_INC_ZERO and REFCOUNT_ADD_ZERO).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This adds CORRUPT_USER_DS to check that the get_fs() test on syscall
return (via __VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE) still sees USER_DS. Since
trying to deal with values other than USER_DS and KERNEL_DS across all
architectures in a safe way is not sensible, this sets KERNEL_DS, but
since that could be extremely dangerous if the protection is not present,
it also raises SIGKILL for current, so that no matter what, the process
will die. A successful test will be visible with a BUG(), like all the
other LKDTM tests.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When building under CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST, list addition and removal will be
sanity-checked. This validates that the check is working as expected by
setting up classic corruption attacks against list manipulations, available
with the new lkdtm tests CORRUPT_LIST_ADD and CORRUPT_LIST_DEL.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
When building under W=1, the lack of lkdtm.h in lkdtm_usercopy.c and
lkdtm_rodata.c was discovered. This fixes the issue and consolidates
the common header and the pr_fmt macro for simplicity and regularity
across each test source file.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This splits all the remaining tests from lkdtm_core.c into the new
lkdtm_bugs.c file to help separate things better for readability.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This splits the *_AFTER_FREE and related tests into the new lkdtm_heap.c
file to help separate things better for readability.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This splits the EXEC_*, WRITE_* and related tests into the new lkdtm_perms.c
file to help separate things better for readability.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This splits the USERCOPY_* tests into the new lkdtm_usercopy.c file to
help separate things better for readability.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This adds a function that lives in the .rodata section. The section
flags are corrected using objcopy since there is no way with gcc to
declare section flags in an architecture-agnostic way.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Kees Cook