While hashing out BPF's current_task_under_cgroup helper bits, it came
to discussion that the skb_in_cgroup helper name was suboptimally chosen.
Tejun says:
So, I think in_cgroup should mean that the object is in that
particular cgroup while under_cgroup in the subhierarchy of that
cgroup. Let's rename the other subhierarchy test to under too. I
think that'd be a lot less confusing going forward.
[...]
It's more intuitive and gives us the room to implement the real
"in" test if ever necessary in the future.
Since this touches uapi bits, we need to change this as long as v4.8
is not yet officially released. Thus, change the helper enum and rename
related bits.
Fixes: 4a482f34af ("cgroup: bpf: Add bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto")
Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/658500/
Suggested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The introduction of pre-allocated hash elements inadvertently broke
the behavior of bpf hash maps where users expected to call
bpf_map_update_elem() without considering that the map can be full.
Some programs do:
old_value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key);
if (old_value) {
... prepare new_value on stack ...
bpf_map_update_elem(map, key, new_value);
}
Before pre-alloc the update() for existing element would work even
in 'map full' condition. Restore this behavior.
The above program could have updated old_value in place instead of
update() which would be faster and most programs use that approach,
but sometimes the values are large and the programs use update()
helper to do atomic replacement of the element.
Note we cannot simply update element's value in-place like percpu
hash map does and have to allocate extra num_possible_cpu elements
and use this extra reserve when the map is full.
Fixes: 6c90598174 ("bpf: pre-allocate hash map elements")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Using per-register incrementing ID can lead to
find_good_pkt_pointers() confusing registers which
have completely different values. Consider example:
0: (bf) r6 = r1
1: (61) r8 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76)
2: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80)
3: (bf) r7 = r8
4: (07) r8 += 32
5: (2d) if r8 > r0 goto pc+9
R0=pkt_end R1=ctx R6=ctx R7=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=32) R8=pkt(id=0,off=32,r=32) R10=fp
6: (bf) r8 = r7
7: (bf) r9 = r7
8: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r7 +0)
9: (0f) r8 += r1
10: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r7 +1)
11: (0f) r9 += r1
12: (07) r8 += 32
13: (2d) if r8 > r0 goto pc+1
R0=pkt_end R1=inv56 R6=ctx R7=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=32) R8=pkt(id=1,off=32,r=32) R9=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=32) R10=fp
14: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r9 +16)
15: (b7) r7 = 0
16: (bf) r0 = r7
17: (95) exit
We need to get a UNKNOWN_VALUE with imm to force id
generation so lines 0-5 make r7 a valid packet pointer.
We then read two different bytes from the packet and
add them to copies of the constructed packet pointer.
r8 (line 9) and r9 (line 11) will get the same id of 1,
independently. When either of them is validated (line
13) - find_good_pkt_pointers() will also mark the other
as safe. This leads to access on line 14 being mistakenly
considered safe.
Fixes: 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Unified UDP encapsulation offload methods for drivers, from
Alexander Duyck.
2) Make DSA binding more sane, from Andrew Lunn.
3) Support QCA9888 chips in ath10k, from Anilkumar Kolli.
4) Several workqueue usage cleanups, from Bhaktipriya Shridhar.
5) Add XDP (eXpress Data Path), essentially running BPF programs on RX
packets as soon as the device sees them, with the option to mirror
the packet on TX via the same interface. From Brenden Blanco and
others.
6) Allow qdisc/class stats dumps to run lockless, from Eric Dumazet.
7) Add VLAN support to b53 and bcm_sf2, from Florian Fainelli.
8) Simplify netlink conntrack entry layout, from Florian Westphal.
9) Add ipv4 forwarding support to mlxsw spectrum driver, from Ido
Schimmel, Yotam Gigi, and Jiri Pirko.
10) Add SKB array infrastructure and convert tun and macvtap over to it.
From Michael S Tsirkin and Jason Wang.
11) Support qdisc packet injection in pktgen, from John Fastabend.
12) Add neighbour monitoring framework to TIPC, from Jon Paul Maloy.
13) Add NV congestion control support to TCP, from Lawrence Brakmo.
14) Add GSO support to SCTP, from Marcelo Ricardo Leitner.
15) Allow GRO and RPS to function on macsec devices, from Paolo Abeni.
16) Support MPLS over IPV4, from Simon Horman.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1622 commits)
xgene: Fix build warning with ACPI disabled.
be2net: perform temperature query in adapter regardless of its interface state
l2tp: Correctly return -EBADF from pppol2tp_getname.
net/mlx5_core/health: Remove deprecated create_singlethread_workqueue
net: ipmr/ip6mr: update lastuse on entry change
macsec: ensure rx_sa is set when validation is disabled
tipc: dump monitor attributes
tipc: add a function to get the bearer name
tipc: get monitor threshold for the cluster
tipc: make cluster size threshold for monitoring configurable
tipc: introduce constants for tipc address validation
net: neigh: disallow transition to NUD_STALE if lladdr is unchanged in neigh_update()
MAINTAINERS: xgene: Add driver and documentation path
Documentation: dtb: xgene: Add MDIO node
dtb: xgene: Add MDIO node
drivers: net: xgene: ethtool: Use phy_ethtool_gset and sset
drivers: net: xgene: Use exported functions
drivers: net: xgene: Enable MDIO driver
drivers: net: xgene: Add backward compatibility
drivers: net: phy: xgene: Add MDIO driver
...
For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to
rewrite packet data.
This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet
memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program.
Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add a new bpf prog type that is intended to run in early stages of the
packet rx path. Only minimal packet metadata will be available, hence a
new context type, struct xdp_md, is exposed to userspace. So far only
expose the packet start and end pointers, and only in read mode.
An XDP program must return one of the well known enum values, all other
return codes are reserved for future use. Unfortunately, this
restriction is hard to enforce at verification time, so take the
approach of warning at runtime when such programs are encountered. Out
of bounds return codes should alias to XDP_ABORTED.
Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A subsystem may need to store many copies of a bpf program, each
deserving its own reference. Rather than requiring the caller to loop
one by one (with possible mid-loop failure), add a bulk bpf_prog_add
api.
Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Should have been obvious, only called from bpf() syscall via map_update_elem()
that calls bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem() under RCU read lock and thus this
must also be in GFP_ATOMIC, of course.
Fixes: 3b1efb196e ("bpf, maps: flush own entries on perf map release")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This work addresses a couple of issues bpf_skb_event_output()
helper currently has: i) We need two copies instead of just a
single one for the skb data when it should be part of a sample.
The data can be non-linear and thus needs to be extracted via
bpf_skb_load_bytes() helper first, and then copied once again
into the ring buffer slot. ii) Since bpf_skb_load_bytes()
currently needs to be used first, the helper needs to see a
constant size on the passed stack buffer to make sure BPF
verifier can do sanity checks on it during verification time.
Thus, just passing skb->len (or any other non-constant value)
wouldn't work, but changing bpf_skb_load_bytes() is also not
the proper solution, since the two copies are generally still
needed. iii) bpf_skb_load_bytes() is just for rather small
buffers like headers, since they need to sit on the limited
BPF stack anyway. Instead of working around in bpf_skb_load_bytes(),
this work improves the bpf_skb_event_output() helper to address
all 3 at once.
We can make use of the passed in skb context that we have in
the helper anyway, and use some of the reserved flag bits as
a length argument. The helper will use the new __output_custom()
facility from perf side with bpf_skb_copy() as callback helper
to walk and extract the data. It will pass the data for setup
to bpf_event_output(), which generates and pushes the raw record
with an additional frag part. The linear data used in the first
frag of the record serves as programmatically defined meta data
passed along with the appended sample.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is:
init/Kconfig:config BPF_SYSCALL
init/Kconfig: bool "Enable bpf() system call"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple traces of modular infrastructure use, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
Note that MODULE_ALIAS is a no-op for non-modular code.
We replace module.h with init.h since the file does use __init.
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Adds a bpf helper, bpf_skb_in_cgroup, to decide if a skb->sk
belongs to a descendant of a cgroup2. It is similar to the
feature added in netfilter:
commit c38c4597e4 ("netfilter: implement xt_cgroup cgroup2 path match")
The user is expected to populate a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY
which will be used by the bpf_skb_in_cgroup.
Modifications to the bpf verifier is to ensure BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY
and bpf_skb_in_cgroup() are always used together.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY and its bpf_map_ops's implementations.
To update an element, the caller is expected to obtain a cgroup2 backed
fd by open(cgroup2_dir) and then update the array with that fd.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since bpf_prog_get() and program type check is used in a couple of places,
refactor this into a small helper function that we can make use of. Since
the non RO prog->aux part is not used in performance critical paths and a
program destruction via RCU is rather very unlikley when doing the put, we
shouldn't have an issue just doing the bpf_prog_get() + prog->type != type
check, but actually not taking the ref at all (due to being in fdget() /
fdput() section of the bpf fd) is even cleaner and makes the diff smaller
as well, so just go for that. Callsites are changed to make use of the new
helper where possible.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Jann Horn reported following analysis that could potentially result
in a very hard to trigger (if not impossible) UAF race, to quote his
event timeline:
- Set up a process with threads T1, T2 and T3
- Let T1 set up a socket filter F1 that invokes another filter F2
through a BPF map [tail call]
- Let T1 trigger the socket filter via a unix domain socket write,
don't wait for completion
- Let T2 call PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF with F2, don't wait for completion
- Now T2 should be behind bpf_prog_get(), but before bpf_prog_put()
- Let T3 close the file descriptor for F2, dropping the reference
count of F2 to 2
- At this point, T1 should have looked up F2 from the map, but not
finished executing it
- Let T3 remove F2 from the BPF map, dropping the reference count of
F2 to 1
- Now T2 should call bpf_prog_put() (wrong BPF program type), dropping
the reference count of F2 to 0 and scheduling bpf_prog_free_deferred()
via schedule_work()
- At this point, the BPF program could be freed
- BPF execution is still running in a freed BPF program
While at PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF time it's only guaranteed that the perf
event fd we're doing the syscall on doesn't disappear from underneath us
for whole syscall time, it may not be the case for the bpf fd used as
an argument only after we did the put. It needs to be a valid fd pointing
to a BPF program at the time of the call to make the bpf_prog_get() and
while T2 gets preempted, F2 must have dropped reference to 1 on the other
CPU. The fput() from the close() in T3 should also add additionally delay
to the reference drop via exit_task_work() when bpf_prog_release() gets
called as well as scheduling bpf_prog_free_deferred().
That said, it makes nevertheless sense to move the BPF prog destruction
generally after RCU grace period to guarantee that such scenario above,
but also others as recently fixed in ceb5607035 ("bpf, perf: delay release
of BPF prog after grace period") with regards to tail calls won't happen.
Integrating bpf_prog_free_deferred() directly into the RCU callback is
not allowed since the invocation might happen from either softirq or
process context, so we're not permitted to block. Reviewing all bpf_prog_put()
invocations from eBPF side (note, cBPF -> eBPF progs don't use this for
their destruction) with call_rcu() look good to me.
Since we don't know whether at the time of attaching the program, we're
already part of a tail call map, we need to use RCU variant. However, due
to this, there won't be severely more stress on the RCU callback queue:
situations with above bpf_prog_get() and bpf_prog_put() combo in practice
normally won't lead to releases, but even if they would, enough effort/
cycles have to be put into loading a BPF program into the kernel already.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Use smp_processor_id() for the generic helper bpf_get_smp_processor_id()
instead of the raw variant. This allows for preemption checks when we
have DEBUG_PREEMPT, and otherwise uses the raw variant anyway. We only
need to keep the raw variant for socket filters, but we can reuse the
helper that is already there from cBPF side.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Some minor cleanups: i) Remove the unlikely() from fd array map lookups
and let the CPU branch predictor do its job, scenarios where there is not
always a map entry are very well valid. ii) Move the attribute type check
in the bpf_perf_event_read() helper a bit earlier so it's consistent wrt
checks with bpf_perf_event_output() helper as well. iii) remove some
comments that are self-documenting in kprobe_prog_is_valid_access() and
therefore make it consistent to tp_prog_is_valid_access() as well.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Several cases of overlapping changes, except the packet scheduler
conflicts which deal with the addition of the free list parameter
to qdisc_enqueue().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The behavior of perf event arrays are quite different from all
others as they are tightly coupled to perf event fds, f.e. shown
recently by commit e03e7ee34f ("perf/bpf: Convert perf_event_array
to use struct file") to make refcounting on perf event more robust.
A remaining issue that the current code still has is that since
additions to the perf event array take a reference on the struct
file via perf_event_get() and are only released via fput() (that
cleans up the perf event eventually via perf_event_release_kernel())
when the element is either manually removed from the map from user
space or automatically when the last reference on the perf event
map is dropped. However, this leads us to dangling struct file's
when the map gets pinned after the application owning the perf
event descriptor exits, and since the struct file reference will
in such case only be manually dropped or via pinned file removal,
it leads to the perf event living longer than necessary, consuming
needlessly resources for that time.
Relations between perf event fds and bpf perf event map fds can be
rather complex. F.e. maps can act as demuxers among different perf
event fds that can possibly be owned by different threads and based
on the index selection from the program, events get dispatched to
one of the per-cpu fd endpoints. One perf event fd (or, rather a
per-cpu set of them) can also live in multiple perf event maps at
the same time, listening for events. Also, another requirement is
that perf event fds can get closed from application side after they
have been attached to the perf event map, so that on exit perf event
map will take care of dropping their references eventually. Likewise,
when such maps are pinned, the intended behavior is that a user
application does bpf_obj_get(), puts its fds in there and on exit
when fd is released, they are dropped from the map again, so the map
acts rather as connector endpoint. This also makes perf event maps
inherently different from program arrays as described in more detail
in commit c9da161c65 ("bpf: fix clearing on persistent program
array maps").
To tackle this, map entries are marked by the map struct file that
added the element to the map. And when the last reference to that map
struct file is released from user space, then the tracked entries
are purged from the map. This is okay, because new map struct files
instances resp. frontends to the anon inode are provided via
bpf_map_new_fd() that is called when we invoke bpf_obj_get_user()
for retrieving a pinned map, but also when an initial instance is
created via map_create(). The rest is resolved by the vfs layer
automatically for us by keeping reference count on the map's struct
file. Any concurrent updates on the map slot are fine as well, it
just means that perf_event_fd_array_release() needs to delete less
of its own entires.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch extends map_fd_get_ptr() callback that is used by fd array
maps, so that struct file pointer from the related map can be passed
in. It's safe to remove map_update_elem() callback for the two maps since
this is only allowed from syscall side, but not from eBPF programs for these
two map types. Like in per-cpu map case, bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem()
needs to be called directly here due to the extra argument.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add a release callback for maps that is invoked when the last
reference to its struct file is gone and the struct file about
to be released by vfs. The handler will be used by fd array maps.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The ctx structure passed into bpf programs is different depending on bpf
program type. The verifier incorrectly marked ctx->data and ctx->data_end
access based on ctx offset only. That caused loads in tracing programs
int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { .. ctx->ax .. }
to be incorrectly marked as PTR_TO_PACKET which later caused verifier
to reject the program that was actually valid in tracing context.
Fix this by doing program type specific matching of ctx offsets.
Fixes: 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access")
Reported-by: Sasha Goldshtein <goldshtn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Fix negative error code usage in ATM layer, from Stefan Hajnoczi.
2) If CONFIG_SYSCTL is disabled, the default TTL is not initialized
properly. From Ezequiel Garcia.
3) Missing spinlock init in mvneta driver, from Gregory CLEMENT.
4) Missing unlocks in hwmb error paths, also from Gregory CLEMENT.
5) Fix deadlock on team->lock when propagating features, from Ivan
Vecera.
6) Work around buffer offset hw bug in alx chips, from Feng Tang.
7) Fix double listing of SCTP entries in sctp_diag dumps, from Xin
Long.
8) Various statistics bug fixes in mlx4 from Eric Dumazet.
9) Fix some randconfig build errors wrt fou ipv6 from Arnd Bergmann.
10) All of l2tp was namespace aware, but the ipv6 support code was not
doing so. From Shmulik Ladkani.
11) Handle on-stack hrtimers properly in pktgen, from Guenter Roeck.
12) Propagate MAC changes properly through VLAN devices, from Mike
Manning.
13) Fix memory leak in bnx2x_init_one(), from Vitaly Kuznetsov.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (62 commits)
sfc: Track RPS flow IDs per channel instead of per function
usbnet: smsc95xx: fix link detection for disabled autonegotiation
virtio_net: fix virtnet_open and virtnet_probe competing for try_fill_recv
bnx2x: avoid leaking memory on bnx2x_init_one() failures
fou: fix IPv6 Kconfig options
openvswitch: update checksum in {push,pop}_mpls
sctp: sctp_diag should dump sctp socket type
net: fec: update dirty_tx even if no skb
vlan: Propagate MAC address to VLANs
atm: iphase: off by one in rx_pkt()
atm: firestream: add more reserved strings
vxlan: Accept user specified MTU value when create new vxlan link
net: pktgen: Call destroy_hrtimer_on_stack()
timer: Export destroy_hrtimer_on_stack()
net: l2tp: Make l2tp_ip6 namespace aware
Documentation: ip-sysctl.txt: clarify secure_redirects
sfc: use flow dissector helpers for aRFS
ieee802154: fix logic error in ieee802154_llsec_parse_dev_addr
net: nps_enet: Disable interrupts before napi reschedule
net/lapb: tuse %*ph to dump buffers
...
Additionally to being able to control the system wide maximum depth via
/proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack, now we are able to ask for
different depths per event, using perf_event_attr.sample_max_stack for
that.
This uses an u16 hole at the end of perf_event_attr, that, when
perf_event_attr.sample_type has the PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN, if
sample_max_stack is zero, means use perf_event_max_stack, otherwise
it'll be bounds checked under callchain_mutex.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-kolmn1yo40p7jhswxwrc7rrd@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Pull perf updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Mostly tooling and PMU driver fixes, but also a number of late updates
such as the reworking of the call-chain size limiting logic to make
call-graph recording more robust, plus tooling side changes for the
new 'backwards ring-buffer' extension to the perf ring-buffer"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (34 commits)
perf record: Read from backward ring buffer
perf record: Rename variable to make code clear
perf record: Prevent reading invalid data in record__mmap_read
perf evlist: Add API to pause/resume
perf trace: Use the ptr->name beautifier as default for "filename" args
perf trace: Use the fd->name beautifier as default for "fd" args
perf report: Add srcline_from/to branch sort keys
perf evsel: Record fd into perf_mmap
perf evsel: Add overwrite attribute and check write_backward
perf tools: Set buildid dir under symfs when --symfs is provided
perf trace: Only auto set call-graph to "dwarf" when syscalls are being traced
perf annotate: Sort list of recognised instructions
perf annotate: Fix identification of ARM blt and bls instructions
perf tools: Fix usage of max_stack sysctl
perf callchain: Stop validating callchains by the max_stack sysctl
perf trace: Fix exit_group() formatting
perf top: Use machine->kptr_restrict_warned
perf trace: Warn when trying to resolve kernel addresses with kptr_restrict=1
perf machine: Do not bail out if not managing to read ref reloc symbol
perf/x86/intel/p4: Trival indentation fix, remove space
...
Follow-up to commit e27f4a942a ("bpf: Use mount_nodev not mount_ns
to mount the bpf filesystem"), which removes the FS_USERNS_MOUNT flag.
The original idea was to have a per mountns instance instead of a
single global fs instance, but that didn't work out and we had to
switch to mount_nodev() model. The intent of that middle ground was
that we avoid users who don't play nice to create endless instances
of bpf fs which are difficult to control and discover from an admin
point of view, but at the same time it would have allowed us to be
more flexible with regard to namespaces.
Therefore, since we now did the switch to mount_nodev() as a fix
where individual instances are created, we also need to remove userns
mount flag along with it to avoid running into mentioned situation.
I don't expect any breakage at this early point in time with removing
the flag and we can revisit this later should the requirement for
this come up with future users. This and commit e27f4a942a have
been split to facilitate tracking should any of them run into the
unlikely case of causing a regression.
Fixes: b2197755b2 ("bpf: add support for persistent maps/progs")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Humans don't write C code like:
u8 *ptr = skb->data;
int imm = 4;
imm += ptr;
but from llvm backend point of view 'imm' and 'ptr' are registers and
imm += ptr may be preferred vs ptr += imm depending which register value
will be used further in the code, while verifier can only recognize ptr += imm.
That caused small unrelated changes in the C code of the bpf program to
trigger rejection by the verifier. Therefore teach the verifier to recognize
both ptr += imm and imm += ptr.
For example:
when R6=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62) R7=imm22
after r7 += r6 instruction
will be R6=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62) R7=pkt(id=0,off=22,r=62)
Fixes: 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
when packet headers are accessed in 'decreasing' order (like TCP port
may be fetched before the program reads IP src) the llvm may generate
the following code:
[...] // R7=pkt(id=0,off=22,r=70)
r2 = *(u32 *)(r7 +0) // good access
[...]
r7 += 40 // R7=pkt(id=0,off=62,r=70)
r8 = *(u32 *)(r7 +0) // good access
[...]
r1 = *(u32 *)(r7 -20) // this one will fail though it's within a safe range
// it's doing *(u32*)(skb->data + 42)
Fix verifier to recognize such code pattern
Alos turned out that 'off > range' condition is not a verifier bug.
It's a buggy program that may do something like:
if (ptr + 50 > data_end)
return 0;
ptr += 60;
*(u32*)ptr;
in such case emit
"invalid access to packet, off=0 size=4, R1(id=0,off=60,r=50)" error message,
so all information is available for the program author to fix the program.
Fixes: 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
While reviewing the filesystems that set FS_USERNS_MOUNT I spotted the
bpf filesystem. Looking at the code I saw a broken usage of mount_ns
with current->nsproxy->mnt_ns. As the code does not acquire a
reference to the mount namespace it can not possibly be correct to
store the mount namespace on the superblock as it does.
Replace mount_ns with mount_nodev so that each mount of the bpf
filesystem returns a distinct instance, and the code is not buggy.
In discussion with Hannes Frederic Sowa it was reported that the use
of mount_ns was an attempt to have one bpf instance per mount
namespace, in an attempt to keep resources that pin resources from
hiding. That intent simply does not work, the vfs is not built to
allow that kind of behavior. Which means that the bpf filesystem
really is buggy both semantically and in it's implemenation as it does
not nor can it implement the original intent.
This change is userspace visible, but my experience with similar
filesystems leads me to believe nothing will break with a model of each
mount of the bpf filesystem is distinct from all others.
Fixes: b2197755b2 ("bpf: add support for persistent maps/progs")
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Start address randomization and blinding in BPF currently use
prandom_u32(). prandom_u32() values are not exposed to unpriviledged
user space to my knowledge, but given other kernel facilities such as
ASLR, stack canaries, etc make use of stronger get_random_int(), we
better make use of it here as well given blinding requests successively
new random values. get_random_int() has minimal entropy pool depletion,
is not cryptographically secure, but doesn't need to be for our use
cases here.
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull misc vfs cleanups from Al Viro:
"Assorted cleanups and fixes all over the place"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
coredump: only charge written data against RLIMIT_CORE
coredump: get rid of coredump_params->written
ecryptfs_lookup(): try either only encrypted or plaintext name
ecryptfs: avoid multiple aliases for directories
bpf: reject invalid names right in ->lookup()
__d_alloc(): treat NULL name as QSTR("/", 1)
mtd: switch ubi_open_volume_path() to vfs_stat()
mtd: switch open_mtd_by_chdev() to use of vfs_stat()
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
1) Support SPI based w5100 devices, from Akinobu Mita.
2) Partial Segmentation Offload, from Alexander Duyck.
3) Add GMAC4 support to stmmac driver, from Alexandre TORGUE.
4) Allow cls_flower stats offload, from Amir Vadai.
5) Implement bpf blinding, from Daniel Borkmann.
6) Optimize _ASYNC_ bit twiddling on sockets, unless the socket is
actually using FASYNC these atomics are superfluous. From Eric
Dumazet.
7) Run TCP more preemptibly, also from Eric Dumazet.
8) Support LED blinking, EEPROM dumps, and rxvlan offloading in mlx5e
driver, from Gal Pressman.
9) Allow creating ppp devices via rtnetlink, from Guillaume Nault.
10) Improve BPF usage documentation, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
11) Support tunneling offloads in qed, from Manish Chopra.
12) aRFS offloading in mlx5e, from Maor Gottlieb.
13) Add RFS and RPS support to SCTP protocol, from Marcelo Ricardo
Leitner.
14) Add MSG_EOR support to TCP, this allows controlling packet
coalescing on application record boundaries for more accurate
socket timestamp sampling. From Martin KaFai Lau.
15) Fix alignment of 64-bit netlink attributes across the board, from
Nicolas Dichtel.
16) Per-vlan stats in bridging, from Nikolay Aleksandrov.
17) Several conversions of drivers to ethtool ksettings, from Philippe
Reynes.
18) Checksum neutral ILA in ipv6, from Tom Herbert.
19) Factorize all of the various marvell dsa drivers into one, from
Vivien Didelot
20) Add VF support to qed driver, from Yuval Mintz"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1649 commits)
Revert "phy dp83867: Fix compilation with CONFIG_OF_MDIO=m"
Revert "phy dp83867: Make rgmii parameters optional"
r8169: default to 64-bit DMA on recent PCIe chips
phy dp83867: Make rgmii parameters optional
phy dp83867: Fix compilation with CONFIG_OF_MDIO=m
bpf: arm64: remove callee-save registers use for tmp registers
asix: Fix offset calculation in asix_rx_fixup() causing slow transmissions
switchdev: pass pointer to fib_info instead of copy
net_sched: close another race condition in tcf_mirred_release()
tipc: fix nametable publication field in nl compat
drivers: net: Don't print unpopulated net_device name
qed: add support for dcbx.
ravb: Add missing free_irq() calls to ravb_close()
qed: Remove a stray tab
net: ethernet: fec-mpc52xx: use phy_ethtool_{get|set}_link_ksettings
net: ethernet: fec-mpc52xx: use phydev from struct net_device
bpf, doc: fix typo on bpf_asm descriptions
stmmac: hardware TX COE doesn't work when force_thresh_dma_mode is set
net: ethernet: fs-enet: use phy_ethtool_{get|set}_link_ksettings
net: ethernet: fs-enet: use phydev from struct net_device
...
This makes perf_callchain_{user,kernel}() receive the max stack
as context for the perf_callchain_entry, instead of accessing
the global sysctl_perf_event_max_stack.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-kolmn1yo40p7jhswxwrc7rrd@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers
that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through
blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT
spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were
changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset
in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We
have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers.
Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read
only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86,
arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by
default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore,
we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our
todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and
first implementation since around netconf 2016.
We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF
code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit
to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger
programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some
part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved
guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase
to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test
case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which
can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this,
additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump
(and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally
the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default.
For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option
bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so
that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons,
the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants
for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off
performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added
the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which
is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no
further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended,
rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this
functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT
compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a
generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is
then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few
changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one.
This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390
without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF
can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can
be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that
bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(),
and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the
passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the
process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter.
Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we
return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning,
interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as
usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of
a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal
to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like
in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers
when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one
abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT
phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written
program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture.
The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32
and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a
small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this
is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND,
and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register
is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on
BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is
newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction.
64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and
patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to
call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other()
pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register.
Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT:
echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden
ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>:
[...]
39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax
3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax
43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax
48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax
4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax
52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax
57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax
5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax
[...]
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden
ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>:
[...]
39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d
3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d
46: mov %r10d,%eax
49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d
4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d
56: mov %r10d,%eax
59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d
5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d
66: mov %r10d,%eax
69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d
6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d
76: mov %r10d,%eax
79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d
7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d
86: mov %r10d,%eax
89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d
8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d
96: mov %r10d,%eax
[...]
As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden
when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based
to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective.
Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and
over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded.
Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just
JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we
still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal
use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing
up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko
suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding
was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in
the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance
for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case,
f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT),
35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter).
BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various
bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were
running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and
redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests
pass.
[1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html
[2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/
[3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since the blinding is strictly only called from inside eBPF JITs,
we need to change signatures for bpf_int_jit_compile() and
bpf_prog_select_runtime() first in order to prepare that the
eBPF program we're dealing with can change underneath. Hence,
for call sites, we need to return the latest prog. No functional
change in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Move the functionality to patch instructions out of the verifier
code and into the core as the new bpf_patch_insn_single() helper
will be needed later on for blinding as well. No changes in
functionality.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Besides others, remove redundant comments where the code is self
documenting enough, and properly indent various bpf_verifier_ops
and bpf_prog_type_list declarations. Moreover, remove two exports
that actually have no module user.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
since UNKNOWN_VALUE type is weaker than CONST_IMM we can un-teach
verifier its recognition of constants in conditional branches
without affecting safety.
Ex:
if (reg == 123) {
.. here verifier was marking reg->type as CONST_IMM
instead keep reg as UNKNOWN_VALUE
}
Two verifier states with UNKNOWN_VALUE are equivalent, whereas
CONST_IMM_X != CONST_IMM_Y, since CONST_IMM is used for stack range
verification and other cases.
So help search pruning by marking registers as UNKNOWN_VALUE
where possible instead of CONST_IMM.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access
packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs,
but due to their design they have to do length check for every access.
When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT
is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing
the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses.
One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW
with similar usage as skb_header_pointer().
The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such
new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if
access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround
plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient.
Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly:
int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *ip;
if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end)
/* packet too small */
return 0;
ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN;
/* access IP header fields with direct loads */
if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001)
return 1;
[...]
}
This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays
the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard
to prove safety of the above program.
For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well.
The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check
the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted
incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases
and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access
[1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts:
net/ipv4/ip_gre.c
Minor conflicts between tunnel bug fixes in net and
ipv6 tunnel cleanups in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The commit 35578d7984 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter")
introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility.
Later on commit a43eec3042 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted
the logic and inadvertently broke it.
Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check
from map and from helper perspective.
Fixes: a43eec3042 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d16 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Minor overlapping changes in the conflicts.
In the macsec case, the change of the default ID macro
name overlapped with the 64-bit netlink attribute alignment
fixes in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The default remains 127, which is good for most cases, and not even hit
most of the time, but then for some cases, as reported by Brendan, 1024+
deep frames are appearing on the radar for things like groovy, ruby.
And in some workloads putting a _lower_ cap on this may make sense. One
that is per event still needs to be put in place tho.
The new file is:
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
127
Chaging it:
# echo 256 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
256
But as soon as there is some event using callchains we get:
# echo 512 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
-bash: echo: write error: Device or resource busy
#
Because we only allocate the callchain percpu data structures when there
is a user, which allows for changing the max easily, its just a matter
of having no callchain users at that point.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160426002928.GB16708@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
When bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD, ...) was invoked with a BPF program whose bytecode
references a non-map file descriptor as a map file descriptor, the error
handling code called fdput() twice instead of once (in __bpf_map_get() and
in replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr()). If the file descriptor table of the
current task is shared, this causes f_count to be decremented too much,
allowing the struct file to be freed while it is still in use
(use-after-free). This can be exploited to gain root privileges by an
unprivileged user.
This bug was introduced in
commit 0246e64d9a ("bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn"), but is only
exploitable since
commit 1be7f75d16 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") because
previously, CAP_SYS_ADMIN was required to reach the vulnerable code.
(posted publicly according to request by maintainer)
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts were two cases of simple overlapping changes,
nothing serious.
In the UDP case, we need to add a hlist_add_tail_rcu()
to linux/rculist.h, because we've moved UDP socket handling
away from using nulls lists.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Daniel Borkmann