Copies user-space string with strndup_user() and moves the type string
duplication code to a function (thus fixing a wrong check on the length of the
type.)
Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch address several issues in the current BSD Secure Levels code:
o plaintext_to_sha1: Missing check for a NULL return from __get_free_page
o passwd_write_file: A page is leaked if the password is wrong.
o fix securityfs registration order
o seclvl_init is a mess and can't properly tolerate failures, failure
path is upside down (deldif and delf should be switched)
Cleanups:
o plaintext_to_sha1: Use buffers passed in
o passwd_write_file: Use kmalloc() instead of get_zeroed_page()
o passwd_write_file: hashedPassword comparison is just memcmp
o s/ENOSYS/EINVAL/
o misc
(akpm: after some discussion it appears that the BSD secure levels feature
should be scheduled for removal. But for now, let's fix these problems up).
Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a slab cache for the SELinux inode security struct, one of which is
allocated for every inode instantiated by the system.
The memory savings are considerable.
On 64-bit, instead of the size-128 cache, we have a slab object of 96
bytes, saving 32 bytes per object. After booting, I see about 4000 of
these and then about 17,000 after a kernel compile. With this patch, we
save around 530KB of kernel memory in the latter case. On 32-bit, the
savings are about half of this.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove an unneded pointer variable in selinux_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
A further fix is needed for selinuxfs link count management, to ensure that
the count is correct for the parent directory when a subdirectory is
created. This is only required for the root directory currently, but the
code has been updated for the general case.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Fix copy & paste error in sel_make_avc_files(), removing a supurious call to
d_genocide() in the error path. All of this will be cleaned up by
kill_litter_super().
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove the call to sel_make_bools() from sel_fill_super(), as policy needs to
be loaded before the boolean files can be created. Policy will never be
loaded during sel_fill_super() as selinuxfs is kernel mounted during init and
the only means to load policy is via selinuxfs.
Also, the call to d_genocide() on the error path of sel_make_bools() is
incorrect and replaced with sel_remove_bools().
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Unify the error path of sel_fill_super() so that all errors pass through the
same point and generate an error message. Also, removes a spurious dput() in
the error path which breaks the refcounting for the filesystem
(litter_kill_super() will correctly clean things up itself on error).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Use existing sel_make_dir() helper to create booleans directory rather than
duplicating the logic.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Fix the hard link count for selinuxfs directories, which are currently one
short.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Simplify sel_read_bool to use the simple_read_from_buffer helper, like the
other selinuxfs functions.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Semaphore to mutex conversion.
The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated
automatically via a script as well.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch disables the automatic labeling of new inodes on disk
when no policy is loaded.
Discussion is here:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=180296
In short, we're changing the behavior so that when no policy is loaded,
SELinux does not label files at all. Currently it does add an 'unlabeled'
label in this case, which we've found causes problems later.
SELinux always maintains a safe internal label if there is none, so with this
patch, we just stick with that and wait until a policy is loaded before adding
a persistent label on disk.
The effect is simply that if you boot with SELinux enabled but no policy
loaded and create a file in that state, SELinux won't try to set a security
extended attribute on the new inode on the disk. This is the only sane
behavior for SELinux in that state, as it cannot determine the right label to
assign in the absence of a policy. That state usually doesn't occur, but the
rawhide installer seemed to be misbehaving temporarily so it happened to show
up on a test install.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
A recent changeset removes dummy_socket_getpeersec, replacing it with
two new functions, but still references the removed function in the
security_fixup_ops table, fix it by doing the replacement operation in
the fixup table too.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking
controls whereby an application can determine the label of the
security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to
via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Patch purpose:
This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or
UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security
context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of
the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the
security context is for each individual packet. An example
application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start
daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client.
Patch design approach:
- Design for TCP
The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for
a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security
association. The application may retrieve this context using
getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a
connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry
cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a
security association has a security context, the context string is
returned, as for UNIX domain sockets.
- Design for UDP
Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different
API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer
security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can
be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established
and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have
different peer and thus the security context might change every time.
As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with
the packet retrieval.
The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).
Patch implementation details:
- Implementation for TCP
The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt
with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error
checking):
getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen);
printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf);
The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check
for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED ==
sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of
struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If
these have security associations with security contexts, the security
context is returned.
getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or
the buffer is unmodified.
- Implementation for UDP
To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to
the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via
getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using
the auxiliary data mechanism.
An example server application for UDP should look like this:
toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
}
}
ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new
ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY.
When the packet is received we get the security context from the
sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the
ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook,
selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security
context from the SELinux space. The existing function,
selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the
security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to
kernel space.
Testing:
We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between
applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in
labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then
extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For
UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the
auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Attached is a patch that hardwires important SE Linux events to the audit
system. Please Apply.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
This patch fixes a couple of bugs revealed in new features recently
added to -mm1:
* fixes warnings due to inconsistent use of const struct inode *inode
* fixes bug that prevent a kernel from booting with audit on, and SELinux off
due to a missing function in security/dummy.c
* fixes a bug that throws spurious audit_panic() messages due to a missing
return just before an error_path label
* some reasonable house cleaning in audit_ipc_context(),
audit_inode_context(), and audit_log_task_context()
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context
information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and
tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the
item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver
of an action.
These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the
appropriate record in the audit code.
This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled
Security Protection Profile (LSPP).
[AV: fixed kmalloc flags use]
[folded leak fixes]
[folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)]
[folded audit_inode_context() leak fix]
[folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT]
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The attached patch updates various items for the new user space
messages. Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Fix SELinux to not reset the tracer SID when the child is already being
traced, since selinux_ptrace is also called by proc for access checking
outside of the context of a ptrace attach.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Make SELinux depend on AUDIT as it requires the basic audit support to log
permission denials at all. Note that AUDITSYSCALL remains optional for
SELinux, although it can be useful in providing further information upon
denials.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Make SELinux depend on SECURITY_NETWORK (which depends on SECURITY), as it
requires the socket hooks for proper operation even in the local case.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
In the small window between strnlen_user() and copy_from_user() userspace
could alter the terminating `\0' character.
Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove the SELinux security structure magic number fields and tests, along
with some unnecessary tests for NULL security pointers. These fields and
tests are leftovers from the early attempts to support SELinux as a
loadable module during LSM development.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch changes the SELinux file_alloc_security function to use
GFP_KERNEL rather than GFP_ATOMIC; the use of GFP_ATOMIC appears to be a
remnant of when this function was being called with the files_lock spinlock
held, and is no longer necessary. Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Fix the SELinux mprotect checks on executable mappings so that they are not
re-applied when the mapping is already executable as well as cleaning up
the code. This avoids a situation where e.g. an application is prevented
from removing PROT_WRITE on an already executable mapping previously
authorized via execmem permission due to an execmod denial.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove the "inline" keyword from a bunch of big functions in the kernel with
the goal of shrinking it by 30kb to 40kb
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
There are errors and inconsistency in the display of NIP6 strings.
ie: net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
There are errors and inconsistency in the display of NIPQUAD strings too.
ie: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ftp.c
This patch:
adds NIP6_FMT to kernel.h
changes all code to use NIP6_FMT
fixes net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
adds NIPQUAD_FMT to kernel.h
fixes net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ftp.c
changes a few uses of "%u.%u.%u.%u" to NIPQUAD_FMT for symmetry to NIP6_FMT
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
- Move capable() from sched.h to capability.h;
- Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used
(in include/, block/, ipc/, kernel/, a few drivers/,
mm/, security/, & sound/;
many more drivers/ to go)
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch converts the inode semaphore to a mutex. I have tested it on
XFS and compiled as much as one can consider on an ia64. Anyway your
luck with it might be different.
Modified-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
(finished the conversion)
Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Some long time ago, dentry struct was carefully tuned so that on 32 bits
UP, sizeof(struct dentry) was exactly 128, ie a power of 2, and a multiple
of memory cache lines.
Then RCU was added and dentry struct enlarged by two pointers, with nice
results for SMP, but not so good on UP, because breaking the above tuning
(128 + 8 = 136 bytes)
This patch reverts this unwanted side effect, by using an union (d_u),
where d_rcu and d_child are placed so that these two fields can share their
memory needs.
At the time d_free() is called (and d_rcu is really used), d_child is known
to be empty and not touched by the dentry freeing.
Lockless lookups only access d_name, d_parent, d_lock, d_op, d_flags (so
the previous content of d_child is not needed if said dentry was unhashed
but still accessed by a CPU because of RCU constraints)
As dentry cache easily contains millions of entries, a size reduction is
worth the extra complexity of the ugly C union.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Cc: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Maneesh Soni <maneesh@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to
instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4.
The patch makes the following changes:
(1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type
to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be
spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the
rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance.
The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation
name are passed to the method.
(2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key
to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in
/proc/pid/cmdline.
This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the
patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no
longer there.
A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow.
(3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this
key will retrieve the information.
(4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the
authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here
for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the
lowest level of the session keyring.
This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to
switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and
so is usable in multithreaded programs.
The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec.
(5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that
permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated
key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated
with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings.
This function can also clear the assumption.
(6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently
assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY).
(7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is
assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if
instantiation is successful.
(8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the
file of permissions functions.
(9) The documentation is updated.
From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Build fix.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Cause any links within a keyring to keys that match a key to be linked into
that keyring to be discarded as a link to the new key is added. The match is
contingent on the type and description strings being the same.
This permits requests, adds and searches to displace negative, expired,
revoked and dead keys easily. After some discussion it was concluded that
duplicate valid keys should probably be discarded also as they would otherwise
hide the new key.
Since request_key() is intended to be the primary method by which keys are
added to a keyring, duplicate valid keys wouldn't be an issue there as that
function would return an existing match in preference to creating a new key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a new keyctl function that allows the expiry time to be set on a key or
removed from a key, provided the caller has attribute modification access.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Use atomic_inc_not_zero for rcu files instead of special case rcuref.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
security/selinux/xfrm.c:155:10: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@mandriva.com.br>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch contains two corrections to the LSM-IPsec Nethooks patches
previously applied.
(1) free a security context on a failed insert via xfrm_user
interface in xfrm_add_policy. Memory leak.
(2) change the authorization of the allocation of a security context
in a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state from both relabelfrom and relabelto
to setcontext.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Now when kbuild passes KBUILD_MODNAME with "" do not __stringify it when
used. Remove __stringnify for all users.
This also fixes the output of:
$ ls -l /sys/module/
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 pcmcia
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 pcmcia_core
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 "processor"
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 "psmouse"
The quoting of the module names will be gone again.
Thanks to GregKH + Kay Sievers for reproting this.
Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
make needlessly global code static
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove the key duplication stuff since there's nothing that uses it, no way
to get at it and it's awkward to deal with for LSM purposes.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Further ARRAY_SIZE cleanups under security/selinux.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@nuerscht.ch>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Use ARRAY_SIZE macro instead of sizeof(x)/sizeof(x[0]).
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Kaiser <nikai@nikai.net>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to
create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies
(xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable
control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets.
Patch purpose:
The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access
control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated
IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing
ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address. The former
are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using
IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on
cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables
access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote
machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the
access control policy.
Patch design approach:
The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec
policy based on their security contexts. Since the communication is
implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the
security association's negotiated and used have the same security
context. The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such
security contexts for policies and security associations. It also
enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned.
Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a
IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be
sent in that manner.
A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
Patch implementation details:
The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested
operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is
selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup. The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure
that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used,
then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet,
respectively.
The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts
when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user
interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc. When a security association
is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the
XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via
selinux_xfrm_state_alloc.
When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if
any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone.
When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if
any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or
selinux_xfrm_state_free.
Testing:
The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools. We
created policies and security associations with particular security
contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the
authorization decision. We also made sure that packets for which no
security context was supplied (which either did or did not use
security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
association) to send/receive network packets.
Patch purpose:
The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access
controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
enforce the access control policy.
Patch design approach:
The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
policies.
A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
Patch implementation details:
On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.
On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
also match the security association being used.
The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
before.
Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
processing proceeds as in the original case.
Testing:
The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have
been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
using the security contexts via racoon.
The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and
contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Permit add_key() to once again update a matching key rather than adding a
new one if a matching key already exists in the target keyring.
This bug causes add_key() to always add a new key, displacing the old from
the target keyring.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch extends the selinuxfs context interface to allow return the
canonical form of the context to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch disables the setting of SELinux xattrs on files created in
filesystems labeled via mountpoint labeling (mounted with the context=
option). selinux_inode_setxattr already prevents explicit setxattr from
userspace on such filesystems, so this provides consistent behavior for
file creation.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch enables files created on a MLS-enabled SELinux system to be
accessible on a non-MLS SELinux system, by skipping the MLS component of
the security context in the non-MLS case.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This is the security/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch.
Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in security/.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch removes a couple of incorrect and obsolete '!' operators
left over from the conversion of the key permission functions from
true/false returns to zero/error returns.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch simplifies some checks for magic siginfo values. It should not
change the behaviour in any way.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch replaces hardcoded SEND_SIG_xxx constants with
their symbolic names.
No changes in affected .o files.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch adds LSM hooks for key management facilities. The notable
changes are:
(1) The key struct now supports a security pointer for the use of security
modules. This will permit key labelling and restrictions on which
programs may access a key.
(2) Security modules get a chance to note (or abort) the allocation of a key.
(3) The key permission checking can now be enhanced by the security modules;
the permissions check consults LSM if all other checks bear out.
(4) The key permissions checking functions now return an error code rather
than a boolean value.
(5) An extra permission has been added to govern the modification of
attributes (UID, GID, permissions).
Note that there isn't an LSM hook specifically for each keyctl() operation,
but rather the permissions hook allows control of individual operations based
on the permission request bits.
Key management access control through LSM is enabled by automatically if both
CONFIG_KEYS and CONFIG_SECURITY are enabled.
This should be applied on top of the patch ensubjected:
[PATCH] Keys: Possessor permissions should be additive
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Export user-defined key operations so that those who wish to define their
own key type based on the user-defined key operations may do so (as has
been requested).
The header file created has been placed into include/keys/user-type.h, thus
creating a directory where other key types may also be placed. Any
objections to doing this?
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Now that RCU applied on 'struct file' seems stable, we can place f_rcuhead
in a memory location that is not anymore used at call_rcu(&f->f_rcuhead,
file_free_rcu) time, to reduce the size of this critical kernel object.
The trick I used is to move f_rcuhead and f_list in an union called f_u
The callers are changed so that f_rcuhead becomes f_u.fu_rcuhead and f_list
becomes f_u.f_list
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch removes a bunch of unecessary checks for (size_t < 0) in
selinuxfs.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
security/selinux/hooks.c: In function `selinux_inode_getxattr':
security/selinux/hooks.c:2193: warning: unused variable `sbsec'
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch allows SELinux to canonicalize the value returned from
getxattr() via the security_inode_getsecurity() hook, which is called after
the fs level getxattr() function.
The purpose of this is to allow the in-core security context for an inode
to override the on-disk value. This could happen in cases such as
upgrading a system to a different labeling form (e.g. standard SELinux to
MLS) without needing to do a full relabel of the filesystem.
In such cases, we want getxattr() to return the canonical security context
that the kernel is using rather than what is stored on disk.
The implementation hooks into the inode_getsecurity(), adding another
parameter to indicate the result of the preceding fs-level getxattr() call,
so that SELinux knows whether to compare a value obtained from disk with
the kernel value.
We also now allow getxattr() to work for mountpoint labeled filesystems
(i.e. mount with option context=foo_t), as we are able to return the
kernel value to the user.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch converts SELinux code from kmalloc/memset to the new kazalloc
unction. On i386, this results in a text saving of over 1K.
Before:
text data bss dec hex filename
86319 4642 15236 106197 19ed5 security/selinux/built-in.o
After:
text data bss dec hex filename
85278 4642 15236 105156 19ac4 security/selinux/built-in.o
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch fixes error handling in sel_make_bools(), where currently we'd
get a memory leak via security_get_bools() and try to kfree() the wrong
pointer if called again.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch fixes a possible NULL dereference in policydb_destroy, where
p->type_attr_map can be NULL if policydb_destroy is called to clean up a
partially loaded policy upon an error during policy load. Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch makes the possessor permissions on a key additive with
user/group/other permissions on the same key.
This permits extra rights to be granted to the possessor of a key without
taking away any rights conferred by them owning the key or having common group
membership.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch splits key permissions checking out of key-ui.h and
moves it into a .c file. It's quite large and called quite a lot, and
it's about to get bigger with the addition of LSM support for keys...
key_any_permission() is also discarded as it's no longer used.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch adds documentation for the process by which request-key
works, including how it permits helper processes to gain access to the
requestor's keyrings.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Plug request_key_auth memleak. This can be triggered by unprivileged
users, so is local DoS.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The following patch updates the way SELinux classifies and handles IP
based protocols.
Currently, IP sockets are classified by SELinux as being either TCP, UDP
or 'Raw', the latter being a default for IP socket that is not TCP or UDP.
The classification code is out of date and uses only the socket type
parameter to socket(2) to determine the class of IP socket. So, any
socket created with SOCK_STREAM will be classified by SELinux as TCP, and
SOCK_DGRAM as UDP. Also, other socket types such as SOCK_SEQPACKET and
SOCK_DCCP are currently ignored by SELinux, which classifies them as
generic sockets, which means they don't even get basic IP level checking.
This patch changes the SELinux IP socket classification logic, so that
only an IPPROTO_IP protocol value passed to socket(2) classify the socket
as TCP or UDP. The patch also drops the check for SOCK_RAW and converts
it into a default, so that socket types like SOCK_DCCP and SOCK_SEQPACKET
are classified as SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET (instead of generic sockets).
Note that protocol-specific support for SCTP, DCCP etc. is not addressed
here, we're just getting these protocols checked at the IP layer.
This fixes a reported problem where SCTP sockets were being recognized as
generic SELinux sockets yet still being passed in one case to an IP level
check, which then fails for generic sockets.
It will also fix bugs where any SOCK_STREAM socket is classified as TCP or
any SOCK_DGRAM socket is classified as UDP.
This patch also unifies the way IP sockets classes are determined in
selinux_socket_bind(), so we use the already calculated value instead of
trying to recalculate it.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch adds extra permission grants to keys for the possessor of a
key in addition to the owner, group and other permissions bits. This makes
SUID binaries easier to support without going as far as labelling keys and key
targets using the LSM facilities.
This patch adds a second "pointer type" to key structures (struct key_ref *)
that can have the bottom bit of the address set to indicate the possession of
a key. This is propagated through searches from the keyring to the discovered
key. It has been made a separate type so that the compiler can spot attempts
to dereference a potentially incorrect pointer.
The "possession" attribute can't be attached to a key structure directly as
it's not an intrinsic property of a key.
Pointers to keys have been replaced with struct key_ref *'s wherever
possession information needs to be passed through.
This does assume that the bottom bit of the pointer will always be zero on
return from kmem_cache_alloc().
The key reference type has been made into a typedef so that at least it can be
located in the sources, even though it's basically a pointer to an undefined
type. I've also renamed the accessor functions to be more useful, and all
reference variables should now end in "_ref".
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
That should be -EINVAL for both.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
We don't put braces around single statements, thanks.
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
With the use of RCU in files structure, the look-up of files using fds can now
be lock-free. The lookup is protected by rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock().
This patch changes the readers to use lock-free lookup.
Signed-off-by: Maneesh Soni <maneesh@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ravikiran Thirumalai <kiran_th@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
In order for the RCU to work, the file table array, sets and their sizes must
be updated atomically. Instead of ensuring this through too many memory
barriers, we put the arrays and their sizes in a separate structure. This
patch takes the first step of putting the file table elements in a separate
structure fdtable that is embedded withing files_struct. It also changes all
the users to refer to the file table using files_fdtable() macro. Subsequent
applciation of RCU becomes easier after this.
Signed-off-by: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch removes the inode_post_link and inode_post_rename LSM hooks as
they are unused (and likely useless).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch removes the inode_post_create/mkdir/mknod/symlink LSM hooks as
they are obsoleted by the new inode_init_security hook that enables atomic
inode security labeling.
If anyone sees any reason to retain these hooks, please speak now. Also,
is anyone using the post_rename/link hooks; if not, those could also be
removed.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch modifies tmpfs to call the inode_init_security LSM hook to set
up the incore inode security state for new inodes before the inode becomes
accessible via the dcache.
As there is no underlying storage of security xattrs in this case, it is
not necessary for the hook to return the (name, value, len) triple to the
tmpfs code, so this patch also modifies the SELinux hook function to
correctly handle the case where the (name, value, len) pointers are NULL.
The hook call is needed in tmpfs in order to support proper security
labeling of tmpfs inodes (e.g. for udev with tmpfs /dev in Fedora). With
this change in place, we should then be able to remove the
security_inode_post_create/mkdir/... hooks safely.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The following patch set enables atomic security labeling of newly created
inodes by altering the fs code to invoke a new LSM hook to obtain the security
attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode
security state during the inode creation transaction. This parallels the
existing processing for setting ACLs on newly created inodes. Otherwise, it
is possible for new inodes to be accessed by another thread via the dcache
prior to complete security setup (presently handled by the
post_create/mkdir/... LSM hooks in the VFS) and a newly created inode may be
left unlabeled on the disk in the event of a crash. SELinux presently works
around the issue by ensuring that the incore inode security label is
initialized to a special SID that is inaccessible to unprivileged processes
(in accordance with policy), thereby preventing inappropriate access but
potentially causing false denials on legitimate accesses. A simple test
program demonstrates such false denials on SELinux, and the patch solves the
problem. Similar such false denials have been encountered in real
applications.
This patch defines a new inode_init_security LSM hook to obtain the security
attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode
security state for it, and adds a corresponding hook function implementation
to SELinux.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds endian notations to the SELinux code.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch improves memory use by SELinux by both reducing the avtab node
size and reducing the number of avtab nodes. The memory savings are
substantial, e.g. on a 64-bit system after boot, James Morris reported the
following data for the targeted and strict policies:
#objs objsize kernmem
Targeted:
Before: 237888 40 9.1MB
After: 19968 24 468KB
Strict:
Before: 571680 40 21.81MB
After: 221052 24 5.06MB
The improvement in memory use comes at a cost in the speed of security
server computations of access vectors, but these computations are only
required on AVC cache misses, and performance measurements by James Morris
using a number of benchmarks have shown that the change does not cause any
significant degradation.
Note that a rebuilt policy via an updated policy toolchain
(libsepol/checkpolicy) is required in order to gain the full benefits of
this patch, although some memory savings benefits are immediately applied
even to older policies (in particular, the reduction in avtab node size).
Sources for the updated toolchain are presently available from the
sourceforge CVS tree (http://sourceforge.net/cvs/?group_id=21266), and
tarballs are available from http://www.flux.utah.edu/~sds.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch goes through the current users of the crypto layer and sets
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP at crypto_alloc_tfm() where all crypto operations
are performed in process context.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
netlink_broadcast users must initialize NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_groups to the
destination group mask for netlink_recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
- Remove bogus code for compiling netlink as module
- Add module refcounting support for modules implementing a netlink
protocol
- Add support for autoloading modules that implement a netlink protocol
as soon as someone opens a socket for that protocol
Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CONFIG_SECURITY=y and CONFIG_SYSFS=n results in the following compile
error:
<-- snip -->
...
LD vmlinux
security/built-in.o: In function `securityfs_init':
inode.c:(.init.text+0x1c2): undefined reference to `kernel_subsys'
make: *** [vmlinux] Error 1
<-- snip -->
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
The attached patch makes sure that a keyring that failed to instantiate
properly is destroyed without oopsing [CAN-2005-2099].
The problem occurs in three stages:
(1) The key allocator initialises the type-specific data to all zeroes. In
the case of a keyring, this will become a link in the keyring name list
when the keyring is instantiated.
(2) If a user (any user) attempts to add a keyring with anything other than
an empty payload, the keyring instantiation function will fail with an
error and won't add the keyring to the name list.
(3) The keyring's destructor then sees that the keyring has a description
(name) and tries to remove the keyring from the name list, which oopses
because the link pointers are both zero.
This bug permits any user to take down a box trivially.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch prevents an error during the key session joining operation
from hanging future joins in the D state [CAN-2005-2098].
The problem is that the error handling path for the KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
operation has one error path that doesn't release the session management
semaphore. Further attempts to get the semaphore will then sleep for ever in
the D state.
This can happen in four situations, all involving an attempt to allocate a new
session keyring:
(1) ENOMEM.
(2) The users key quota being reached.
(3) A keyring name that is an empty string.
(4) A keyring name that is too long.
Any user may attempt this operation, and so any user can cause the problem to
occur.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This fixes five bugs in the key management syscall interface:
(1) add_key() returns 0 rather than EINVAL if the key type is "".
Checking the key type isn't "" should be left to lookup_user_key().
(2) request_key() returns ENOKEY rather than EPERM if the key type begins
with a ".".
lookup_user_key() can't do this because internal key types begin with a
".".
(3) Key revocation always returns 0, even if it fails.
(4) Key read can return EAGAIN rather than EACCES under some circumstances.
A key is permitted to by read by a process if it doesn't grant read
access, but it does grant search access and it is in the process's
keyrings. That search returns EAGAIN if it fails, and this needs
translating to EACCES.
(5) request_key() never adds the new key to the destination keyring if one is
supplied.
The wrong macro was being used to test for an error condition: PTR_ERR()
will always return true, whether or not there's an error; this should've
been IS_ERR().
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch fixes the address length checks in the selinux_socket_connect
hook to be no more restrictive than the underlying ipv4 and ipv6 code;
otherwise, this hook can reject valid connect calls. This patch is in
response to a bug report where an application was calling connect on an
INET6 socket with an address that didn't include the optional scope id and
failing due to these checks.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Implement kernel labeling of the MLS (multilevel security) field of
security contexts for files which have no existing MLS field. This is to
enable upgrades of a system from non-MLS to MLS without performing a full
filesystem relabel including all of the mountpoints, which would be quite
painful for users.
With this patch, with MLS enabled, if a file has no MLS field, the kernel
internally adds an MLS field to the in-core inode (but not to the on-disk
file). This MLS field added is the default for the superblock, allowing
per-mountpoint control over the values via fixed policy or mount options.
This patch has been tested by enabling MLS without relabeling its
filesystem, and seems to be working correctly.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Once again, the simple_attr in libfs was actually sufficient - I'd
thought the __attribute__(format(printk(1,2))) was more mysterious than
it really is.
At last, here is the full patch to make seclvl use securityfs.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
--
seclvl.c | 228 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------------------
1 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 158 deletions(-)
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/seclvl.c
===================================================================
Here's a small patch against 2.6.13-rc2 that adds securityfs, a virtual
fs that all LSMs can use instead of creating their own. The fs should
be mounted at /sys/kernel/security, and the fs creates that mount point.
This will make the LSB people happy that we aren't creating a new
/my_lsm_fs directory in the root for every different LSM.
It has changed a bit since the last version, thanks to comments from
Mike Waychison.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
The attached patch makes the keyring functions calculate the new size of a
keyring's payload based on the size of pointer to the key struct, not the size
of the key struct itself.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Currently selinux_sb_copy_data requires an entire page be allocated to
*orig when the function is called. This "requirement" is based on the fact
that we call copy_page(in_save, nosec_save) and in_save = orig when the
data is not FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA. This means that if a caller were to call
do_kern_mount with only about 10 bytes of options, they would get passed
here and then we would corrupt PAGE_SIZE - 10 bytes of memory (with all
zeros.)
Currently it appears all in kernel FS's use one page of data so this has
not been a problem. An out of kernel FS did just what is described above
and it would almost always panic shortly after they tried to mount. From
looking else where in the kernel it is obvious that this string of data
must always be null terminated. (See example in do_mount where it always
zeros the last byte.) Thus I suggest we use strcpy in place of copy_page.
In this way we make sure the amount we copy is always less than or equal to
the amount we received and since do_mount is zeroing the last byte this
should be safe for all.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2.6.12-rc6-mm1 has a few remaining synchronize_kernel()s, some (but not
all) in comments. This patch changes these synchronize_kernel() calls (and
comments) to synchronize_rcu() or synchronize_sched() as follows:
- arch/x86_64/kernel/mce.c mce_read(): change to synchronize_sched() to
handle races with machine-check exceptions (synchronize_rcu() would not cut
it given RCU implementations intended for hardcore realtime use.
- drivers/input/serio/i8042.c i8042_stop(): change to synchronize_sched() to
handle races with i8042_interrupt() interrupt handler. Again,
synchronize_rcu() would not cut it given RCU implementations intended for
hardcore realtime use.
- include/*/kdebug.h comments: change to synchronize_sched() to handle races
with NMIs. As before, synchronize_rcu() would not cut it...
- include/linux/list.h comment: change to synchronize_rcu(), since this
comment is for list_del_rcu().
- security/keys/key.c unregister_key_type(): change to synchronize_rcu(),
since this is interacting with RCU read side.
- security/keys/process_keys.c install_session_keyring(): change to
synchronize_rcu(), since this is interacting with RCU read side.
Signed-off-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch,based on sample code by Roland McGrath, adds an execheap
permission check that controls the ability to make the heap executable so
that this can be prevented in almost all cases (the X server is presently
an exception, but this will hopefully be resolved in the future) so that
even programs with execmem permission will need to have the anonymous
memory mapped in order to make it executable.
The only reason that we use a permission check for such restriction (vs.
making it unconditional) is that the X module loader presently needs it; it
could possibly be made unconditional in the future when X is changed.
The policy patch for the execheap permission is available at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execheap.patch
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to
make the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack
executable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the
existing execmem permission in order to e.g. perform runtime code
generation. Note that this does not yet address thread stacks. Note also
that unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on
mprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is
not passed the necessary information presently.
The original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack
region, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for
/proc/<pid>/maps markers.
(http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110719881508591&w=2)
The patches also can be found at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patchhttp://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patch
policy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in
order to support the execstack permission and exclude it
from general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te.
kernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within
the kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Export this symbol to GPL modules for eCryptfs: an out-of-tree GPL'ed
filesystem.
Signed off by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch uses RCU to manage the session keyring pointer in struct
signal_struct. This means that searching need not disable interrupts and get
a the sighand spinlock to access this pointer. Furthermore, by judicious use
of rcu_read_(un)lock(), this patch also avoids the need to take and put
refcounts on the session keyring itself, thus saving on even more atomic ops.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch makes it possible to pass a session keyring through to the
process spawned by call_usermodehelper(). This allows patch 3/3 to pass an
authorisation key through to /sbin/request-key, thus permitting better access
controls when doing just-in-time key creation.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways:
(1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure.
(2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of
write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators.
The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction
semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus
rendering the spinlock superfluous.
The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks.
(3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive
keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be
taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does
not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting
keyring be pinned.
(4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed
of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to
prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up.
(5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It
includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It
also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be
changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the
payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data
length getting out of sync.
I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in
conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid
of.
(6) Update the keys documentation.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl:
This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid
or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are
0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed
privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped
1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is
owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended
for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked.
2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped
readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but
not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will
not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when
adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment.
(akpm:
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable);
>
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL?
No problem to me.
> > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid)
> > current->mm->dumpable = 1;
>
> Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER?
Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines
should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go
everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used
as a bool in untouched code)
> Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that
> would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too.
Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat
rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic
diff because it is used all over the place.
)
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a gfp_mask to audit_log_start() and audit_log(), to reduce the
amount of GFP_ATOMIC allocation -- most of it doesn't need to be
GFP_ATOMIC. Also if the mask includes __GFP_WAIT, then wait up to
60 seconds for the auditd backlog to clear instead of immediately
abandoning the message.
The timeout should probably be made configurable, but for now it'll
suffice that it only happens if auditd is actually running.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
There is a memory leak during mount when SELinux is active and mount
options are specified.
Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <geraldsc@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
sysfs: fix the rest of the kernel so if an attribute doesn't
implement show or store method read/write will return
-EIO instead of 0 or -EINVAL or -EPERM.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
To retrieve the neighbour tables send RTM_GETNEIGHTBL with the
NLM_F_DUMP flag set. Every neighbour table configuration is
spread over multiple messages to avoid running into message
size limits on systems with many interfaces. The first message
in the sequence transports all not device specific data such as
statistics, configuration, and the default parameter set.
This message is followed by 0..n messages carrying device
specific parameter sets.
Although the ordering should be sufficient, NDTA_NAME can be
used to identify sequences. The initial message can be identified
by checking for NDTA_CONFIG. The device specific messages do
not contain this TLV but have NDTPA_IFINDEX set to the
corresponding interface index.
To change neighbour table attributes, send RTM_SETNEIGHTBL
with NDTA_NAME set. Changeable attribute include NDTA_THRESH[1-3],
NDTA_GC_INTERVAL, and all TLVs in NDTA_PARMS unless marked
otherwise. Device specific parameter sets can be changed by
setting NDTPA_IFINDEX to the interface index of the corresponding
device.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Per Steve Grubb's observation that there are some remaining cases where
avc_audit() directly logs untrusted strings without escaping them, here
is a patch that changes avc_audit() to use audit_log_untrustedstring()
or audit_log_hex() as appropriate. Note that d_name.name is nul-
terminated by d_alloc(), and that sun_path is nul-terminated by
unix_mkname(), so it is not necessary for the AVC to create nul-
terminated copies or to alter audit_log_untrustedstring to take a length
argument. In the case of an abstract name, we use audit_log_hex() with
an explicit length.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
When I added the logging of pid= and comm= back to avc_audit() I
screwed it up. Put it back how it should be.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
This patch changes the SELinux AVC to defer logging of paths to the audit
framework upon syscall exit, by saving a reference to the (dentry,vfsmount)
pair in an auxiliary audit item on the current audit context for processing
by audit_log_exit.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
We turned this all off because the 'exe=' was causing deadlocks on
dcache_lock. There's no need to leave the pid and comm out though.
They'll all be logged correctly if full auditing is enabled, but we
should still print them in case auditing _isn't_ enabled.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
It's silly to have to add explicit entries for new userspace messages
as we invent them. Just treat all messages in the user range the same.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
This patch should fix the avc_alloc_node() oom condition that Andrew
reported when no policy is loaded in SELinux.
Prior to this patch, when no policy was loaded, the SELinux "security
server" (policy engine) was only returning allowed decisions for the
requested permissions for each access check. This caused the cache to
thrash when trying to use SELinux for real work with no policy loaded
(typically, the no policy loaded state is only for bootstrapping to the
point where we can load an initial policy).
This patch changes the SELinux security server to return the complete
allowed access vector at once, and then to reset the cache after the
initial policy load to flush the initial cache state created during
bootstrapping.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds more messages types to the audit subsystem so that audit
analysis is quicker, intuitive, and more useful.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
---
I forgot one type in the big patch. I need to add one for user space
originating SE Linux avc messages. This is used by dbus and nscd.
-Steve
---
Updated to 2.6.12-rc4-mm1.
-dwmw2
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Add audit_log_type to allow callers to specify type and pid when logging.
Convert audit_log to wrapper around audit_log_type. Could have
converted all audit_log callers directly, but common case is default
of type AUDIT_KERNEL and pid 0. Update audit_log_start to take type
and pid values when creating a new audit_buffer. Move sequences that
did audit_log_start, audit_log_format, audit_set_type, audit_log_end,
to simply call audit_log_type directly. This obsoletes audit_set_type
and audit_set_pid, so remove them.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
shutdown credential information. It creates a new message type
AUDIT_TERM_INFO, which is used by the audit daemon to query who issued the
shutdown.
It requires the placement of a hook function that gathers the information. The
hook is after the DAC & MAC checks and before the function returns. Racing
threads could overwrite the uid & pid - but they would have to be root and
have policy that allows signalling the audit daemon. That should be a
manageable risk.
The userspace component will be released later in audit 0.7.2. When it
receives the TERM signal, it queries the kernel for shutdown information.
When it receives it, it writes the message and exits. The message looks
like this:
type=DAEMON msg=auditd(1114551182.000) auditd normal halt, sending pid=2650
uid=525, auditd pid=1685
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
This patch provides finer grained permissions for the audit family of
Netlink sockets under SELinux.
1. We need a way to differentiate between privileged and unprivileged
reads of kernel data maintained by the audit subsystem. The AUDIT_GET
operation is unprivileged: it returns the current status of the audit
subsystem (e.g. whether it's enabled etc.). The AUDIT_LIST operation
however returns a list of the current audit ruleset, which is considered
privileged by the audit folk. To deal with this, a new SELinux
permission has been implemented and applied to the operation:
nlmsg_readpriv, which can be allocated to appropriately privileged
domains. Unprivileged domains would only be allocated nlmsg_read.
2. There is a requirement for certain domains to generate audit events
from userspace. These events need to be collected by the kernel,
collated and transmitted sequentially back to the audit daemon. An
example is user level login, an auditable event under CAPP, where
login-related domains generate AUDIT_USER messages via PAM which are
relayed back to auditd via the kernel. To prevent handing out
nlmsg_write permissions to such domains, a new permission has been
added, nlmsg_relay, which is intended for this type of purpose: data is
passed via the kernel back to userspace but no privileged information is
written to the kernel.
Also, AUDIT_LOGIN messages are now valid only for kernel->user messaging,
so this value has been removed from the SELinux nlmsgtab (which is only
used to check user->kernel messages).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch removes the sclass argument from ipc_has_perm in the SELinux
module, as it can be obtained from the ipc security structure. The use of
a separate argument was a legacy of the older precondition function
handling in SELinux and is obsolete. Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The SELinux hooks invoke ipv6_skip_exthdr() with an incorrect
length final argument. However, the length argument turns out
to be superfluous.
I was just reading ipv6_skip_exthdr and it occured to me that we can
get rid of len altogether. The only place where len is used is to
check whether the skb has two bytes for ipv6_opt_hdr. This check
is done by skb_header_pointer/skb_copy_bits anyway.
Now it might appear that we've made the code slower by deferring
the check to skb_copy_bits. However, this check should not trigger
in the common case so this is OK.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This fixes a deadlock on the dcache lock detected during testing at IBM
by moving the logging of the current executable information from the
SELinux avc_audit function to audit_log_exit (via an audit_log_task_info
helper) for processing upon syscall exit.
For consistency, the patch also removes the logging of other
task-related information from avc_audit, deferring handling to
audit_log_exit instead.
This allows simplification of the avc_audit code, allows the exe
information to be obtained more reliably, always includes the comm
information (useful for scripts), and avoids including bogus task
information for checks performed from irq or softirq.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so
that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security
policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family
only. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket
class.
Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in
the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch fixes a bug in the SELinux Netlink message type detection code,
where the wrong constant was being used in a case statement. The incorrect
value is not valid for this class of object so it would not have been
reached, and fallen through to a default handler for all Netlink messages.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
Davi Arnaut