This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch moves the directly coded alternatives for turning PAN on/off
into separate uaccess_{enable,disable} macros or functions. The asm
macros take a few arguments which will be used in subsequent patches.
Note that any (unlikely) access that the compiler might generate between
uaccess_enable() and uaccess_disable(), other than those explicitly
specified by the user access code, will not be protected by PAN.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
If a CPU supports both Privileged Access Never (PAN) and User Access
Override (UAO), we don't need to disable/re-enable PAN round all
copy_to_user() like calls.
UAO alternatives cause these calls to use the 'unprivileged' load/store
instructions, which are overridden to be the privileged kind when
fs==KERNEL_DS.
This patch changes the copy_to_user() calls to have their PAN toggling
depend on a new composite 'feature' ARM64_ALT_PAN_NOT_UAO.
If both features are detected, PAN will be enabled, but the copy_to_user()
alternatives will not be applied. This means PAN will be enabled all the
time for these functions. If only PAN is detected, the toggling will be
enabled as normal.
This will save the time taken to disable/re-enable PAN, and allow us to
catch copy_to_user() accesses that occur with fs==KERNEL_DS.
Futex and swp-emulation code continue to hang their PAN toggling code on
ARM64_HAS_PAN.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
'User Access Override' is a new ARMv8.2 feature which allows the
unprivileged load and store instructions to be overridden to behave in
the normal way.
This patch converts {get,put}_user() and friends to use ldtr*/sttr*
instructions - so that they can only access EL0 memory, then enables
UAO when fs==KERNEL_DS so that these functions can access kernel memory.
This allows user space's read/write permissions to be checked against the
page tables, instead of testing addr<USER_DS, then using the kernel's
read/write permissions.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: move uao_thread_switch() above dsb()]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
This patch optimize copy_to-from-in_user for arm 64bit architecture. The
copy template is used as template file for all the copy*.S files. Minor
change was made to it to accommodate the copy to/from/in user files.
Signed-off-by: Feng Kan <fkan@apm.com>
Signed-off-by: Balamurugan Shanmugam <bshanmugam@apm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
'Privileged Access Never' is a new arm8.1 feature which prevents
privileged code from accessing any virtual address where read or write
access is also permitted at EL0.
This patch enables the PAN feature on all CPUs, and modifies {get,put}_user
helpers temporarily to permit access.
This will catch kernel bugs where user memory is accessed directly.
'Unprivileged loads and stores' using ldtrb et al are unaffected by PAN.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
[will: use ALTERNATIVE in asm and tidy up pan_enable check]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
The AArch64 instruction set contains load/store pair memory accessors,
so use these in our copy_*_user routines to transfer 16 bytes per
iteration.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
This patch add support for various user access functions. These
functions use the standard LDR/STR instructions and not the LDRT/STRT
variants in order to allow kernel addresses (after set_fs(KERNEL_DS)).
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Al Viro