This is mainly a patch for clarification, and to let us remove
the time_t definition from the kernel to prevent new users from
creeping in that might not be y2038-safe.
All remaining uses of 'time_t' or '__kernel_time_t' are part of
the user API that cannot be changed by that either have a
replacement or that do not suffer from the y2038 overflow.
Acked-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting msq ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/msg (0444) and the MSG_STAT shmctl
command. The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the msq metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs). Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.
This patch introduces a new MSG_STAT_ANY command such that the msq ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-4-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many user space API headers are missing licensing information, which
makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default are files without license information under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPLV2. Marking them GPLV2 would exclude
them from being included in non GPLV2 code, which is obviously not
intended. The user space API headers fall under the syscall exception
which is in the kernels COPYING file:
NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel
services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use
of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work".
otherwise syscall usage would not be possible.
Update the files which contain no license information with an SPDX
license identifier. The chosen identifier is 'GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note' which is the officially assigned identifier for the
Linux syscall exception. SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the
methodology of how this patch was researched.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
SysV can be abused to allocate locked kernel memory. For most systems, a
small limit doesn't make sense, see the discussion with regards to SHMMAX.
Therefore: increase MSGMNI to the maximum supported.
And: If we ignore the risk of locking too much memory, then an automatic
scaling of MSGMNI doesn't make sense. Therefore the logic can be removed.
The code preserves auto_msgmni to avoid breaking any user space applications
that expect that the value exists.
Notes:
1) If an administrator must limit the memory allocations, then he can set
MSGMNI as necessary.
Or he can disable sysv entirely (as e.g. done by Android).
2) MSGMAX and MSGMNB are intentionally not increased, as these values are used
to control latency vs. throughput:
If MSGMNB is large, then msgsnd() just returns and more messages can be queued
before a task switch to a task that calls msgrcv() is forced.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
x32 msgsnd/msgrcv system calls are the same as x86-64 msgsnd/msgrcv system
calls, which use 64-bit integer for long in struct msgbuf . But x32 long
is 32 bit. This patch replaces long in struct msgbuf with __kernel_long_t.
Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1388182464-28428-5-git-send-email-hjl.tools@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
This patch is required for checkpoint/restore in userspace.
c/r requires some way to get all pending IPC messages without deleting
them from the queue (checkpoint can fail and in this case tasks will be
resumed, so queue have to be valid).
To achive this, new operation flag MSG_COPY for sys_msgrcv() system call
was introduced. If this flag was specified, then mtype is interpreted as
number of the message to copy.
If MSG_COPY is set, then kernel will allocate dummy message with passed
size, and then use new copy_msg() helper function to copy desired message
(instead of unlinking it from the queue).
Notes:
1) Return -ENOSYS if MSG_COPY is specified, but
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is not set.
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Arnd Bergmann