Joe Malicki reports that setuid sometimes doesn't: very rarely,
a setuid root program does not get root euid; and, by the way,
they have a health check running lsof every few minutes.
Right, check_unsafe_exec() notes whether the files_struct is being
shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so
sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid.
But /proc/<pid>/fd and /proc/<pid>/fdinfo lookups make transient
use of get_files_struct(), which also raises that sharing count.
There's a rather simple fix for this: exec's check on files->count
has been redundant ever since 2.6.1 made it unshare_files() (except
while compat_do_execve() omitted to do so) - just remove that check.
[Note to -stable: this patch will not apply before 2.6.29: earlier
releases should just remove the files->count line from unsafe_exec().]
Reported-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
Narrowed-down-by: Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>
Tested-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2.6.26's commit fd8328be87
"sanitize handling of shared descriptor tables in failing execve()"
moved the unshare_files() from flush_old_exec() and several binfmts
to the head of do_execve(); but forgot to make the same change to
compat_do_execve(), leaving a CLONE_FILES files_struct shared across
exec from a 32-bit process on a 64-bit kernel.
It's arguable whether the files_struct really ought to be unshared
across exec; but 2.6.1 made that so to stop the loading binary's fd
leaking into other threads, and a 32-bit process on a 64-bit kernel
ought to behave in the same way as 32 on 32 and 64 on 64.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Due to a different size of ino_t ustat needs a compat handler, but
currently only x86 and mips provide one. Add a generic compat_sys_ustat
and switch all architectures over to it. Instead of doing various
user copy hacks compat_sys_ustat just reimplements sys_ustat as
it's trivial. This was suggested by Arnd Bergmann.
Found by Eric Sandeen when running xfstests/017 on ppc64, which causes
stack smashing warnings on RHEL/Fedora due to the too large amount of
data writen by the syscall.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch allows LSM modules to determine whether current process is in an
execve operation or not so that they can behave differently while an execve
operation is in progress.
This patch is needed by TOMOYO. Please see another patch titled "LSM adapter
functions." for backgrounds.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The patch:
commit a6f76f23d2
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
moved the place in which the 'safeness' of a SUID/SGID exec was performed to
before de_thread() was called. This means that LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE is now
calculated incorrectly. This flag is set if any of the usage counts for
fs_struct, files_struct and sighand_struct are greater than 1 at the time the
determination is made. All of which are true for threads created by the
pthread library.
However, since we wish to make the security calculation before irrevocably
damaging the process so that we can return it an error code in the case where
we decide we want to reject the exec request on this basis, we have to make the
determination before calling de_thread().
So, instead, we count up the number of threads (CLONE_THREAD) that are sharing
our fs_struct (CLONE_FS), files_struct (CLONE_FILES) and sighand_structs
(CLONE_SIGHAND/CLONE_THREAD) with us. These will be killed by de_thread() and
so can be discounted by check_unsafe_exec().
We do have to be careful because CLONE_THREAD does not imply FS or FILES.
We _assume_ that there will be no extra references to these structs held by the
threads we're going to kill.
This can be tested with the attached pair of programs. Build the two programs
using the Makefile supplied, and run ./test1 as a non-root user. If
successful, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1
--TEST1--
uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
exec ./test2
--TEST2--
uid=4043, euid=0 suid=0
SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID
and if unsuccessful, something like:
[dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1
--TEST1--
uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
exec ./test2
--TEST2--
uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!
The non-root user ID you see will depend on the user you run as.
[test1.c]
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <pthread.h>
static void *thread_func(void *arg)
{
while (1) {}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pthread_t tid;
uid_t uid, euid, suid;
printf("--TEST1--\n");
getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid);
printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid);
if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, thread_func, NULL) < 0) {
perror("pthread_create");
exit(1);
}
printf("exec ./test2\n");
execlp("./test2", "test2", NULL);
perror("./test2");
_exit(1);
}
[test2.c]
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
uid_t uid, euid, suid;
getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid);
printf("--TEST2--\n");
printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid);
if (euid != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!\n");
exit(1);
}
printf("SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID\n");
exit(0);
}
[Makefile]
CFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -Wall -Werror -Wunused
all: test1 test2
test1: test1.c
gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test1 test1.c -lpthread
test2: test2.c
gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test2 test2.c
sudo chown root.root test2
sudo chmod +s test2
Reported-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Not a single architecture has wired up sys_pselect7 plus it is the
only system call with seven parameters. Just make it static and
rename it to do_pselect which will do the work for sys_pselect6.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that
all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
of no return with no possibility of failure.
I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:
cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)
but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
(they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).
The following sequence of events now happens:
(a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
creds that we make.
(a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to
bprm->cred.
This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
unnecessary, and so they've been removed.
(b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in
bprm->unsafe for future reference.
(c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.
(i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,
but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
fail.
(ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should
calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.
This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
Anything that might fail must be done at this point.
(iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.
bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux
in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
not on the interpreter.
(d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This
performs the following steps with regard to credentials:
(i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
may not be covered by commit_creds().
(ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
(c.i).
(e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to
credentials:
(i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
must be done before the credentials are changed.
This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
must have been done in (c.ii).
(ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
should be part of struct creds.
(iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.
(iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
are now immutable.
(v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.
(f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been
made.
(2) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
(*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()
Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
(*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()
Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()
Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()
New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
second and subsequent calls.
(*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
(*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()
New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This
includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not
fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
to the process; when the latter is called, they have.
The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.
(3) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
the credentials-under-construction approach.
(c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Some userland apps seem to pass in a "0" for the seconds, and several
seconds worth of usecs to select(). The old kernels accepted this just
fine, so the new kernels must too.
However, due to the upscaling of the microseconds to nanoseconds we had
some cases where we got math overflow, and depending on the GCC version
(due to inlining decisions) that actually resulted in an -EINVAL return.
This patch fixes this by adding the excess microseconds to the seconds
field.
Also with thanks to Marcin Slusarz for spotting some implementation bugs
in the diagnostics patches.
Reported-by: Carlos R. Mafra <crmafra2@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'v28-range-hrtimers-for-linus-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (37 commits)
hrtimers: add missing docbook comments to struct hrtimer
hrtimers: simplify hrtimer_peek_ahead_timers()
hrtimers: fix docbook comments
DECLARE_PER_CPU needs linux/percpu.h
hrtimers: fix typo
rangetimers: fix the bug reported by Ingo for real
rangetimer: fix BUG_ON reported by Ingo
rangetimer: fix x86 build failure for the !HRTIMERS case
select: fix alpha OSF wrapper
select: fix alpha OSF wrapper
hrtimer: peek at the timer queue just before going idle
hrtimer: make the futex() system call use the per process slack value
hrtimer: make the nanosleep() syscall use the per process slack
hrtimer: fix signed/unsigned bug in slack estimator
hrtimer: show the timer ranges in /proc/timer_list
hrtimer: incorporate feedback from Peter Zijlstra
hrtimer: add a hrtimer_start_range() function
hrtimer: another build fix
hrtimer: fix build bug found by Ingo
hrtimer: make select() and poll() use the hrtimer range feature
...
It's not the final state, but it allows moving ->readdir() instances
to passing filldir return value to caller of vfs_readdir().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
struct stat / compat_stat is the same on all architectures, so
cp_compat_stat should be, too.
Turns out it is, except that various architectures have slightly and some
high2lowuid/high2lowgid or the direct assignment instead of the
SET_UID/SET_GID that expands to the correct one anyway.
This patch replaces the arch-specific cp_compat_stat implementations with
a common one based on the x86-64 one.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [ sparc bits ]
Acked-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> [ parisc bits ]
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With MAX_ARG_STRINGS set to 0x7FFFFFFF, and being passed to 'count()' and
compat_count(), it would appear that the current max bounds check of
fs/exec.c:394:
if(++i > max)
return -E2BIG;
would never trigger. Since 'i' is of type int, so values would wrap and the
function would continue looping.
Simple fix seems to be chaning ++i to i++ and checking for '>='.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: "Ollie Wild" <aaw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With lots of help, input and cleanups from Thomas Gleixner
This patch switches select() and poll() over to hrtimers.
The core of the patch is replacing the "s64 timeout" with a
"struct timespec end_time" in all the plumbing.
But most of the diffstat comes from using the just introduced helpers:
poll_select_set_timeout
poll_select_copy_remaining
timespec_add_safe
which make manipulating the timespec easier and less error-prone.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
This patch adds 2 helpers that will be used for the hrtimer based select/poll:
poll_select_set_timeout() is a helper that takes a timeout (as a second, nanosecond
pair) and turns that into a "struct timespec" that represents the absolute end time.
This is a common operation in the many select() and poll() variants and needs various,
common, sanity checks.
poll_select_copy_remaining() is a helper that takes care of copying the remaining
time to userspace, as select(), pselect() and ppoll() do. This function comes in
both a natural and a compat implementation (due to datastructure differences).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
* do not pass nameidata; struct path is all the callers want.
* switch to new helpers:
user_path_at(dfd, pathname, flags, &path)
user_path(pathname, &path)
user_lpath(pathname, &path)
user_path_dir(pathname, &path) (fail if not a directory)
The last 3 are trivial macro wrappers for the first one.
* remove nameidata in callers.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch adds the new signalfd4 syscall. It extends the old signalfd
syscall by one parameter which is meant to hold a flag value. In this
patch the only flag support is SFD_CLOEXEC which causes the close-on-exec
flag for the returned file descriptor to be set.
A new name SFD_CLOEXEC is introduced which in this implementation must
have the same value as O_CLOEXEC.
The following test must be adjusted for architectures other than x86 and
x86-64 and in case the syscall numbers changed.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#ifndef __NR_signalfd4
# ifdef __x86_64__
# define __NR_signalfd4 289
# elif defined __i386__
# define __NR_signalfd4 327
# else
# error "need __NR_signalfd4"
# endif
#endif
#define SFD_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC
int
main (void)
{
sigset_t ss;
sigemptyset (&ss);
sigaddset (&ss, SIGUSR1);
int fd = syscall (__NR_signalfd4, -1, &ss, 8, 0);
if (fd == -1)
{
puts ("signalfd4(0) failed");
return 1;
}
int coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD);
if (coe == -1)
{
puts ("fcntl failed");
return 1;
}
if (coe & FD_CLOEXEC)
{
puts ("signalfd4(0) set close-on-exec flag");
return 1;
}
close (fd);
fd = syscall (__NR_signalfd4, -1, &ss, 8, SFD_CLOEXEC);
if (fd == -1)
{
puts ("signalfd4(SFD_CLOEXEC) failed");
return 1;
}
coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD);
if (coe == -1)
{
puts ("fcntl failed");
return 1;
}
if ((coe & FD_CLOEXEC) == 0)
{
puts ("signalfd4(SFD_CLOEXEC) does not set close-on-exec flag");
return 1;
}
close (fd);
puts ("OK");
return 0;
}
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add sys_ni stub]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Adds a check for an overflow in the filesystem size so if someone is
checking with statfs() on a 16G blocksize hugetlbfs in a 32bit binary that
it will report back EOVERFLOW instead of a size of 0.
Acked-by: Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Tollefson <kniht@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Even though copy_compat_strings() doesn't cache the pages,
copy_strings_kernel() and stuff indirectly called by e.g.
->load_binary() is doing that, so we need to drop the
cache contents in the end.
[found by WANG Cong <wangcong@zeuux.org>]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Change all the #ifdef TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK conditionals in non-arch code to
#ifdef HAVE_SET_RESTORE_SIGMASK. If arch code defines it first, the generic
set_restore_sigmask() using TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK is not defined.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This adds the set_restore_sigmask() inline in <linux/thread_info.h> and
replaces every set_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK) with a call to it. No
change, but abstracts the details of the flag protocol from all the calls.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and
vfsmount of a struct path in the right order
* Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&nd->path)
* Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional()
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.
Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
<dentry,vfsmount> pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:
without patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux
with patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux
This patch:
Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The compat_sys_mount() system call throws EINVAL for text-based NFSv4
mounts.
The text-based mount interface assumes that any mount option blob that
doesn't set the version field to "1" is a C string (ie not a legacy
mount request). The compat_sys_mount() call treats blobs that don't
set the version field to "1" as an error. We just relax the check in
compat_sys_mount() a bit to allow C strings to be passed down to the NFSv4
client.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This is the new timerfd API as it is implemented by the following patch:
int timerfd_create(int clockid, int flags);
int timerfd_settime(int ufd, int flags,
const struct itimerspec *utmr,
struct itimerspec *otmr);
int timerfd_gettime(int ufd, struct itimerspec *otmr);
The timerfd_create() API creates an un-programmed timerfd fd. The "clockid"
parameter can be either CLOCK_MONOTONIC or CLOCK_REALTIME.
The timerfd_settime() API give new settings by the timerfd fd, by optionally
retrieving the previous expiration time (in case the "otmr" parameter is not
NULL).
The time value specified in "utmr" is absolute, if the TFD_TIMER_ABSTIME bit
is set in the "flags" parameter. Otherwise it's a relative time.
The timerfd_gettime() API returns the next expiration time of the timer, or
{0, 0} if the timerfd has not been set yet.
Like the previous timerfd API implementation, read(2) and poll(2) are
supported (with the same interface). Here's a simple test program I used to
exercise the new timerfd APIs:
http://www.xmailserver.org/timerfd-test2.c
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix ia64 build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix m68k build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mips build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix alpha, arm, blackfin, cris, m68k, s390, sparc and sparc64 builds]
[heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com: fix s390]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix powerpc build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix sparc64 more]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
All instances of rw_verify_area() are followed by a call to
security_file_permission(), so just call the latter from the former.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Remove the arg+env limit of MAX_ARG_PAGES by copying the strings directly from
the old mm into the new mm.
We create the new mm before the binfmt code runs, and place the new stack at
the very top of the address space. Once the binfmt code runs and figures out
where the stack should be, we move it downwards.
It is a bit peculiar in that we have one task with two mm's, one of which is
inactive.
[a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl: limit stack size]
Signed-off-by: Ollie Wild <aaw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
[bunk@stusta.de: unexport bprm_mm_init]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Optimize select by a using stack space for small fd sets.
core_sys_select() already has this optimization. This is for compat
version.
Signed-off-by: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Just thought this is easier to read.
Acked-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch implements the necessary compat code for the timerfd system call.
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch implements the necessary compat code for the signalfd system call.
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Implement utimensat(2) which is an extension to futimesat(2) in that it
a) supports nano-second resolution for the timestamps
b) allows to selectively ignore the atime/mtime value
c) allows to selectively use the current time for either atime or mtime
d) supports changing the atime/mtime of a symlink itself along the lines
of the BSD lutimes(3) functions
For this change the internally used do_utimes() functions was changed to
accept a timespec time value and an additional flags parameter.
Additionally the sys_utime function was changed to match compat_sys_utime
which already use do_utimes instead of duplicating the work.
Also, the completely missing futimensat() functionality is added. We have
such a function in glibc but we have to resort to using /proc/self/fd/* which
not everybody likes (chroot etc).
Test application (the syscall number will need per-arch editing):
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <syscall.h>
#define __NR_utimensat 280
#define UTIME_NOW ((1l << 30) - 1l)
#define UTIME_OMIT ((1l << 30) - 2l)
int
main(void)
{
int status = 0;
int fd = open("ttt", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0666);
if (fd == -1)
error (1, errno, "failed to create test file \"ttt\"");
struct stat64 st1;
if (fstat64 (fd, &st1) != 0)
error (1, errno, "fstat failed");
struct timespec t[2];
t[0].tv_sec = 0;
t[0].tv_nsec = 0;
t[1].tv_sec = 0;
t[1].tv_nsec = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_utimensat, AT_FDCWD, "ttt", t, 0) != 0)
error (1, errno, "utimensat failed");
struct stat64 st2;
if (fstat64 (fd, &st2) != 0)
error (1, errno, "fstat failed");
if (st2.st_atim.tv_sec != 0 || st2.st_atim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("atim not reset to zero");
status = 1;
}
if (st2.st_mtim.tv_sec != 0 || st2.st_mtim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("mtim not reset to zero");
status = 1;
}
if (status != 0)
goto out;
t[0] = st1.st_atim;
t[1].tv_sec = 0;
t[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT;
if (syscall(__NR_utimensat, AT_FDCWD, "ttt", t, 0) != 0)
error (1, errno, "utimensat failed");
if (fstat64 (fd, &st2) != 0)
error (1, errno, "fstat failed");
if (st2.st_atim.tv_sec != st1.st_atim.tv_sec
|| st2.st_atim.tv_nsec != st1.st_atim.tv_nsec)
{
puts ("atim not set");
status = 1;
}
if (st2.st_mtim.tv_sec != 0 || st2.st_mtim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("mtim changed from zero");
status = 1;
}
if (status != 0)
goto out;
t[0].tv_sec = 0;
t[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT;
t[1] = st1.st_mtim;
if (syscall(__NR_utimensat, AT_FDCWD, "ttt", t, 0) != 0)
error (1, errno, "utimensat failed");
if (fstat64 (fd, &st2) != 0)
error (1, errno, "fstat failed");
if (st2.st_atim.tv_sec != st1.st_atim.tv_sec
|| st2.st_atim.tv_nsec != st1.st_atim.tv_nsec)
{
puts ("mtim changed from original time");
status = 1;
}
if (st2.st_mtim.tv_sec != st1.st_mtim.tv_sec
|| st2.st_mtim.tv_nsec != st1.st_mtim.tv_nsec)
{
puts ("mtim not set");
status = 1;
}
if (status != 0)
goto out;
sleep (2);
t[0].tv_sec = 0;
t[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
t[1].tv_sec = 0;
t[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
if (syscall(__NR_utimensat, AT_FDCWD, "ttt", t, 0) != 0)
error (1, errno, "utimensat failed");
if (fstat64 (fd, &st2) != 0)
error (1, errno, "fstat failed");
struct timeval tv;
gettimeofday(&tv,NULL);
if (st2.st_atim.tv_sec <= st1.st_atim.tv_sec
|| st2.st_atim.tv_sec > tv.tv_sec)
{
puts ("atim not set to NOW");
status = 1;
}
if (st2.st_mtim.tv_sec <= st1.st_mtim.tv_sec
|| st2.st_mtim.tv_sec > tv.tv_sec)
{
puts ("mtim not set to NOW");
status = 1;
}
if (symlink ("ttt", "tttsym") != 0)
error (1, errno, "cannot create symlink");
t[0].tv_sec = 0;
t[0].tv_nsec = 0;
t[1].tv_sec = 0;
t[1].tv_nsec = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_utimensat, AT_FDCWD, "tttsym", t, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)
error (1, errno, "utimensat failed");
if (lstat64 ("tttsym", &st2) != 0)
error (1, errno, "lstat failed");
if (st2.st_atim.tv_sec != 0 || st2.st_atim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("symlink atim not reset to zero");
status = 1;
}
if (st2.st_mtim.tv_sec != 0 || st2.st_mtim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("symlink mtim not reset to zero");
status = 1;
}
if (status != 0)
goto out;
t[0].tv_sec = 1;
t[0].tv_nsec = 0;
t[1].tv_sec = 1;
t[1].tv_nsec = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_utimensat, fd, NULL, t, 0) != 0)
error (1, errno, "utimensat failed");
if (fstat64 (fd, &st2) != 0)
error (1, errno, "fstat failed");
if (st2.st_atim.tv_sec != 1 || st2.st_atim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("atim not reset to one");
status = 1;
}
if (st2.st_mtim.tv_sec != 1 || st2.st_mtim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("mtim not reset to one");
status = 1;
}
if (status == 0)
puts ("all OK");
out:
close (fd);
unlink ("ttt");
unlink ("tttsym");
return status;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add missing i386 syscall table entry]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Merge all compat ioctl handling into compat_ioctl.c instead of splitting it
over compat.c and compat_ioctl.c. This also allows to get rid of ioctl32.h
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Looks-good-to: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
IA64 and ARM-OABI are currently using their own version of epoll compat_
code.
An architecture needs epoll_event translation if alignof(u64) in 32 bit
mode is different from alignof(u64) in 64 bit mode. If an architecture
needs epoll_event translation, it must define struct compat_epoll_event in
asm/compat.h and set CONFIG_HAVE_COMPAT_EPOLL_EVENT and use
compat_sys_epoll_ctl and compat_sys_epoll_wait.
All 64 bit architecture should use compat_sys_epoll_pwait.
[sfr: restructure and move to fs/compat.c, remove MIPS version
of compat_sys_epoll_pwait, use __put_user_unaligned]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, each fdtable supports three dynamically-sized arrays of data: the
fdarray and two fdsets. The code allows the number of fds supported by the
fdarray (fdtable->max_fds) to differ from the number of fds supported by each
of the fdsets (fdtable->max_fdset).
In practice, it is wasteful for these two sizes to differ: whenever we hit a
limit on the smaller-capacity structure, we will reallocate the entire fdtable
and all the dynamic arrays within it, so any delta in the memory used by the
larger-capacity structure will never be touched at all.
Rather than hogging this excess, we shouldn't even allocate it in the first
place, and keep the capacities of the fdarray and the fdsets equal. This
patch removes fdtable->max_fdset. As an added bonus, most of the supporting
code becomes simpler.
Signed-off-by: Vadim Lobanov <vlobanov@speakeasy.net>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch changes struct file to use struct path instead of having
independent pointers to struct dentry and struct vfsmount, and converts all
users of f_{dentry,vfsmnt} in fs/ to use f_path.{dentry,mnt}.
Additionally, it adds two #define's to make the transition easier for users of
the f_dentry and f_vfsmnt.
Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
OpenVZ Linux kernel team has found a problem with mounting in compat mode.
Simple command "mount -t smbfs ..." on Fedora Core 5 distro in 32-bit mode
leads to oops:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 RIP: compat_sys_mount+0xd6/0x290
Process mount (pid: 14656, veid=300, threadinfo ffff810034d30000, task ffff810034c86bc0)
Call Trace: ia32_sysret+0x0/0xa
The problem is that data_page pointer can be NULL, so we should skip data
conversion in this case.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Mirkin <amirkin@openvz.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
758333458a fixes the not checked copy_to_user
return value of compat_sys_pselect7. I ran into this too because of an old
source tree, but my fix would look quite a bit different to Andi's fix.
The reason is that the compat function IMHO should behave the very same as
the non-compat function if possible. Since sys_pselect7 does not return
-EFAULT in this specific case, change the compat code so it behaves like
sys_pselect7.
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Hugh Dickins